Indeterminacy in incomplete market economies

Summary It is shown that in a two-period economy with a continuum of states and real assets, the following holds: (1) if the asset structure is complete, then generically the number of equilibria is finite; (2) if there are a finite number of real assets (this can approximate completeness arbitrarily close) then, for a nonempty open set of economies, there are a continuum of distinct equilibria. Asymptotic versions (on the number of states and on the number of assets) of the result are also given. It is argued, therefore, that incompleteness, by itself, may be a leading source of indeterminacy.I want to thank R. A. Dara, J. Geanakoplos and the audience of a larger number of presentations (at Brown, Stanford, Columbia, Harvard, Paris,...) for useful comments.     

Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies

We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders?? interests. We show that convergence to a competitive outcome may fail for some distributions of firms?? shares across consumers and provide a characterization of the class of ownership structures that lead to Walrasian equilibrium allocations in the limit.     

When do market games have transferable utility?

A pure exchange economy generates a “market game” in which the allocations achievable by any coalition are determined by the initial endowments of its members. Subject to certain regularity conditions, it is shown that for a market game it is possible to find utility representations for each consumer so that the game can be treated as a game with transferable utility if and only if indirect utility of all consumers can be represented in the Gorman polar form. This is the class for which aggregate demand behaves as if it were the demand of a single consumer.     

Real indeterminacy in incomplete financial market economies without aggregate risk

Summary We analyze an exchange economy with incomplete financial markets and assets whose returns are fixed in units of account. Moreover, we assume absence of aggregate risk, i.e., that individual preferences and total resources are constrained to be invariant across different states of the world. In this framework we show that the set of (commodity) price-endowment equilibria is diffeomorphic to a Euclidean space. We then exploit this global parameterization to prove that the set of equilibrium allocations associated with each endowment in a generic set contains a smooth manifold, whose dimension is equal to the number of missing assets.     

Equilibrium in economies with incomplete financial markets

This paper analyses an exchange economy in the absence of Arrow-Debreu complete markets. It is assumed that trading takes place in the sequence of spot markets and futures markets for securities payable in units of account. Unlimited short-selling in securities is allowed. A general equilibrium in such an economy is a set of current and future prices (contingent on uncertain events) and a set of individual plans such that all markets are cleared. The existence of such an equilibrium is proved under usual assumptions. This is in contrast to the case of futures markets for contingent futures commodities where an equilibrium may not exist. The optimality of equilibrium allocations is also discussed.     

The structure of the set of sunspot equilibria in economies with incomplete financial markets

Summary This paper considers the set of equilibria of two-period, sunspot economies withS purely extrinsic states of nature in the second period andI assets with linearly independent nominal payoffs. The span of the payoff matrix contains the vector [1, ... , 1] (i.e., inside money). The set of economies is described in terms of (sunspot-invariant) utility functions. IfS>I> 0, there is an open, dense set of economies such that, given a vector of no arbitrage asset prices, the set of equilibrium allocations contains a smooth manifold of dimensionS—I. Such a manifold contains at least one nonsunspot equilibrium (and at most a finite number of such equilibria).The paper was written while I was a visitor at C.O.R.E., Universitè Catholique de Louvain, with the financial support of a S.P.E.S. fellowship. I would like to thank D. Cass, H. Polemarchakis and P. Siconolfi for their helpful comments.     

Ownership structure and market conduct among Swiss banks

This paper explores the degree of competition among each of several major categories of Swiss banks, using a structural econometric model. Conduct is found to vary across ownership structures, with foreign-owned banks exhibiting the most market power and state-owned or mutual banks the least. The results are consistent with agency theory but contrast with some previous empirical results. They are also consistent with a Swiss premium in the provision of international banking services, though this latter hypothesis is not formally tested.     

Counterparty effects on capital structure decision in incomplete market

This paper builds a static contingent-claim model that allows for examining the optimal capital structure with the joint arguments of counterparty default risk and market incompleteness. A first-passage-time model with jump default barrier is adopted to capture the counterparty effects on the pricing of defaultable claims. Following the framework of Jarrow and Yu (2001), the jump in primary firm's bankruptcy barrier is designed as the loss on capital resulted from secondary firm's bankruptcy. The relevance of market incompleteness in the context of claim-pricing is considered using “good-deal asset price bound” method by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000). We show that the effects of counterparty's default clearly diminish the uses of debt, which indirectly explains the so-called under-leveraged puzzle. We further find that counterparty effects on capital structure are sensitive to market incompleteness and firm's characteristics, such as tax rate and bankruptcy cost rate.     

Sunspots,indeterminacy and Pareto inefficiency in economies with incomplete markets

Summary. We consider two periods economies with both intrinsic and extrinsic uncertainty. Asset markets are incomplete in the certainty economy. If assets are nominal, there are enough commodities and the number of agents is greater than two and smaller than the total number of states of nature tomorrow (minus one), then a sunspot-invariant equilibrium is generically Pareto dominated by some sunspot equilibria. When assets are real, and there are enough commodities, if there are sunspot equilibria, there are sunspot equilibria Pareto dominating sunspot-invariant equilibria under the same restriction on the number of agents (and stronger restrictions on the number of commodities).Received: 20 October 2003, Revised: 1 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D52.I wish to thank Paolo Siconolfi for helpful suggestions and comments. I aknowledge the financial support of M.I.U.R. and the kind hospitality of C.C.D.R. in Summer 2003.     

Computing equilibria in finance economies with incomplete markets and transaction costs

Summary. Transaction costs on financial markets may have important consequences for volumes of trade, asset pricing, and welfare. This paper introduces an algorithm for the computation of equilibria in the general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and transaction costs. We show that economies with transaction costs can be analyzed with differentiable homotopy techniques and thus in the same framework as frictionless economies despite the existence of non-differentiabilities of agents asset demand functions and the existence of locally non-unique equilibria. We introduce an equilibrium selection concept into the computation of economic equilibria that picks out a specific equilibrium in the presence of a continuum of equilibria.Received: 2 December 2002, Revised: 15 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C61, C62, C63, C68, D52, D58, G11, G12. Correspondence to: P. Jean-Jacques HeringsThis research started when Jean-Jacques Herings enjoyed the generous hospitality of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University. His research has been made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences and a grant of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research. We thank audiences at Stanford University, UC San Diego, and Venice for discussions on the subject. We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Equilibria in incomplete assets economies with infinite dimensional spot markets

The paper studies the two period incomplete markets model where assets are claims on state contingent commodity bundles and there are no bounds on portfolio trading. The important results on the existence of equilibrium in this model assume that there is a finite number of commodities traded in each spot market and that preferences are given by smooth utility functions. With these assumptions an equilibrium exists outside an “exceptional” set of assets structures and initial endowments. The present paper extends these results by allowing for general infinite dimensional commodity spaces in each spot market. These include all the important commodity spaces studied in the literature on the existence of Walrasian equilibrium—in each spot market the consumption sets are the positive cone of an arbitrary locally solid Riesz space or of an ordered topological vector space with order unit or of a locally solid Riesz space with quasi-interior point. The paper establishes that even with our very general commodity spaces there exists an equilibrium for a “very” dense set of assets structures. Our approach is in the main convex analytic and the results do not require that preferences be smooth or complete or transitive. The concepts and techniques studied in this paper have important finite as well as infinite dimensional applications. This paper has benefited from the comments of Martine Quinzii, Wayne Shafer, Manuel Santos and Yeneng Sun. The research of C. D. Aliprantis is supported by the NSF Grants SES-0128039, DMS-0437210, and ACI-0325846. The research of R. Tourky is funded by the Australian Research Council Grant A00103450.     

Ownership structure,board composition and the market for corporate control in the UK: an empirical analysis

This paper analyses the board composition and ownership structures of a sample of companies that have been acquired and those of a matching control sample that have not. We find significant governance differences between acquired firms and the control sample. Firms with the following characteristics were more likely to be acquired: they had the same person acting as CEO and chair, a higher proportion of non-executive directors, larger institutional shareholdings and higher director shareholdings. An analysis of small firms also found evidence of higher CEO shareholdings. We also find that treating all take-overs as a single group leads to a model mis-specification which does not identify the incentive effects of board and CEO shareholdings present in non-hostile acquisitions. These results are consistent with two agency-derived hypotheses, financial incentives and effective monitoring. We also find that targets exhibit lower growth potential but do not have worse accounting performance.     

Investment in emerging market economies

This article empirically models investment in emerging economies. Using dynamic panel estimation methods and quarterly data for 31 emerging economies for the period 1990:1?C2008:3, we show that (i) the GDP and the cost of capital are the key fundamental determinants of investment; (ii) financial factors (such as equity prices, credit and lending rate) play a relevant role on the dynamics of investment, in particular, for Asian and Latin American countries; (iii) investment growth exhibits substantial persistence and (iv) crises episodes magnify the negative response of investment.     

Private information, transferable utility, and the core

We consider transferable-utility, cooperative games, featuring differently informed players. Parties can exchange endowments or undertake joint production, but not pool information. Coalitional contracts must therefore comply with members’ private information. Qualitatively different shadow prices then arise: some for material endowments, others for knowledge. We focus on computable core solutions, generated by shadow prices. Such solutions obtain under standard regularity assumptions.     

Financial market spillovers in transition economies

This paper examines financial market comovements across European transition economies and compares their experience to that of other regions. Correlations in monthly indices of exchange market pressures can partly be explained by direct trade linkages, but not by measures of other fundamentals. Higher-frequency data during three crisis periods reveals the presence of structural breaks in the relationship between exchange-, but not stock markets. While the reaction of markets during the Asian and Czech crises is muted, the pattern of high-frequency spillovers during the Russian crisis looks very similar to that observed in other regions during turbulent times. With greater financial market integration, the financial markets of the more advanced transition economies can be expected to behave more and more like their Asian and Latin American counterparts.     

Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information

The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms. Blocking is organized at the interim stage by an incentive-compatible mediation plan. Membership of the blocking coalition itself may be determined randomly by the blocking mediator. Nonemptiness of an interim fine core is proven for games with a balanced structure, independent types, and sidepayments. An offer of severance payments may be needed to inhibit blocking. Core allocations are characterized in terms of virtual-utility scales that generalize the weighted-utility scales of the inner core. Mechanisms that achieve core allocations are coalitionally durable.     

Adjustment policies in socialist and private market economies

The article shows that although the outward-oriented newly industrializing countries suffered considerably greater external shocks than the inward-oriented NICs and two socialist countries, Hungary and Yugoslavia, this was offset severalfold by differences in economic growth rates. High growth rates were the result of output-increasing policies of export promotion and import substitution in the outward-oriented NICs whereas the inward-oriented NICs, Hungary, and Yugoslavia relied largely on external financing of the adverse balance-of-payments effects of external shocks that necessitated the application of deflationary measures once borrowing possibilities were exhausted.