Piracy and limited liability

This paper analyzes the effects of end-user piracy on a monopolized software industry with network effects in which consumers have heterogeneous income and limited liability. Limited liability produces a piracy cost which increases with income. The monopolist thus may be able to exploit the network effect brought about by the piracy of low-income consumers to charge a higher price to high-income consumers thereby earn a higher profit, especially when the monopolist can prevent the network effect from spilling over to the high-income consumers. If intellectual property rights policies are severe enough, then the monopolist can avoid the spillover. Otherwise it may become a case where each high-income buyer benefits from the piracy but the monopolist is hurt. However, a severe policy may bring about a high piracy rate since it invites the monopolist to raise the price.      

A note on corporate taxation,limited liability,and asymmetric information

Becker and Fuest (this issue, p. 1–10) provides a new explanation for the link between limited liability and corporate taxation. The authors argue that a corporate tax on all entrepreneurs with limited liability is optimal when entrepreneurs can offset potential losses and when asymmetric information exists regarding projects’ qualities. This note considers a model with a slightly modified production technology. It confirms that entrepreneurs’ abilities to offset losses and the existence of asymmetric information may affect government policy. However, it also shows that the optimal taxation policy differs from that suggested by Becker and Fuest.      

Environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability

We study optimal government policy when firms' operations involve a risk of a large environmental accident, firms do not have sufficient assets to cover such costs, and the risk is affected by firms' efforts which are unobservable to outsiders. When firms' profits and government revenues have equal weights in the social welfare function, a first best can be implemented and requires that the firm be subsidized heavily when operating with no accident, and all its assets confiscated in the event of an accident. With a lower weight on firm profits the solution is always second best, with lower subsidies to the firm, and a firm effort lower than at the first-best solution. When firm investments affect both the required accident-preventing effort for given risk and the work effort required for a given output, the first best never involves specific investment subsidies, while a second-best solution generally always does.The paper is part of the research project Environmental policy under asymmetric information', at the SNF Centre for research in economics and business administration, Department of Economics, University of Oslo. I thank, without implicating, Mikael Hoel, Jean-Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on a preliminary version.     

Imperfect information, Bayesian learning, and capital accumulation

This paper examines the consequences of informational imperfections for economic growth in an overlapping generations model in which agents learn the technological parameters in a Bayesian fashion. Under mild sufficient conditions, beliefs converge to the true value of the technological parameters. Nevertheless, even short-lived informational imperfections could have lasting effects, as they alter the long-run equilibrium levels of the capital stock. Therefore, learning dynamics may explain some of the observed differences in the performance of countries with otherwise similar economic characteristics.     

Imperfect Competition, Capital Shortages and Unemployment Persistence

We construct a model integrating the traditions of imperfect competition macroeconomics and real business cycles. For this we study a dynamic economy with optimizing households, firms and trade unions subject to stochastic shocks. We can derive closed form solutions for the behaviour of all agents. It is found that the combination of capital shortages and imperfect competition in labor markets can give rise to unemployment, and that this unemployment is quite persistent, even when the underlying shocks are not.     

不完全理性、投资者情绪与封闭式基金之谜

本文的主要贡献在于运用不完全理性投资者的情绪解析中国"封闭式基金之谜",并且论证投资者情绪是资产定价的重要因素。首先通过国内数据检验封闭式基金价格的过度波动说明国内投资者的不完全理性;其次提出了对LST(1991)的改进方法,通过提出假说与统计论证,解释了尽管国内封闭式基金的投资者结构与美国的不同,却有和LST类似的实证结果;进而利用其他反映情绪的指标间接证明封闭式基金折价是情绪指标;最后,检验情绪对市场收益的长期反向影响(长期收益反转)和情绪对短期市场收益的正向影响(短期收益惯性),论证了投资者情绪是资产定价的重要因素。     

Imperfect Information and Opportunism

Information is a scarce resource. It is inherently available only in a limited form to decision-makers. Limited or imperfect information is caused by uncertainty — both ontologic and epistemic, limitations in cognitive capabilities or bounded rationality, hidden information, and information asymmetries. This has fundamental implications for the manner in which the self-interested behavior of agents will manifest itself. The article argues that in the context of imperfect information, self-interest can function in a manner quite different from what standard approaches assume. This has been demonstrated by the recent financial crisis. However, there has been limited consideration in mainstream models, both of the neoclassical and institutional type, as to what the exact nature of self-interestedness is, and how this affects the market behavior of agents. The nature of self-interest, therefore, needs to be modeled explicitly to improve the explanatory power of economic theories.     

不完备合同与剩余控制权

合同的性质与交易效率密切相关,我们应该从效率的角度来讨论合同,本文也是基于这个出发点,提出了合同剩余的效率概念,定义合同剩余为C+(A+B)×(1-k),相应地,对这部分剩余的控制权即称之为剩余控制权.这种定义本身说明了合同剩余的来源,体现出合同与交易效率之间的负相关关系.     

Imperfect capital markets and life-cycle consumption

This paper develops a long-range consumption planning model which, unlike conventional life-cycle theory, admits a disparity between borrowing and lending rates of interest. It is shown that, when capital markets are imperfect, optimal consumption depends not only upon an arithmetic average of the household's intertemporal income distribution, the traditional life-cycle income variable, but also upon current income and higher-order moments of that income distribution. The consumption function is estimated using the 1967–1968 CEDE budget survey of four major Colombian cities. A test is made to determine whether the assumption of perfect capital markets is acceptable for empirical approximation. The results strongly indicate that, for households in middle and lower income classes, the explanatory power of the consumption function can be raised by introducing a more flexible life- time budget constraint. The model is then estimated and used to compute the marginal consumption responses of Colombian households to transitory and permanent income changes.     

略论产品责任和产品质量责任之比较

产品责任是一种特殊的民事侵权责任.分散在《产品质量法》、《消费者权益保护法》、《民法通则》等法律中的相关法律条款构建了我国的产品责任制度.与产品责任相比,产品质量责任是由我国《产品质量法》新规定的一个概念,两者的性质不能等同.笔者认为从法律责任的概念以及相关法律条文的规定来看,产品质量责任应当是一种公法责任.     

Bankruptcy costs, liability dollarization, and vulnerability to sudden stops

Countries with intermediate levels of institutional quality suffer larger output contractions following sudden stops of capital inflows than less developed nations. However, countries with strong institutions seldom experience significant falls in output after capital flow reversals. We reconcile these two observations using a calibrated DSGE model that extends the financial accelerator framework developed in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The model captures financial market institutional quality with creditors' ability to recover assets from bankrupt firms. Bankruptcy costs affect vulnerability to sudden stops directly but also indirectly by affecting the degree of liability dollarization. Simulations reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between bankruptcy costs and the output loss following sudden stops.     

Prices and Information Under Imperfect Competition

Imperfectly competitive product markets cannot be informationally efficient as private information has strategic implications interfering with price adjustment. This is illustrated in a duopoly model with sequential price setting where private information either leads to prices not being adjusted to all available information or to adjusted but biased prices.     

R&D, Imperfect Competition and Growth with Human Capital Accumulation

This paper studies the long‐run consequences of imperfect competition on growth and the sectoral distribution of skills within an R&D‐based growth model with human capital accumulation. We find that steady‐state growth is driven only by incentives to accumulate skills. In the model imperfect competition has a positive growth effect, while influencing the allocation of human capital to the different economic activities employing this factor input. Contrary to general wisdom, the share of resources invested in R&D turns out not to be monotonically increasing in the product market power and its correlation with the equilibrium output growth rate is not unambiguous.     

我国有限责任公司异议股东股份回购请求权制度探析

我国2005年修订的<公司法>在第75条首次规定了有限责任公司异议股东股份回购请求权制度.对这一制度确立的必要性及立法层面上存在的漏洞和不足作了探析.对完善这一制度提出了几点构想:由现行原则上禁止,例外允许改为原则允许,例外禁止;完善公司告知义务;完善股份价款交付期间.     

Playing monopoly in the creek: Imperfect competition, development, and in-stream flows

Land ownership and control of development in new and frontier cities is often concentrated. Local public goods, such as wetlands and riparian habitats, can be adversely affected by development. Regulatory pressure to protect these local public goods may not emerge until after some development has occurred. When development rights are insecure, an incentive exists to accelerate early development, an incentive that increases with the number of firms. Further, multiple equilibria may exist, which can result in large increases in development for small increases in the number of firms. When firms are uncertain about how the regulator values the local public good, development may be further accelerated and there may be even more equilibria.     

Fraud and fiduciary liability

All employee benefit plans are potential targets of fraudulent schemes. Smaller plans are targeted by unscrupulous brokers and promoters selling fraudulent policies; plans large enough to be self-insured face greater risks of fraud by providers and participants misrepresenting claims. Plan trustees, administrators and consultants should be alert to the many ways fraudulent schemes manifest themselves and to the legal remedies available; establish investigative programs to detect and discourage fraud; and promote education and plan incentives for participants to report fraud.     

Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds

We study frictionless matching in large economies with and without market imperfections, providing sufficient conditions for monotone matching that are weaker than those previously known. Necessary conditions, which depend on a key analytical object we call the surplus function , are also offered. Changes in the surplus yield valuable information about the comparative statics of matching patterns across environments. We apply our framework to some examples adapted from the literature, accounting for and extending several comparative–static and welfare results. We also explore the dependence of the matching pattern on the type distribution.     

Transmission Constraints and Imperfect Markets for Power

This article argues that, while most of the economic gains from the restructuring of the power industry will be achieved in electricity generation, trading and retailing, the transmission grid holds the keys to an important share of the economic value created by the process. Using a simple three-node network, this article shows that an increase in transmission capacity has two effects: (1) cheaper power can be used, and (2) competition among generators is increased. This carries three policy implications: first, policy makers can and should use transmission expansion to increase competition in generation. Second, generators will not necessarily finance nor advocate optimal transmission expansion: they may prefer to keep the rents derived from local market power, rather than gain better access to markets, even if they receive transmission payments corresponding to their investment, as suggested in parts of the United States. Finally, this work provides support for the vertical separation between generation and transmission, beyond the traditional foreclosure argument.