The cross section of conditional mutual fund performance in European stock markets

This paper implements strategies that use macroeconomic variables to select European equity mutual funds, including Pan-European, country, and sector funds. We find that several macro-variables are useful in locating funds with future outperformance and that country-specific mutual funds provide the best opportunities for fund rotation strategies using macroeconomic information. Specifically, our baseline long-only strategies that exploit time-varying predictability provide four-factor alphas of 12–13% per year over the 1993–2008 period. Our study provides new evidence on the skills of local versus Pan-European asset managers, as well as how macroeconomic information can be used to locate and time these local fund manager skills.     

Do hedge funds deliver alpha? A Bayesian and bootstrap analysis

Using a robust bootstrap procedure, we find that top hedge fund performance cannot be explained by luck, and hedge fund performance persists at annual horizons. Moreover, we show that Bayesian measures, which help overcome the short-sample problem inherent in hedge fund returns, lead to superior performance predictability. Sorting on Bayesian alphas, relative to OLS alphas, yields a 5.5% per year increase in the alpha of the spread between the top and bottom hedge fund deciles. Our results are robust and relevant to investors as they are neither confined to small funds, nor driven by incubation bias, backfill bias, or serial correlation.     

Selling winners, holding losers: Effect on fund flows and survival of disposition-prone mutual funds

Recent studies suggest that presence of a disposition effect in a large subset of investors can create stock mispricings, which has serious implications for market efficiency. We examine whether US equity mutual funds are disposition-prone, how that effect influences performance, investor flows and fund survival, and whether the disposition orientation of mutual funds affects stock prices in a sustained manner.We find that about 30% of all funds exhibit some degree of disposition behavior and that such funds underperform funds that are not disposition-prone by 4-6% per year. Moreover, after controlling for performance, tax overhang and other factors that potentially affect flows, disposition-prone funds attract significantly smaller flows than other funds. The results suggest that mutual fund investors are smart enough to minimize investment in disposition-prone funds. Consequently, disposition-prone funds have significantly higher rates of failure than other funds, thereby reducing the impact of such trading behavior on security prices.     

Investing in mutual funds when returns are predictable

This paper forms investment strategies in US domestic equity mutual funds, incorporating predictability in (i) manager skills, (ii) fund risk loadings, and (iii) benchmark returns. We find predictability in manager skills to be the dominant source of investment profitability—long-only strategies that incorporate such predictability outperform their Fama-French and momentum benchmarks by 2 to 4%/year by timing industries over the business cycle, and by an additional 3 to 6%/year by choosing funds that outperform their industry benchmarks. Our findings indicate that active management adds significant value, and that industries are important in locating outperforming mutual funds.     

Do Female Mutual Fund Managers Manage Differently?

We examine the performance and investment behavior of female fixed‐income mutual fund managers compared with male fixed‐income mutual fund managers. We find that male‐ and female‐managed funds do not differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. Our results suggest that differences in investment behavior often attributed to gender may be related to investment knowledge and wealth constraints. Despite the similarities between male and female managers, we find evidence that gender influences the decision making of mutual fund investors. We find that the net asset flows into funds managed by females are lower than for males, especially for the manager's initial year managing the fund.     

Affiliated mutual funds and the allocation of initial public offerings

We examine how investment banks use initial public offerings (IPOs) in relation to their affiliated mutual funds. The dumping ground hypothesis predicts that the lead underwriter allocates cold IPOs to its affiliated funds so that more deals can be completed when demand for these IPOs is weak. Affiliated funds could also receive more cold IPOs because the lead underwriter uses allocations of hot IPOs to unaffiliated funds to gain trading commission business. The nepotism hypothesis predicts that the lead underwriter allocates hot IPOs to its affiliated funds to boost their performance and thus attract more money. We find little evidence supporting the dumping ground hypothesis, although some evidence supports the nepotism hypothesis, especially during the internet bubble period of 1999–2000.     

Ownership structure and risk in publicly held and privately owned banks

Using detailed ownership data for a sample of European commercial banks, we analyze the link between ownership structure and risk in both privately owned and publicly held banks. We consider five categories of shareholders that are specific to our dataset. We find that ownership structure is significant in explaining risk differences but mainly for privately owned banks. A higher equity stake of either individuals/families or banking institutions is associated with a decrease in asset risk and default risk. In addition, institutional investors and non-financial companies impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes. For publicly held banks, changes in ownership structure do not affect risk taking. Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behavior of publicly held banks, such that ownership structure is no longer a determinant in explaining risk differences. However, higher stakes of banking institutions in publicly held banks are associated with lower credit and default risk.     

Broker recommendations and Australian small‐cap equity fund management

This study examines whether the abnormal performance of active Australian small‐cap equity fund managers is associated with broker recommendations. Our evidence supports the investment value of broker recommendations, showing significant abnormal returns (ARs) both pre‐ and post‐broker recommendations. We find that when a factor‐mimicking portfolio based on broker recommendations is added to a Carhart (1997) model, annual alphas are reduced by 48 basis points. Using transaction‐level data, buy trades following broker recommendations earn significant cumulative ARs of 1.56 per cent after 60 days. Overall, we find that broker recommendations account for an economically significant component of alphas.     

Great expectations: Banks as equity underwriters

We examine the in-roads commercial banks have made into equity underwriting over 1990–2002. While banks end the period handling upwards of 25% of equity underwriting, this increase results almost exclusively from acquisitions of investment banks with an already established market share of equity underwriting. We find a significant decline in the market share of equity underwriting that banks acquired in the post-merger period, a decline that is larger than that experienced by independent investment banks of comparable reputation. Banks lose market share because they originate fewer IPOs and their IPOs have a lower incidence of follow-on SEOs compared to independent investment banks. Following the merger, banks experience a large fall off in their ability to retain follow-on SEOs and are less successful in winning SEO mandates when an issuer switches from its IPO underwriter. Overall, the findings suggest it has been difficult for banks to achieve scope economies in equity underwriting.     

Financial constraints of private firms and bank lending behavior

We investigate whether and how financial constraints of private firms depend on bank lending behavior. Bank lending behavior, especially its scale, scope and timing, is largely driven by bank business models which differ between privately owned and state-owned banks. Using a unique dataset on private small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) we find that an increase in relative borrowings from local state-owned banks significantly reduces firms’ financial constraints, while there is no such effect for privately owned banks. Improved credit availability and private information production are the main channels that explain our result. We also show that the lending behavior of local state-owned banks can be sustainable because it is less cyclical and neither leads to more risk taking nor underperformance.     

Managerial rights,use of investment banks,and the wealth effects for acquiring firms’ shareholders

We examine the relation between managerial rights in acquiring firms and the decision to use an investment bank in merger and acquisition deals, and explore whether this relation impacts the wealth effects for acquiring firms’ shareholders. We find that acquiring firms whose managers have relatively strong rights are more likely to use investment banks to facilitate deals and are more likely to use reputable banks. The wealth effects to acquiring firms are inversely related to the use of investment banks when managerial rights are relatively strong. However, the wealth loss is mitigated when acquiring firms use reputable investment banks.     

Banking relationships and access to equity capital markets: Evidence from Japan’s main bank system

We study the role of banking relationships in IPO underwriting. When a firm in Japan goes public, it can engage an investment bank that is related through a common main bank, or can select an alternative investment bank. The main bank relationship can be an efficient way for the investment bank to acquire information generated by the main bank, but may give rise to conflicts of interest. We find that main bank relationships give small issuers increased access to equity capital markets, but that issuers of large IPOs often switch to non-related investment banks that are capable of managing large offerings. While investment banks seek to exploit bargaining power with related issuers, issuers respond to expected high issue cost by switching to non-related investment banks. The net result is that total issue costs through related and non-related investment banks are similar. With respect to aftermarket performance and use of proceeds, we find no evidence of conflict of interest or self-dealing for either the main bank or the investment bank.     

Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets

We examine the spillover wealth effects of the Orange County, California bankruptcy announcement in December 1994 on municipal bonds, municipal bond funds, and bank stocks. This bankruptcy is prominent because of unprecedented losses and because it was caused by a highly leveraged derivatives strategy rather than a shortage of tax revenues and excess spending. We find contagion in the bond market with significantly negative abnormal returns for municipal bond funds without direct exposure to Orange County and for non‐Orange County municipal bonds. In addition, our findings suggest the contagion spills over to the common stocks of investment and commercial banks that deal in or use derivatives; however, the equities of banks unexposed to derivatives are not affected.     

False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas

This paper develops a simple technique that controls for "false discoveries," or mutual funds that exhibit significant alphas by luck alone. Our approach precisely separates funds into (1) unskilled, (2) zero-alpha, and (3) skilled funds, even with dependencies in cross-fund estimated alphas. We find that 75% of funds exhibit zero alpha (net of expenses), consistent with the Berk and Green equilibrium. Further, we find a significant proportion of skilled (positive alpha) funds prior to 1996, but almost none by 2006. We also show that controlling for false discoveries substantially improves the ability to find the few funds with persistent performance.     

Reverse Survivorship Bias

Mutual funds often disappear following poor performance. When this poor performance is partly attributable to negative idiosyncratic shocks, funds' estimated alphas understate their true alphas. This paper estimates a structural model to correct for this bias. Although most funds still have negative alphas, they are not nearly as low as those suggested by the fund‐by‐fund regressions. Approximately 12% of funds have net four‐factor model alphas greater than 2% per year. All studies that run fund‐by‐fund regressions to draw inferences about the prevalence of skill among mutual fund managers are subject to reverse survivorship bias.     

Hedge fund liquidity and performance: Evidence from the financial crisis

We investigate how share restrictions affect hedge fund performance in crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with prior research, we find that in the pre-crisis period more illiquid funds generate a share illiquidity premium compensating investors for limited liquidity. In the crisis period, this share illiquidity premium turns into an illiquidity discount. Hedge funds with more stringent share restrictions invest more heavily in illiquid assets. While share restrictions enable funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they seem insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios in the crisis. In a crisis period, funds holding illiquid portfolios experience lower returns and alphas, also when share restrictions are controlled for. Funds with an asset–liability mismatch perform particularly poorly and experience the strongest outflows. Share restrictions are also a proxy for incentives as investors cannot immediately withdraw their money after poor performance. We show that higher incentive fees can offset the share illiquidity discount in the crisis period.     

Do investment banks listen to their own analysts?

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks “eat their own cooking,” showing that these presumably sophisticated institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.     

Stress testing credit risk: The Great Depression scenario

By employing Moody’s corporate default and rating transition data spanning the last 90 years we explore how much capital banks should hold against their corporate loan portfolios to withstand historical stress scenarios. Specifically, we will focus on the worst case scenario over the observation period, the Great Depression. We find that migration risk and the length of the investment horizon are critical factors when determining bank capital needs in a crisis. We show that capital may need to rise more than three times when the horizon is increased from 1 year, as required by current and future regulation, to 3 years. Increases are still important but of a lower magnitude when migration risk is introduced in the analysis. Further, we find that the new bank capital requirements under the so-called Basel 3 agreement would enable banks to absorb Great Depression-style losses. But, such losses would dent regulatory capital considerably and far beyond the capital buffers that have been proposed to ensure that banks survive crisis periods without government support.     

Mutual fund performance when parent firms simultaneously manage hedge funds

This study examines the performance of mutual funds managed by firms that simultaneously manage hedge funds. We find that the reported returns of mutual funds in these “side-by-side” associations with hedge funds significantly underperformed those of mutual funds that shared similar fund and family characteristics but differed in that they were not affiliated with hedge funds. Digging deeper into performance, we find that the underperformance was confined to return gaps, a return measure that captures the impact of unobservable managerial actions. Interestingly, mutual funds with investment styles that were most closely aligned to affiliated hedge funds generated reported-return alphas and return gaps that underperformed by the greatest amount. Finally, we find that side-by-side mutual funds received less of a contribution to performance from IPO underpricing than similar unaffiliated mutual funds or affiliated hedge funds. Evidence does not support the hypothesis that affiliations with hedge funds allow side-by-side mutual funds to attract superior stock-picking talent. Our evidence does not allow us to rule out the possibility that management firms maximized fee income by strategically transferring performance from mutual funds to hedge funds.     

UK equity mutual fund alphas make a comeback

In this study, we re-visit the performance of 887 active UK equity mutual funds using a new approach proposed by Angelidis, Giamouridis, and Tessaromatis. The authors argue that mutual funds stock selection is driven by the benchmark index, so if the benchmark generates alpha, there will be a bias in interpretation of manager's stock-picking ability. In their model, the alpha of a fund is adjusted by the benchmark's alpha. By applying this method, we eliminate bias inflicted by the persistently negative alphas of FTSE 100 Index in the period 1992–2013. We find that adjusted Fama–French and Carhat alphas of UK equity mutual funds are higher than those implied by the standard three- and four-factor models and are overall positive, contrary to most of the existing literature on UK fund performance. This result is consistent across funds' investment styles and robust to the use of FTSE Small Cap as benchmark for a sub-sample of small cap funds.