Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct mechanisms in the standard framework of Myerson (J Math Econ 10:67–81, 1982). Our results complement those of Han (J Econ Theory 137(1):610–626, 2007) who analyzes a complete information setting where agents’ actions are fully contractible.     

On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games

This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3×3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3×3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent selection in global games may not be a robust equilibrium. Our proof reveals that the assumption in global games that the noise errors are independent of the state imposes a non-trivial restriction on incomplete information perturbations.     

The competing risks of acquiring and being acquired: Evidence from Colombia's financial sector

This paper studies the determinants of the probability of participating in a process of merging or acquisition for financial institutions in Colombia. We use survival analysis techniques and competing risks models to estimate the probability of participating in such processes as an acquiring or acquired firm. Using an especially rich database containing financial information of Colombian banks for the period 1990–2007, we find that both macroeconomic and microeconomic variables are important determinants of this probability. However, there are differential effects for the acquiring firm and the acquired firm. Particularly, while firm size and solvency are significant determinants of the probability of being an acquiring firm, efficiency is an important determinant of the probability of being acquired. Also, the concentration index, which plays no role for acquiring firms, plays an important role in the probability of being acquired.     

信息不完全的信用风险定价模型及其在我国的应用

基于信息不完全的信用风险定价模型与传统的结构化模型和约化模型的最大区别在于它将信息不完全这一前提引入了以信息完全为前提的结构化模型,同时它又考虑了约化模型中强度的优点,引入短期信用风险的度量,成为当前最切合现实的信用风险定价模型。本文认为,应用基于信息不完全的信用风险定价模型来测度信用风险,将具有十分重要的现实意义。     

Strategic human resource management and its effects on firm performance: an implementation of the competing values framework

Based on the literature of the competing values framework, this paper develops a new HRM model and attempts to clarify what type of HRM (in terms of the orientation of the function) is linked with various aspects of firm performance. In order to acquire a better view of this much researched issue, three more factors that influence this relationship have been added to the equation: competitive strategy, external environment and organizational size. The empirical research was carried out in Greece among a sample of 104 organizations. The research findings show that when HRM is consistent with the competitive strategy it has significant effects on financial performance. Another important finding is that market performance is positively influenced by HRM flexibility and negatively influenced by HRM control, unless the external environment is complex, when the most successful combination is control-internal orientation.     

Robust implementation under alternative information structures

In this paper we consider a model in which agents have complete information about their neighbors and, possibly, incomplete information about the rest of the environment. We consider two different informational frameworks. In the first, agents do not have priors about the relevant characteristics in the rest of the environment. In the second, agents are supposed to have priors about the unknown characteristics. We present a mechanism which implements any social choice correspondence satisfying monotonicity and no veto power in both informational settings for every possible prior thus requiring little knowledge from the point of view of the designer of the information possessed by agents about the environment. The authors wish to thank J. Canals, B. Chakravorty, P. Chander, C. Herrero, G. Orosel, D. Schmeidler, W. Thomson, W. Trockel, F. Vega, A. Villar, T. Yamato and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. The first author acknowledges financial support from the Institució Valenciana d’Estudies i Investigació; L.V.I.E. and DGICYT under projects PB/88-0289 and PB/91-0756. The second author acknowledges financial support from DGICYT under project PB/90-0156. A previous version of the paper was written when authors visited (May 1991) the Institute of Mathematical Economics (Bielefeld) to which authors are grateful.     

论企业竞争中的专利信息工作

文章从专利原始文献与专利加工信息两个角度探讨了专利信息的内涵,并论述了专利信息工作在企业竞争中的作用。     

论股票上市公司的信息披露

股票上市公司进行社会筹资,就必须对外披露会计信息,以保护投资者和潜在投资者的利益。我国《证券法》和相关法律对信息披露做了一些规定,但仍存在一些问题。笔者就相关问题提出了几点措施,希望股票上市公司的信息披露更加完善。     

信息显示在工程招投标制度中的功能分析

重点探讨了招投标制度中由于招投标双方信息不对称而导致的招投标制度难以有效的执行的问题,力图从信息显示方面解释为什么要选择招投标制度,从理论上解释要进行招投标活动的必要,以及如何进行招投标活动主体的保护两方面问题。     

内幕交易者的交易策略与最优监管研究

本文以Kyle(1985)及缪新琼和邹恒甫(2004)的单期模型为基础,通过假定内幕交易者的不完全信息以及市场对半强有效条件程度上的偏离,克服了缪新琼和邹恒甫(2004)的两个主要缺陷,同时,借鉴Jhinyong Shin(1996)提出的测量监管力度的指标,在有监管的情况下对内幕交易者的交易策略、最终收益以及监管机构的最优监管策略进行了分析。     

An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision

Abstract.  This paper surveys what can be learned from recent advances in the incomplete contract literature to understand how public goods are or should be provided. The paper starts with a section on the full information case that presents and discusses the classical Samuelson condition on the optimal provision of public goods. The rest of the paper presents results under asymmetric information. It is constituted of two main parts. In the first one, the social planner has complete contracting ability. We discuss the basic setting and assumptions of this comprehensive contracting approach and study the trade-offs it generates. The second part of the paper is devoted to the study of contracting incompleteness. Such incompleteness can emerge from various sources, which we present and discuss. We then study the case of a politically chosen decision-maker and the consequences of its inability to commit for more than one period and of the ability for individuals to form groups. Finally, we address the problem of the choice between public and private forms of public good provision. The concluding section summarizes the main policy lessons.     

Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of buyer types known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses of the agent, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog offers. In the second stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm and product-price pair from that firm’s catalog. By backward induction, this Stackelberg game with asymmetric information reduces to a game over catalogs with payoff indeterminacies. In particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or across catalogs, corresponding to any catalog profile offered by firms there may be multiple possible expected firm payoffs, all consistent with the rational optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types. The resolution of these indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which emerges in the market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular game over catalogs, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game. We call such a mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we address in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism—and therefore, does there exist a Nash equilibrium for the catalog game? We show under fairly mild conditions on primitives that catalog games naturally possess tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash equilibria.     

Coordinating under incomplete information

We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence. We thank Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Hans Carlsson, Ani Guerdjikova and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Part of this work was done while Asheim was visiting Cornell University, which hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.