The alchemy of CDO credit ratings

Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) were one of the largest and fastest growing segments of the structured finance market, fueling the 2003-2007 boom in syndicated loans and leveraged buyouts. The credit crisis brought CLO issuance to a halt, and as a result the leveraged loan market dried up. Similar to other structured finance products, investors in CLOs rely heavily on credit rating provided by the rating agencies, yet little is known about CLO rating practices. This paper attempts to fill the gap. Using novel hand-collected data on 3912 tranches of collateralized loan obligations we document the rating practices of CLOs and analyze their structures.     

Leads and lags in sovereign credit ratings

This paper analyses lead–lag relationships in sovereign ratings across five agencies, and finds evidence of interdependence in rating actions. Upgrade (downgrade) probabilities are much higher, and downgrade (upgrade) probabilities are much lower for a sovereign issuer with a recent upgrade (downgrade) by another agency. S&P tends to demonstrate the least dependence on other agencies, and Moody’s tends to be the first mover in upgrades. Rating actions by Japanese agencies tend to lag those of the larger agencies, although there is some evidence that they lead Moody’s downgrades.     

Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis

We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.     

Compensation incentives of credit rating agencies and predictability of changes in bond ratings and financial strength ratings

Over the past decade there has been mixed evidence on the lead–lag relation between issuer-paid and investor-paid credit rating agencies. We investigate the lead–lag relationship for changes in bond ratings (BRs) and financial strength ratings (FSRs), for the US insurance industry, where FSRs impose market discipline. First, we find that changes in issuer-paid BRs are led by changes in investor-paid BRs, even over a period that issuer-paid agencies have improved their timeliness. Second, information flows in both directions between changes in issuer-paid BRs and FSRs. Third, issuer-paid FSRs are predictable by investor-paid BRs. Fourth, the lead effect of investor-paid downgrades is economically significant as it is associated with an unconditional, post-event, 30-day cumulative abnormal return of −4%. This return is a result of investor-paid downgrades in BRs, which predict more downgrades in the following 90 days (same period return of −11%).     

Costly external finance,corporate investment,and the subprime mortgage credit crisis

We study the effect of the recent financial crisis on corporate investment. The crisis represents an unexplored negative shock to the supply of external finance for non-financial firms. Corporate investment declines significantly following the onset of the crisis, controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying measures of investment opportunities. Consistent with a causal effect of a supply shock, the decline is greatest for firms that have low cash reserves or high net short-term debt, are financially constrained, or operate in industries dependent on external finance. To address endogeneity concerns, we measure firms’ financial positions as much as four years prior to the crisis, and confirm that similar results do not follow placebo crises in the summers of 2003–2006. Nor do similar results follow the negative demand shock caused by September 11, 2001. The effects weaken considerably beginning in the third quarter of 2008, when the demand-side effects of the crisis became apparent. Additional analysis suggests an important precautionary savings motive for seemingly excess cash that is generally overlooked in the literature.     

On syndicate composition, corporate structure and the certification effect of credit ratings

We assess the relative importance of ratings versus stock exchange listings in reducing information asymmetry using a dataset of syndicated loans to public and private firms in the UK. We find that the certification effect of ratings is largest for private firms and that syndicates are smallest if firms are privately held or unrated. Moreover, we find that the marginal effect of being stock exchange listed is insignificant once these firms are rated. Exploiting the heterogeneity among lenders, we find that especially foreign bank and non-bank investors do not provide capital if firms are unrated. Our paper highlights the information produced by rating agencies as an important mechanism by which ratings improve access to capital. Our results also emphasize the importance of syndicate moral hazard on the supply of uninformed capital: bank-borrower relationships significantly increase the loan share syndicated to investors particularly if firms are not listed and unrated.     

A public good approach to credit ratings – From concept to reality

From the onset of the 2008–2009 financial crisis to the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, credit rating agencies have been assigned considerable blame. Reforming the credit rating industry has hence become an important policy issue. In addition to the regulatory efforts in the context of accepting the for-profit business model of ratings, there is a growing realization that credit ratings bear the characteristics of a public good. Financial market participants need reliable, transparent and independent assessment of credit risks. Credit ratings are therefore better viewed as an infrastructure matter. However, the proposed regulations seem to have missed this point. This paper introduces a new approach to credit ratings undertaken by the Risk Management Institute at the National University of Singapore that is predicated on the provision of credit ratings as a public good. With a public good alternative in place, the currently predominant for-profit business model may be counterbalanced.     

The effects of regulation on industry structure and trade generation in the US securities industry

This study investigates the effects of Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement on market share within the US securities industry as well as the determinants of market share during 1996–2004. We find that these regulations did not cause top brokers to lose market share in spite of their reduction of information asymmetries existing within the brokerage industry. They did, however, significantly reduce the quarterly variability in market share changes. We find that Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement reduce the importance of an all-star analyst, issuer affiliation, and analyst optimism for gaining brokerage market share. We further discover that the Global Research Analyst Settlement increases the importance of coverage as a market share determinant while reducing the value of analyst experience for non-top brokers. We find that our results remain robust even when we limit our analysis to a set of pure brokerage firms.     

Counter-cyclical substitution between trade credit and bank credit

This paper explores the substitution relationship between trade credit and bank credit, and its counter-cyclic dynamic pattern through economic cycles. We propose a new theoretical model, using a mechanism design method, which predicts the substitution between the two credits and its counter-cyclic behavior, subject to the condition of technological efficiency not less than one. This model also helps explain the somewhat contradictory evidence in the literature, on the relationship between the two credits. We present empirical evidence on the substitution effect and its counter-cyclic behavior, by using a balanced panel data set of 284 listed Chinese companies for the period 1998-2006. We further find that the substitution behaves counter-cyclically with respect to the coincident macroeconomic indicator, namely, GDP. Our empirical analysis also has some new features such as treating endogeneity carefully and incorporating the lag-effect of trade credit coherently.     

The informational content of unsolicited ratings

This paper investigates whether the stock market reacts to unsolicited ratings for a sample of firms rated by S&P between January 1996 and December 2005. We first analyze the stock market reaction to the assignment of an initial unsolicited rating. We find evidence that this reaction is negative and particularly accentuated for small Japanese firms. We then analyze the stock market reaction to changes in unsolicited ratings for a Japanese sub-sample and find that here too the stock market reacts negatively. Our results imply that unsolicited ratings convey new information to the stock market and that investors react to this information. Although unsolicited ratings are based on publicly available information only, the stock market seems to be inefficient in processing this information for Japanese companies.     

Trade credit and bank credit: Evidence from recent financial crises

This paper studies the effect of financial crises on trade credit for a sample of 890 firms in six emerging economies. Although the provision of trade credit increases right after a crisis, it contracts in the following months and years. Firms that are financially more vulnerable to crises extend less trade credit to their customers. We argue that the decline in aggregate trade credit ratios is driven by the reduction in the supply of trade credit that follows a bank credit crunch, consistent with the “redistribution view” of trade credit provision, whereby bank credit is redistributed via trade credit from financially stronger firms to weaker firms.     

The information content of trade credit

During 1992–2007, suppliers financed almost 10% of the total assets of US listed firms. This intensive usage of trade credit is puzzling in the light of its high (implicit) costs. By arguing that trade credit use provides valuable information to outside investors, we first derive a theoretical model that predicts a positive correlation between trade credit use and the quality of the firm’s investments. Then, using several proxies for firm’s investment quality (Z-score, return on assets, and long-run abnormal returns), we show that this prediction receives strong support from a large sample of US firms.     

Trade credit and company performance during the 2008 financial crisis

We investigate whether the 2008 financial crisis had an impact on companies’ trade credit, and whether changes in trade credit mitigated the crisis’s impact on firm profitability. We document that the availability of trade credit decreased, and that this decline is more pronounced, the higher the companies’ pre‐crisis reliance on short‐term debt. We further report evidence that the redistribution hypothesis holds during crisis periods. Finally, we show that the crisis had a negative impact on company performance, but that this impact was lower (greater) for firms that report an increase in trade receivables (payables) in crisis compared to pre‐crisis periods.     

The adjustment of credit ratings in advance of defaults

This paper assesses biases in credit ratings and lead–lag relationships for near-to-default issuers with multiple ratings by Moody’s and S&P. Based on defaults from 1997 to 2004, we find evidence that Moody’s seems to adjust its ratings to increasing default risk in a timelier manner than S&P. Second, credit ratings by the two US-based agencies are not subject to any home preference. Third, given a downgrade (upgrade) by the first rating agency, subsequent downgrades (upgrades) by the second rating agency are of greater magnitude in the short term. Fourth, harsher rating changes by one agency are followed by harsher rating changes in the same direction by the second agency. Fifth, rating changes by the second rating agency are significantly more likely after downgrades than after upgrades by the first rating agency. Additionally, we find evidence for serial correlation in rating changes up to 90 days subsequent to the rating change of interest after controlling for rating changes by the second rating agency.     

Information asymmetry and firms’ credit market access: Evidence from Moody's credit rating format refinement

I exploit Moody's 1982 credit rating refinement to examine its effects on firms’ credit market access, financing decisions, and investment policies. While firms’ ex ante yield spread can partially predict the direction of refinement changes, firms with refinement upgrades experience an additional decrease in their ex post borrowing cost compared with firms with downgrades. The former subsequently also issue more debt and rely more on debt financing over equity than the latter. Lastly, upgraded firms have more capital investments, less cash accumulation, and faster asset growth than downgraded firms. These findings show that credit market information asymmetry significantly affects firms’ real outcomes.     

Interaction of market and credit risk

Experience during the financial crisis illustrates that the integrated measurement and management of different forms of risk remains a challenge for industry practitioners, researchers and financial supervisors alike. In the context of related literature, this article summarizes new research on the interaction of market and credit risk and implications for risk management that is presented in this special issue. The research covered highlights in particular the errors that can occur in the aggregation of the two types of risk and the strong relationships between them that suggest caution in the use of pragmatic distinctions between them. The article also touches on some research-based lessons for supervisory policies and suggests some directions for future research.     

The performance of reverse leveraged buyouts

Reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) have received increased public scrutiny but attracted little systematic study. We collect a comprehensive sample of 526 RLBOs between 1981 and 2003 and examine the three-year and five-year stock performance of these offerings. RLBOs appear to perform as well as or better than other initial public offerings and the stock market as a whole, depending on the specification. Evidence exists of a deterioration of returns over time.     

The Costs of Issuing Preferred Stock

U.S. firms commonly use preferred stocks to raise external capital. Yet this hybrid security's issuance costs and offer yields have not been previously examined in a systematic manner. We analyze a sample of 3,042 U.S. preferred stocks issued between 1980 and 1999. We find that convertible issues, which are riskier than straight issues, entail higher gross spreads and other direct expenses. Scale, credit rating, and industry effects influence gross spreads and issuance costs. We also compare preferred stocks yields with various bellwether bond yields. Our results support the tax‐based argument that suggests that yields on preferred stocks should be lower than comparable risky bonds.     

Determinants of start-up firm external financing worldwide

The typical new start-up firm acquires external financing in stages through its development. Researchers have frequently examined the later stages of financing; however, they have rarely analyzed the early stages of financing. This study examines the determinants of the initial start-up financing of entrepreneurial firms in 27 countries. There are information asymmetries and moral hazard problems inherent in the funding of an initial start-up firm. Empirical results show that institutional investors rely on the experience of entrepreneurs in managing start-ups and the quality of investor protection to reduce moral hazard. On the other hand, informal investors are also common in initial start-up funding. They tend to be attracted to the type of products in the new firm. In comparison, informal investors are likely to have a social relationship with the entrepreneur, and thus have information about that person’s skill and character, which renders entrepreneurial experience less important.     

Fund size, limited attention and valuation of venture capital backed firms

This paper examines the effect of fund size on investee firm valuations in the venture capital market. We show a convex (U-shape) relationship between fund size and firm valuations. We further document that firm valuations are positively correlated to measures of limited attention. In addition, we show a concave (inverse U-shape) relationship between fund size and venture's performance measured as the probability of successful exits. Further, this relation is particularly strong when the pre-money valuation of the investment is high. Our findings hold across a wide range of robustness checks, including but not limited to sample selection and correction for unobserved company-level value drivers. Our findings support the notion that there is diseconomy of scale in the venture capital industry, which is partially due to the constraints from the quality and quantity of human capital when fund size grows.