Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance: A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation

Although extant literature has shown that formal contracts and relational governance play a key role in interorganizational relationships, the nature of their interplay still remains equivocal. To better understand the relationships between contractual and relational governance, we conducted a qualitative review and meta-analysis of the existing literature. Meta-analytic results from 33,051 interorganizational relationships across 149 empirical studies have indicated that contractual governance is positively related to both sides of relational governance—trust and relational norms. Our results have also indicated that contracts, trust, and relational norms jointly improve satisfaction and relationship performance and jointly reduce opportunism. These findings provide strong evidence for the complementarity arguments of the contractual–relational governance relationships and their joint impacts on performance. We also found that the mutual relationships between contractual and relational governance are moderated by the institutional environments, the interorganizational relationship type and length, and the construct measurement of contracts. Overall, this study provides new insights on when contractual and relational governance complement or substitute each other. We discuss the implications of our study for theory and practice and propose a research agenda for future research on governance in interorganizational relationships.     

Governing buyer–supplier relationships through transactional and relational mechanisms: Evidence from China

Building on economic and social exchange theories, this study investigates the different roles transactional and relational mechanisms have in hindering opportunism and improving relationship performance in an emerging economy. Our study applied to manufacturer–distributor dyads in China and used matched survey data (225 paired sample firms) to test our hypotheses. Our hierarchical multivariate regression and semipartial correlation analyses suggest that transactional mechanisms are more effective in restraining opportunism while relational mechanisms are more powerful in improving relationship performance. This performance is improved more significantly when both contracts and relational norms are used jointly than when used separately. Likewise, opportunism is curbed more effectively when both contracts and trust are used jointly than when used individually.     

Motivate and select: Relational contracts with persistent types

We develop a model of relational contracts with moral hazard and asymmetric persistent information about an employee's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics and the distribution of employees' talent. Bonus contracts are more likely to be adopted in complex jobs and when high talent is not too common or too rare. Firms with “normal” jobs are more likely to adopt termination contracts. In labor market equilibrium, different contracts may be adopted by ex ante identical firms. Hence, we offer an explanation for the coexistence of different employment systems within the same industry.     

Relational retention

This paper uses a repeated-game model to study the retention of talented workers in the face of competition for talent. When the job benefits that workers value are non-contractible, retention cannot be achieved by a sequence of spot contracts, but must be based on self-enforcing long-term agreements, which we call relational retention contracts. Retention then is successful only if workers trust their employers' promises. We demonstrate that relational contracts are valuable even if there are no incentive problems inside firms and that firms with a relatively low valuation for talent may be able to retain talented workers.     

Are relational ties always good for knowledge acquisition? Buyer–supplier exchanges in China

Relational ties between manufacturers and their suppliers serve as an important strategic resource for value creation and realization. However, conflicting evidence exists regarding their role in the acquisition of specific knowledge. This study proposes that relational ties have a nonlinear effect on specific knowledge acquisition and that this nonlinear relationship is conditional on contract specificity and competitive intensity. Results from a sample of 385 manufacturer–supplier exchanges in China demonstrate that a buyer's relational ties with its major supplier have an inverted U-shaped effect on specific knowledge acquisition from this supplier; this inverted U-shaped relationship is stronger (steeper) when contract specificity is high and competition is more intense. These findings suggest that managers should understand the benefits and downsides of relational ties in acquiring specific knowledge and avoid building highly embedded ties when they draft detailed contracts or competition is highly intensive.     

Prevention incentives in long‐term insurance contracts

Long‐term insurance contracts are widespread, particularly in public health and the labor market. Such contracts typically involve monthly or annual premia which are related to the insured's risk profile. A given profile may change, based on observed outcomes which depend on the insured's prevention efforts. The aim of this paper is to analyze the latter relationship. In a two‐period optimal insurance contract in which the insured's risk profile is partly governed by her effort on prevention, we find that both the insured's risk aversion and prudence play a crucial role. If absolute prudence is greater than twice absolute risk aversion, moral hazard justifies setting a higher premium in the first period but also greater premium discrimination in the second period. This result provides insights on the trade‐offs between long‐term insurance and the incentives arising from risk classification, as well as between inter‐ and intragenerational insurance.     

Group versus Individual Performance Pay in Relational Employment Contracts when Workers are Envious

I compare group to individual performance pay when workers are envious and performance is nonverifiable. Avoiding payoff inequity, the group reward scheme is optimal as long as the firm faces no credibility problem. The individual reward scheme may, however, become superior albeit introducing the prospect of unequal pay. This is due to two reasons: Group incentives are relatively low‐powered compared to individual incentives, requiring higher incentive pay and impeding credibility of the firm. Moreover, with individual rewards, the firm benefits from the incentive‐strengthening effect of envy, allowing for yet smaller overall incentive pay and further softening the credibility constraint. I also show that contracts combining both individual and group rewards are often optimal, depending on the firm's credibility problem. These contracts include joint and relative performance pay schemes.     

供应链中分销企业与生产企业的关系契约分析

通过对供应链中分销企业与生产企业的关系契约分析，得出了契约双方非一体化情况下能够自执行的关系契约是存在的，并且存在向一体化的帕雷托改进，但有时也存在自执行的关系契约使得非一体化情况下的效率能够达到一体化下的效率。     

Social capital as a facilitator of successful buyer-supplier performance management

Performance management in supply chains is an increasingly important, rapidly developing but challenging area. It may benefit from sufficient levels of social capital, such as frequent interactions between buyers and suppliers. However, social capital has not yet been studied as a facilitator of performance management. To bridge this knowledge gap, we examine buyer-supplier performance management and social relationship characteristics as perceived by suppliers. We analyze empirical data gathered through a survey of 482 suppliers by employing PLS-SEM and PLS-MGA. The findings elaborate on the role of cognitive, relational, and structural capital in performance management activities within a buyer-supplier relationship. Moreover, the results demonstrate how a supplier's positive perception, in the form of preferred customer status, can be facilitated through performance management activities. The findings reveal that there is a difference in the role of structural and relational capital between key and non-key supplier groups in performance management activities. We conclude that successful performance management in buyer-supplier relationships requires more than simply a system for sharing information. The mature use of performance measurement is also essential, with cognitive capital being especially beneficial in this endeavor.     

Reviewing interfirm relationship quality from a supply chain management perspective

With the overlap of the interfirm relationship quality and supply chain management research in mind, this paper reviewed 100 recent, scientific, English-language papers on interfirm relationship quality based on a categorisation schema derived from a conceptual framework of supply chain management. We aim to contribute to the existing supply chain management literature by providing an insight into the connections of supply chain performance with buyer–supplier relationship quality from the relationship quality scholars’ perspective. Through content analysis, frequency and contingency analysis, we evaluated how the three relationship quality dimensions—information, operational, and relational dimensions—and the three types of supply chain performance—financial and market, operational, and relational performance have been reflected in the current interfirm relationship quality papers and how the scholars have tended to link them to each other. The results reveal that relational dimension plays a key role in SC relationship management and influences performance significantly. Information dimension will affect performance indirectly through relational dimension. However, the impact of the operational dimension on performance varies. In addition, buyers’ and suppliers’ perspectives on the relational drivers of their financial performance may differ. Based on the findings, we suggest promising avenues for future investigation of supply chain relationship and performance.

     

Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats

We consider a dynamic moral hazard model where the principal offers a series of short-run contracts. We study the optimal mix of two alternative instruments for incentive provision: a performance based wage (a “carrot”) and a termination threat (a “stick”). At any given point in time, these instruments are substitutes in the provision of incentives. We are particularly interested in the dynamic interaction of these two instruments. Both carrot and stick are used more intensively as the agent approaches the end of his finite life. The sharing of the surplus of the relationship plays a key role: a termination threat is included in the optimal contract if and only if the agent’s expected future gain from the relationship is sufficiently high, compared to the principal’s expected future gain. Also, a termination threat is more likely to be optimal if output depends more on “luck” than on effort, if the discount factor is high, or if the agent’s productivity is low. The model, provided that the optimal contract includes a termination threat, essentially provides an alternative explanation for upward-sloping wage profiles even in the absence of full-commitment.     

Distorted Performance Measures and Dynamic Incentives

Incentive contracts must typically be based on performance measures that do not exactly match the agents' true contribution to the principals' objectives. Such misalignment may pose difficulties for effective incentive design. We analyze the extent to which implicit dynamic incentives, such as career concerns and ratchet effects, alleviate or aggfravate these problems. Our analysis demonstrates that the interplay between distorted performance measures and implicit incentives implies that career and ratchet effects have real effects in that stronger ratchet effects or greater distortion may increase optimal monetary incentives, and that distortion affects the optimality of different promotion rules.     

Managerial Incentives Based on Acquisition of Information

In a moral hazard setting, we model the fact that the agent may get private signals about the final outcome of his effort before the public realization of this outcome. Actions affect both the distribution of the outcome and the quality of the agent's private information. We compare simple contracts, based on output only, with revelation contracts, based on output and messages about signals. Revelation contracts give the agent some discretionary power during the course of the relationship; they are optimal if and only if lowering effort does not increase the quality of private information in the sense of Blackwell (1953). In the context of managerial compensation schemes, the revelation contracts we analyze can be viewed as allowing the agent to exercise an option on the final profits before the realization of these profits. The theory thus provides an alternative justification of the widespread use of stock options in managerial compensation schemes, as opposed to compensation schemes that rely only on salary, bonus, and (restricted) stock plans.     

Optimal Debt Contracts with Renegotiation

This paper sutudies the role of debt in committing a seller not to trade at a low price. We consider a discrete-time finite-horizon buyer–seller relationship. The seller makes an upfront relationship-specific investment, which is financed with debt. Debt then is repaid gradually to mitigate the hold-up risk. Even though debt is renegotiable, under the assumption that with a small probability renegotiation may fail and may lead to inefficient liquidation, debt still can be used as a commitment device. We solve for renegotiation proof dynamic debt contracts that are optimal for the seller and show that debt is repaid over the entire course of the relationship with declining repayments .     

Scale development and validation of Transaction Cost Economics typology for contracts: A systems thinking approach

A variety of contract typologies that exist in the literature are helpful in the exploration of different approaches in contractual relations, but only when measured with the right instruments. Although Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has a distinct, high-level, and abstract typology for contracts, it still lacks a measurement scale. In this paper, a measurement scale for the TCE contract typology (classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts) was developed and validated, using systems thinking approach and experimental design to contribute to the empirical tests of TCE within the contracting realm. First, the antecedents of contract selection within the TCE literature were analyzed using the systemigram technique to visualize and parse out complex relationships that lead to contract selection. The analysis of the TCE Systemigram helped the development of the scale and revealed the need to revisit the risk neutrality assumption embedded in TCE. Second, a measurement scale for the TCE contract typology (classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts) was developed adhering to the original texts of seminal papers and reviews from the TCE literature. Third, the 14-item measurement scale was validated using a series of three vignette-based experimental studies.Key messageThis research explores the antecedents of the TCE contract typology and develops a measurement scale for essential characteristics of classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts, as defined in TCE, using systems thinking approach and a novel vignette-based experimental design.     

Selection into and across credit contracts: Theory and field research

Lenders may choose to encourage borrower side contracting using group, or co-signed, loans or discourage it using individual loans, so as to make relative performance comparisons. In this context wealth of the agents relative to outsiders, and wealth inequality among potential joint liability partners, are important factors determining the choice among loan contracts. In a related model of whether to borrow, higher covariance of returns mitigates an adverse selection effect. We test these models using relatively rich data gathered in field research in Thailand. The prevalence of joint liability contracts relative to individual contracts exhibits a U-shaped relationship with the wealth of the borrowing household and increases with the wealth dispersion. The likelihood of joint-liability borrowing increases the lower is the probability of project success, a direct affirmation of adverse selection. Higher correlation across projects makes joint liability borrowing more likely relative to all other alternatives. Strikingly, most of the results disappear if we do not condition the sample according to the dictates of the models, with selection into and across credit contracts.     

The moderating role of relational bonding in green supply chain practices and performance

Previous research has paid attention to the effect of green supply chain practices on green innovation performance. However, little has been done to examine the substantive role of relational bonding in green supply chain management context. This study attempts to identify relational bonding as a potential moderator and examines the relationships between green supply chain practices, relational bonding, and green innovation performance. The results indicate that green supply chain practices and relational bonding are positively related to green innovation performance. Relational bonding moderates the relationship between green supply chain practices and green innovation performance. This study makes a contribution by integrating relationship marketing literature and green management literature. This study also provides practical implication for the essential role of relational bonding in green supply chain management.     

Creating psychological and legal contracts through human resource practices: A signaling theory perspective

Despite the surge in research on the psychological contract over the past two decades, there has been little integrative research that has examined psychological contracts in conjunction with legal contracts. We address this shortcoming by presenting a framework for understanding the differences between psychological contracts and legal contracts in the United States. This is done by presenting definitions and examples of psychological contracts (i.e., relational and transactional) and the two forms of legal contracts: (a) express (written and oral), and (b) implied (quasi-contract and promissory estoppel). In addition, by utilizing signaling theory [Rynes, S.L. (1991). Recruitment, job choice, and post-hire consequences: A call for new research directions. In M. D. Dunnette & L. M. Hough (Eds.), Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology, (pp. 399–444). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.], we describe the means by which human resource practices such as recruitment, training, performance appraisal, compensation, and employee handbooks can create psychological and legal contracts. We conclude by proposing directions for future research and implications for practicing managers.     

关系型社会资本如何影响企业创新绩效——基于知识转移的路径解析

企业的创新绩效受到企业在网络中的关系型社会资本的制约,这一研究正逐渐受到学者的关注,但相关研究中关系型社会资本对企业创新绩效影响的路径探索往往并不深入。基于此,从信任、沟通、冲突管理三个维度测度企业的关系型社会资本,考察了其对企业创新绩效的影响模式,以及知识转移在此作用中的中介效应。结果显示:关系型社会资本的三个维度均对创新绩效有显著的促进作用,其中有效沟通的作用效果更明显,同时知识转移在该关系中发挥了部分中介效应。研究建议指出,企业应注重构建经济型与政企型社会关系网络,加强关系型社会资本的构建与维护,尤其要注重通过促进企业间的沟通有效性来提升企业间的知识转移效果及创新绩效。     

Information, Control, and Organizational Structure

This paper investigates how a designer of an organization (referred to as the regulator) should organize a production activity in which two different units produce components and where each unit has private information about its costs. Three organizational structures are analyzed. In the first (informational consolidation), the regulator contracts with a consolidated unit that produces both components. In the second (informational decentralization), the regulator independently contracts with the producer of each component. In the third (informational delegation), the regulator contracts with one of the units, which in turn subcontracts with the other. In each case, the regulator's optimal mechanism consisting of payment and output schedules is fully characterized. Informational consolidation and informational decentralization yield different output schedules. Under informational decentralization, the optimal output schedule may not depend on the sum of the marginal costs of each component, but when it does, the regulator strictly prefers informational consolidation to informational decentralization. Informational delegation is shown to be equivalent to informational decentralization when the regulator can observe the contracting between the units.