美国加州电力危机的经验教训

1996年，加州开始进行电力市场解除管制的尝试时，大多数人认为引入竞争机制可以降低成本，增加消费者的选择，给消费者、工商企业带来实惠。 　　但是 2000年夏天和冬天人们在加州看到的却是：电力短缺、电价飞涨、供电公司面临破产、不断出现的断电以及公众的愤怒。 　　针对加州目前的危机，美国存在着两种不同的意见：一派是以加州州长和州管理委员会为代表的人士，它们认为加州的电力危机源于电力改革，加州的电力供应商利用开放的批发市场和异常的气候，操作电价，牟取暴利，呼吁重新管制电力市场，以保护消费者利益。而联邦委员会和…     

“十二五”深化电价改革研究

国务院要求在十五末期建成的竞争性电力市场尚无踪影,已进行的发电企业与大用户直接交易试点均不具有推广意义,电网公司电价至今未按规则监管,基于国际惯例的煤、电价格联动规则事实上已遭废弃、可再生能源电价政策缺乏相应的配套措施。因而尽管电价改革成绩显著,但深化空间仍然巨大。十二五期间,应继续推进电价的市场化改革,因地制宜地做好竞争性电力市场设计,落实电力体制改革的领导责任,建立基于市场经济的电力监管体系,鼓励和规范过渡期的自主性电力交易。要用改革解决煤、电矛盾,设计并执行上网电价正常的调整机制和不可控成本及时转移机制。应尽早实现电力输、配的价格独立。重建风电引发系统运行成本的分摊机制,风电输送成本和因此而导致的系统调峰成本应全部纳入可再生能源开发成本,建立中央与地方两级可再生能源发展基金征收与使用制度。     

美国加州电力危机的启示

2000年夏天以来，美国加州出现了电力供应和电力企业的财务危机。加州已于2001年1月开始在全州范围内实行轮流停电；太平洋天然气和电力公司、南加州爱迪逊两家大型电力企业亏损约90亿美元，股票大跌，频临破产，造成该地区政治、经济和社会的不稳定。针对目前加州这场电力危机。美国国内存在着两种不同看法。一种观点认为，这一危机是因为电力改革的失误。其理由是，在开放的批发市场上，加州的电力供应企业利用异常气候引起需求增加的机会，操纵电价，从中牟取暴利。因此，呼吁重新管制电力市场，以保护消费者利益。另一种观点认为，这场危机是由加州电力规制的弊端造成的，呼吁进一步推动改革，用市场杠杆来调节电力供求之间的不平衡。     

市场过程的复杂性与演化适应特征

作为一个过程的市场,具有复杂演化系统的特征.市场过程理论、复杂性理论的一个共同努力,是试图复兴古典经济思想对复杂现象的理解方法.作为复杂适应系统的市场过程,具有非线性、试错、创造性、路径依赖、自组织和演化特征.复杂市场经济中,面临不可避免无知的人类,只有依靠企业家发现过程才能对付知识问题.     

金融市场基于行为人演化建模理论与方法探析

金融市场基于行为人演化建模研究是综合了基于行为人计算经济学、演化经济学、复杂适应系统演化模拟等研究思想与方法 ,通过对行为人演化模拟来探索行为人投资策略经由市场相互作用的、自适应复杂系统演化机制。基于作为经济演化研究工具的行为人计算经济学的内容、特征及其在金融市场中对行为人探索性建模的应用以及对卢卡斯式行为人与人工适应行为人的研究模式和演化方式进行的系统分析与对比研究的结果表明 ,市场交易机制、行为人演化方式方面有许多问题需要进一步探索。     

城市物流产业集群生态系统结构及演化机理分析

城市物流产业相关企业及支撑机构在城市一定空间聚集,耦合共生形成一类具有自组织、自调节、自适应功能的产业生态系统。文章按生态经济学原理和产业集群经济规律,界定了城市物流产业集群生态系统的概念及组成要素;结合复杂系统自组织和生物种群进化理论,分析了城市物流产业集群生态系统演化的前提、诱因、动力和方式,进而从系统内部企业个体、种群、集群与外部环境协同演化三个层面分析了城市物流产业集群生态系统的自组织演化机理,为认识城市物流产业集群发展规律、科学制定调控政策等提供了新的思路。     

复杂制度网络的嵌入性关系与制度演化

从复杂性理论出发,认为制度是一种复杂网络系统,具有小世界和无标度特征,且网络正是制度产生的方式。分析了复杂制度网络系统的拓扑结构,阐述了该系统演化的嵌入性特点及其对制度演化的影响方式,并结合企业制度的演化进行了具体的分析。揭示了复杂制度网络系统存在的多重嵌入分形结构,为研究复杂制度系统及其演化提供了一种新的研究视角和方法。     

区域企业群落向产业集群演化的自组织协同机制

企业群落是一个非线性复杂系统,是产业集群的初级阶段.产业集群是企业群落内的子系统在非线性相互作用下,通过激烈竞争与合作后达到协同的高效有序的自组织结构.本文从复杂性系统自组织理论的角度和协同学方法,考察和分析了区域企业群落向产业集群演化的物理过程和自组织机理,提出了区域主导产业是该系统的序参量,在演化过程中起着支配和主导作用.在一定程度上揭示了区域产业集群的生成及其演化规律.     

经济学中的演化计算方法

经济学中的演化计算包括起源于20世纪40年代的元胞自动机、50年代的系统动力学、80年代的演化经济学、90年代的复杂自适应系统以及复杂网络研究方法。从这些流派的共性来看,经济学中的狭义演化计算应当是以计算模拟为基础,以微观个体为出发点或微观规律为出发点,以研究复杂经济系统的整体演化过程或结局为目的的方法。经济学中的演化计算实现了经济学和数学、计算机科学、管理学、社会科学以及生物学等学科的融合。演化计算方法抛弃了传统经济学中的严格的理性假设,并且从方法论层面上否定了传统的还原论方法。经济学中的演化计算方法在以下几个方面是理论上的重点或热点:新的演化计算理论和工具的出现、复杂网络理论中的计算复杂性分析与快速算法的实现、演化机制的不断探讨以及它和正统经济学在方法论层面的不断比较。     

供应链复杂系统企业社会责任的自组织演化

基于供应链复杂系统的自组织特征,运用系统动力学模型,对供应链复杂系统在履行社会责任时的自组织演化进行了分析。研究发现,供应链复杂系统履行社会责任的自组织演化与系统的流量、上下游企业的相互依赖程度以及外部环境因素相关。研究结果表明,供应链复杂系统的各子系统通过协作,产生协同效应,可以更好地履行社会责任。     

Reliability Management in Competitive Electricity Markets

This paper examines market design issues for reliability management in competitive power markets. The institutional structure is characterized by a power exchange that conducts electricity market trading, a system operator that operates the electric power system, and a property right system for transimission pricing. In a competitive market, priority insurance fosters market information for determining efficient system reliability levels and induces system operator to maintain system security efficiently. A six-node network example is examined to illustrate the basic insights.     

Market power in the Spanish electricity auction

Hourly data from the Spanish day-ahead electricity auction is used to obtain a lower bound measure of generators’ market power. Our method is not based on cost estimates but rather on the behavioral differences between strategic generators and more competitive producers. The results indicate that, despite the price cap effect of regulation in this market, the larger operators in the day-ahead market are able to increase significantly prices above the competitive benchmark. We also show that the two large generators do not exploit the full potential of their market power.     

The NOME law: implications for the French electricity market

In December 2010, France approved the law “Nouvelle Organisation du Marché de l’Electricité” (or NOME law) to promote competition in the retail electricity market. In practice, the law allows retailers to buy nuclear production from the incumbent, at a regulated access price. This mechanism works up to a ceiling of 100 terawatt hours, which represents one quarter of the incumbent’s production from nuclear plants. Each retailer is assigned a share of that amount proportionally to its portfolio of clients. We contribute to the debate raised by the NOME law regarding the evolution of retail market prices. We show that a price decrease results if the ceiling is sufficiently high compared to the market share of the retailers competing with the incumbent. This pro-competitive effect is stronger when the incumbent’s rivals take into account the impact of their market strategy on the redistribution rule. Finally, we find that, if the regulated price of the NOME electricity is set above the nuclear cost, the incumbent realizes a gain that may result in strategic withholding, weakening the pro-competitive effects of the law.     

Price effects of independent transmission system operators in the United States electricity market

In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sought to “remove impediments to competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring more efficient, lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers” through a series of market rules. A product of these rules was the establishment of regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) charged with facilitating equal access to the transmission grid for electricity suppliers. Whether these changes in market structure have succeeded in achieving FERC’s goal to provide “lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers” remains an open question. This paper utilizes a panel data set of the 48 contiguous United States and a treatment effects model in first differences to determine whether there have been changes in delivered electric prices as a result of the establishment of ISOs and RTOs. To avoid the confounding effects of electric restructuring, the model is estimated with the full panel data set, and then again without the states that have restructured their electric markets. This estimation shows that electricity prices fall approximately 4.8 % in the first 2 years of an ISO’s operation and that this result is statistically significant. However, this result is dependent on the presence of states that restructured their electricity markets. When these restructured states are removed from the data set the price effects of RTOs become indistinguishable from zero. The paper concludes that rate agreements are the principal source of the observed decrease in prices and that RTOs have not had the desired effect on electricity prices.     

电力市场中计及实时电价的电力系统运行风险管理新策略

针对电力市场中用户对实时电价的反应,本文提出一种计及实时电价的电力系统运行风险管理新策略。该策略在评估电力系统运行风险的基础上,对实时电价进行调节,并以电价为信号,刺激用户采取合理的用电结构和方式,从而增强电力系统运行的可靠性。该方法只是弥补了传统方法无法考虑系统运行可靠性的不足,而并非颠覆传统的电价管理方法,所以二者具有很好的衔接性。最后,通过对IEEPRTS测试系统的可靠性进行计算分析,验证了所提算法的有效性。     

Effective monitoring and mitigation in the organized wholesale electric power markets

The organized wholesale electric power markets in the United States are characterized by structural market power, and would not produce competitive results absent administrative intervention. Market power mitigation is a fundamental and permanent part of the market design for the organized wholesale electricity markets. Market power mitigation is essential to FERC’s policy of relying on competition to regulate electric wholesale power prices, consistent with its mandate under the Federal Power Act. Controversy has arisen about how to ensure that the markets clear on the basis of offers that have been determined to be competitive. Specifically, the issue is what institution and function is best situated to provide the initial critical determination about whether a participant’s offer is competitive. Despite recent clarification of FERC policies on the market monitoring function, the roles of market administrators and market monitors are a potential source of confusion and counterproductive institutional conflict. The FERC should refine and clarify its policy in this area by according exclusive responsibility to institutional, independent market monitors to monitor participants’ conduct and the potential for the exercise of market power through ex ante review of cost-based offers used in market power mitigation, subject to review by FERC.     

Can capacity markets be designed by democracy?

In the United States, Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) operate the power grid serving nearly 70% of electricity customers and are critical organizations for ensuring reliable system operations and facilitating the integration of new technologies and market participants. RTOs are designed to be stakeholder-driven organizations, with rules and policies crafted through a highly participatory process. While the decisions that RTOs make have implications for industry, society and the environment, their decision processes have not been modeled in any systematic way. In this paper, we develop a modeling framework for the stakeholder process of PJM, an RTO serving thirteen states plus the District of Columbia, adapting some of the seminal literature from political science and political economy on the theory of voting systems. This modeling framework can generate predictions of stakeholder process outcomes, identify strong coalitions among stakeholders and identify shifts in political power in the formulation of RTO market rules. We illustrate this analysis framework using a detailed data set from stakeholder deliberations of capacity market reform in PJM. Our model predicts that the current structure of the stakeholder process in PJM makes the passage of capacity market reforms through the stakeholder process virtually impossible because it creates strong coalitions that would favor or oppose changes to capacity market rules. In the capacity market case, we also identify a small subset of voters that act as swing voters and confirm that political power is shifted to these voters by deviations from otherwise strong coalitions and abstentions from the voting process altogether. Our framework represents the first attempt to model the decision-making behavior of RTOs in any systematic way, and points towards emerging research needs in evaluating the governance structure of RTOs.     

Prices versus quantities: environmental regulation and imperfect competition

By exercising market power, a firm will distort the production, and therefore the emissions decisions, of all firms in the market. This paper examines how the welfare implications of strategic behavior depend on how pollution is regulated. Under an emissions tax, aggregate emissions do not affect the marginal cost of polluting. In contrast, the price of tradable permits is endogenous. I show when this feedback effect increases strategic firms’ output. Relative to a tax, tradable permits may improve welfare in a market with imperfect competition. As an application, I model strategic and competitive behavior of wholesalers in a Mid-Atlantic electricity market. Simulations suggest that exercising market power decreased emissions locally, thereby substantially reducing the regional tradable permit price. Furthermore, I find that had regulators opted to use a tax instead of permits, the deadweight loss from imperfect competition would have been even greater.     

A market mechanism for electric power transmission

As competition is introduced into the electric power industry, access and pricing policy for transmission will play a pivotal role in shaping future market structure and performance. The externalities associated with the loop flow phenomenon in an electric power network constitute a significant barrier to the formation of efficient markets for electricity and transmission services. In this paper, we present a new approach to the design of an efficient market mechanism for transmission access that resolves these externalities. Under a trading rule that combines the Coasian and the Pigouvian principles to resolution of externalities, property rights are defined so that a competitive market could be established for transmission services and electricity to achieve a social optimum within a power pool. We characterize a dynamic trading process which is Lyapunov stable and always converges to a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we discuss some practical applicability and long-term investment issues.The authors are indebted to Charles Clark, Shmuel Oren, Pravin Varaiya, Robert Wilson, Felix Wu, and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions and particularly to William Hogan for many incisive comments and constructive suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of International Association of Energy Economists in Washington D.C., June 20, 1995, and at the Joint LBS/IFORS International Symposium on Energy Models for Policy and Planning in London on July 18–20, 1995. This paper does not represent the views of EPRI or its members. The authors remain solely responsible for the errors in this paper.     

基于跨案例研究的颠覆性技术演进特征分析

在梳理前人研究成果的基础上，得到颠覆性技术演进的14个特征范畴，从低端颠覆和高端颠覆视角选取电动自行车等4项不同类型颠覆性技术演进特征进行跨案例分析，遵循复制法对特征范畴进行反复修正、补充与融合，分别得到12个低端颠覆性技术演进特征和13个高端颠覆性技术演进特征，并据此构建全过程视角下颠覆性技术特征模型。通过对两种颠覆性技术演进特征进行对比分析，总结出在创造性、异轨性和迭代性上的特征共性，以及在价值主张、价值路线和价值检验上的特征差异。