Asset pricing with loss aversion

The use of standard preferences for asset pricing has not been very successful in matching asset price characteristics, such as the risk-free interest rate, equity premium and the Sharpe ratio, to time series data. Behavioral finance has recently proposed more realistic preferences such as those with loss aversion. Research is starting to explore the implications of behaviorally founded preferences for asset price characteristics. Encouraged by some studies of Benartzi and Thaler [1995. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1), 73–92] and Barberis et al. [2001. Prospect theory and asset prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics CXVI (1), 1–53] we study asset pricing with loss aversion in a production economy. Here, we employ a stochastic growth model and use a stochastic version of a dynamic programming method with an adaptive grid scheme to compute the above mentioned asset price characteristics of a model with loss aversion in preferences. As our results show using loss aversion we get considerably better results than one usually obtains from pure consumption-based asset pricing models including the habit formation variant.     

Modeling attitudes toward uncertainty through the use of the Sugeno integral

The aim of this paper is to present under uncertainty, and in an ordinal framework, an axiomatic treatment of the Sugeno integral in terms of preferences which parallels some earlier derivations devoted to the Choquet integral. Some emphasis is given to the characterization of uncertainty aversion.     

Distribution-sensitivity of rank-dependent poverty measures

We propose a criterion to rank poverty measures on the basis of distribution-sensitivity. The criterion compares reactions to ‘lossy’ transfers among the poor. We focus on the class of rank-dependent poverty measures and provide distribution-sensitivity rankings of the poverty gap ratio, the first and second Sen measures, the Thon measure, the Shorrocks measure, and the Thon, Kakwani and S-Gini classes of measures. Moreover, we discuss the relationship between the proposed criterion and two alternative distribution-sensitivity criteria based on the Arrow–Pratt theory of risk aversion. Finally, we provide an empirically tractable necessary and sufficient condition for unanimous poverty rankings by all continuous and replication invariant rank-dependent poverty measures that exhibit a predetermined minimum degree of distribution-sensitivity.     

Asset pricing with expectation shocks

This paper adds persistent shocks into the adaptive learning expectation formation process in stochastic growth asset pricing production and endowment economies. These expectation shocks, designed to capture psychological elements which can arise from news, changes in sentiment, herding and bandwagon effects, generate waves of optimism and pessimism in equity price forecasts. The paper estimates parameters of the expectation shock and adaptive learning process with the method of simulated moments, and compares simulation results to U.S. economic and financial market stylized facts. Numerical results for both the estimated production and endowment economies show that the expectation shock model matches several of the stylized facts better than does a model that assumes rational expectations or adaptive learning alone.     

Probabilistic sophistication,second order stochastic dominance and uncertainty aversion

We study the interplay of probabilistic sophistication, second order stochastic dominance and uncertainty aversion, three fundamental notions in choice under uncertainty. In particular, our main result, Theorem 2, characterizes uncertainty averse preferences that are probabilistically sophisticated, as well as uncertainty averse preferences that satisfy second order stochastic dominance. As a byproduct, Proposition 2 highlights a fundamental tension between probabilistic sophistication/second order stochastic dominance and uncertainty aversion in the presence of nontrivial unambiguous events.     

Option pricing with an illiquid underlying asset market

We examine how price impact in the underlying asset market affects the replication of a European contingent claim. We obtain a generalized Black–Scholes pricing PDE and establish the existence and uniqueness of a classical solution to this PDE. Unlike the case with transaction costs, we prove that replication with price impact is always cheaper than superreplication. Compared to the Black–Scholes case, a trader generally buys more stock and borrows more (shorts and lends more) to replicate a call (put). Furthermore, price impact implies endogenous stochastic volatility and an out-of-money option has lower implied volatility than an in-the-money option. This finding has important implications for empirical analysis on volatility smile.     

Implementation of competitive nonlinear pricing: tariffs with inclusive consumption

The paper studies how the optimal nonlinear quantity-payment allocation can be truthfully implemented by optional tariffs in a differentiated goods duopoly. Consumers choose from a menu of tariffs and are subsequently billed according to this. We find that implementation by simple two part tariffs may not be a feasible strategy in a duopoly because the optimal nonlinear tariff exhibits a convexity for lower quantities. We show that the optimal outcome can be implemented if the firms can use two part tariffs with inclusive consumption. The fixed fee includes a free consumption allowance, whereas subsequent consumption is charged according to a steep unit price. That way the firm is able to secure voluntary participation without violating the incentive constraint. The paper shows some examples from the telecommunications industry where firms offer two part tariffs with free call minutes to low demand segments.     

应对不确定性：危机传播管理的博弈与创新

现代危机具有的不确定性让危机传播面临更大的挑战,不确定性越大,危机就越来越难以被预测,社会管理者就失去了观测和制定传播计划的主要依据,这令作为公共危机传播管理者的政府经常面临两难选择。危机的不确定性很大一部分来源于媒体融合环境的不确定性,这使现代危机传播的整个过程也变得不确定。政府作为现代危机传播者,必须对危机传播过程中的不确定性有充分的认识,在危机传播和应对的过程中灵活博弈,把握传播机会,创新传播方法。     

Costly State Verification with Varying Risk Preferences and Liability

Abstract.  In the scenario of loan contracts with costly state verification, we examine how the properties of the set of states, different risk preferences of debtors and varying liability of lenders affect the structure of optimal repayments. In particular, we show that with risk‐averse debtors, a general set of states, a constant observation cost and both unlimited and limited lender liability, the debtor is strictly better off revealing the true state of nature when his realized revenue is low, which implies that optimal debtor consumption has a downward jump around the single switch from observed to unobserved states. If the debtor can destroy revenue or if the debtor is risk neutral, this non‐monotonicity of consumption disappears. Moreover, given the loan size, there is more monitoring under debtor‐risk aversion than risk neutrality. We present simulations showing that a contract with unlimited lender liability and debtor‐risk aversion has a higher expected observation cost but a lower variance of consumption than a contract with limited lender liability. Finally, we discuss the problems of commitment to verification and contract renegotiation in this framework.     

The uncertainty in extreme risk forecasts from covariate-augmented volatility models

For a GARCH-type volatility model with covariates, we derive asymptotically valid forecast intervals for risk measures, such as the Value-at-Risk or Expected Shortfall. To forecast these, we use estimators from extreme value theory. In the volatility model, we allow for leverage effects and the inclusion of exogenous variables, e.g., volatility indices or high-frequency volatility measures. In simulations, we find coverage of the forecast intervals to be adequate for sufficiently extreme risk levels and sufficiently large samples, which is consistent with theory. Finally, we investigate if covariate information from volatility indices or high-frequency data improves risk forecasts for major US stock indices. While—in our framework—volatility indices appear to be helpful in this regard, intra-day data are not.     

Dynamic advertising and pricing with constant demand elasticities

In this paper we analyze a stochastic dynamic advertising and pricing model with isoelastic demand. The state space is discrete, time is continuous and the planing horizon is allowed to be finite or infinite. A dynamic version of the Dorfman–Steiner identity will be derived. Explicit expressions of the optimal advertising and pricing policies, of the value function and of the optimal advertising expenditures will be given. The general results will be used to analyze the case of impatient customers. Furthermore, particular time inhomogeneous models and homogeneous ones with and without discounting will be examined. We will study the social efficiency of a monopolist's optimal policies and the consequences of specific subsidies. From a buyer's perspective, our analysis reveals that waiting – when looking at (immediate) expected prices – is never profitable should two or more units be available. But we will also prove that the sequence of average sales prices is monotone decreasing. Moreover, the techniques applied to solve the discrete stochastic advertising and pricing problem will be used to solve a related deterministic control problem with continuous state space.     

Existence of marginal pricing equilibria in economies with externalities and non-convexities

We consider a general equilibrium model with externalities and non-convexities in production. The consumption sets, the preferences of the consumers and the production possibilities are represented by set-valued mappings to take into account possibility of external effects. There is no convexity assumption on the correspondences of production. We propose a definition of the marginal pricing rule, which generalizes the one used in the model without externality and, which satisfies a continuity assumption with respect to the external effect.We prove the existence of general equilibria under assumptions which allow us to encompass together the works on economies with externalities and convex conditional production sets, and those on marginal pricing equilibria in economies without externalities. We provide examples to illustrate the definition of the marginal pricing rule and to show the difference with the standard case.     

Convergence rates of recombining trees for pricing options on stocks under GBM and regime-switching models with known cash dividends

In the literature there appear various kinds of binomial trees for pricing options on stocks under geometric Brownian motions (GBMs) with known cash dividends. The aim of this paper is to compare the performance of the existing binomial trees in aspect of the convergence rates, which are usually used to measure precisely how fast the approximate values converge to the exact one, and to give a theoretical proof of the convergence rates for the interpolation binomial trees which are based on a model that excludes the arbitrage possibilities. Also the paper extends the studies to the regime-switching models with known cash dividend payment.     

Price and quantity competition among heterogeneous suppliers with two-part pricing: applications to clubs, local public goods, networks, and growth controls

Models of club goods, local public goods, and growth controls appear to have theoretical structures distinct from usual oligopoly models. This article shows, however, that they are special cases of a generalized oligopoly model that incorporates the possibility of two-part pricing and externalities between consumers (either congestion or network externalities). Our generalized two-part pricing model not only serves as a synthesis of a wide range of models but also allows us to obtain several new results on equilibrium prices. Another advantage of our model is that it can be interpreted as a reduced form of more complicated models that have spatial structures. This facilitates extension to the case where firms are heterogeneous and the number of firms is arbitrary.