Should there exist secondary markets for executive stock options?

This paper investigates the potential disadvantages of the secondary markets for executive stock options (ESOs). The benefits of such markets are evident, but they might also have negative effects for shareholders. Executives might, for example, use inside information to time their ESO selling. We investigate two personal motives of managers that can be assumed to affect their optimal selling decision, that is, managers' personal portfolio management issues and the use of inside information. We explore these motives by analyzing unique data from Finland, where there are secondary markets for ESOs. The results of the study support the traditional portfolio diversification hypothesis according to which managers tend to sell their ESOs when holding an ESO is equivalent to holding the underlying stock; that is, in such a case a manager's wealth is closely tied to the stock price of the firm. With respect to the use of inside information the results indicate that ESO selling activity is not related to future stock price behaviour, suggesting that managers do not use inside information to determine the selling time of their ESOs. These results imply that the existence of secondary markets for ESOs does not weaken the usefulness of ESOs as the management compensation, although the benefits of such markets are evident.     

Management compensation contracts and distribution policies in the US technology sector

This paper examines the impact of executive compensation practices on (a) the decision to distribute and (b) the distribution channel employed by companies from the US technology sector. We report that firms that compensate their managers using executive stock options (ESOs) tend to distribute less and firms that use stock awards make more distributions. When we simultaneously examine the distribution and the channel used, we find firms using ESOs restrict their dividend payments but their propensity for stock repurchases is unaffected. Firms using stock awards to compensate managers make greater distributions across all channels. We also provide strong evidence in favour of the agency and leverage explanations for distributions.     

Accounting For Employee Share Options

Accounting for employee share options (ESOs) has caused a furore in the United States. Understandably, Australian standard-setters are moving cautiously but have signalled they may follow the FASB's lead. ESOs are a major form of executive remuneration but have not usually been recognised in the employer's financial statements unless and until they are exercised. The FASB has proposed that ESOs be valued on their grant date and immediately recognised as an asset (prepaid compensation) and additional shareholders' equity (options outstanding); the asset is then to be amortised over the period in which the employee's services are received. We describe and comment on the debate, in the light of the proposal's likely impact on firms' financial profiles.     

How Might Companies Value ESOs?

There has been a steady growth in the use of employee equity compensation plans, and in the use of executive stock options (ESOs) in particular, along with a rise in shareholder and public perceptions that the values of compensation plans are not always fully disclosed. The IFSA of Australia recently called for separate reporting in financial statements of numbers and values of ESOs. Companies, when negotiating employment contracts, frequently agree to compensate an executive if a share option plan is subsequently not approved by shareholders. These facts suggest that reporting the value of an ESO plan is a useful and important exercise. We outline a model for the valuation of ESOs typically issued by Australian listed companies and illustrate the application of the model with a case study.     

Executive stock option vesting conditions,corporate governance and CEO attributes: evidence from Australia

We investigate the association between executive stock option (ESO) vesting conditions, corporate governance and CEO attributes. Using observations from the 250 largest Australian firms, we find that stronger corporate governance is positively associated with the length of the vesting period and the use of performance hurdles. We also find that when CEOs approach retirement, firms are more likely to grant longer time‐vesting options but are less likely to impose performance hurdles. Further, more powerful CEOs appear to influence the granting of ESOs with less restrictive vesting conditions. Our findings suggest that both corporate governance and CEO attributes significantly shape the design of ESOs.     

Who should set CEO pay? The press? Congress? Shareholders?

Populist fervor in an election year has transformed executive compensation from a business issue into a political one. Critics, led by Graef Crystal, author of In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives, charge that CEOs are ripping off shareholders with their outrageous salaries while running U.S. corporations into the ground. Politicians claim overpaid CEOs are the root cause of the U.S. competitiveness problem. Add a recessionary business climate to the fact that some CEOs earn 130 times more than their lowest paid employees, and you have the makings of a populist rebellion. In a bid to appease voters, Congress is considering several bills that would limit the deductibility of "excessive executive salaries," the SEC has opened the issue to shareholder comment, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board is looking at new accounting standards for granting stock options to executives as part of company compensation schemes. Andrew R. Brownstein and Morris J. Panner say it's time to put the debate back where it belongs--in a business context. The real question is not are executives paid too much, but are shareholders getting their money's worth. Most U.S. corporations use stock compensation to link company long-term performance to executive salaries. And because of the staggering market performance of U.S. corporations in the 1980s, an overwhelming majority of CEOs are actually paid in line with their performance. Rather than cut executive pay, Brownstein and Panner suggest that corporations extend incentive-based compensation plans to all employees, thus narrowing the salary gap and establishing pay for performance at every level of the organization.     

Accounting for Executive Stock Options: A Case Study in Avoiding Tough Decisions

We review the development of accounting requirements for executive stock options (ESOs) and find that the standard-setting process has been susceptible to pressure groups including the corporate sector, politicians and even the accounting profession itself. The failure of Australian and overseas accounting regulators to take tough decisions may have created a systematic bias towards the use of ESOs which can result in grossly inefficient compensation structures motivated by a desire to maximise reported profits rather than to create optimal managerial incentives. We conclude that most of the arguments against recognition of stock option expense can be dismissed as blatant self-interest at worst, or remarkably muddled thinking at best.     

Revisiting the incentive effects of executive stock options

We develop a multiperiod framework to evaluate the incentive effects of executive stock options (ESOs). For a given increase in the grant-date firm stock price (and a concurrent increase in return volatility), the increment of total value at the vesting date acts as a proxy for the incentive effects of ESOs. If the option is attached to the existing contract without adjusting cash compensation, we suggest that a firm should not always fix the strike price to the grant-date stock price; instead, the strike price should vary with the length of the vesting period. We also show that, compared with at-the-money options, restricted stock generates greater incentives to increase stock prices in some scenarios, especially when equity-based awards are vested early. If the vesting period is long, the firm could grant options instead of restricted stock to maximize incentives.     

A dynamic analysis of executive stock options: Determinants and consequences

We investigate the determinants of executive stock options (ESOs) and their impact on risky investment and subsequent firm performance in a dynamic setting. We find that, first, the dynamic response of ESOs to growth opportunity and risk is positive and lasts for two to three years. Second, the dynamic response of risky investments to option compensation is positive but converges to zero after three years. More importantly, the positive effect of ESOs on risky investments is observed when CEOs' personal risk-aversion is taken into account. Third, accounting performance responds positively to the risky, option-induced investment, but the dynamic effect lasts only for one year. Meanwhile, when managers undertake more risky investments than what ESOs imply, accounting performance responds negatively to the over-investment.     

Financial crisis and bank executive incentive compensation

We study the executive compensation structure in 14 of the largest U.S. financial institutions during 2000–2008. We focus on the CEO's purchases and sales of their bank's stock, their salary and bonus, and the capital losses these CEOs incur due to the dramatic share price declines in 2008. We consider three measures of risk-taking by these banks. Our results are mostly consistent with and supportive of the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010), that is, managerial incentives matter — incentives generated by executive compensation programs are correlated with excessive risk-taking by banks. Also, our results are generally not supportive of the conclusions of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) that the poor performance of banks during the crisis was the result of unforeseen risk. We recommend that bank executive incentive compensation should only consist of restricted stock and restricted stock options — restricted in the sense that the executive cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for two to four years after their last day in office. The above incentive compensation proposal logically leads to a complementary proposal regarding a bank's capital structure, namely, banks should be financed with considerably more equity than they are being financed currently.     

The Pricing of Risk and Sentiment: A Study of Executive Stock Options

Option pricing models accounting for illiquidity generally imply the options are valued at a discount to the Black‐Scholes value. Our model considers the role of sentiment, which offsets illiquidity. Using executive stock options and compensation data from 1992 to 2004 for S&P 1500 firms, we find that executives value employee stock options (ESOs) at a 48% premium to the Black‐Scholes value. These premia are explained by a sentiment level of 12% in risk‐adjusted, annualized return, suggesting a high level of executive overconfidence. Subjective value relates negatively to illiquidity and idiosyncratic risk, and positively to sentiment in all specifications, consistent with the offsetting roles of sentiment and risk aversion.     

The relation between corporate governance and CEOs’ equity grants

We investigate whether the firm’s corporate governance affects the value of equity grants for its CEO. Consistent with the managerial power view, we find that more poorly-governed firms grant higher values of stock options and restricted stock to their CEOs after controlling for the economic determinants of these grants. We show that the negative relation between governance strength and equity grants is not likely to be attributable to omitted economic factors or substitution effects between governance strength and equity incentives. As further evidence consistent with the managerial power view, we show that firms with poorer governance in the pre-Enron era cut back more on using employee stock options (ESOs) for their CEOs in the post-Enron era, a period when the accounting and outrage costs of ESOs increased, consistent with poorly-governed firms taking more advantage of opaque ESO accounting rules than better-governed firms. We show that the association between governance strength and abnormal equity grants is less negative in the post-Enron period than it was in the pre-Enron period, consistent with firms making more efficient equity-granting decisions after the corporate governance changes mandated by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the major US stock exchanges took effect.     

Contracting Incentives and Compensation for Property-Liability Insurer Executives

This article examines several hypotheses about the structure and level of compensation for 103 property‐liability chief executive officers (CEOs) from 1995 through 1997. The greater the level of firm risk and the larger the firm, the greater the use of incentive compensation. Insurers subject to more regulatory attention and those whose CEOs have greater stock ownership make less use of incentive compensation. There is some evidence that option grants and restricted stock awards provide CEOs with differing incentives. This article finds that corporate governance structures, managers' stock ownership, and regulatory attention are not adequate to prevent CEOs from receiving compensation levels in excess of what economic factors predict. Contrary to findings in prior studies, there is little evidence that use of incentive compensation or level of total compensation paid increases with insurer investment opportunities, as traditionally measured.     

Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?

We examine whether executive stock options can induce excessive risk taking by managers in firms’ security issue decisions. We find that CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to stock return volatility due to their option holdings are more likely to choose debt over equity as a capital-raising vehicle. More importantly, the pattern holds not only in firms that are underlevered relative to their optimal capital structure but also in overlevered firms. This evidence is inconsistent with executive stock options aligning the interests of managers and shareholders; rather, it supports the hypothesis that stock options sometimes make managers take on too much risk and in the process pursue suboptimal capital structure policies.     

Executive stock options and incentive effects due to systematic risk

Existing research on executive stock options mainly focuses on total risk when studying risk incentives. In this study, we use a GARCH option pricing framework to show that the incentive effects of executive stock options depend on the composition of risk. Controlling for total risk, the value of executive stock options increases with systematic risk and this effect is stronger when the total risk is low. Thus, when firms grant standard or non-indexed options, CEOs will have incentives to increase systematic risk even when the total risk remains constant. In contrast, indexed options will provide CEOs with incentives to reduce systematic risk. We therefore conclude that an optimal mix of indexed and non-indexed option grants will provide CEOs with incentives to take the desired level of systematic risk.     

Employee Stock Options, Equity Valuation, and the Valuation of Option Grants Using a Warrant-Pricing Model

We investigate the use of a warrant‐pricing approach to incorporate employee stock options (ESOs) into equity valuation and to account for the dilutive effect of ESOs in the valuation of option grants for financial reporting purposes. Our valuation approach accounts for the jointly determined nature of ESO and shareholder values. The empirical results show that our stock price estimate exhibits lower prediction errors and higher explanatory powers for actual share price than does the traditional stock price estimate. We use our valuation approach to assess the implications of dilution on the fair‐value estimates of ESO grants. We find that the fair value is overstated by 6% if we ignore the dilutive feature of ESOs. Furthermore, this bias is larger for firms that are heavy users of ESOs, small, and R&D intensive, and for firms that have a broad‐based ESO compensation plan.     

Accounting rules? Stock buybacks and stock options: Additional evidence

This paper finds that CEO stock options influence the choice, amount, and timing of funds distributed as a buyback. These results favor a managerial opportunism motive for buybacks over other theories and support two key research expectations – that buybacks impose option-induced agency costs on outside shareholders, and that managers benefit from weak governance and unclear accounting in this choice. CEOs increase their insider selling following a buyback, which also supports a managerial opportunism perspective. Once we control for these agency factors, we find no evidence that buyback activity associates reliably with EPS accretion from the reduction in common shares. We conclude that the popular use of stock buybacks as a form of cash distribution derives significantly from a strong contemporaneous relation between buybacks and CEOs’ use of stock options as additional compensation.     

Non-marketability and the value of employee stock options

We adapt the Benninga et al. (2005) framework to value employee stock options (ESOs). The model quantifies non-diversification effects, is computationally simple, and provides an endogenous explanation of ESO early-exercise. Using a proprietary dataset of ESO exercise events we measure the non-marketability ESO discount. We find that the ESO value on the grant date is approximately 45% of a similar plain vanilla Black–Scholes value. The model is aligned with empirical findings of ESOs, gives an exercise boundary of ESOs and can serve as an approximation to the fair value estimation of share-based employee and executive compensation. Using the model we give a numerical measure of non-diversification in an imperfect market.     

Executive stock-based compensation and firms’ cash payout: the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences

We hypothesize that the structure of executive stock-based compensation helps to align managers’ payout choices with shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences. Specifically, stock options, which are not dividend-protected, can deter self-interested executives from using dividends as a form of payout. In contrast, restricted stock, which is dividend-protected, is more likely to induce the use of dividends. Relatedly, shareholders’ preferences for dividends, which are taxed as ordinary income, can depend on the income tax consequences of dividends relative to those of long-term capital gains. To test our hypothesis, we investigate whether the exogenous changes in shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences following the 2003 dividend tax rate reduction result in predictable shifts in executive stock-based compensation and in managers’ payout choices. Consistent with our prediction, we find a positive relation between the increased use of dividends in firms’ payouts and the increased (decreased) use of restricted stock (stock options) in executive compensation, particularly for firms with a greater percentage ownership by individual investors and with lower costs associated with modifying the structure of their compensation plans. Our investigation of the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences in the design of executive stock-based compensation extends the prior literature that has largely focused on the role of incentive contracts in inducing managerial effort, risk taking, and retention.     

Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations

Unscheduled stock options to target chief executive officers (CEOs) are a nontrivial phenomenon during private merger negotiations. In 920 acquisition bids during 1999-2007, over 13% of targets grant them. These options substitute for golden parachutes and compensate target CEOs for the benefits they forfeit because of the merger. Targets granting unscheduled options are more likely to be acquired but they earn lower premiums. Consequently, deal value drops by $62 for every dollar target CEOs receive from unscheduled options. Conversely, acquirers of targets offering these awards experience higher returns. Therefore, deals involving unscheduled grants exhibit a transfer of wealth from target shareholders to bidder shareholders.