Stochastic endogenous time preference

Preference for flexibility arises inherently in sequential decision making. However, a majority of the literature has limitations to capture a changing preference for flexibility across time in the sense that such an attitude is independent of past actions. This study incorporates the histories of past actions into an infinite-horizon extension of Dekel et al. (2001) and models a decision maker whose attitude toward flexibility evolves over time from the uncertainty of future time preference or discount factors. Moreover, we provide behavioral comparisons of the degree of patience across different histories and characterize the shift of subjective beliefs about discount factors in the sense of an increasing convex and concave stochastic order.     

行业视阈下企业“并购或联盟”的选择偏好研究

企业并购和联盟的行为并不仅仅是特定的企业层面的问题,很多行业内都出现了大规模并购或联盟的风潮,这已成为了一种显著的行业性现象。在一个既定的行业中,大部分的企业都面临着相似的技术要求和市场态势。行业对于企业选择其外部成长战略的偏好有着重要的影响。在本文中,作者将提出三个行业层面的影响维度,通过两分法,将行业分为八种情景,分别讨论在不同行业情景下企业对兼并收购或战略联盟的选择偏好。     

Strategic interaction and aggregate incentives

We consider a model of interdependent efforts, with linear interaction and lower bound on effort. Our setting encompasses asymmetric interaction and heterogeneous agents’ characteristics. We examine the impact of a rise of cross-effects on aggregate efforts. We show that the sign of the comparative static effects is related to a condition of balancedness of the interaction. Moreover, we point out that asymmetry and heterogeneous characteristics are sources of non-monotonic variation of aggregate efforts.     

Spatial agglomeration and endogenous growth

This paper constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model with spatial interactions in which a human capital externality is the centripetal force towards agglomeration. The resource cost of transportation is, on the other hand, the main centrifugal force, preventing a city from growing unboundedly. A central feature of our analysis is the dynamic interaction between (perpetual) economic growth and (bounded) city growth. We examine the socially optimal and the decentralized growth rates as well as city sizes. In the decentralized environment, individuals under-invest, whereas cities are under-populated. We show how public policies may enable a decentralized city to attain the socially optimal allocation.     

Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.     

Inequality and catching-up under decreasing marginal impatience

This paper examines how endogenous time preference interacts with inequalities in economic development. We consider two distinct groups of households with intrinsic inequality (e.g., capitalists and workers), and show that (i) under decreasing marginal impatience (DMI), an unequal society may be preferable for poor households than an egalitarian one in which every household owns an equal share of asset; (ii) poor households tend to benefit more under DMI than CMI (constant marginal impatience) from positive shocks; (iii) inequality exhibits a sharp inverted-U shape as more people become rich, which should be good news for developing countries in catching up; and (iv) a tax on capital income reduces poor households’ income when the fraction of the rich is sufficiently small. We also examine immigration and discuss capital mobility.     

Changes in risk and strategic interaction

In this paper we study the comparative statics of Nth degree stochastic dominance shifts in a large class of non-cooperative games. We consider symmetric equilibria as well as asymmetric equilibria in which the risk changes are idiosyncratic and not necessarily of the same stochastic order. Furthermore, we establish conditions for risk changes to produce multiplier effects on equilibrium strategies. Finally, we evaluate the comparative statics of stochastic dominance shifts in supermodular games, which may feature multiple equilibria and non-convex strategy sets.     

Equilibrium dynamics in a class of one-sector endogenous growth models with external habits: An application of special functions

This paper analyzes the equilibrium dynamics in a class of one-sector endogenous growth models with external habits. Using an explicit solution expressed in terms of the Gauss hypergeometric function, we show that the levels of consumption, habits and capital may exhibit non-monotonic transition dynamics, even though their ratios converge monotonically. A numerical simulation illustrates this result.     

Learning by doing,endogenous discounting and economic development

In this paper, we focus on a growth model where the discount rate is decreasing in capital accumulation and endogenous growth is made possible through learning by doing, knowledge accumulation being a by-product of gross investment. In such a model, the utility function has to be restricted to take positive values implying that the elasticity of marginal utility is lower than one. The presence of endogenous discounting generates a steady-state of stagnation which can be saddle-path stable or unstable depending on the marginal productivity of knowledge. In the case of long run growth, the fact that the elasticity of marginal utility is lower than one implies the existence of two asymptotic balanced growth paths: the one with the higher growth rate being a saddle point while the one with the lower growth rate not being a saddle point. We also study the optimal solution which is characterized by a unique balanced growth path. The policy consists as usual in subsidizing investment in order to internalize the externality.     

Socio-political instability and growth dynamics

We develop an overlapping generations (OLG) monetary endogenous growth model characterized by socio-political instability, with the latter being specified as a fraction of output lost due to strikes, riots and protests. We show that growth dynamics arise in this model when socio-political instability is a function of inflation. In particular, two distinct growth dynamics emerge, one convergent and the other divergent contingent on the strength of the response of socio-political instability to inflation. Since our theoretical results hinge on socio-political instability being a function of inflation, we test the prediction that inflation affects socio-political instability positively by using a panel of 156 countries for the 1980–2012 period, and allowing for country and time fixed effects. The results indicate that inflation relates positively with socio-political instability. Policy makers should be cognisant that it is crucial to maintain long-run price stability, as failure to do so may result in high inflation emanating from excessive money supply growth, leading to high (er) socio-political instability, and ultimately, the economy being on a divergent balanced growth path.     

Strategic Interaction between Governments and Investors under Privatization Programs

This article analyses the strategic moves of governments and investors under privatization programs in a game‐theoretic context. In sequential‐move games of both perfect information and incomplete information, the best response of the strategic investors to observing a slow pace of privatization is to have a low participation in economic activity because of concerns over public policy credibility. This is true even if the government chooses to randomize its action to send mixed signals to the investors while adopting a slow pace of privatization for budgetary reasons. However, the outcome is Pareto inferior to a situation of phased but fast implementation of privatization programs and high private‐sector participation under plausible assumptions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Feasibility and optimality of sustainable growth under materials balance

Pollution from consumption and production is an inevitable part of economic processes. We employ a materials balance approach and develop an endogenous growth theory, with recycling activity, to examine the evolution of the economic and environment systems. This paper provides feasibility and optimality conditions for sustainable economic growth with rising environmental quality. The fundamental condition of feasibility is that the flow of natural resources, which eventually returns to the environment as waste and pollution, has a negative growth rate in the long run.     

A portfolio approach to endogenous growth: equilibrium and optimal policy

This paper develops a portfolio approach to modeling endogenous growth in continuous time that is especially suitable for addressing fiscal and financial issues in policy design. The analysis focuses on the equilibrium relationship between fiscal and financial policy, rates of return and wealth allocation. We analyze two models. The first is based on the Arrow-Romer model with increasing returns and an external effect of capital on labor productivity. The second draws on Barro's analysis of government spending and endogenous growth. In both models, we study the equilibrium allocation and discuss the optimal fiscal and financial policy.     

Evolution of preferences and cross-country differences in time devoted to market work

I model the hypothesis that preferences evolve and permanent differences in individual attitudes towards work emerge between two countries characterized initially by identical preferences as a result of a period in which only one of the two countries is subject to regulations constraining labor supply, or as a by-product of different tax rates on labor income. Hence, the elimination of these regulations may not allow the economy thus deregulated to converge to the same hours of market work per person of the other economy, and the long-run differential in market work between economies subject to different tax rates is amplified.     

The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction

The article strengthens and provides a dynamic extension of the theory on collective rent seeking and private provision of a public good. Each individual agent within each group chooses in continuous or discrete time a continuous or discrete effort level. The combined effort within each group provides within-group public goods which are used as an input in the between-group n-group competition for an external prize. Intergroup mobility and intergroup warfare are allowed for. Each group and each individual agent within each group get a fraction of the prize based on a linear combination of equity and relative effort. A model/algorithm is developed generating analytical results and simulations illustrating how the interaction within and between groups proceeds through time.     

Abatement R&D,market imperfections,and environmental policy in an endogenous growth model

We develop an endogenous growth model featuring environmental externalities, abatement R&D, and market imperfections. We compare the economic performances under three distinct regimes that encompass public abatement, private abatement without tax recycling, and private abatement with tax recycling. It is found that the benefit arising from private abatement will be larger if the degree of the firms’ monopoly power is greater. With a reasonably high degree of monopoly power, a mixed abatement policy by which the government recycles environmental tax revenues to subsidize the private abatement R&D is a plausible way of reaching the highest growth rate and welfare.     

A general endogenous grid method for multi-dimensional models with non-convexities and constraints

The endogenous grid method (EGM) significantly speeds up the solution of stochastic dynamic programming problems by simplifying or completely eliminating root-finding. We propose a general and parsimonious EGM extended to handle (1) multiple continuous states and choices, (2) multiple occasionally binding constraints, and (3) non-convexities such as discrete choices. Our method enjoys the speed gains of the original one-dimensional EGM, while avoiding expensive interpolation on multi-dimensional irregular endogenous grids. We explicitly define a broad class of models for which our solution method is applicable, and illustrate its speed and accuracy using a consumption–saving model with both liquid assets and illiquid pension assets and a discrete retirement choice.     

Transport tax reform, commuting, and endogenous values of time

We consider a model of urban transport with two trip purposes, commuting (assumed perfectly complementary to labour supply) and noncommuting, to analyse the effects of transport tax reform on the value of time and marginal external congestion costs. Higher commuting taxes plausibly reduce time values, but higher noncommuting transport prices will typically raise the value of time. The intuition for this latter finding is that the reduction in congestion that follows from the tax increase itself raises net wages per hour of work (inclusive of commuting time). Empirical illustrations with Belgian data show a potentially large effect of transport tax reform on time values. In quite a few of the tax reforms studied traffic levels are reduced, but the increase in time values implies that marginal external congestion costs actually increase.     

Decision-making under risk: Editing procedures based on correlated similarities, and preference overdetermination

This paper studies editing procedures based on similarity relations in an expected utility maximization context. It shows that these procedures are compatible both with a family of difference-correlated similarities on the prize space and with a set of families (one for each probability) of ratio-correlated similarity relations on the probability space. In view of the properties satisfied by these families of correlated similarities, it is suggested that Rubinstein's preference overdetermination problem can be avoided. Received: 17 April 1996 / Accepted: 24 September 1998