The testable implications of zero-sum games

We study collective choices from the revealed preference theory viewpoint. For every product set of individual actions, joint choices are called Nash-rationalizable if there exists a preference relation for each player such that the selected joint actions are Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. We characterize Nash-rationalizable joint choice behavior by zero-sum games, or games of conflicting interests. If the joint choice behavior forms a product subset, the behavior is called interchangeable. We prove that interchangeability is the only additional empirical condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-cooperative games.     

Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of buyer types known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses of the agent, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog offers. In the second stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm and product-price pair from that firm’s catalog. By backward induction, this Stackelberg game with asymmetric information reduces to a game over catalogs with payoff indeterminacies. In particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or across catalogs, corresponding to any catalog profile offered by firms there may be multiple possible expected firm payoffs, all consistent with the rational optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types. The resolution of these indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which emerges in the market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular game over catalogs, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game. We call such a mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we address in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism—and therefore, does there exist a Nash equilibrium for the catalog game? We show under fairly mild conditions on primitives that catalog games naturally possess tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash equilibria.     

Pseudocontinuous functions and existence of Nash equilibria

In topological spaces, we introduce a new class of functions (pseudocontinuous functions) and we present some characterizations and properties. In particular, we show that any preference relation endowed of utility functions is continuous if and only if any utility is pseudocontinuous. A maximum theorem is proved for such a class of functions and connections with similar results are investigated. Finally, the existence of Nash equilibria for games with pseudocontinuous payoffs is obtained.     

Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

This paper makes the observation that a finite Bayesian game with diffused and disparate private information can be conceived of as a large game with a non-atomic continuum of players. By using this observation as its methodological point of departure, it shows that (i) a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE) exists in a finite Bayesian game with private information if and only if a Nash equilibrium exists in the induced large game, and (ii) both Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal BNE exist in finite Bayesian games with private information. In particular, it shows these results to be a direct consequence of results for a version of a large game re-modeled for situations where different players may have different action sets.     

Large economies and two-player games

We characterize the core and the competitive allocations of a continuum economy as strong Nash equilibria of an associated game with only two players.     

Impossibility of Nash implementation in two-person economies

In this note, we prove two impossibility results of Nash implementation in two-person economies. First, we will show the non-existence of continuous and balanced mechanisms which implement the Walrasian correspondence. Second, by adding a convexity assumption of mechanisms, we present the impossibility of continuous implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations in balanced way. Received: 16 April 1996 / Accepted: 25 April 1997     

会计信息失真中的纳什均衡

文章针对会计造假和监督行为建立博弈模型,运用纳什均衡理论,分析当前会计信息失真的重要原因,同时提出了防范和治理措施。     

The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information

This paper studies the decision-theoretic foundation for the notion of stability in the dynamic context of strategic interaction. We formulate and show that common knowledge of rationality implies a “stable” pattern of behavior in extensive games with perfect information. In the “generic” case, our approach is consistent with Aumann’s [Aumann, R.J., 1995. Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality. Games and Economic Behavior 8, 6–19] result that common knowledge of rationality leads to the backward induction outcome.     

第三方物流资源整合的纳什均衡分析

我国第三方物流自出现以来,取得了迅速的发展,但发展水平不高,功能结构单一.对第三方物流进行资源整合,成为加快我国物流发展过程中急需解决的问题.本文在简析我国第三方物流发展现状和整合步骤的基础上,通过建立博弈模型,进行纳什均衡分析,指出政府和行会在整合中的重要作用;最后进一步论述了政府和行会在第三方物流资源整合中的工作.     

Coalitional games with veto players: Consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes

Following Dagan et al. [Dagan, N., Volij, O., Serrano, R. (1997). A non-cooperative view on consistent bankruptcy rules, Games Econ. Behav. 18, 55–72], we construct an extensive form game for veto-balanced TU games in which a veto player is the proposer and the other players are responders. The set of Nash outcomes of this extensive form game is described, and compared to solutions of TU games such as the nucleolus, kernel and egalitarian core. We find necessary and sufficient conditions under which the nucleolus of the game is a Nash outcome.     

The relationship between revealed preference and the Slutsky matrix

This paper presents a method of calculating the utility function from a smooth demand function whose Slutsky matrix is negative semi-definite and symmetric. The calculated utility function is the unique upper semi-continuous function corresponding with the demand function. Moreover, we present an axiom for demand functions. We show that under the strong axiom, this new axiom is equivalent to the existence of the corresponding continuous preference relation. If the demand function obeys this axiom, the calculated utility function is also continuous. Further, we show that the mapping from the demand function into a continuous preference relation is continuous, which ensures the applicability of our results for econometrics. Moreover, if this demand function satisfies the rank condition, then our utility function is smooth. Finally, we show that under an additional axiom, the above results hold even if the demand function has corner solutions.     

Non-manipulability in Walrasian cost games

JEL classification: D41, D51 Received: 24 December 1999 / Accepted: 18 October 2001     

Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.     

A note on the symmetry of all Nash equilibria in games with increasing best replies

It is well known that a symmetric game has only symmetric (pure strategy) Nash equilibria if its best-reply correspondences admit only increasing selections and its strategy sets are totally ordered. Several nonexamples of the literature show that this result is generally false when the totality condition of the relation that orders the strategy sets is simply dropped. Making use of the structure of interaction functions, this note provides sufficient conditions for the symmetry of all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in symmetric games where best-reply correspondences admit only increasing selections, but strategy sets are not necessarily totally ordered.     

纳什均衡在中小物流企业物流安全监管中的应用

从纳什均衡理论出发,分析物流安全监管部门与中小物流企业之间在物流安全监管中的相互角力情况,并提出了一些改进物流安全监管部门监督、改善企业物流安全运作的途径。     

Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies

We prove that every compactly generated non-transferable utility (NTU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. The set of Walrasian payoff vectors for our induced coalition production economy coincides with the inner core of the balanced cover of the original game. This equivalence depends heavily on our representation. We exemplify that this equivalence need not hold in other representations. We also give a sufficient condition for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for our induced coalition production economy.     

基于纳什联盟博弈的移动商务生态圈价值分配模型

文章在价值链、价值网的基础上构建了移动商务生态圈,通过系统动力学模型模拟生态圈的投资收益及价值分配模型。通过模拟数据求解纳什联盟博弈均衡解,根据模拟数据应用纳什联盟博弈,求解出移动商务生态圈效用最优的价值分配比例。建立这样的价值分配模型有助于建立共生、互生和再生的移动商务生态圈。