Unit Ipos: The Who,When, And Why Of Warrant Amendment

Although unit initial public offering (IPO) firms reserve the right to amend the original terms of their warrants, only some choose to extend the exercise period, lower the exercise price, or both. We examine the extent of warrant amendment among unit IPOs and find that the decision to amend is related to the need for cash and is generally employed when share prices are closer to the original warrant exercise prices. Furthermore, extension is less likely when the firm is riskier, whereas higher levels of insider ownership significantly reduce the likelihood that a firm will lower the exercise price.     

Stock Splits and Stock Dividends: Why,Who, and When

This study investigates empirically why firms split their stock or distribute stock dividends and why the market reacts favorably to these distributions. The findings suggest that stock splits are mainly aimed at restoring stock prices to a “normal range.” Some support can also be found for the oft-mentioned signalling motive of stock splits. Stock dividends are altogether different from stock splits, and they appear to be a decreasing phenomenon. The clue to stock dividend distributions may lie in their perceived substitution for relatively low cash dividends.     

Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs

Acquisitions enable target chief executive officers (CEOs) to remove liquidity restrictions on stock and option holdings and diminish the illiquidity discount. Acquisitions also enable acquirer CEOs to improve the long‐term value of overvalued holdings. Examining all firms during 1993 to 2001, we show that CEOs with higher holdings (illiquidity discount) are more likely to make acquisitions (get acquired). Further, in 250 completed acquisitions, target CEOs with a higher illiquidity discount accept a lower premium, offer less resistance, and more often leave after acquisition. Similarly, acquirer CEOs with higher holdings pay a higher premium, expedite the process, and make diversifying acquisitions using stock payment.     

Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements

This article analyzes the timing of CEO stock option awards, as a method of investigating corporate managers' influence over the terms of their own compensation. In a sample of 620 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994, I find that the timing of awards coincides with favorable movements in company stock prices. Patterns of companies' quarterly earnings announcements are consistent with an interpretation that CEOs receive stock option awards shortly before favorable corporate news. I evaluate and reject several alternative explanations of the results, including insider trading and the manipulation of news announcement dates.     

Responsible Investors: Who They Are,What They Want

This article by a long‐time partner in Domini Social Investments, a well‐known socially responsible investment firm, begins by describing four different approaches that institutional investors have currently adopted as they account for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations in their investment decisions: (1) the incorporation of internationally accepted ESG norms and standards (as set forth in, for example, the FTSE4Good Indexes); (2) the use of industry‐specific ESG ratings and rankings (such as those used for the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes); (3) the integration of ESG considerations into stock valuation (as advocated, for example, in the Principles of Responsible Investment); and (4) the identification of companies whose business models successfully address the most pressing societal needs (often referred to as “impact investing”). The article then seeks to answer the question: what corporate ESG programs and policies can be most effectively used by managers seeking to attract institutional investors using these different approaches? The author describes three kinds of corporate ESG programs. In one approach, corporate managers focus on strengthening relations with non‐investor stakeholders, including employees, the environment, and local communities. In the second approach, corporations seek to create “shared value” by emphasizing products and services that help address society's most pressing needs. The third approach focuses on identifying and addressing the firm's industry‐specific ESG performance indicators (KPIs) that are most material to stockholders and other stakeholders. Given institutional investors' growing commitment to the incorporation of ESG concerns, corporate managers should understand the range of investors' approaches to ESG and how to account for them in their strategic planning. At the same time, they are encouraged to develop comprehensive ESG policies and goals, devote adequate resources to their implementation, and communicate efforts effectively to these investors and to the public.     

Respondable risk and incentives for CEOs: The role of information-collection and decision-making

This paper examines the incentive provision when the agent can respond to risk by exerting effort to collect information about the underlying state and making corresponding decisions. Such effort is shown to be more valuable in a riskier environment and incentives can increase with “respondable” risk. The relation between incentives and risk is more positive when the agent's effort is more effective in collecting information or in acting upon it. Using data on chief executive officers (CEOs), I find that incentives for CEOs increase with industry-wide risk, a measure of respondable risk. The positive relation diminishes when the CEO is less able to collect information or is less effective in acting upon it.     

An Analysis of Incentives for Australian Firms to Apply for Reporting Excellence Awards

An award for reporting excellence is presented annually to Australian reporting entities. This paper investigates whether firms that apply for the award are systematically different from firms that elect not to apply. The paper also investigates the benefits which may flow from winning an award for reporting excellence. The results of the paper are consistent with the proposition that such an award may be used by a firm as a means of reducing wealth transfers related to the political process.     

Inducement grants,hiring announcements,and adverse selection for new CEOs

Review of Accounting Studies - We examine how adverse selection problems when hiring new external CEOs affect contractual features of inducement grants. Focusing on the sensitivity of inducement...     

Sustainability reporting by Australian public sector organisations: Why they report

Recent research on social and environmental (SE) reporting has focused on corporations, rather than public sector agencies. Also, there has been little interest in ascertaining the views of preparers of accounts regarding SE reporting. This study analysed why a group of “better practice” organisations reported on SE matters. The researchers conducted semi-structured interviews with key preparers in the various organisations and found that their reporting was informed by the latest GRI and aimed at mostly internal stakeholders. The annual report was only one of the media used for disclosure and adoption was driven by a key individual in the organisation.     

Competing Risks of Mortgage Termination: Who Refinances,Who Moves,and Who Defaults?

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Why, when, and who terminates their mortgages? The primary reasons for mortgage termination are refinancing, selling of the property, and default....     

Who Finances Durable Goods and Why It Matters: Captive Finance and the Coase Conjecture

We propose that, by financing their own product sales through captive finance subsidiaries, durable goods manufacturers commit to higher resale values for their products in future periods. Using data on captive financing by the manufacturers of heavy equipment, we find that captive‐backed models have lower price depreciation. The evidence is consistent with captive finance helping manufacturers commit to ex‐post actions that support used machine prices. This, in turn, conveys higher pledgeability for captive‐backed products, even for individual machines financed by banks. Although motivated as a rent‐seeking device, captive financing generates positive spillovers by relaxing credit constraints.     

CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies

We undertake a broad-based study of the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on corporate financial policies and show that the risk-taking incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) significantly influence their firms’ financial policies. In particular, we find that CEOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with lower (higher) leverage and higher (lower) cash balances. CFOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with safer (riskier) debt-maturity choices and higher (lower) earnings-smoothing through accounting accruals. We exploit the stock option expensing regulation of 2004 to establish a causal link between managerial incentives and corporate policies. Our findings have important implications for optimal corporate compensation design.     

Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The Case of Acquiring CEOs

We explore how compensation policies following mergers affect a CEO's incentives to pursue a merger. We find that even in mergers where bidding shareholders are worse off, bidding CEOs are better off three quarters of the time. Following a merger, a CEO's pay and overall wealth become insensitive to negative stock performance, but a CEO's wealth rises in step with positive stock performance. Corporate governance matters; bidding firms with stronger boards retain the sensitivity of their CEOs' compensation to poor performance following the merger. In comparison, we find that CEOs are not rewarded for undertaking major capital expenditures.     

CFOs versus CEOs: Equity incentives and crashes

Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993-2009, we provide evidence that the sensitivity of a chief financial officer's (CFO) option portfolio value to stock price is significantly and positively related to the firm's future stock price crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak evidence of the positive impact of chief executive officer option sensitivity on crash risk. Finally, we find that the link between CFO option sensitivity and crash risk is more pronounced for firms in non-competitive industries and those with a high level of financial leverage.     

The Quality Option and Timing Option in Futures Contracts

Often futures contracts contain quality options whereby the short position has the choice of delivering one of an acceptable set of assets. We explore the implications of the quality option on the futures price. We develop a method for pricing the quality option for the general case of n deliverable assets and provide numerical illustrations of its significance. Even when the asset prices are very highly correlated, this option can have nontrivial value, especially when there is a large number of deliverable assets. We analyze the impact of the timing option and its interaction with the quality option. A procedure is developed for valuing the timing option in the presence of the quality option, and some numerical estimates are obtained.     

The evolution of boards and CEOs following performance declines

This paper examines the evolution of corporate boards following a large performance decline. Over 40% of the original directors depart the board during the three years following underperformance. Measures of initial CEO influence over the board such as CEO ownership are associated with smaller increases in board independence and less board turnover. The underperforming firms undergo a strong recovery subsequently, with the largest performance improvement occurring among firms that experience no turnover on their boards and among firms that do not change their board independence. We conclude that the large board turnover experienced by underperforming firms presents significant challenges for subsequent recovery.     

商业银行CEO走向失败的十个预警信号

在当今世界经济金融不确定的年代,商业银行CEO的优点在一般情况下很难展示出来,但缺点对银行的负面影响会立竿见影,最近世界商业银行巨头由于CEO的平庸而展现了病来如山倒的一幕就是明证.     

公允价值计量与管理层薪酬契约

本文以2007、2008年持有公允价值变动损益的A股上市公司为样本,分析了公允价值收益、公允价值损失与管理层薪酬之间的敏感系数。研究结果表明,A股上市公司存在着对公允价值变动损益的"重奖轻罚"现象。"重奖轻罚"现象表明我国上市公司激励有效而约束乏力的薪酬不对称特征也存在于盈余分项目层面,这将会助长管理层的机会主义行为,放大企业风险。本文还发现,公允价值"持有收益"并不必然增加股东财富,委托人不能辨别新增财富的可实现性与现实性的差异,也不能辨别市场优势地位与管理层努力程度对业绩的影响,常见的公司治理机制在该问题上并没有发挥应有的控制作用,表明中国的公司治理机制仍有待完善。