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1.
We prove that, by the method of construction of a coalition production economy due to Sun et al. [Sun, N., Trockel, W., Yang, Z., 2008. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an nn-person game. Journal of Mathematical Economics 44, 853–860], every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Namely, for every TU game, we can construct a coalition production economy that generates the given game. We briefly discuss the relationship between the core of a given TU game and the set of Walrasian payoff vectors for the induced coalition production economy.  相似文献   

2.
In a pure exchange economy with differential information and a finite set of traders, physical commodities and states of nature, we characterize the Walrasian expectations or Radner equilibria by using the veto power of the grand coalition. We prove that an allocation x is a Radner equilibrium allocation if and only if it is “privately non-dominated” by the grand coalition in every economy obtained by perturbing the original initial endowments in the direction of x. The first and second welfare theorems become particular cases of our main result. Since the deterministic Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie model is a special case of the differential information economy model we also provide a new characterization of the Walrasian equilibria.  相似文献   

3.
We study an economy where all goods entering preferences or production processes are indivisible. Fiat money not entering consumers’ preferences is an additional perfectly divisible parameter. We establish a First and Second Welfare Theorem and a core equivalence result for the rationing equilibrium concept introduced in Florig and Rivera (2005a). The rationing equilibrium can be considered as a natural extension of the Walrasian notion when all goods are indivisible at the individual level but perfectly divisible at the level of the entire economy.  相似文献   

4.

We consider convergence to Walrasian equilibrium in a situation where firms know only market price and their own cost function. We term this a situation of minimal information. We model the problem as a large population game of Cournot competition. The Nash equilibrium of this model is identical to the Walrasian equilibrium. We apply the best response (BR) dynamic as our main evolutionary model. This dynamic can be applied under minimal information as firms need to know only the market price and the their own cost to compute payoffs. We show that the BR dynamic converges globally to Nash equilibrium in an aggregative game like the Cournot model. Hence, it converges globally to the Walrasian equilibrium under minimal information. We extend the result to some other evolutionary dynamics using the method of potential games.

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5.
In this paper we establish the existence of (a) an optimal bankruptcy rule which enables us to describe the Walrasian trading economy as a game with trade in fiat money; and (b) non- cooperative equilibrium points of this game which (in terms of prices and the final allocation yielded) include the competitive equilibrium points, and the accompanying money rate of interest (induced by borrowing at a central bank), when the bankruptcy rule is different from optimal.  相似文献   

6.
We attempt to determine the probability of a blocking coalition from a notion of being non- Walrasian which does not rely on the explicit use of norms. The key concept introduced is that of Walras degrees. Theorem 1 gives the bounds of the probability of blocking in terms of these degrees. Theorem 2 gives the asymptotic conditional probability of a blocking coalition given that coalitions are losing. The relationship between the degrees of the conventional norms on allocations is also investigated.  相似文献   

7.
This paper raises once more the Keynesian challenge of the classical doctrine that an unguided market economy has a natural tendency towards optimal employment of resources. By means of a simple macromodel, we show that if quantity expectations are incorporated into the Walrasian model, then it is no longer generally true that the ‘invisible hand’ leads the economy to Walrasian equilibrium. Instead, it may lead the economy to a kind of Keynesian equilibrium in which the firms' sales expectations constitute a binding constraint on production. Moreover, while Pareto optimum is unstable and hence unattainable in our model, a ‘second-best’ optimum among stable equilibria exists and requires a public sector. Accordingly, a trade-off between efficiency and other policy aims occurs only at tax rates above the positive tax rate in optimum  相似文献   

8.
The object of this paper is to demonstrate in economic terms the equivalence of the problem of aggregation in input-output analysis with coalition and bargaining problems. Depending on the specific norm for aggregation it is shown that the aggregation criterion and the coalition forming criterion in an n-person game leads to a broadly similar situation in the market sense given that the market operates to that criterion. It is also shown that a mathematical analogue to this formulation may be obtained via the techniques of geometric programming.  相似文献   

9.
We show that for a large class of both finite and mixed market games, the Bargaining Set coincides with the core, and is strictly larger than the set of all Walrasian allocations. This is to be constrasted with the recently established equivalence between the three sets in atomless markets.  相似文献   

10.
We consider a pure exchange economy with finitely many indivisible commodities that are available only in integer quantities. We prove that in such an economy with a sufficiently large number of agents, but finitely many agents, the strong core coincides with the set of expenditure-minimizing Walrasian allocations. Because of the indivisibility, the preference maximization does not imply the expenditure minimization. An expenditure-minimizing Walrasian equilibrium is a state where, under some price vector, all agents satisfy both the preference maximization and the expenditure minimization.  相似文献   

11.
We criticize the R.E.E. approach to asymmetric information general equilibrium because it does not explain how information gets ‘into’ the prices. This leads to well-known paradoxes. We suggest a multiperiod game instead, where the flow of information into and out of prices is explicitly modeled. In our game Nash equilibria (N.E.) (1) generalize Walrasian equilibria to asymmetric information, (2) exist generically, (3) eliminate pure speculation, (4) allow prices to reveal information and markets to become more efficient over time, (5) are consistent with the weak efficient markets hypothesis that tracking past prices is not profitable, (6) yet always lead to higher utility for better informed agents (such as experts). Throughout the paper we use one concrete game. In the last section we prove that there is a broad range of games that would have the same properties.  相似文献   

12.
We consider a class of economies with public goods that have the following properties: (i) The preferences of the agents are convex, interior, and strictly increasing. (ii) The technology for production of public goods is a closed convex cone that satisfies free disposal and an additional mild assumption. No assumptions are made on continuity, completeness or transitivity of preferences. We provide a continuous and feasible mechanism that implements the Lindahl equilibrium by Nash equilibria, and has the following property: For every economy in our class every Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism is a strong Nash equilibrium.  相似文献   

13.
We establish new characterizations of Walrasian expectations equilibria based on the veto mechanism in the framework of differential information economies with a complete finite measure space of agents. We show that it is enough to consider the veto power of a single coalition, consisting of the entire set of agents, to obtain the Aubin private core. Moreover, we investigate on the veto power of arbitrarily small and big coalitions, providing an extension to mixed markets of well known Schmeidler (1972) and Vind’s (1972) results in terms of Aubin private core allocations.  相似文献   

14.
We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations.  相似文献   

15.
The natural projection plays a fundamental role to understand the behavior of the Walrasian economies. In this paper, we extend this method to analyze the behavior of infinite dimensional economies. We introduce the definition of the social equilibrium set, and we show that there exists a bijection between this set and the Walrasian equilibrium set of an infinite dimensional economy. In order to describe the main topological characteristics of both sets, we analyze the main differential characteristics of the excess utility function and then, we extend the method of the natural projection as suggested by Y. Balasko.  相似文献   

16.
We establish an existence theorem for Cournot–Walras equilibria in a monopolistically competitive economy. Instead of the traditional approach which depends on Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, we employ the theories of aggregative games and best reply potential games. We show that, if there exists a representative consumer, under some conditions on preferences and production technologies, the profit maximization game is a (pseudo) best reply potential game. Hence, the existence of the equilibria is proved independently of the well known convex-valued assumption on the best responses. Although our assumptions result in the additive separability on a utility function of a representative consumer, the existence of increasing returns and indivisible productions can be allowed. In our model, it is shown that the game played by firms exhibits strategic substitutes whether the products of firms are substitutes or complements, and this plays an important role for the existence of the equilibria.  相似文献   

17.
杨亚梅 《价值工程》2005,24(12):12-15
在经济全球化和中国加入WTO的背景下,我国掀起一股“外资并购热”。人们普遍认为,利用发达国家新一轮产业结构调整的机会,借助国际并购浪潮,促进外资参与国企的改组改造,推动国有企业与跨国公司合作,将对盘活国企存量资本,促进我国的产业结构调整和相关行业整合产生积极影响。但是,并购只是外资进入中国的一种途径而已。本文通过对外资并购在我国的发展趋势和动因的分析,指出其对我国经济的影响及我国应采取的对策。  相似文献   

18.
A pillage game is a formal model of Hobbesian anarchy as a coalitional game. The technology of pillage is specified by a power function that determines the power of each coalition as a function of its members and their wealth. A coalition can despoil any other coalition less powerful than itself. The present paper studies the problem of achieving an efficient allocation of resources when the required reallocation changes the distribution of power. For example, land redistribution may increase total production, but may also deprive the original owners of the power they need to compel compensation. In this case the original owners would block the redistribution. Previous work on pillage games has focused on the stable set (von Neumann–Morgenstern solution) as a representation of a stable balance of power. However, the balance of power is typically too delicate to support all efficient allocations. The present paper shows that for a large class of power functions, a recently developed extension of the stable set, called the legitimate set, can be rich enough to support all efficient allocations.   相似文献   

19.
We show that a profit maximizing monopolistic intermediary may behave approximately like a Walrasian auctioneer by setting bid and ask prices nearly equal to Walrasian equilibrium prices. In our model agents choose to trade either through the intermediary or privately. Buyers (sellers) trading through the intermediary potentially trade immediately at the ask (bid) price, but sacrifice the spread as gains. A buyer or seller who trades privately shares all the gains to trade with this trading partner, but risks costly delay in finding a partner. We show that as the cost of delay vanishes, the equilibrium bid and ask prices converge to the Walrasian equilibrium prices. Received: 2 February 1996 / Accepted: 28 March 1997  相似文献   

20.
Abstract. We consider a discrete time, pure exchange infinite horizon economy with consumers and consumption goods per period. Within the framework of decentralized mechanisms, we show that for any given consumption trade at any period of time, say at time one, the consumers will need in general an infinite dimensional (informational) space to identify such a trade as an intertemporal Walrasian one. However, we show a set of environments where the Walrasian trades at each period of time can be achieved as the equilibrium trades of a sequence of decentralized competitive mechanisms, using only both current prices and quantities to coordinate decisions. Received: 1 December 1999 / Accepted: 31 October 2000  相似文献   

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