The impacts of multiperil crop insurance on Indonesian rice farmers and production

This article analyzes the effect of multiperil crop insurance policy for risk‐averse Indonesian rice farmers located in Tuban and Gresik Regencies of the East Java Province. Based on the model, comparative static analysis of a change in policy variables (coverage levels and premium subsidies) on input use through the coupling, wealth, and insurance effects are presented. The comparative static results are largely ambiguous and left as empirical questions. Consequently, the model is numerically simulated to quantify the effects of different coverage levels and subsidy rates on input use, expected net insurance payments, and certainty equivalents. The empirical analysis shows that MPCI crop insurance results in a decline in expected yield for coverage levels above about 82.5% for both regencies. Furthermore, higher subsidy rates amplify the reduction in input use and yield. Therefore, incomplete coverage with relatively low premium subsidies is the best policy to minimize the impact on input use and yield. However, from the farmers’ perspective, the optimal policy combination results from the highest coverage level and subsidy, which offer the largest expected net insurance payments and certainty equivalent.     

Effects of subsidized crop insurance on crop choices

This study focuses on how subsidized crop insurance affects crop choices. Crop insurance may change farm investments by reducing risks and providing subsidies. First, actuarially fair insurance reduces risks in crop production and marketing, holding the expected return constant. Second, insurance subsidies encourage farms to purchase crop insurance, which increases the expected return to insured risky crops. Farms also have many self‐insurance mechanisms such as crop diversification or working off the farm. We derive conditions under which (1) unsubsidized and actuarially fair crop insurance or (2) insurance premium subsidies lead to more investment in a risky higher return crop. We then examine the role of self‐insurance for these conditions. The impact of premium subsidies is decomposed into a direct profit effect and an indirect coverage effect. These effects are explained by substitutions between market insurance and self‐insurance and between a risky crop and a safe crop. We discuss each effect as a combination of subsidy and risk effects. Numerical illustrations show that an insurance subsidy has a larger impact on risky crop investments compared to that of an input subsidy when farms are more risk‐averse and have high costs of self‐insurance. The framework provides a novel way to evaluate subsidized crop insurance programs.     

Actuarial Fairness of Crop Insurance Rates with Constant Rate Relativities

Increased availability and demand for low-deductible crop insurance policies have increased focus on crop insurance rating methods. Actuarial fairness cannot be achieved if constant multiplicative factors are used to determine how premiums change as coverage levels increase. A comparison of premium rates generated by the factors used by the two most popular crop insurance products with those generated by a standard yield distribution shows that the popular insurance products overcharge for low-deductible policies in most counties. This overpricing may explain why large premium subsidies were required to induce farmers to move from low-deductible to high-deductible policies beginning in 2001.     

Demand for area crop insurance among litchi producers in northern Vietnam

This study examines the need for crop insurance for litchi production in northern Vietnam and how farmers might participate in such a program. Hypothetical insurance programs were developed which proposed all‐risk coverage based on area yields. This coverage was offered to farmers to determine both their interest in the program and how insurance features and farmer characteristics affected their decision to buy insurance. Farmers were also surveyed regarding their production practices, price and yield expectations, and financial and personal characteristics. Even before considering other program costs and government budget constraints, there is not a strong case for establishing a crop insurance program here. Results indicate that while farmer participation would be significant, crop insurance is not needed to achieve policy goals like raising farmer income or guaranteeing subsistence levels of income. Crop insurance is not needed to promote litchi production, which is already expanding rapidly due to its high profitability relative to other farm enterprises. In their choice of coverages, farmers preferred higher yield guarantee levels and lower indemnity prices. Estimated premiums were quite low when expressed as a percent of expected revenue, and farmers were not responsive to changes in premiums. Econometric analysis indicated that high income farmers were more likely to participate, but other farmer characteristics seemed to matter little. Anecdotal evidence suggested that farmers believed the expected area yields used to set insurance coverage levels were too low. Because litchi productivity varies significantly by tree age and the litchi planted area is expanding rapidly, determining appropriate values for expected area yields and insurance coverage levels appeared to be the biggest challenge in program design. It is hypothesized that additional farmer education about the relationship between area and farm yields and other aspects of area insurance could improve such a program's operation. Published by Elsevier Science B.V.     

Farmers' Health Insurance and Access to Health Care

We estimate farmers' health care consumption given their insurance status, explicitly taking into account the possible endogeneity of insurance. Data come from the 1996–2001 waves of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey conducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Results show that farmers have problems accessing affordable health insurance coverage, and these access problems lead to an overall reduction in the utilization of health care services by uninsured farmers. After controlling for selection, we observe quantitatively large and statistically significant direct effects of uninsurance on the utilization of health care services.     

Area Yield Index Insurance or Farm Yield Crop Insurance? Chinese Perspectives on Farmers' Welfare and Government Subsidy Effectiveness

We evaluate the performance of area yield crop insurance (AYCI) and farm yield crop insurance (FYCI) using farm-level yield data from China, focusing on their effects on farmers' welfare, and their cost-effectiveness in terms of government subsidy. Given a subsidy rate sufficient to generate a politically acceptable participation level, the price advantage of AYCI may no longer offset its higher basis risk, and consequently FYCI may be preferred by farmers. From the government's perspective, AYCI is the cheapest option to maintain reasonable farmer participation in insurance, but is not necessarily the most cost-effective choice. Our findings suggest that, contrary to an assumption that informs many developing country agricultural insurance programmes, AYCI schemes are not necessarily preferred to FYCI. Decisions on the structure of a national agricultural insurance programme should be based on careful consideration of local conditions.     

Demand for Crop Insurance in Developing Countries: New Evidence from India

Determining farmers’ real demand for crop insurance is difficult, especially in developing countries, where there is a lack of formal financial sector integration and a high reliance on informal risk mitigation options. We provide some new estimates of farmers’ willingness‐to‐pay for insurance in the context of a large‐scale subsidised programme in India. We conducted a discrete choice experiment with agricultural households across four states in India, enabling us to estimate preferences for specific insurance policy attributes such as coverage period, method of loss assessment, timing of indemnity payments and the cost of insurance. Our results suggest that farmers do value crop insurance under certain conditions and some are willing to pay a premium for such coverage in excess of the subsidised rates they are currently required to pay under this programme. In particular, farmers value the assurances that they will receive timely payouts when they incur losses, and may not have a strong preference for the method with which losses are assessed. On the other hand, farmers are quite sensitive to coverage periods. Our baseline assessment shows that when optimised to farmer requirements, there can be a sizeable demand for crop insurance by developing country farmers.     

An empirical analysis of the factors influencing farmer demand for forest insurance: Based on surveys from Lin’an County in Zhejiang Province of China

The lack of effective farmer demand is a major factor that restricts the development of China's forest insurance. To solve this problem, this study uses a Logit model to conduct an empirical analysis of relevant factors in the farmers’ demand for forest insurance, based on field survey data of Lin’an County, Zhejiang Province. The results show that the farmers’ understanding of forest insurance, the proportion of forestry revenues in the total household income, forest size, forest disaster frequency, forest insurance liability, insurance amount setup, and the farmers’ satisfaction regarding the premium subsidy policy, are the main factors that affect the farmers’ demand for forest insurance. Therefore, we propose to expand forest insurance promotion, raise the farmers’ income, rationally design insurance products, and optimize the forest premium subsidy policy to enhance the farmers’ willingness to participate in forest insurance.     

Motivations to grow energy crops: the role of crop and contract attributes

Perennial energy crops are a promising source of bioenergy whose production involves production risks, long‐term commitment of land and need for crop‐specific investments without the coverage of crop insurance potentially available for conventional crops. We conduct a choice experiment in five states in the Midwestern and South‐central regions of the U.S. to examine the effect of crop‐contract attributes on the joint discrete‐continuous choice decisions to adopt an energy crop and convert acres to it from a status quo use, while controlling for the effect of various farmers’ risk and time preferences, sociodemographic characteristics, and availability of crop insurance for conventional crops. We find robust evidence that high discount rates, high upfront establishment costs and need for crop‐specific investments create disincentives for adoption and allocation of land to energy crop production. The effects of riskiness of returns and risk aversion are less robust across specifications. The effect of conventional crop insurance on the energy crop adoption decision differs across types of insurance; in particular, farmers with revenue insurance are statistically significantly less likely to adopt an energy crop. Our results have implications for the design of effective contracts and policy incentives to induce the production of energy crops.     

Farmers' Preferences for Crop Insurance Attributes

Utilizing survey data from corn and soybean farmers in the Midwest, this study assesses the relative importance of different features of crop insurance products. Conjoint analysis results indicate that farmers' preferences for flexibility dominate both type of insurance and coverage level. Revenue insurance demand is greater by those who are larger, younger, and farm in more separate locations. Results are significant and consistent by size, insurance usage, leverage, and risk perception. The results permit prediction of market shares of competing insurance products within specific producer segments, and thus also provide guidance for targeting specific producer groups with new product configurations.     

Farmer Participation,Entry and Exit Decisions in the Italian Crop Insurance Programme

The factors affecting the demand for agricultural insurance in the USA have been extensively studied over the last two decades. However, the determinants of a farm's entry and exit decisions in the insurance market have received relatively little attention. Turnover in the insurance book of business is an important issue in most private and public crop insurance plans. Moreover, insurance markets in the EU are still largely under‐investigated. We investigate empirically the determinants of crop insurance participation in Italy. We show that the participation rate is high for large firms and that it is negatively correlated with crop diversification, which is itself a form of insurance. High premiums tend to inhibit both entry and exit from the insurance market. Larger and wealthier farms are more likely to adopt insurance and renew coverage over time. We discuss implications of our results for public intervention and the private industry. In particular, we demonstrate that the decision to drop coverage by an insured grower may differ significantly from the corresponding decision to enroll in an insurance programme by an uninsured farmer. To the extent that policymakers want to encourage participation in subsidized crop insurance programmes, education and outreach efforts toward uninsured farmers may differ substantially from those directed toward keeping insured farmers enrolled in the programme. We investigate these differences.     

Factors Influencing Farmers' Crop Insurance Decisions

Farmers' decisions to purchase crop insurance and their choices among alternative products are analyzed using a two-stage estimation procedure. The influences of risk perceptions, competing risk management options, as well structural and demographic differences are evaluated. The likelihood for crop insurance usage is found to be higher for larger, older, less tenured, more highly leveraged farms, and by those with higher perceived yield risks. The marginal effects of size, age, perceived yield risk, perceived importance of risk management activities, and other structural and demographic variables are identified in terms of their influences on choices among alternative crop insurance products.     

内蒙古自治区森林保险优化策略

内蒙古自治区森林保险自2013年正式启动试点工作以来,虽然森林保险的覆盖率稳步增长,但仍存在森林保险发展极不均衡、商品林参保所占比例偏低、保险产品尚难以满足灾害恢复需要、部分市县配套保费补贴压力过大、现行招标模式未能形成有效市场竞争等问题,这些问题严重制约内蒙古自治区森林保险的发展。为了促进内蒙古自治区森林保险高质量发展,必须丰富和创新保险产品,提高商品林参保意愿;提升灾害风险区划和费率厘定的科学性;调整保费补贴标准,减轻地方财政压力;优化完善招标机制,提高保险服务质量。     

How Do Health and Social Insurance Programmes Affect the Land and Labour Allocations of Farm Households? Evidence from Taiwan

To protect farmers from health care costs and risks to livelihood, most countries have developed special health and social insurance programmes specifically for farmers. While numerous studies have examined the determinants of participation in these programmes, little is known about how they influence famers' land and labour allocations. Without government‐sponsored health and social insurance, farmers may seek off‐farm employment in order to obtain similar benefits. Conditioning eligibility for social insurance on minimum land holdings and on‐farm work days can lead to delayed retirement and other forms of job lock. We investigate these issues using a unique dataset of 703,287 farms in Taiwan. After controlling for non‐random participation in Taiwan's social insurance programme, we find that the programme increases (decreases) on (off) farm labour supply, and decreases the amount of set‐aside land. This suggests that payments from social insurance substitute for those issued through land set‐aside programmes to some extent, and that failing to account for this substitution increases the cost of achieving both programmes' objectives.     

政策性森林保险开展状况的评价与分析——基于福建林农问卷调查的实证研究

基于福建林农问卷调查,对目前政策性森林保险的开展状况进行评价与分析。分析表明:林农对政策性森林保险开展状况的总体满意程度较高,但林农对森林保险的保险责任、保险金额和灾后理赔的评价不高,林农对森林保险的购买意愿并不强烈。针对这些问题,本文提出了完善目前政策性森林保险运行机制的对策建议。     

The influence of direct payments on farmers’ hail insurance decisions

We analyze determinants of hail insurance use of Swiss farmers, using FADN panel data covering the period 1990–2009. Mixed effect logistic regression models are estimated to identify the most important farm and farmer characteristics that trigger insurance use. In addition, information on local hail risk is taken into account in these models. It shows that larger farms, with specialization in crop production, and with larger local hail risks are more likely to adopt the hail insurance. Moreover, insurance users are usually older and better educated. Since the early 1990s, Swiss agricultural policy has reduced price support and introduced general and ecological direct payments. This has led to a much higher importance of direct payments for farmers’ incomes. Our analysis shows that this development has contributed to decreasing hail insurance adoption rates in Switzerland over the period considered. Our results indicate that the larger the share of direct payments for total farm revenue, the less attractive is insurance as a risk management strategy for farmers. This interdependency should be explicitly considered by agricultural policy in the design of support mechanisms.     

Adopting bioenergy crops: Does farmers’ attitude toward loss matter?

We apply prospect theory to examining farmers’ economic incentives to divert a share of their land to bioenergy crops (miscanthus and switchgrass in this study). Numerical simulation is conducted for 1,919 rain‐fed U.S. counties to identify the impact of loss aversion on bioenergy crop adoption, and how this impact is influenced by biomass price, discount rate, credit constraint status, and policy instruments. Results show that ignoring farmer's loss aversion causes overestimation of miscanthus production but underestimation of switchgrass production, particularly when farmers are credit constrained and have a high discount rate. We find that establishment cost subsidy induces more miscanthus production whereas subsidized energy crop insurance induces more switchgrass production. The efficacy of these two policy instruments, measured by biomass production increased by per dollar of government outlay, depends on the magnitude of farmers’ loss aversion and discount rate.     

Input use under cost-of-production crop insurance: Theory and evidence

There have been a number of previous studies that examined the effects of yield- or revenue-based crop insurance products on input use of farmers. However, no study has specifically investigated the input use impacts of a cost-of-production (COP) crop insurance policy, even though this type of crop insurance is the predominant one used in several other countries outside of the United States (such as the Philippines and China). This article aims to theoretically and empirically examine the effect of a COP crop insurance product on farmers’ chemical input use. Our theoretical model suggests that the effect of COP insurance on input use can either be positive or negative, with the resulting impact depending on the strengths of (a) the traditional moral hazard effect of insurance (i.e., an input use decreasing effect); versus (b) the marginal incentives to apply more inputs due to input levels being the main determinant for expected indemnity amounts in this type of insurance (i.e., an input use increasing effect). A survey data set from corn farmers in the Philippines is then used to empirically illustrate how a particular COP insurance product influences input use in a real-life context. In this case, we find that COP insurance increases the use of chemical inputs (e.g., fertilizers and total chemical expenditure), implying that the positive marginal incentive to apply more inputs dominates the negative moral hazard effect.     

Warming temperatures will likely induce higher premium rates and government outlays for the U.S. crop insurance program

Likely climate change impacts include damages to agricultural production resulting from increased exposure to extreme heat. Considerable uncertainty remains regarding impacts on crop insurance programs. We utilize a panel of U.S. corn yield data to predict the effect of warming temperatures on the mean and variance of yields, as well as crop insurance premium rates and producer subsidies. While we focus on corn, we demonstrate that the subsidy impacts are likely to carry over to other major program crops. We find that warming decreases mean yields and increases yield risk on average, which results in higher premium rates. Under a 1°C warming scenario, we find that premium rates at the 90% coverage level will increase by 39% on average; however, there is considerable statistical uncertainty around this average as the 95% confidence interval spans from 22% to 61%. We also find evidence of extensive cross‐sectional differences as the county‐level rate impacts range from a 10% reduction to a 63% increase. Results indicate that exposure to extreme heat and changes in the coefficient of variation are large drivers of the impacts. Under the 1°C warming scenario, we find that annual subsidy payments for the crop insurance program could increase by as much as $1.5 billion, representing a 22% increase relative to current levels. This estimate increases to 3.7 billion (57%) under a 2°C warming scenario. Our results correspond to a very specific counterfactual: the marginal effect of warming temperatures under current technology, production, and crop insurance enrollments. These impacts are shown to be smaller than the forecasted impacts under a commonly used end‐of‐century general circulation model for even the most optimistic CO₂ emissions projection.     

森林保险保费补贴政策林业产出激励效应评估

基于开展森林保险保费补贴政策的23个省(市、自治区)2014—2018年面板数据,在分析正向激励效应与负向抑制效应下的森林保险保费补贴政策产出效应传导机制的基础上,运用柯布-道格拉斯生产函数与面板数据模型从林业产出视角分别对全国层面、东部地区和中西部地区的森林保险保费补贴政策实施效果进行评估。结果表明:森林保险保费补贴政策存在产出激励效应,且存在1期滞后;同时,森林保险保费补贴对林业产出的促进效果受影响于林业风险,风险水平的上升会抑制保费补贴政策对林业产出的促进作用;森林保险保费补贴政策产出激励效应及林业风险对补贴政策产出激励效应的影响均存在区域差异性。最后,提出实施保费补贴差异化、逐步提升保障水平等建议。