An introduction to problems of economic development in the CMEA countries

Through the Asian financial crisis, many key international economic issues have come to the forefront the stability of the international financial system under the IMF, “Asian values”, the universal validity of the Asian Economic Development Model, China's leadership in the regional world economy, Japan's role in the region, and the immunity of Greater China from the current financial crisis. Currently, most Asian countries seem eager to redress structural problems involving the government sector, banking, and corporate governance. In the process of this full scale restructuring, Korea must reevaluate its economic relationship with Central Asia. This paper argues that Korean financial crisis stems basically from the system failure. Furthermore, since a small open economy carries with it intrinsic vulnerabilities, the government should be more careful in securing optimal foreign exchange, opening capital markets based on the economy's absorption capacity. In this respect, the banking industry should be run based on the profitability of capital. Once banking industries are distorted by the practice of government‐led policy loans, it is more difficult to correct those customized distortions. The banking industry should play a larger role as the “brain of the economy”, sensing abnormalities of the economy. Moreover, in today's increasingly interdependent global economic system, no single country can solve its problems without close coordination of its policy with the outside world. An early warning system to signal financial instability would help developing economies in modernizing and strengthening their domestic financial institutions and would also work as a supplement to the IMF standby fund. Also, human resource management has proven too important to be neglected. Central Asia could derive lessons from the above Asian “failure”, not the Asian “miracle”, to avoid inappropriate policies and to deepen its economic development.     

Europe’s hard fix: the Euro area

One of the most important economic policy issues is the selection of exchange rate regime. The possible choices range from the hard peg to a freely floating nominal exchange rate. Since the early 1990s a move towards the two corners of the exchange rate regime spectrum has been observed, especially in Europe with the creation of EMU. The move towards the corners is discussed from the perspective of Mundell’s “impossible trinity” which states that among the three desirable objectives (1) stabilisation of the exchange rate, (2) free international capital mobility, and (3) an effective monetary policy oriented towards domestic goals, only two can be mutually consistent. Issues related to economic integration and EMU are reviewed, focusing on the famous question: Does one size fit all? Since monetary union raises some interesting issues of political nature, not present in other exchange rate arrangements, the paper ends with a discussion about some political aspects of monetary union.     

Do Monetary Policy Announcements Affect Exchange Rate Returns and Volatility of Returns? Some Evidence from High‐Frequency Intra‐Day South African Data

This paper examines the temporal effect of domestic monetary policy surprises on both returns and volatility of returns of the South African rand/U.S. dollar exchange rate. The analysis in this “event study” proceeds using intra‐day minute‐by‐minute exchange rate data, repo rate data from the South African Reserve Bank's scheduled monetary policy announcements, and market consensus repo rate forecasts. A carefully selected sample over the period August 2003 to November 2017 ensures that the change in monetary policy is exogenous to the exchange rate. We find statistically and economically significant responses in intra‐day high‐frequency South African rand/U.S. dollar exchange rate returns and volatility of exchange rate returns to domestic interest rate surprises, but anticipated changes have no bearing on exchange rate returns and their volatility. The empirical results also indicate that there is an instantaneous response of the rand/dollar exchange rate to monetary policy surprises and that monetary policy news is an important determinant of the exchange rate until at least 42 minutes after the pronouncement – suggesting a high degree of market “efficiency” in its mechanical sense (although not necessarily in the deeper economic‐informational sense) in processing this information. Essentially, the asymmetric GARCH results exhibit no leverage effects – positive and negative information shocks have symmetric effects on conditional variance.     

Inflation and dollar accounts in Peru's banking system, 1978–1984

Since 1978 Peru has permitted dollar-denominated deposits in its banking system. Over this period Peru's inflation rate increased, and the exchange rate was flexibly adjusted. Peru therefore had two units of account in its monetary system, a transaction unit and a purchasing power unit. Any economy that has a purchasing power unit, particularly within the banking system, may have a stronger “inflation feedback mechanism” — that is, a given inflationary shock may produce more inflationary pressure. The Peruvian experience appears to support this view.     

“Weak” Trade,European States in the International Arms 1920–1937: The impact of external threats,market forces,and domestic constraints

Abstract

This article analyses the small- and medium-size arms trade behaviour of nine “weak” (that is, limited political and economic influence) European states in the interwar period: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In particular, the significance of external threats, market forces and domestic constraints is assessed for these states' military trade. Firstly, the hypothesis that there might be fewer domestic constraints on the military trade behaviour of these states was not supported by the analysis. The increased military spending of the 1930s seemed to benefit the domestic producers. Secondly, most of these countries were dependent on their aggregate military trade, especially military exports. Thirdly, the hypothesis that the differences between these states might be explained by geographical, strategic or economic factors was found too simplistic. Only proximate groupings could be developed based on various types of categories. Fourthly, “weak” states were found to benefit from the intense international political and economic competition of the 1930s, enabling the pursuit of new military export markets amidst increasing threats.     

货币错配与经济金融稳定:来自亚太地区的经验

中国的汇率制度改革使得在钉住汇率制度下积聚的巨大货币错配风险逐渐暴露出来。货币错配是否会影响经济金融稳定,通过对亚洲金融危机、日本经济衰退以及本世纪以来亚洲新兴市场国家累积的新风险进行梳理、比较与分析,认为净外币负债型货币错配与净外币资产型货币错配在一定条件下都会影响经济金融稳定。     

Twin Banking and Currency Crises and Monetary Policy

Currency crises are found to be strongly associated with banking crises. This paper constructs a twin banking and currency crisis model by introducing the banking sector into the currency crisis model and examining the case in which the exchange rate risk is located in the banking system. The model shows that an unanticipated shock caused by the shift of investors’ expectations and/or a negative productivity shock can trigger a twin banking and currency crisis. To achieve both financial stability and economic stability, the central bank uses multiple monetary policy instruments. In contrast to the conventional policy recommendation in response to a currency crisis, i.e., interest rate hike, we find that when the exchange rate risk is located in the banking sector, the monetary policy option to prevent a twin crisis is to lower the policy interest rate and the reserve requirement ratio and raise the interest rate on reserves. Our results show that the location of the exchange rate risk matters for the choice of an appropriate monetary policy response during a crisis.     

Emerging and small open economies,unconventional monetary policy and exchange rates – a survey

At the outset of the Great Recession emerging in 2007, central banks of major-currency economies have adopted non-standard monetary policies. We examine whether and to what extent these measures pose a challenge to central banking in emerging and small open economies. In particular we assess how global liquidity spillovers caused by major central banks affect the economic dynamics of emerging and small open economies. In this respect, economies which are close to or even at the periphery of major-currency economies are particularly prone to “unbalanced” real exchange rate dynamics. In the short run, corresponding level and volatility effects in key relative prices may endanger financial stability in the recipient country. The long-term effects include a metamorphosis of the anchoring of private-sector inflation expectations into a perilous tightrope act in central banking of these economies.     

Some Lessons for Regulation from Recent Bank Crises

Recent bank crises in developed and developing countries have underlined the question of a good “regulatory regime,” which is a wider concept than the set of prudential principles and business rules established by external regulatory agencies. The role of external regulation in fostering a safe and sound banking system is limited. The incentive's structure for private banks and the efficiency of monitoring and supervision have to play a great role. Liberalization of markets can have bad effects in the transitional period, but advantages can be enormous after the system starts to work correctly. The main lesson of recent bank crises is that there needs to be more effective surveillance of financial institutions both by supervisory authorities and by markets. Effective regulation (internal and external) and supervision of banks and financial institutions have the potential to give a major contribution to the stability and robustness of financial system.     

Responding to the global financial crisis: Vietnamese exchange rate policy, 2008–2009

The paper presents an analysis of exchange rate policy in Vietnam during 2008–2009. In early 2008, the country faced a sudden reversal of capital flows as signs of developing domestic vulnerabilities became evident. The downward pressure on the dong then intensified with the onset of the global financial crisis in the fall. In these environments, the Vietnamese authorities responded with various exchange rate policy measures. The paper documents a shift in Vietnam's de facto exchange rate regime, from a basket peg to a simple US dollar peg, when the domestic vulnerabilities became compounded by the evolving global crisis. The authorities utilized additional measures to relieve pressure on the parallel exchange rate. An event study methodology finds little evidence of systematic effectiveness for these policy actions; any effectiveness was short-lived. A close examination of individual actions suggests that the impact of foreign exchange market intervention appeared more consistent than any other type of measure and most effective when combined with other measures.     

Dynamic Transition of Exchange Rate Regime in China

Thepaper considers the optimal transition path for China＇s exchange rate regime. How can China successfully make the shift from the current dollar peg regime to a more desirable regime, whether a basket peg or a floating regime？ To answer this question, we develop a dynamic small open economy general equilibrium model. We construct four transition policies based on a basket peg or a floating regime and compare the welfare gains of these policies relative to maintaining the dollar peg regime. Two main results are derived from the quantitative analysis using Chinese data from 1999Q1 to 2010Q4. First, following a gradual adjustment to a basket peg regime is the most appropriate path for China to take, with minimal welfare losses associated with the shift in the exchange rate regime. Second, a sudden shift to the basket peg is the second best solution, and is superior to a sudden shift to floating because the monetary authority can efficiently determine optimal weights to attach to currencies in the basket to achieve policy goals once they adopt a basket peg regime.     

波兰和泰国汇率制度改革经验与启示

经济环境的变化决定着汇率制度的变迁。波兰转轨以来汇率制度相继选择了单一盯住美元、盯住一篮子货币、爬行区间浮动和自由浮动等形式。泰国二战至亚洲金融危机爆发前一直采用单一盯住美元的固定汇率制度。文章据此结合我国人民币汇率制度得出如下经验与启示：应牢牢把握汇率制度调整的主动权并渐进改革,协调好汇率制度与货币政策的关系,与汇率制度相配合有步骤地开放资本项目,加强金融监管尤其是加强对货币错配的审慎性监管等。     

人民币升值与银行危机的历史启示

历史上,许多国家在汇率制度改革后经历了银行危机。在对五个银行危机指标进行分析后,对中国与18个退出固定汇率制度后经历货币升值的国家进行了对比研究。实证分析结果表明,中国在实际退出固定汇率制度并保持人民币小幅升值的经济背景下,发生银行危机的概率没有明显变化。     

Comparing Exchange Market Pressure across Five African Countries

This paper compares the credibility of exchange rate arrangements for the five African countries which are members of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries and will be referred to as Afro-Luso. Our working hypothesis is that credibility necessarily implies low mean exchange market pressure (EMP), low EMP conditional volatility and low-severity EMP crises under financial-market integration. In addition, economic fundamentals must account for EMP dynamics. We also seek evidence of a risk–return relationship for mean EMP and of “bad news” (negative shocks) having a greater impact on EMP volatility than “good news” (positive shocks). Using our econometric models, we are able to rank Afro-Luso countries’ conditional volatility in ordinal terms. Our main conclusion is that countries with currency pegs, such as Guinea-Bissau (GB) and Cape Verde (CV), clearly have lower volatility when compared to those with managed floats and are therefore more credible. Moreover, EMP crises episodes under pegs are much less severe. We find that economic fundamentals correctly account for mean EMP in all countries and that the risk–return relationship is much more favourable for investors under currency pegs, as the increase in volatility is lower for the same rate of return. The exception to this finding is Mozambique (MOZ), which apparently has a risk–return profile akin to that enjoyed by countries with pegs. A plausible reason is that MOZ has the only managed float in our sample implementing monetary and exchange rate policy within the confines of an IMF framework, which establishes floors for international reserves and ceilings for the central bank’s net domestic assets. This intuition needs to be tested, however. EMP conditional volatility, meanwhile, is generally driven by changes in domestic credit (lowers it) and foreign reserve changes (raises it). The first effect is more pronounced under currency pegs, but also under MOZ’s managed float. “Bad news” increases volatility more that “good news” only in the case of CV’s currency peg, which we take to be another sign of its credibility. A few striking cross-country comparisons also emerge in our analysis. Among countries with managed floats, Angola (ANG) has the most severe EMP crises, MOZ the least severe and São Tomé &; Príncipe (STP) lies between the two extremes but closer to MOZ.     

Devaluation,Debt, and Default in Emerging Economies

We explore the interactions between exchange rate and fiscal policy, and default on external debt. Exchange rate policy affects the supply of short-term debt facing the government. Under a conventional soft peg, it can be optimal for the government to set the exchange rate at a level in which partial default occurs. In this case multiple equilibria exist, with one featuring high interest rate, overvalued exchange rate, low level of output, and default. Default is also an equilibrium under a hard peg, precisely because devaluation is not an option. Under a hard peg, however, there is a unique equilibrium.

Price Stability and the Case for Flexible Exchange Rates

We revisit Friedman’s case for flexible exchange rates in a small open economy with several distortions and rigidities and a variety of domestic and external shocks. We find that, for external shocks, the flexible exchange rate regime outperforms the fixed regime independent of the source of domestic nominal rigidities provided that the monetary authorities pursue a policy of strict inflation targeting. For domestic supply shocks, a joint policy of a flexible exchange rate and strict inflation targeting fares well when the main source of nominal rigidities is in the domestic goods markets, but not if rigidities arise in the labor markets.     

China's Exchange Rate Policy: The Case for Greater Flexibility

Since the Asian crisis, the merit of the Chinese government's de facto peg to the US Dollar has been the subject of widening debate. This paper reviews the issues surrounding China's currency regime choice and assesses the case for greater fiexibility. Reform era exchange rate policies are examined along with the performance of the economy during and since the Asian crisis. In the Chinese context, the arguments for and against fixed exchange rates are then explained and assessed. Finally, an elemental comparative static macroeconomic model is used to examine the implications of domestic and external shocks under different exchange rate regimes and with differing degrees of capital mobility. The results support the view that more fiexibility would be beneficial to China and that this benefit can be expected to increase as capital mobility increases.     

基于动态因子分析法的银行体系稳定性测度

银行作为金融业最为重要的组成部分,其稳定性水平会严重影响金融体系的稳定性,进而影响一国经济的发展状况。采用动态因子分析方法对银行体系的稳定性进行综合测度,探析了影响银行体系稳定性的各项因素,发现宏观经济因素对银行体系稳定性的影响程度不如银行自身因素大,最后给出几点关于进一步提高我国银行体系稳定性的建议。     

中国金融开放过程中的金融稳定

金融稳定是微观宏观、内部外部因素交织在一起的结果。开放条件下金融风险通过贸易和金融渠道由外部传染到内部,并在内部因素的配合下导致金融系统的不稳定。文章梳理了中国金融对外开放的历程,分析了中国金融稳定现状和存在的问题。提出实行更有弹性的汇率制度、谨慎地开放资本账户、完善国内金融体系、加强审慎有效的金融监管、加强金融生态环境建设等金融稳定建设措施。     

Can a rapidly growing export-oriented economy exit smoothly from a currency peg? Lessons from Japan’s high-growth era

We analyze the impact of Japan’s exit from its currency peg in 1971. We identify sizeable effects on Japanese exports and investment but find that the negative impacts on the economy were neutralized by strong global demand and domestic fiscal support. While our analysis suggests that a rapidly-growing, export-oriented economy can exit a peg for a managed float despite the presence of capital controls and the absence of sophisticated foreign currency forward markets, it underscores the importance of exiting while global conditions are favorable and points to the importance of using fiscal policy to support domestic demand as the rise in the real exchange rate slows the growth of net exports and investment.