On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances

This paper derives optimal schemes for the free allocation of emission allowances in a dynamic context. We consider emissions- and output-based allocation rules which allow for updating of the basis of allocation over time and thereby do not rely on historical data only. We show that such dynamic schemes do not necessarily induce inefficient outcomes. In closed trading systems with an absolute cap on emissions, grandfathering schemes which allocate allowances proportionally to past emissions are first-best. However, in open trading systems where allowances can be traded with outsiders, first-best allocation schemes must not depend on firm-specific decisions while second-best schemes correspond to a Ramsey rule of optimal tax differentiation and are generally based on both past emission and output levels.     

The effectiveness of anti-leakage policies in the European Union: results for Austria

With the third trading period of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) starting in 2013, the system of allocating emission allowances will significantly change: In contrast to the previous two trading periods, auctioning of the allowances should now be the rule rather than the exception. Accompanying this policy change, concerns over competitiveness of energy intensive, trade exposed sectors as well as over limited environmental effectiveness via the channel of carbon leakage, have regained prominence. In this paper, we thus explore the impacts of potential EU policies to counter losses in international competitiveness and carbon leakage from the perspective of Austria. Based on numerical simulations with a computable general equilibrium model, we evaluate three policy options: an input subsidy for carbon allowances (thus reflecting the planned partially free allocation mechanism in the third EU ETS phase), a subsidy for domestic production, and an export rebate based on sectoral CO₂ costs. Our results show that each policy has the potential to support domestic production in exposed sectors relative to a full auctioning scenario and thus increase competitiveness. However, none is imperatively effective at reducing Austria’s net carbon emissions: while the carbon trade balance is improved and hence leakage declines, the tradability of emission permits within the EU ETS allows CO₂ emissions from Austria’s ETS output to increase. A cost benefit analysis indicates that the two policies promoting domestic output and exports are more cost effective than the CO₂ input subsidy.     

IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE EMISSION TRADING PLANS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

Abstract.  Two approaches to emissions trading are cap-and-trade, with an aggregate cap on emissions distributed as emission allowances, and baseline-and-credit, with firms earning emission reduction credits for emissions below baselines. Theory suggests the long-run equilibria of the plans will differ with baselines proportional to output. To test this prediction we develop a computerized environment in which subjects representing firms can adjust their emission rates and capacity levels and trade emission rights in a sealed-bid auction. Demand for output is simulated. We report on six laboratory sessions with variable emissions rates, but fixed capacity: three each with the cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit mechanisms.     

DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING: ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION AND RECYCLING STRATEGIES IN CALIFORNIA

Cap and trade remains attractive to many state governments because it provides a much‐needed source of additional revenue when greenhouse gas emission allowances are auctioned to the highest bidder. We analyze the income distribution impacts of the California Global Warming Solutions Act under alternative policy designs. These include the free allocation of emission allowances versus recycling of auction revenues through proportional income tax relief and a per capita dividend. The analysis is undertaken under conditions where significant economic gains, rather than losses, are projected for the policy, and in the context of the new electricity pricing regulatory environment in which passing along the opportunity costs of using free allowances may not be approved. We adapt and enhance the Regional Economic Models, Inc. Policy Insight Plus Model and apply it for the first time to estimate the income distribution impacts of cap and trade. The analysis illustrates the importance of considering macroeconomic impacts and identifies important efficiency‐equity tradeoffs. The method and results are generalizable to the dozens of states and regions still formulating or revising climate action plans in the United States and to many regions and nations around the world. (JEL D31, R11, Q54)     

Global impacts of the Kyoto agreement: results from the MS-MRT model

This paper analyzes the economic impacts on different regions of the world of a global agreement to limit carbon emissions. A multi-sector, multi-region trade model (MS-MRT) is developed that focuses on the international trade aspects of climate change policy. These include the distribution of impacts on economic welfare, international trade and investment across regions, the spillover effects of carbon emission limits in Annex 1 countries on non-Annex 1 countries, carbon leakage, changes in terms of trade and industry output, and the effects of international emissions trading. Our central estimates are presented with a set of sensitivity tests to assess the extent to which our conclusions depend on elasticity and baseline assumptions. A technical appendix presents algebraic details of the model structure and calibration.     

Hot air for sale: a quantitative assessment of Russia’s near-term climate policy options

Since January 2005 the European Union has launched an EU-internal emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) for emission-intensive installations as the central pillar to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS will be linked to a Kyoto emissions market where greenhouse gas emission allowances of signatory Kyoto countries can be traded. In this paper we investigate the implications of Russian market power for environmental effectiveness and regional compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol taking into account potential linkages between the Kyoto emissions market and the EU ETS. We find that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the latter remains relatively separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs if it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.      

Output‐based rebating of carbon taxes in a neighbour's backyard: Competitiveness,leakage and welfare

We investigate how, in an open economy, carbon taxes combined with output‐based rebating (OBR) perform in interaction with the carbon policies of a large neighbouring trading partner. Analytical results suggest that, whether the purpose of the OBR policy is to compensate firms for carbon tax burdens or to maximize welfare (accounting for global emission reductions), the OBR rate should be positive in policy‐relevant cases. Numerical simulations for Canada, with the US as the neighbouring trading partner, indicate that the impact of US policies on the OBR rate will depend crucially on the purpose of the Canadian OBR policies. If, for a given US carbon policy, Canada's aim is to restore the competitiveness of domestic emission‐intensive and trade‐exposed (EITE) firms to the same level as before the introduction of its own carbon taxation, we find that the necessary domestic OBR rates will be insensitive to the foreign carbon policies. However, if not only the Canadian carbon tax but also an equally high US tax is introduced, compensatory Canadian OBR rates will be up to 50% lower, depending on the sector and on US OBR policy. If the policy objective is to increase economy‐wide allocative efficiency (welfare) of Canadian policies by accounting for carbon leakage, the US policies will have only a minor downward pressure on desirable OBR rates in Canada. Practical choices of OBR rates hardly affect overall domestic economic performance; thus, output‐based rebating qualifies as an instrument for compensating EITE industries without a large sacrifice in terms of economy‐wide allocative efficiency.     

污染物减排政策效果比较——基于经济学视角

我国政府已经把减少污染物排放作为约束性指标纳入到国家中长期发展战略之中,采取有效的污染物减排政策是中国缓解环境压力、实现经济社会可持续发展的重要手段.排污权交易制度是在总量管制的情况下,通过污染物排放权的分配,最终实现该区域总的排污量削减.本文从经济学的视角,研究了排污权交易的实施基础,并与行政强制性减排以及环境税减排进行了效率比较,结果表明排污权交易比单纯的行政强制性排污和环境税约束具有更高的市场效率以及灵活性,同时并不会降低整个社会的污染物排放效果.此外,从市场势力的影响、市场信息的影响、交易规则的影响等方面讨论了影响排污权交易市场效率的因素,对我国排污权交易市场的发展提出了相应的建议,为排污权交易市场的稳定运行提供了理论参考.     

我国火力发电行业SO2排放许可限值约束作用研究

2017年,我国环保部门完成了火力发电等行业的排污许可证的核发,对我国建设排污权交易制度和实现“一证式”环境管理体制具有重要意义。围绕排污许可证中污染物的排放许可限值展开研究,应用脱钩原理对我国2003—2017年火力发电行业SO2排放与经济增长之间的脱钩关系进行分析,并基于脱钩理论,结合灰色预测方法GM(1,1)并运用情景假设法分析评价了排污许可证对我国2018—2020年火力发电行业SO2排放的约束作用强弱及其合理性,并提出建议。     

Implications of CO<Subscript>2</Subscript> emissions trading for short-run electricity market outcomes in northwest Europe

We examine the short-run implications of CO₂ trading for power production, prices, emissions, and generator profits in northwest Europe in 2005. Simulation results from a transmission-constrained oligopoly model are compared with theoretical analyses to quantify price increases and windfall profits earned by generators. The analyses indicate that the rates at which CO₂ costs are passed through to wholesale prices are affected by market competitiveness, merit order changes, and elasticities of demand and supply. Emissions trading results in large windfall profits, much but not all of which is due to free allocation of allowances. Profits also increase for some generators because their generation mix has low emissions, and so they benefit from electricity price increases. Most emission reductions appear to be due to demand response not generation redispatch.      

Industry-level emission trading between power producers in the EU

This paper investigates how restrictions for emission trading to the energy-intensive power sector will affect the magnitude and distribution of abatement costs across EU countries vis-à-vis a comprehensive EU emission trading regime. It is found that emission trading between European power sectors allows the harvest of a major part of the efficiency gains provided by full trade as compared to strictly domestic action. However, trade restrictions may create a more unequal distribution of abatement costs across member states than is the case for a comprehensive trade regime. The reason for this is that restricted permit trade enhances secondary terms-of-trade benefits to EU member countries with low marginal abatement costs at the expense of the other EU member states.     

Carbon Abatement and International Spillovers

Carbon abatement policies in large open economies affect both the allocation of domestic resources and international market prices. A change in international prices implies an indirect secondary burden or benefit for all trading countries. Based on simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of global trade and energy use, we show that international spillovers have important welfare implications for carbon abatement policies designed to meet exogenous emission reduction targets. We present a decomposition of the total welfare effect of carbon abatement policies into a primary domestic market effect (at constant international prices) and a secondary international spillover impact as a result of changes in international prices. This decomposition reveals the extent to which domestic abatement costs are increased or decreased as a result of the impact of carbon abatement on international prices.     

On the Endogeneity of Market Power in Emissions Markets

Previous approaches on market power in emissions trading markets rely on the existence of a subset of competitive players. In this paper, I relax this assumption and treat market power as an endogenous concept which depends on the initial allocation of allowances. All parties realize their potential influence on the market price. This approach allows a clear comparative statics analysis of the impact of the allowance allocation on the efficiency of markets. I provide specific examples that illustrate the implications that stem from the proposed modeling approach relative to previous models.     

Multinational taxation and international emissions trading

Many studies have shown that the activities of multinational corporations are quite sensitive to differences in income tax rates across countries. In this paper I explore the interaction between multinational taxation and abatement activities under an international emissions permit trading scheme. Four types of plans are considered: (1) a single domestic permit system with international offsets; (2) separate national permit systems without trade; (3) separate national permit systems with limited offsets; and (4) an international permit trading system. For each plan, I model the incentives for the multinational firm to choose abatement activities at home and abroad and to transfer emissions credits between parent and subsidiary. Limits on trading across countries restrict efficiency gains from abatement, as is well known. But if available offset opportunities are limited to actual abatement activities, those activities are also more susceptible to distortions from incentives to shift taxable income. Transfer-pricing rules can limit but not always eliminate these distortions. In a system of unlimited international trading, abatement is efficiently allocated across countries, but tax shifting can still be achieved through intra-firm transfer pricing. From the basis of efficiency for both environmental and tax policies, the best design is an international permit trading system with transparent, enforceable transfer-pricing rules.     

THE SO2 EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM: COST SAVINGS WITHOUT ALLOWANCE TRADES

Title IV of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act initiated a historic experiment in incentive-based environmental regulation by permitting electric generating facilities to trade allowances for emission of sulfur dioxide. To date, relatively little allowance trading has occurred. However, the costs of compliance have been much less than anticipated. The purpose of this paper is to address the apparent paradox—that the allowance trading program may not require (very much) trading in order to be successful. Title IV represented two great steps forward in environmental regulation: (i) a move toward performance standards and (ii) formal allowance trading. The first step has been sufficient to date for improving dynamic efficiency and achieving relative cost-effectiveness.     

Endowments,Specialization, and Policy

The paper explores the relationship between industry shares in production and their determinants including factor endowments, technology, and government policies, in a GDP–function framework. We use a new international panel dataset on production and trade compiled by the World Bank. As an intermediate step we calculate Hicks‐neutral productivity indices that vary across industries, time, and countries. We find that own‐TFP is robustly associated with industry shares across time and countries and that, after correcting for these productivity differences, output shares are related to factor endowments (Rybczynski effects) in a plausible way. Once Rybczynski effects are controlled for, we find little evidence of demand‐side policies (import tariffs) affecting the allocation of resources; we find, however, more role for supply‐side policies as the relative size of capital‐intensive industries is positively associated with infrastructure–capital endowments.     

欧盟碳排放权交易体系第三阶段改革对碳价格的影响

欧盟碳排放权交易体系第三阶段改革成效显著,研究其关键改革政策对碳市场的影响,将为我国的碳市场建设提供一定的经验借鉴。本文选取了第三阶段三项主要改革政策——配额总量递减、折量拍卖、市场稳定储备机制作为评估对象,以第三阶段欧盟碳配额期货价格的日度数据为被解释变量,三大改革政策为解释变量,采用时间序列协整模型和向量误差修正模型对各因素的影响作出评估。研究结果表明,各项改革政策都与碳配额期货价格呈正向协整关系,通过改善市场供求失衡状况,有效推动了第三阶段碳价格的提高,对减排企业形成了长效的激励和约束,提高了欧盟碳排放权交易体系的运行效率。因此,我国在建立和完善碳排放权交易体系进程中,要根据本国情况合理设置配额总量和配额分配方式,设置配额柔性调整机制,不断提高市场流动性,促进碳价格的提高,保证碳排放权交易市场的稳定发展。     

Trading Sulphur Emissions in Europe: `Guided Bilateral Trade'

In this paper a system of `guided permit trading' is developed for SO₂emissions reduction which considers permit trading as a bilateral andsequential process. This implies that in order to meet the deposition targetsat the end of the trading process, not every single trade transaction hasto meet the deposition targets. To ensure that the target is ultimately met,the number of permits traded should be controlled by a trade coordinatinginstitution. A simulation of the system of guided bilateral trading ofSO₂ permits among European countries on the basis of the SecondSO₂ Protocol indicates that some non-profitable trade transactionstake place. This prevents the cost effective emission allocation from beingfully achieved. However, the calculations show that guided bilateral permittrading may generate substantial cost savings while contributing toenvironmental protection.     

The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach

The initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions trading schemes. We generalize the analysis of Böhringer and Lange (2005, Eur Econ Rev 49(8): 2041–2055) to initial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter-firm relative performance comparisons (including grandfathering and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms). We show that using firms’ historical output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting, while using firms’ historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor, which is independent of output and emissions. We then outline sufficient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism.