Are small family firms financially sophisticated?

We study the drivers of financial sophistication in small family firms. Sophistication is defined as the use of non-basic financial products such as options, swaps, debt restructuring, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) advisory services. Our analysis is based on a unique dataset with detailed information on 187 Italian family firms. We find that the main drivers of financial sophistication are: (1) the generation that currently owns the firm; (2) the presence of a non-family CFO; and (3) the existence of a non-family shareholder. We analyze the impact of these factors on the following four classes of non-basic financial products: corporate finance, cash management, corporate lending and risk management. Our results can be used to determine the characteristics of financially sophisticated family firms and whether their corporate governance and ownership structure increase the use of non-basic financial products.     

Why do firms repurchase stock to acquire another firm?

This study investigates firms that repurchase their stock to finance an acquisition. Since research shows that cash-financed acquisitions perform better than stock-financed acquisitions, why do firms that have available cash initiate the extra transactional step. I find these firms are well compensated for their efforts, especially in the long run. On average, these firms have negative abnormal returns prior to their repurchase announcements and thus may choose repurchasing to signal undervaluation. Furthermore, the stock acquisition step allows these firms to share risk, counteract the negative effects of dilution, and enjoy a tax advantage for their efforts.

Are zombie firms more incentivized to financialize?

This paper investigates whether zombie firms demonstrate a tendency to invest in the financial sector, a practice we term financialization strategy. Unlike those in the United States, Japan, and Europe, we find that zombie firms in China are not necessarily small and that they rely heavily on government subsidies in addition to bank loans for survival. In addition, we document that zombie firms in China experience limited investment opportunities in their core businesses. This combination of readily available funding and limited investment opportunities jointly motivate the financialization of firms with zombie status. We further find that financialization is preferred by non-state-owned firms and by those located in regions with less developed markets. Finally, we suggest that a contagion effect can occur in terms of financialization in provinces that have a high percentage of zombie firms. This research sheds light on the effects of a triangular relationship among firms, government agencies, and financial institutions on both the operations of individual firms and overall market efficiency.     

Financing patterns around the world: Are small firms different?

Using a firm-level survey database covering 48 countries, we investigate how financial and institutional development affects financing of large and small firms. Our database is not limited to large firms but includes small and medium-size firms and data on a broad spectrum of financing sources, including leasing, supplier, development, and informal finance. Small firms and firms in countries with poor institutions use less external finance, especially bank finance. Protection of property rights increases external financing of small firms significantly more than of large firms, mainly due to its effect on bank finance. Small firms do not use disproportionately more leasing or trade finance compared with larger firms, so these financing sources do not compensate for lower access to bank financing of small firms. We also find that larger firms more easily expand external financing when they are constrained than small firms. Finally, we find suggestive evidence that the pecking order holds across countries.     

Does it help firms to secretly pay for stock promoters?

We examine deals between listed firms and promoters who have been secretly hired to increase their stock prices. This behavior by the secret promoter is illegal (and leads to prosecution) but the actions of the hiring firm are legal. We use data from these prosecutions to analyze the behavior and motivations of the hiring firms. We find that secret promotion leads to an initial increase in the price and trading volume of the firms on the date that the secret promotion started. Subsequently, however, we find that this increase in price is reversed when regulators (e.g. SEC or NASD) take action against these promoters for not disclosing their relationships with the hiring firms. We find that the main motives behind these relationships are to maximize the private benefits of the firm’s managers and owners through pumping the share prices and subsequently dumping their shareholdings.     

Are good-news firms riskier than bad-news firms?

This paper examines the relative risk of good-news firms, i.e., those with high standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), and bad-news (low SUE) firms using a stochastic discount factor approach. We find that a stochastic discount factor constructed from a set of basis assets helps explain post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). The risk exposures on the pricing kernel increase monotonically from the lowest to highest SUE sorted portfolios. Specifically, good-news firms always have higher risk exposures than bad-news firms in both 10 SUE sorted portfolios and 25 size and SUE sorted portfolios. However, the estimated expected risk premium is too small to explain the observed magnitude of returns on the PEAD strategy. Our risk adjustment can explain only about one-fourth of the total magnitude of the average realized return to the PEAD strategy. As a result, the average risk-adjusted returns of earnings momentum strategies are mostly positive and significant. Overall, our results support the view that at least some portion of the returns to the earnings momentum strategies examined represent compensation for bearing increased risk.     

Are publicly held firms less efficient? Evidence from the US property-liability insurance industry

This paper studies the performance of publicly held firms in the US property-liability insurance industry by analyzing companies that issued initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1994 to 2005, using private firms as the benchmark. I investigate ex ante determinants and ex post effects of IPOs on firm efficiency, operating performance, and other financials. I also analyze stock returns and follow-on SEO and acquisition activities to provide further information on IPO motivation. The paper finds that the likelihood of an IPO significantly increases with firm size and premium growth. IPO firms experience no post-issue underperformance in efficiency, operations, or stock returns; register improvement in allocative and cost efficiency; and reduce financial leverage and reinsurance usage. Moreover, IPO firms are active in follow-on SEO issues and acquisition activities. The findings are mostly consistent with the theory that firms go public for easier access to capital and to ease capital constraints.     

Do environmentally sustainable practices lead to financially less constrained firms? International evidence

In this study, we utilise a comprehensive dataset from 41 countries spanning 2002–2013 and show that environmentally sustainable practices (ESP) are negatively associated with financial constraints of firms. We refine ESP into three components: emission reduction, product innovation and resource reduction, and show that firms which are more innovative and efficient in reducing wastage of resources are most benefited by ESP. The findings are even stronger for firms operating in countries with high institutional qualities, in high emission and highly competitive industries. These results are important to lending institutions for making financing decisions. Policymakers and investors could also utilise ESP as a key distinguishing factor for firms to benefit from lower financial constraints. Appropriate support and initiatives from local and national regulators could motivate firms to be more environmentally friendly.     

How important are small banks to small business lending?: New evidence from a survey of small firms

Typically, small banks lend a larger proportion of their assets to small businesses than do large banks. The recent wave of bank mergers has thinned the ranks of small banks, raising the concern that small firms may find it difficult to access bank credit. However, bank consolidation will reduce small business credit only if small banks enjoy an advantage in lending to small businesses. We test the existence of a small bank cost advantage in small business lending by conducting the following simple test: If such advantages exist, then we should observe small businesses in areas with few small banks to have less bank credit. Using data on small business borrowers from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance, we find that the probability of a small firm having a line of credit from a bank does not decrease in the long run when there are fewer small banks in the area, although short-run disruptions may occur. Nor do we find that firms in areas with few small banks are any more likely to repay trade credit late, suggesting that such firms are no more credit constrained than firms in areas with many small banks.     

Are CEO stock option grants optimal? Evidence from family firms and non-family firms around the Sarbanes–Oxley Act

This paper investigates the optimality of stock option grants to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) by examining a set of S&P 500 companies around the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). I find that stock option grants to non-founding-family CEOs decreased dramatically after the passage of SOX. In addition, non-family firms granted significantly more stock options than family firms before the SOX, but not after its passage. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that CEOs use stock option grants as tools to extract rents from shareholders. This interpretation is further supported by evidence that the large decrease in stock option grants after the SOX was passed is not detrimental to firm performance, and by evidence from a test of the trade-off between option and non-option compensation.     

Are founding families less willing to bear risk? Evidence from the currency exposure and internationalization strategy of family firms

Although theory predicts that family firms should be less willing to bear risk than nonfamily firms, prior empirical papers have not found support for this prediction. In this paper, we focus on conditional currency risk because founding families can relatively easily influence their firms’ currency exposure. We find that family firms have relatively lower conditional currency exposure. This result holds for both descendant-led and nonfamily-led family firms. Consistent with purposeful actions of founding families, we find that exposure decreases with control-enhancing mechanisms, such as excess voting rights. The findings also support a wealth-preservation motive, evidenced by a finding that exposure declines with the number of family beneficiaries. Additional analysis suggests that family firms achieve the relatively lower risk by reducing internationalization depth and limiting exposure to riskier currencies.     

Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?

Taxes represent a significant cost to the firm and shareholders, and it is generally expected that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness. However, this argument ignores potential non-tax costs that can accompany tax aggressiveness, especially those arising from agency problems. Firms owned/run by founding family members are characterized by a unique agency conflict between dominant and small shareholders. Using multiple measures to capture tax aggressiveness and founding family presence, we find that family firms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts, ceteris paribus. This result suggests that family owners are willing to forgo tax benefits to avoid the non-tax cost of a potential price discount, which can arise from minority shareholders’ concern with family rent-seeking masked by tax avoidance activities [Desai and Dharmapala, 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 145–179]. Our result is also consistent with family owners being more concerned with the potential penalty and reputation damage from an IRS audit than non-family firms. We obtain similar inferences when using a small sample of tax shelter cases.     

Are imputation credits capitalised into stock prices?

We investigate whether imputation tax credits are capitalised into Australian stock prices by utilising discounted cash‐flow valuation models and examining the relation between earnings yields and imputation credit yields. While imputation credits are valuable to many investors, the evidence that they are reflected in share prices is at best mixed and largely unconvincing. Our results reveal that imputation credits fail to lower realised returns casting doubts over whether imputation credits are priced from the perspective of longer‐term buy‐and‐hold investors. If so, such investors can expect to fully benefit from their imputation credits, and imputation effects may not impact on the cost of capital.     

Are Islamic stock indexes exposed to systemic risk? Multivariate GARCH estimation of CoVaR

The main objective of this paper is to assess the exposure of Islamic stock indexes to systemic tail events. We use Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) and Delta CoVaR measures as developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and a sample of Islamic and conventional stock indexes, from various developed and emerging markets, during the period September 2005 to March 2015. The empirical results reveal that the systemic risk has a moderate adverse effect on Islamic indexes, with a lower level in Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC hereafter). The findings also show the Asian stock indexes can be considered as effective hedge assets, after the global financial crisis (GFC hereafter). Furthermore, the empirical reveal that portfolio including Islamic stock indexes performs better than a benchmark portfolio in turmoil periods. These findings have several implications in financial decisions including the strategy of stability and asset allocation.     

Are firms from developed markets more international than firms from emerging markets?

Regionalist supporters’ claim that most of the world's largest firms are regional rather than global and that managers should be encouraged to ‘think regional, act local and forget global’ (Rugman and Moore, 2004, p. 67). We apply the matrix of multinationality proposed by Aggarwal et al. (2011) to a sample of the world's 500 largest corporations, the Fortune Global 500. We show that these firms range from purely domestic to regional, trans-regional and entirely global with most lying in the trans-regional and global categories. Our results imply that global strategies are essential to international trade and management in today's business environment. We compare multinationality results by market type (developed versus emerging market), industry, size and age. We find that firms from more advanced economies tend to be older, larger and more multinational than firms from emerging markets. We find no relationship between multinationality and age or multinationality and size, and conclude that developed market firms are not more multinational as a result of size, age or industrial structure.     

Investment performance of “environmentally-friendly” firms and their initial public offers and seasoned equity offers

We employ a sample of 748 environmentally-friendly (or “green”) firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges to extend studies of the effects of socially responsible investment (SRI) on stock investment returns and the performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Our empirical tests document positive and statistically significant excess returns for our environmentally-friendly firms and their IPOs and SEOs, in contrast to our control IPO and SEO samples which underperform. In summary, a “green” equity premium is evident in returns calculated from a variety of benchmarks.     

Do firms understate stock option-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123?

Focusing on the four key option pricing model inputs—expected option life, expected stock price volatility, expected dividend yield, and the risk-free interest rate for the expected life of the option—this study finds that firms understate option value estimates and, thus, stock-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123. As predicted based on incentives and opportunities for management to understate SFAS 123 expense, the understatement of option value estimates is increasing in proxies for the magnitude of the expense, is greater for firms with weaker corporate governance, and, to a lesser extent, is increasing in the excessiveness of executive pay. The findings are strongest for the expected option life and expected stock price volatility input assumptions, consistent with firms’ greater latitude in determining these inputs. We find weaker evidence of understatement associated with the expected dividend yield assumption, and none for the interest rate assumption, consistent with these inputs being less amenable to discretion. Taken together, our findings raise some concern that the exercise of management discretion adversely affects the overall reliability of SFAS 123 expense.

How and why do small firms manage interest rate risk?

Although small firms are particularly sensitive to interest rates and other shocks, empirical work on corporate risk management has focused instead on large public companies. This paper studies fixed-rate and adjustable-rate loans to see how small firms manage their exposure to interest rate risk. Credit-constrained firms are found to match significantly more often with fixed-rate loans, consistent with prior research that shows the supply of credit shrinks during periods of rising interest rates. Banks originate a higher share of adjustable-rate loans than other lenders, ameliorating maturity mismatch and exposure to the lending channel of monetary policy. Time-series patterns in the fixed-rate share are consistent with recent evidence on debt market timing.     

Examining bank SEOs: Are offers made by undercapitalized banks different?

Despite extensive monitoring, banking operations are often considered opaque, and despite explicit capital adequacy regulation, banks may have substantial discretion in their financing. Both monitoring and capital regulation have changed substantially over time, with the adoption of FDICIA being one important breakpoint. This article empirically studies seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by banks to understand how opacity and capital regulation interact to determine the timing of bank SEOs and their market valuation. SEOs both by banks that are undercapitalized relative to regulatory standards and also well-capitalized banks are fully discretionary when it comes to SEOs, even before FDICIA. Both undercapitalized and well-capitalized banks experience similar and significantly negative stock price reactions to SEO announcements, and also have similar prior patterns of insider trading and similar economic drivers of the issuance decision. Moreover, post-SEO abnormal stock returns are similar to benchmark returns for both types of issuers in the long run, suggesting that, contrary to the well-documented evidence for industrial SEOs, investors understand the value implications of bank SEOs upon announcement. The evidence implies that undercapitalized banks' SEOs are more discretionary and that all bank SEOs are less opaque than implied by earlier studies.