Local Governance: Impacts of Fiscal Decentralization on Government Size and Spending Composition in Vietnam*

The study provides an understanding of the impacts of fiscal decentralization and local governance on government size and spending composition. We use a balanced panel data set of 63 provinces of Vietnam over the 2006–2015 period. By estimating the spatial Durbin model, we find that local public spending and government size grow over time and have spatial spillovers. Fiscal decentralization significantly reduces public spending and government size, which supports the Leviathan hypothesis. More interestingly, combining local governance, the marginal spatial spillover effects of the fiscal decentralization on public spending and government size are intensified. Our findings imply that local governments should enhance interregional collaboration in fiscal management to limit duplicate public spending and promote regional sustainable development.     

财政分权，省级官员特征与地方政府债务规模——基于2010-2014年省级政府数据的实证分析

政府债务规模和风险是一级政府关注的重点问题。从财政分权和省级官员特征两个维度,本文考察了地方政府债务规模的影响因素,并在此基础上进一步研究财政分权程度和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的交互影响作用。通过2010-2014年30个省级政府的实证数据进行混合OLS回归,研究发现财政分权程度越高,地方政府债务规模越小。省级官员的年龄过大或过小都会使地方政府债务规模的减小,同时具有企业工作背景的省长和省委书记也会抑制地方政府债务规模的扩张,并且财政分权和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的影响是相互促进的。据此提出建议,合理控制地方政府债务膨胀。     

Financial Resource Base of Sub‐national Governments and Fiscal Decentralization in Ghana

Abstract: The past two decades have witnessed numerous attempts in developing countries at institutionalizing decentralization. Political leaders tended, before then, to believe that centralized planning was the key to economic growth and development. Ghana has not been excluded from this wave towards the transfer of power, competences, resources and functions from the centre to local levels of government. While Ghana has achieved significant political and administrative decentralization as well as decentralized planning, fiscal decentralization has been the unyielding component of the process. This paper examines the desirability, or otherwise, of fiscal decentralization in the context of funding arrangements. It uses the funding regime model as a basis for analysing how regulatory provisions, political and economic factors and practices, determine financial capacity of sub‐national governments. Evidence in the paper leads to the conclusion that sub‐national governments in Ghana do not support fiscal autonomy. They, instead, prefer being served and financed by the central government.     

财政分权对我国城市房价的影响——以杭州市为例

2016年,中国的房地产市场依旧火热,房价增长迅速,热点频出,当然,房价的疯狂上涨也带来了很多难以解决的问题。研究财政分权,土地财政和房地产价格三者之间的关联,并通过对杭州市的相关数据进行实证分析,运用格兰杰检验分析杭州市的财政分权,土地财政和房地产价格,得出如下结论：财政分权使地方政府寻求更多的收入来源,加剧了地方政府对房地产业的扶持,并且导致了土地财政,从而正面影响了房地产价格。     

Can Fiscal Decentralization Alleviate Government Consumption Volatility?

This paper assesses the effect of fiscal decentralization on government consumption volatility using data for 97 developed and developing countries from 1971 to 2010. The results suggest that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization leads to lower government consumption volatility. This result holds for the sub-sample of advanced economies, while it is not confirmed for those less-developed. This mechanism seems to work mainly through a lower volatility of the non-discretionary spending, which typically belongs to the central government’s policy. We also confirm existing findings according to which country size lowers government spending volatility. Thus, given a minimum level of development, fiscal decentralization reforms can reduce spending volatility by distributing power to sub-central governments, particularly in smaller countries which are usually more prone to volatility.     

中国地方政府公共卫生支出行为实证分析

公共卫生支出属于财政支出的重要组成部分。合理界定公共卫生支出占财政支出的比重是公共财政体制的重要内容。文章对2004-2010年间全国31省、市、自治区面板数据进行实证分析研究了影响地方财政公共卫生支出的因素及效应。研究表明:人口规模、经济发展水平、城市化程度和与财政公共卫生支出之间存在一定的相关性。财政分权对公共卫生支出具有很小的负面影响,政府规模的膨胀程度、人口结构与财政公共卫生支出并没有必然的因果关系。     

生产性支出偏好与经济增长波动

文章基于我国1998-2006年的县级面板数据,分析财政支出结构对经济增长波动的影响机制。理论分析表明,我国地方政府偏好生产性支出的特点,将提高经济增长波动率;实证结果有力地论证了上述结论,即生产性公共支出占比提高10%,经济增长波动率将增加0.42%。稳健性分析发现中西部县级地区较东部地区经济增长的波动率更大。此外,我国生产性支出偏好对经济增长波动率的影响具有明显的顺周期特征,在繁荣时期,经济增长波动率的增加幅度将超过0.8%。文章的结论可为推进和完善中央与地方财政事权和支出责任划分提供参考和依据。     

Fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in China

Since the tax-sharing reform in 1994, the Chinese fiscal system has exhibited a marked vertical fiscal imbalance—a mismatch between expenditure and revenue assignments—at the local levels, which may cause the common-pool problem in local governments' behavior. Using a large fiscal dataset at the county level from 1997 to 2006, this paper studies the effects of fiscal decentralization on local expenditure policy and analyzes how the vertical fiscal imbalance shapes these effects. The estimation results show that expenditure decentralization increases government spending and leads to a fund allocation with a larger weight on capital construction and smaller weights on education and administration. In contrast, revenue decentralization has little influence on local government expenditures. We show that the differences in the effects of expenditure and revenue decentralization can be attributed to the distortionary effects caused by the vertical fiscal imbalance and, thus, offer support to the importance of the common-pool problem at the county level of China's fiscal system.     

Fiscal Decentralization or Centralization: Diverging Paths of Chinese Cities

If fiscal decentralization promotes growth, why do some regions decentralize more than others? This article identifies the growing divergence of fiscal centralization among Chinese cities and explains it in a public finance framework. It argues that fiscal decentralization and its economy‐liberalizing effect entail significant short‐term fiscal risk. The more a locality relies on uncompetitive business ownership for fiscal revenue, the less likely fiscal decentralization is to occur. This article compiles a dataset of 20 provincial capitals between 1999 and 2016 to test for the connection between a city's tax base and its fiscal centralization level. It then pairs two “most similar” cities to trace how fiscal security concerns drove their fiscal and economic policies apart. This article adds a micro‐level perspective to the literature on fiscal federalism. By pointing out the fiscal constraints confronting local governments, it offers a new angle to understand the different growth paths of Chinese cities.     

What Do OECD Countries Cut First When Faced with Fiscal Adjustments?

Following the present scale of fiscal imbalances in developed countries, significant fiscal consolidation will be inevitable in the coming years. Fiscal discipline will require cuts in government expenditure, leading to trade‐offs between different components of government expenditure. In this article, we explore the relationship between components of government expenditure and government size during the period 1970‐2007 for a sample of 25 developed countries to shed light on how fiscal discipline might influence public spending composition in the coming years. Using the Pooled Mean Group estimation we find that fiscal adjustments protect functions that have both a social and productive character, such as education and health spending. In addition, the most productive spending, that related to transport and communications, is also isolated from budgetary cuts. This result shows evidence of governments reacting to the voter's increasing realization that reducing productive expenditures harms long‐term economic growth by striking a balance between utility and economic‐growth‐enhancing expenditure.     

财政分权与经济增长

理解财政分权在经济增长过程中所起的作用颇为重要。本文采用1953～2003年的时间序列数据,以地方政府财政支出占全部财政支出的比重作为度量财政分权的指标,用实证研究的办法考察财政分权对于中国经济增长的影响。与已有的一些研究结果不同的是,本文的回归结果显示,对经济增长具有显著影响的并不是财政分权的绝对水平,而是财政分权程度的变动。本文依据这一结果分析了财政分权与经济增长的关系。     

财政分权、地方财政支出偏好与城市用地规模扩张——以长三角地区为例

摘要：文章通过利用1996-2010年长三角地区16个核心城市的面板数据,实证考察了财政分权、地方财政支出与城市用地规模扩张之间的关系。研究表明：财政务权和地方政府竞争体制使得地方政府在财政支出上存在着明显的偏向,三者均是城市用地规模扩张的主要推动因素;不同城市用地规模扩张的速度存在差异;体制因素是城市用地规模盲目扩张的深层次原因。为了从根本土改变地方政府的行为为鼓励,需立足中国实际,完善现有的财政体制,规范中央和地方的财政收支;改革现行的政绩考核体制,保持官员任期的连续性和稳定性;要深化我国的户籍制度改革,打破居民迁移的体制壁垒。实现”用脚投票”的机制．     

Deficit Estimation and Welfare Effects after the 1994 Fiscal Reform in China： Evidence from the County Level

Using simple statistical analysis of count-level budgetary data from across all of China＇s counties, the present paper examines whether the post-1994 fiscal decentralization has affected redistribution at the count-level. The new fiscal system has been less able to narrow inter-county dispersion in ftscal imbalances than the old one, even after taking intergovernmental transfer payments into account. Although with the post-1994 system there has been a modest increase in per capita welfare spending in all counties on average, much of the new-found fiscal resources have been spent on salary and administrative expenses rather than spending on public goods. Therefore, it is imperative that the reform of China＇s tax system is intensified.     

财政自主与公共支出效率:自地方政府实践维度观察

公共支出效率主要受相对财政自主——地方政府自有收入在支出中的比例——的正面影响。这表明了分权确立独立主体的激励型好处,但更受绝对财政自主——地方政府自有收入——的负面影响,意味着我国分权缺乏相应的控制和问责机制,所谓的财政自主还没有达到规范意义上的要求。因此,我国地方分权应坚持,但配套的公共财政包括公共预算制度更应尽快建立和健全。     

Estimating local fiscal multipliers using political connections

We use political connections between central and local governments in China to identify the effects of government spending. Our key innovation is using changes of central government ministers as a source of exogenous variation in earmarked transfers received by prefectural city-level governments. The analysis reveals that the increase in earmarked transfers is temporary and local effective tax rates do not respond to such fiscal expansions. Given that using cross-regional analysis for a monetary union can difference out the influence of monetary policy, the fiscal shock we study is a temporary, non-tax financed and no-monetary-policy-response government spending shock. We find the local fiscal multiplier in China is above one and there are no significant spillover effects from local government spending.     

Local fiscal multipliers and population aging in Japan

This study examines how the effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on population aging. To this end, this study estimates the local fiscal multipliers in Japan. Results suggest that the estimated local fiscal multiplier on output is larger in non-aged areas than aged areas, and that the effects on the number of workers are not statistically significant in either area type. Additionally, the multipliers on private investment are only higher than one in non-aged prefectures. Results also indicate that the multiplier generated by an increase in government investment is larger than that in government consumption. These results indicate fewer slack resources in aged areas that can be mobilized in response to increased government spending.     

Intra‐provincial Revenue Sharing and the Subnational Government's Fiscal Capacity in China: The Case of Zhejiang Province

This study investigates whether the tax‐sharing system has deteriorated the fiscal capacity of subnational governments by analyzing how fiscal revenues are divided between provincial and sub‐provincial governments. Our study of county‐level fiscal data from Zhejiang Province in China during 1994–2007 shows that intra‐provincial revenue‐sharing rules favor county governments in two ways: (i) they improve county governments ‘fiscal autonomy in terms of using their own revenues; and (ii) they enhance county governments ‘fiscal capacity through province‐to‐county general transfers. In addition, we find that intra‐provincial fiscal revenue‐sharing rules and transfers reduce fiscal disparity between counties.     

当前地方政府融资存在的问题及其治理

文章认为,由于财政分权改革导致地方政府事权与财权不相匹配,使得地方各级政府的财源不能满足现时的地方发展的需求,导致巨额财政赤字。而目前的经济发展模式和中央对地方政府考核以及官员晋升激励模式,使得这一问题更加严重,同时地方政府融资渠道狭窄,导致地方各级政府融资偏离财政监督,宏观调控艰难;地方政府融投资平台开始泛滥,监管体系不健全,导致目前地方政府债务失控;地方政府信息披露机制尚未建立,地方政府融投资信息不透明,使得地方政府的融资风险也难以宏观调控。基于此分析,文章提出了完善法律体系、改革财政分配关系、建立管理机制、完善融资体系和信息披露制度等对策。     

新型城镇化加剧了地方政府的土地依赖吗?——来自中国省际面板分位数估计的经验证据

借助2002年到2011年全国省际面板分位数估计方法实证研究了地方政府土地财政扩张的新型城镇化诱因。结果表明：(1)新型城镇化过程具备市场化内生的自我生财机制;当前导致地方土地财政高企的主要原因在于地方政府追求就业拉动而采取的税收竞争行为。(2)公共服务与社会保障城乡一体化进程在短期内具有增加地方政府财政支出压力性质,但中长期具备快速提振城镇化质量的“回流效应”。(3)东部地区土地依赖程度较高急需建立适应城镇化发展的土地财政代偿机制,而中西部地区土地财政风险可控可继续实施土地出让金提取反哺城镇化发展的战略思路。     

Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments

According to the Leviathan Model, fiscal federalism is a binding constraint on revenue‐maximizing government. The competitive pressure of fiscal federalism reduces public sector size, as compared to unitary states. This study uses panel data of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze the effect of different instruments on government revenue and its structure. Because of the considerable tax autonomy of sub‐national Swiss governments, it is possible to investigate different mechanisms by which fiscal federalism may influence government size. The results indicate that tax exporting has a revenue‐expanding effect; whereas, tax competition favors a smaller size of government. Fragmentation has no robust effect on the size of government revenue for Swiss cantons. The overall effect of revenue decentralization leads to fewer tax revenues but higher user charges. Thus, revenue decentralization favors a smaller size of government revenue and shifts government revenue from taxes to user charges.