A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with Technological Innovations in the Banking Sector

Received November 2, 2001; revised version received July 15, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003 I have received helpful comments from Alan J. Sutherland, Peter N. Smith, Michael R. Wickens, Morten O. Ravn, John P. Hutton and an anonymous referee. They are in no way responsible for my interpretations or any errors that the paper may contain.     

The “Adjustable-curtain” Strategy: Overbooking of Multiclass Service

The “adjustable-curtain” strategy, now commonly practiced by many airline companies, refers to a strategy where the airline adjusts the size of the business-class section of the aircraft shortly before boarding takes place. This strategy enables the carrier to deny boarding of economy-class passengers in an event of a high show-up of business-class (high-paying) passengers by simply enlarging the business-class section at the expense of the economy-class section (and of course, the other way around, in a case of a low show-up of business passengers). This paper develops a simple method of computing a profit-maximizing reservation policy which determines the number of business- and economy-class bookings taking into account that the adjustable-curtain strategy will be utilized prior to boarding. Received July 27, 2001; revised version received October 5, 2001     

How Long is a Piece of Cable? Equilibrium Determination of Local Telephone Areas

This paper studies the endogenous determination of telephone local calling areas. In many telephone systems, calls between users in the same calling area are local; calls to outside the calling area are long distance and priced differently. We allow the extension of this area to be treated as a strategic variable. We show the extension of the calling areas which maximizes the carrier's profit to be the same which a welfare maximizing regulator would choose. Under a price cap regime in which prices are required to meet an average price constraint, the firm manipulates strategically the extension of the local calling areas. We end the paper by considering the case of a competitive market. In this case, again, the owner of the local loop extends the local calling areas in response to decreased efficiency or increased competition of its competitors. Received April 25, 2002; revised version received September 9, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003     

Additive and Multiplicative Uncertainty Revisited: What Explains the Contrasting Biases?

above the certainty level while for additive uncertainty the price should be lower than the certainty level. This note gives an intuitive explanation for the result after first presenting a parsimonious review of the two models. We also discuss which, if either, of the two models is more realistic. Received December 14, 2001; revised version received July 16, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003 We thank referees for helpful comments. Ciaran Driver would like to acknowledge the research facilities from ANU, Canberra for their help in writing this paper.     

Timing of Entry under Externalities

Received August 23, 2000; revised version received May 14, 2001     

Jobs,Production Linkages,and the Environment

Received April 29, 2002; revised version received July 12, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003 We are indebted to two anonymous referees for useful comments. The work described in this paper was supported by a grant from the Research Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. CUHK 4032/98H) and the Research Center for International Economics of the City University of Hong Kong. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Taxation and Labor Markets

We exploit the common features of models such as union, search and efficiency wage models to develop a framework that can be used to analyze the effects of any revenue-neutral tax reform on employment. In particular, we show that taxes paid by workers are not equivalent to taxes paid by firms when taxes are non linear. Moreover, we show that the positive impact of tax progressivity on employment is attributable only to a limited set of hypotheses. Received May 2, 2001; revised version received November 27, 2001 Published online: December 5, 2002     

Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs

Received December 14, 2000; revised version received July 16, 2001     

Is the Efficiency Wage Efficient when Workers Decide on the Working Time?

There is a body of literature that argues that workers' productivity is significantly influenced by their hours of work. This paper attempts to set up a shirking model of efficiency wages with endogenous working time to investigate how the endogenous working time decision critically influences work effort and undermines the efficacy of efficiency wages. We believe such a model might conceivably support the empirical finding that there exists a possibly perverse relationship between worker's effort and wages. Received July 10, 2001; revised version received March 21, 2002 Published online: November 11, 2002     

Patent Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model

We investigate how the patent policy affects economic growth and social welfare based on an endogenous growth model with R&D activities. We show that the patent length that maximizes the social welfare is finite. Moreover, by introducing compulsory licensing, we also show that the patent length that maximizes the social welfare is not infinite even if the royalty rate can be controlled. Received June 29, 2001; revised version received February 5, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 We wish to thank two anonymous referees for their constructive comments. We also thank Akira Yakita for his helpful comments.     

Structural Change and Generalized Balanced Growth

This paper addresses the criticism that balanced growth models are inconsistent with the dynamics of structural change characterizing the process of economic development. Using a sectoral disaggregated version of a research-driven growth model, we develop the concept of a generalized balanced growth path (GBGP). Along a GBGP, macroeconomic variables grow at constant rates while disaggregated variables grow at non-constant rates. As a result, balanced growth in macroeconomic aggregates and structural change can occur simultaneously. Received April 3, 2001; revised version received February 20, 2002 Published online: November 11, 2002     

A Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy with Inheritance

An overlapping generations model of an exchange economy with two sources of uncertainty is considered. Individuals have a finite expected life span and uncertain annual income. Conditions concerning birth, death, inheritance and bequests are fully specified. Under such conditions, the existence of a stationary Markovian equilibrium is established in some generality, and several explicitly solvable examples are examined in detail. Received August 6, 2001; revised version received March 12, 2002 Published online: November 11, 2002     

On Forecasting Heterogeneity, Irrational Exuberance, and the Multiplicity of Rational Expectations Equilibria

Received February 20, 2001; revised version received July 23, 2001     

Market Instability in a Stackelberg Duopoly

m -period duopoly model with inventory costs, where each firm chooses when to produce. We find that, in contrast to most existing works concerning endogenous roles of the firms, no pure strategy equilibrium exists when m is strictly larger than two. This result indicates that no stable pattern of allocation of roles exists except for a two-period model; thus the leader-follower relationship inevitably becomes instable. Received August 1, 2000; revised version received July 20, 2001     

Delegation in Oligopoly: Managerial Schemes and Loan Commitments

This paper examines an industry in which firms must arrange financing for the production levels they plan to undertake in equilibrium. Financing can rely on the spot, or it can be obtained from options in the form of loan commitments. In that context, we analyze whether the owners of the firms centralize financing and output decisions or delegate these decisions to managers. We show a multiplicity of equilibria from a number of organizational modes under delegation. An organizational form where the owner decides on short-term financing but delegates production with a long-term managerial scheme is not an equilibrium organizational form. Received November 26, 2001; revised version received June 10, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 We thank María-Paz Espinosa and two referees for their helpful comments. We also acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education under projects SEC99-0820 (CICYT) and SEC2002-00266. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Increased Input Supplies,Government Size,Welfare and Trade in the Presence of Increasing Returns

This paper examines the impact of exogenous changes in the supply of primary factors of production on the relative size of government and welfare in the context of a model where increasing returns are present in the production of an intermediate good. It is shown that an increase in the supply of labor (capital) increases the relative size of government if the share of labor is large (small) in the public sector as compared to the private sector. An increase in the supply of capital increases welfare but the impact of an increase in the supply of labor cannot be unambiguously determined. In the context of a North-South model, the paper also considers the pattern of trade. It is shown that North will export capital-intensive intermediate goods to the South. Received September 13, 2001; revised version received June 1, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 I am indebted to Professor Bob Catley and two anonymous referees for invaluable comments and suggestions. However, responsibility of any remaining errors or omissions is mine alone.     

Endogenous Growth and Negative Externalities

Received March 5, 2001; revised version received August 5, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003     

Tacit Collusion in a Spatial Model with Delivered Pricing

Received August 5, 1999; revised version received July 20, 2001     

Specific versus ad valorem Taxation and Externalities

Received December 15, 2000; revised version received September 10, 2001     

Product Variety and Real Exchange Rates: The Balassa-Samuelson Model Reconsidered

This paper introduces product variety into the Balassa-Samuelson model in order to extend the model of real exchange rate determination. With product differentiation, real exchange rates depend not only on the relative price of nontradables to tradables but also on relative prices among tradables. This paper identifies a new factor that determines the extent of variety, termed Infrastructural Technology, and that affects real exchange rates not through the relative price of nontradables but through relative prices among tradables. This paper also conducts empirical tests, and the results of these tests support the model. Received May 31, 2001; revised version received March 20, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003