Firms’ innovation strategy under the shadow of analyst coverage

We study the effect of analyst coverage on firms’ innovation strategy and outcome. Using data of US firms from 1990 to 2012, we find evidence that an increase in financial analysts leads firms to cut research and development expenses, acquire more innovative firms, and invest in corporate venture capital. We attribute the first result to the effect of analyst pressure and the others to the informational role of analysts. We also find that financial analysts encourage firms to make more efficient investments related to innovation, which increases their future patents and citations and influences the novelty of their innovations.     

The bright side of analyst coverage on corporate innovation: Evidence from China

Using a sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2019, we investigate the effect of analyst coverage on corporate innovation. We find that analyst coverage will promote corporate innovation, supporting the information hypothesis. We also discuss possible mechanisms of how analyst coverage increases innovation. The information and monitor effects are two plausible channels that allow analyst coverage to promote innovation. Heterogeneity analysis shows the positive relation is more pronounced in non-SOEs, in higher intellectual property protection regions. And considering the firms' life cycle, we find firms in the growth and maturity stage are more vulnerably affected by analysts. Further investigation reveals a positive relationship between analyst coverage and external innovation, and the increased innovation ultimately translates into the long-term value of firms. Our research enriches the impact of analyst coverage on innovation and provides new empirical evidence to improve the multi-level capital market.     

Analyst following,staggered boards,and managerial entrenchment

We use agency theory to explore how analyst coverage is influenced by the managerial entrenchment associated with the staggered board. The evidence suggests that firms with staggered boards attract significantly larger analyst following. We also document that firms with staggered boards experience less information asymmetry. Staggered boards insulate managers from the discipline of the takeover market. Entrenched managers are well-protected by the staggered board and have fewer incentives to conceal information, resulting in less information asymmetry. The more transparent information environment facilitates the analyst’s job. As a consequence, more analysts are attracted to firms with staggered boards. We also document the beneficial role of analyst coverage in improving firm value. Our results confirm the notion that analysts, as information intermediaries, provide oversight over management and thus help alleviate agency conflicts. The positive effect of analyst coverage, however, is severely reduced when the firm has a staggered board in place.     

Do star analysts know more firm-specific information? Evidence from China

Using a unique database in China, we extend the literature to further distinguish the information production role of star vs. non-star analysts. We confirm the general conclusion of a positive association between analyst coverage and stock return synchronicity measured by a firm’s R² in China. The findings from star analysts, however, show that star analyst coverage actually decreases stock return synchronicity. We contend that the firm-specific human capital in star analysts helps the analysts overcome the challenges of information production in an emerging market. The superior firm-specific human capital argument of star analysts is further supported by the negative association of star analysts’ firm-specific experiences and stock return synchronicity. Our conclusions are robust to different specifications of star analyst presence and different definitions of analysts’ firm-specific experiences. We also find that star analysts exhibit a more accurate earnings forecast than non-star analysts.     

The impact of all-star analyst job changes on their coverage choices and investment banking deal flow

Using a sample of all-star analysts who switch investment banks, we examine (1) whether analyst behavior is influenced by banking relationships and (2) whether analyst behavior affects investment banking deal flow. Although the stock coverage decision depends on the relationship with the client firms, we find no evidence that analysts change their optimism or recommendation levels when joining a new firm. Investment banking deal flow is related to analyst reputation only for equity transactions. For debt and M&A transactions, analyst reputation does not matter. There is no evidence that issuing optimistic earnings forecasts or recommendations affects investment banking deal flow.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

Are All Security Analysts Equal?

We examine the extent to which security analysts are homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. Earlier research documents a significant and positive relation between analyst coverage and firm valuation. We identify three classes of equity analysts and examine their differential effect on firm valuation associated with their coverage and their information production. We find that equity analysts are not homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation. The presence of analysts at national securities firms have the strongest effect on firm valuation followed by analysts at regional securities firms and finally analysts at nonbrokerage, or research, firms. We attribute this result to the differential monitoring and information dissemination function rendered by the analysts. Information produced by analysts, however, does not share the same credibility. Specifically, we find brokerage firms' buy recommendations are discounted by the market and have a weak effect on firm valuation. The results can be supported by arguments that brokerage firm analysts' recommendations are contaminated by their firms' investment banking relations with corporations.     

The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act on Analyst Forecast Properties: The Impact of Firm Size and Growth Opportunities

Abstract:  We provide evidence that the effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the Act) of 1995 on analyst forecast properties is conditional on firm size and growth opportunities. We show that analyst coverage, frequency of forecast revisions, forecast errors and dispersion after the Act decreased for large firms and for firms with low growth opportunities but increased for small firms and for firms with high growth opportunities. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Act results in additional high quality disclosures in large firms, which face higher litigation risk and tighter scrutiny from investors but not in smaller firms. Our findings of increases in analyst coverage and revision but deterioration in accuracy and precision of analyst forecasts for firms with high growth opportunities after the Act suggest that in spite of increased corporate disclosures, the information environment for analysts deteriorated in those firms.     

Corporate watchdogs

We investigate the role of financial analysts as corporate watchdogs. We show that firms that are subject to intense analyst monitoring are more likely to be investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or to be the subject of a securities class action. Using cross-sectional variations in managerial entrenchment, we find that this effect is not a reflection of the “dark side of analyst coverage,” analysts pushing executives to misbehave to exceed short-term expectations. Our findings are robust to different identification strategies addressing the endogeneity of analyst coverage decisions.     

Stock price synchronicity and analyst coverage in emerging markets

This paper examines the relation between the stock price synchronicity and analyst activity in emerging markets. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that security analysts specialize in the production of firm-specific information, we find that securities which are covered by more analysts incorporate greater (lesser) market-wide (firm-specific) information. Using the R² statistics of the market model as a measure of synchronicity of stock price movement, we find that greater analyst coverage increases stock price synchronicity. Furthermore, after controlling for the influence of firm size on the lead–lag relation, we find that the returns of high analyst-following portfolio lead returns of low analyst-following portfolio more than vice versa. We also find that the aggregate change in the earnings forecasts in a high analyst-following portfolio affects the aggregate returns of the portfolio itself as well as those of the low analyst-following portfolio, whereas the aggregate change in the earnings forecasts of the low analyst-following portfolio have no predictive ability. Finally, when the forecast dispersion is high, the effect of analyst coverage on stock price synchronicity is reduced.     

Accruals quality and analyst coverage

We provide evidence that analyst coverage increases as accruals quality decreases. This finding is consistent with the services of financial analysts becoming more valuable and in greater demand as accruals provide weaker signals about future cash flows. Further, it is accruals quality associated with innate uncertainty in the firm’s operating environment that attracts analysts even after controlling for operating uncertainty associated with cash flow and stock return volatility. This suggests that low quality accruals provide an opportunity for analysts to benefit from generating private information. Consistent with analysts providing compensating information, we find that forecasts for firms with lower accruals quality contain more private information.     

Industry specialist auditors, outsider directors, and financial analysts

This study investigates the relationships among industry specialist auditors, outside directors, and financial analysts. Specifically, we examine the effect of analyst coverage on the association between auditor industry specialization and outside directorship. We find that outside directors are less likely to hire industry specialist auditors for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage. Our findings suggest that analyst coverage moderates outside directors’ demand for industry specialist auditors, that is, financial analysts may compete with industry specialist auditors to some extent in monitoring financial reporting process.     

Sell‐Side Analyst Research and Stock Comovement

We document that a stock's price around a recommendation or forecast covaries with prices of other stocks the issuing analyst covers. The effect of shared analyst coverage on stock price comovement extends beyond analyst activity days. A stock's daily returns covary with the returns of other stocks with which it shares analyst coverage. These links between stock price comovement and shared analyst coverage are consistent with the coverage‐specific information we find in earnings forecasts; analysts who cover both stocks in a pair expect future earnings of the stocks to be more highly correlated than do analysts who cover only one stock from the pair. Collectively, our evidence indicates that analyst research produces coverage‐specific spillovers that raise price comovement among stocks that share analyst coverage. The strength of these spillovers is comparable to spillovers from broad industry and market information in analyst research.     

Analyst coverage and corporate tax aggressiveness

We examine the impact of analyst coverage on corporate tax aggressiveness. To address endogeneity concerns, we perform a difference-in-differences analysis using a setting which causes exogenous decreases in analyst coverage. Our tests identify a negative causal effect of analyst coverage on tax aggressiveness, suggesting that higher analyst coverage constrains corporate tax aggressiveness. Further cross-sectional variation tests find that this constraining effect on tax aggressiveness is more pronounced in firms with lower investor recognition and firms with more opaque information environments. Our results are consistent with the notion that higher analyst coverage increases the visibility of aggressive tax planning behavior as well as heightens analysts’ demand for more transparent information, which in turn reduces tax aggressiveness.     

Causal effect of analyst following on corporate social responsibility

I examine the influence of sell-side financial analysts on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and find that firms with greater analyst coverage tend to be less socially responsible. To establish causality, I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) technique, using brokerage closures and mergers as exogenous shocks to analyst coverage, as well as an instrumental variables approach. Both identification strategies suggest that analyst coverage has a negative causal effect on CSR. Analyst coverage seems to influence CSR activities via analysts' influence on the value of managerial ownership and discretionary spending. My findings are consistent with the view that spending on CSR is a manifestation of an agency problem and that financial analysts curb such discretionary spending by disciplining managers.     

Investment and access to external finance in Europe: Does analyst coverage matter?

We aim to determine whether analyst coverage improves European firms’ access to capital markets and investment. Based on a data set that includes firms from several European countries between 2000 and 2015, we implement a treatment effect framework and an instrumental variables (IV) approach, in which the intensity of industry-level waves in coverage is used as an instrument for firm-level coverage. We show that analyst coverage is favorable to firms’ debt and share issuance and their investment expenses. Our paper emphasizes the key role of financial analysts in improving European firms’ financial conditions.     

Analyst firm parent–subsidiary relationship and conflict of interest: evidence from IPO recommendations

We uncover a new source for the conflict of interest in analyst coverage existed before the Regulation FD period by examining whether recommendations within the parent–subsidiary (PS) relationship are more optimistic and whether they have better investment value than non‐PS recommendations. We find evidence consistent with the conflict of interest: PS analysts on average issue more optimistic recommendations, but their recommendations have worse or no better investment value in the calendar‐time portfolio analysis. Analyst firm PS relationship is another source for the conflict of interest in analyst coverage that has not been identified before.     

The consequences to analyst involvement in the IPO process: Evidence surrounding the JOBS Act

The JOBS Act allows certain analysts to be more involved in the IPO process, but does not relax restrictions on analyst compensation structure. We find that these analysts initiate coverage that is more optimistically biased, less accurate, and generates smaller stock market reactions. Investors purchasing shares following these initiations lose over 3% of their investment by the firm's subsequent earnings release. By contrast, issuers, analysts, and investment banks appear to benefit from this increased bias, as optimism is more positively associated with proxies for firm visibility and investment banking revenues when analysts are involved in the IPO process.     

The role of the business press in the pricing of analysts’ recommendation revisions

We investigate the information-dissemination role of the business press by examining the coverage of analyst recommendation revisions. Consistent with the press providing wider dissemination of analyst reports, we find evidence that coverage of analyst recommendation revisions significantly increases the initial market reaction to these revisions and decreases the subsequent price drift. Furthermore, we find that news flash coverage, rather than in-depth coverage, of a recommendation revision drives both the initial market reaction results and drift results. Finally, we show that broader press coverage influences the activities of large-trade institutional investors but not high-frequency traders. Overall, our findings suggest a complementary role between analysts and the business press: increased dissemination of recommendation revisions, rather than information creation on the part of the business press, serves to better inform the market about analyst recommendation revision decisions.

     

Research for sale: Determinants and consequences of paid-for analyst research

I examine the determinants and market impact of paid-for coverage using a hand-collected sample of paid-for reports over 1999–2006. More than five hundred publicly listed US companies paid for analyst coverage since 1999. Yet little is known about the informational consequences of this analyst research. Firms with greater uncertainty, weaker information environments, and low turnover are more likely to buy coverage as they have the most to gain from analyst coverage but are unlikely to attract sell-side analysts. Despite the inherent conflicts of interest, I find paid-for reports have information content for investors based on 2-day abnormal returns. After the initiation of coverage, companies experience an increase in institutional ownership, sell-side analyst following, and liquidity. In addition, the results are strongest for the fee-based research firm with ex ante policies that reduce potential conflicts of interest.