Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

Financial crises: Lessons from the Nordic experience

The current financial crisis is the 19th such crisis in the post-war period in advanced economies. Recent literature classifies the Nordic crises in Norway, Sweden and Finland in late 1980s and early 1990s among the Big Five crises that have happened before the current crisis, which is now of a global nature. This paper outlines the developments of the Nordic crises, reasons behind them and crisis management by the authorities. Relatively more emphasis is placed on the Finnish crisis, as it was the deepest one. The paper concludes by considering the lessons that can be drawn from the Nordic crises.     

中国金融安全网建设:理论回顾、国际经验与制度设计

金融安令网是一把"双刃剑",它在防止银行挤兑和危机蔓延的同时,削弱了市场纪律,产生了严重的道德风险问题,影响金融稳定.目前我国金融安全网建设存在诸多问题,需要借鉴国际经验,结合国情,加快制定我国金融安全网的有关法律法规、加强我国银行业信息披露、完善中央银行"最后贷款人"制度、建立显性存款保险制度以及加强银行业市场纪律,以构建我国激励相容的金融安全网.     

Lessons from Financial Crises: The Role of Clearinghouses

This article investigates the historical development of clearinghouses and their ability to deal with financial crises. The article first reviews the role of bank clearinghouses in the Panic of 1907, the final crisis of the National Banking Era that led to the founding of the Federal Reserve, and examines how the clearinghouses responded by issuing transactions media, despite legal obstacles, and providing coinsurance among the members. The article then traces the late nineteenth and twentieth century evolution of clearinghouses at futures exchanges to understand how they promote stability and withstand crises by mutualizing risks among members. The key feature of both bank and futures clearinghouses is the effective integration of the members during times of distress, illustrating how the private markets develop institutions and contracts to manage risk and respond to financial crises.     

Strategic Financial Management: Lessons from Seasoned Equity Offerings

Each of today's three dominant academic theories of capital structure has trouble explaining the financing behavior of companies that have seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). In conflict with the tradeoff theory, the authors’ recent studies of some 7,000 SEOs by U.S. industrial companies over the period 1970‐2017 notes that the vast majority of them—on the order of 80%—had the effect of moving the companies away from, rather than toward, their target leverage ratios. Inconsistent with the pecking‐order theory, SEO issuers have tended to be financially healthy companies with low leverage and considerable unused debt capacity. And at odds with the market‐timing theory, SEOs appear to be driven more by the capital requirements associated with large investment projects than by favorable market conditions. The authors’ findings also show that, in the years following their stock offerings, the SEO companies tend to issue one or more debt offerings, which have the effect of raising their leverage back toward their targets. Whereas each of the three theories assumes some degree of shortsightedness among financial managers, the authors’ findings suggest that long‐run‐value‐maximizing CFOs manage their capital structures strategically as opposed to opportunistically. They consider the company's current leverage in relation to its longer‐run target, its investment opportunities and long‐term capital requirements, and the costs and benefits of alternative sequences of financing transactions. This framework, which the authors call strategic financial management, aims to provide if not a unifying, then a more integrated, explanation—one that draws on each of the three main theories to provide a more convincing account of the financing and leverage decisions of SEO issuers.     

International spillovers of monetary policy: Lessons from Chile,Korea, and Poland

In this paper, we assess evidence on international monetary policy spillovers to domestic bank lending in Chile, Korea, and Poland, using confidential bank-level data and different measures of monetary policy shocks in relevant currency areas. These three emerging market economies are small and open, their banking systems do not have significant presence overseas, and they can be considered as price takers in the world economy. Such features allow for better identification of binding financial constraints and foreign monetary policy shocks. We find that the monetary policy shocks spill over into domestic bank lending, modifying the degree to which financial frictions tighten or relax, and this evidence is consistent with international bank lending and portfolio channels.     

吸取全球国际金融危机的经验教训

吸取全球国际金融危机的经验教训,能够有不同的视角,更要注意其全球性和关联性.其一,既要注重金融安全,又要反对金融霸权,必须抑制美元泛滥;其二,必须缩小贫富差距,弱化利益集团及其相互博弈,实现群体之间的利益制衡;其三,金融创新虚把握一定的度;其四,市场经济的美国模式不是唯一的,更不是最佳选择.     

麦道夫欺诈案对完善金融监管制度的启示

2008年12月,美国纳斯达克股票市场公司前董事会主席伯纳德·麦道夫因涉嫌欺诈被捕.这个案件主体与被害人身份特殊,欺诈规模大,延续时间长.对现行金融监管体制造成了巨大冲击,并为我国完善金融监管制度带来新的启示.     

Lessons from the Financial Crisis of 1907*

The story of the panic and crash of 1907 suggests that major financial crises can be the result of a convergence of certain market forces—forces of the market's “perfect storm,” if you will—that cause investors and depositors to react with alarm. The storm begins with a highly complex financial system, whose very complexity makes it difficult for anyone to know what might be going wrong. By definition, the multiple parts of the financial system are linked, which means that trouble in one institution, city, or region can travel easily and quickly to others. Buoyant growth in the economy makes the financial system more fragile, due partly to the demand for capital and partly to the tendency of some institutions to take more risk than is prudent. Leaders in government and the financial sector implement policies that inadvertently or otherwise elevate the exposure to risk of crisis. When an economic shock hits the financial system, the mood of the market swings from optimism to pessimism, creating a self‐reinforcing downward spiral. Collective action by leaders succeeds in arresting the spiral, thought he speed and effectiveness with which they act ultimately determines the length and severity of the crisis. In reflecting on the crash and panic of 1907, this article considers these market forces, both t heir interact ion with one another in the past and their possible relevance to market conditions a century later.     

Private Equity and Portfolio Companies: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Critics of private equity have warned that the high leverage often used in PE‐backed companies could contribute to the fragility of the financial system during economic crises. The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms could increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. The alternative hypothesis is that PE, with its operating capabilities, expertise in financial restructuring, and massive capital raised but not invested (“dry powder”), could increase the resilience of PE‐backed companies. In their study of PE‐backed buyouts in the U.K.—which requires and thereby makes accessible more information about private companies than, say, in the U.S.—the authors report finding that, during the 2008 global financial crisis, PE‐backed companies decreased their overall investments significantly less than comparable, non‐PE firms. Moreover, such PE‐backed firms also experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects were especially notable among smaller, riskier PE‐backed firms with less access to capital, and also for those firms backed by PE firms with more dry powder at the crisis onset. In a survey of the partners and staff of some 750 PE firms, the authors also present compelling evidence that PEs firms play active financial and operating roles in preserving or restoring the profitability and value of their portfolio companies.     

从“华尔街金融风暴”谈农业银行二级分行的风险管理

次贷危机引起华尔街金融风暴、进而导致的全球金融风暴，暴露出银行业当前风险管理的缺失。本文以此次金融风暴为戒，思考和分析了农行二级分行风险管理方面存在的问题和障碍，提出了解决此类问题的对策建议，对于加强当前农行风险管理具有一定的参考作用。     

International Financial Reporting Standards in an Emerging Economy: Lessons from Romania

International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are a reference point for the modernisation of accounting models in emerging economies. Previous literature documents a diverse IFRS experience, especially among emerging economies. The IFRS implementation strategy and local institutional characteristics shape the way in which the standards are used in practice. We use the Romanian case to illustrate the effect of various contextual factors, some historical, on the process and outcomes of IFRS implementation. We show that IFRS implementation can follow a different pattern in emerging economies.     

Financial Statement Fraud: Some Lessons from US and European Case Studies

This paper studies 14 companies that were subject to an official investigation arising from the publication of fraudulent financial statements. The research found senior management to be responsible for most fraud. Recording false sales was the most common method of financial statement fraud. Meeting external forecasts emerged as the primary motivation. Management discovered most fraud, although the discovery was split between incumbent and new management.     

金融控股公司的发展与借鉴

面对金融全球化的趋势，１９９９年美国《金融服务现代化法案》的通过，使美国金融控股公司的竞争优势开始显现，花旋集团的成功就是一个很好的例子，我国加入ＷＴＯ在即，借鉴与发展金融控股公司是我国金融业走向混业经营的必然选择。     

中美财务欺诈案的几点启示

我国注册会计师行业在经历了10余年的恢复创建期后，从20世纪90年代初开始，随着社会主义市场经济逐步向法制化、规范化方向发展，在内外因素交互作用的影响下，一些多年积聚的风险开始暴露。特别是进入2001年，以银广夏、麦科特为代表的一批上市公司造假案成了当年下半年中国股票市场大幅下跌的导火索，导致广大投资者蒙受了巨额经济损失，为其出具审计报告的会计师事务所及注册会计师受到了有关部门的严厉查处，注册会计师也一度成为社会各界指责的焦点。而当人们把信任的目光投向国际会计公司时，美国安然、世通、施乐等大型跨国公司又相…     

The Financial Crisis: Causes and Lessons*

The author argues that the root cause of the recent crisis was a housing bubble whose origins can be traced to loose monetary policy and a government housing policy that continually pushed for lower lending standards to increase home ownership. The negative consequences of such policies were amplified when transmitted throughout the financial system by financial institutions through the process of securitization. In attempting to assess culpability for the crisis and identify possible reforms, the author focuses on three categories:

• 1 Defects in Financial Products: Without criticizing derivatives and the process of securitization, the author identifies the sheer complexity of the securities as a major source of the problem—for which the solution is a simpler security design combined with greater disclosure about the underlying assets being securitized.
• 2 Defects in Risk Management: Thanks in large part to agency and other incentive problems, there was universal underestimation of risks by mortgage originators and financial institutions throughout the securitization chain. Changing incentive pay structures is part of the solution, and so are better accounting rules for SPEs. But more effective regulatory oversight and ending “too big to fail” may well be the only way to curb excessive private risk-taking.
• 3 Defects in Government Policy and Regulation: While acknowledging the need for more effective oversight, the author argues that there was ample existing authority for U.S. regulators to have addressed these issues. Lack of power and authority to regulate was not at the heart of the problem—the real problem was lack of foresight and judgment about the unexpected. After expressing doubt that regulators can prevent major financial failures, the author recommends greater attention to devising better methods of resolving such failures when they occur. One of the main goals is to ensure that losses are borne not by taxpayers but by private investors in a way that maintains incentives for market discipline while limiting spillover costs to the entire system.

     

What determines market development?: Lessons from Latin American derivatives markets with an emphasis on Chile

There is considerable heterogeneity in the development of derivatives markets in different countries. The question is: why? This paper addresses this question in the context of major derivatives markets in Latin America. The largest derivatives exchanges in Latin America are located in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. In addition, over-the-counter (OTC) markets exist in Chile and Peru. Excluding Peru, Chile's derivatives market is to date the least developed. We show that this is due to regulatory constrains and illiquidity. Domestic transactions are OTC, and consist mostly of exchange rate forwards. Recent changes in the Central Bank of Chile's exchange rate policy have not had a considerable impact on the aggregate trading volume of forwards. However, amendments made to the Law of Capital Markets in 2001 bring the possibility of having a more developed derivatives market in the future.     

我国农地金融制度建设的经验教训与启示

我国的农地金融制度建设从1988年贵州湄潭县的农地金融制度试验开始,发展到目前遍地开花的农地使用权抵押贷款,经历了一个逐步成熟的发展过程。本文挑选浙江嘉兴的土地流转经营权抵押贷款和丽水的林权抵押贷款作为案例,将它与贵州湄潭农地金融制度的试验进行对比分析,试图为我国农地金融制度的构建提供有价值的参考。     

日本跨国金融并购的经验与教训

日本跨国金融的历史较早，规模较大，并购效果争议颇多。分析日本当时面临的国内外经济金融环境以及金融机构自身条件，有助于理解日本跨国金融并购发展演变，总结其中的经验教训，对于中国当前具有重要的现实意义。