Bank capital (requirements) and credit supply: Evidence from pillar 2 decisions

We analyze how time-varying bank-specific capital requirements affect bank lending to the non-financial corporate sector as well as banks' balance sheet adjustments. To do so, we relate Pillar 2 capital requirements to a comprehensive corporate credit register coupled with bank and firm balance sheet data. Our analysis consists of three components. First, we investigate how capital requirements affect the supply of bank credit to the corporate sector, both on the intensive and extensive margin, as well as for different types of credit. Subsequently, we document how bank and firm characteristics as well as the monetary policy stance impact the relationship between bank capital requirements and the supply of credit. Finally, we examine how time-varying bank-specific capital requirements affect banks' balance sheet composition.     

Competition and Coalition among Underwriters: The Decision to Join a Syndicate

This paper studies the decision of lead investment banks to organize hybrid syndicates (commercial banks participating as co‐managers) versus pure investment bank syndicates. The findings show that hybrid underwriting issues are more challenging to float. Compared to pure investment bank syndicates, hybrid syndicates serve clients that are smaller, have lower common stock rankings and less prior access to the capital markets, rely more on bank loans, and invest less capital but issue larger amounts, which indicates that commercial banks' participation enhances hybrid services. Moreover, lead investment banks tend to invite banks' participation when clients exhibit higher loyalty in reusing their services.     

Liquidity creation,regulatory capital,and bank profitability

We examine the interrelationships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank profitability of US banks. We find that regulatory capital and liquidity creation affect each other positively after controlling for bank profitability. However, this relationship is largely driven by small banks and primarily during non-crisis periods. It is also sensitive to the level of banks' regulatory capital and how it is measured. Furthermore, we find that banks which create more liquidity and exhibit higher illiquidity risk have lower profitability. Finally, the relationship between regulatory capital and bank performance is not linear and depends on the level of capitalization. Regulatory capital is negatively related to bank profitability for higher capitalized banks but positively related to profitability for lower capitalized banks. Therefore, a change in regulatory capital has differential impacts on bank performance. Our findings have various implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

Fiscal consolidations and bank balance sheets

We empirically investigate the effects of fiscal policy on bank balance sheets, focusing on episodes of fiscal consolidation. To this aim, we employ a very large data set of individual banks' balance sheets, combined with a newly compiled data set on fiscal consolidations. We find that standard capital adequacy ratios such as the Tier-1 ratio tend to improve following episodes of fiscal consolidation: for the median bank in our sample, a 1% of GDP fiscal consolidation increases the Tier-1 capital ratio by around 1.5 percentage points over two years. Our results suggest that this improvement results from a portfolio re-balancing from private to public debt securities which reduces the risk-weighted value of assets. In fact, if fiscal adjustment efforts are perceived as structural policy changes that improve the sustainability of public finances and, therefore, reduce credit risk, the banks' demand for government securities should increase relative to other assets.     

Should banks be geographically diversified? Empirical evidence from cross-country diversification of European banks

Using a sample of European bank, this paper investigates the impact of banks' geographic diversification on their cost of equity capital. Examining the geographic diversification of European banks gives an insight on the value of cross-border banking. To measure diversification between major geographic areas in which the bank operates, the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, based on revenues generated at home and abroad is constructed for each bank. To address the problem of endogeneity, system generalized method of moments estimator is used. The main finding of the analysis is that, other things equal, more geographic diversified banks have higher cost of equity capital than geographically focused ones. This result implies that the adverse market valuation effect of geographic diversification (increase in agency problem) dominates the positive ones (increase in efficiency and reduction in risk).     

Bank capital and credit market competition: Will competitive pressure lead to higher capital levels?

This paper establishes a theoretical model to study the relationship between credit market competition and bank capital. In the model, bank capital can alleviate the debt overhang problem, and the extent to which banks can enjoy the gain of holding capital is decreasing in the competitive pressure in the credit market. It is shown that credit market competition reduces banks' incentive to hold capital. Deposit insurance also induces banks to hold less capital. In addition, bank capital regulation is welfare improving, and banks may voluntarily hold capital in excess of regulatory minimums.     

Investor ambiguity,systemic banking risk and economic activity: The case of too-big-to-fail

This paper examines the relationship between investors' ambiguity in the financial options market and systemic banks' risk. Eliciting ambiguity information from option pricing data on the twelve major U.S. banks between 2003 and 2010, we show that higher behavioral deviations from risk-neutral and Bayesian valuation (i.e., investor ambiguity) are associated with higher systemic banks' downside, market and credit risks. Consistent with behavioral explanations, we confirm the detrimental effect of ambiguity on financial market outcomes and find strong evidence of ambiguity among call and put option holders. Variance decomposition indicates that such a pattern of behavior explains a significant proportion of U.S. banking risk variance. This effect is more pronounced during periods of economic turbulence and bank stress (i.e., the 2007–2009 crisis), and holds after controlling for size, tail risk, implied volatility, and volatility of volatility dynamics. We also document that ambiguity from the financial market has a depressing impact on real economic activity, including capacity utilization, non-farm payrolls and overall economic performance. Our findings are robust to alternative specifications of ambiguity such as multiple priors and expected utilities with uncertain probabilities.     

Bank capital and equity investment regulations

This paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks' minimum required capital–asset ratio and the regulation that limits, and in some countries forbids, banks' investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms. There are two sources of moral hazard in the model: one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance, and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project. Among other things, the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank's stability and can also be Pareto-improving. Equity regulation is never Pareto-improving and does not increase the bank's stability.     

Intra- and inter-regional portfolio diversification strategies under regional market integration: Evidence from U.S. global banks

This study empirically assesses whether being a part of any specific region affects global banks' decisions on capital allocation across 20 developed and 44 emerging markets by using data on U.S. banks in the period from 2006 to 2015. We find that both the intra-bank lending of a parent bank to its affiliates abroad and the local lending of foreign affiliates decrease as internal lending to neighboring countries within a region increases. This finding provides evidence of the negative spillover or contagion effects from regional allocations on the capital allocation of global banks to individual economies. Our findings reflect that financial markets are integrated within the region, which suggests no intra-regional diversification benefits to the United States or to other global investors. Moreover, parent banks' intra-bank lending translates into foreign affiliates' local lending in the host country. A policy implication is that countries in the same region should strengthen coordinated efforts to ensure free intra-regional capital mobility and diversify country-specific risk. The findings of this study can help enhance our understanding of the relationships between financial markets interconnectedness and global banks' portfolio management strategies.     

资本管制下商业银行战略选择对绩效的影响

以我国14家上市商业银行2004～2009年的平衡面板数据为样本,通过银行关键战略资源配置来体现银行战略选择,将银行战略问题从定性向定量转化,并通过理论建模和实证分析来研究资本管制、战略选择和绩效三者的关系。结果认为,资本管制对银行的资本充足率与绩效都存在显著直接影响;资本管制通过调整商业银行资本充足率,对绩效产生间接影响;管制压力与不同的战略资源配置的交互作用分别对资本充足率、绩效有不同的影响。     

Visible Reserves in Banks – Determinants of Initial Creation,Usage and Contribution to Bank Stability

The opportunity of building up visible “Reserves for General Banking Risks” by the bank management represents a peculiarity in the German financial accounting framework for banks. We investigate German banks' motives for the creation and usage of these reserves and assess their role in financial stability. We find that banks primarily create and use GBR reserves to build up Tier 1 capital for regulatory capital management and earnings management purposes. Most importantly, however, we also reveal that banks using these reserves are less likely to experience a future distress or a bank default event. We therefore conclude that the existence of GBR reserves within the financial accounting framework represents both a convenient capital and earnings management tool for bank managers and a beneficial regulatory instrument to enhance bank stability.     

Credit Traps and Macroprudential Leverage

We construct a macroeconomic model with overlapping generations to study credit traps—prolonged periods of stagnant real activity accompanied by low productivity, financial sector undercapitalization, and credit misallocation. Shocks to bank capital tighten banks' borrowing constraints causing them to allocate credit to easily collateralizable but low productivity projects. Low productivity weakens bank capital generation, reinforcing tight borrowing constraints, sustaining the credit trap steady state. Macroprudential policy to limit bank leverage can be welfare enhancing. In the presence of a credit trap, optimal leverage policy is countercyclical.     

Foreign Banks in Transition Countries: To Whom Do They Lend and How Are They Financed?

We use focused interviews with managers of foreign parent banks and their affiliates in Central Europe and the Baltic States to analyze the small‐business lending and internal capital markets of multinational financial institutions. Our approach allows us to complement the standard empirical literature, which has difficulty in analyzing important issues such as lending technologies and capital allocation. We find that the acquisition of local banks by foreign banks has not led to a persistent bias in these banks' credit supply toward large multinational corporations. Instead, increased competition and the improvement of subsidiaries' lending technologies have led foreign banks to gradually expand into the SME and retail markets. Second, it is demonstrated that local bank affiliates are strongly influenced by the capital allocation and credit steering mechanisms of the parent bank.     

BANK REGULATIONS,CAPITAL STRUCTURE,AND RISK

The joint influence of the Federal Reserve's (Fed) discount window credit and reserve requirements and FDIC's deposit insurance on a bank's optimal capital structure and asset risk choices is analyzed. The specific seniority of such regulatory claims, and potentially strong negative correlation between bank asset classes, significantly alters our traditional view of such regulatory influences on bank behavior. I find that the discount window's presence does not always prompt bank risk taking and leverage, but it does partially offset such incentives under certain conditions. In addition to its cost, a reserve requirement provides the bank with an indirect subsidy that may encourage deposit funding. Thus, regulatory reforms, such as the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, which curtail banks' access to the discount window, may not always be appropriate to resolve a bank's incentive for moral hazard behavior. The Fed's presence needs to be more comprehensively examined to design effective regulatory policy.     

M‐PRESS‐CreditRisk: Microprudential and Macroprudential Capital Requirements for Credit Risk under Systemic Stress

M‐PRESS‐CreditRisk is a novel stress testing approach that can help authorities gauge banks' capital adequacy related to credit risk. For the first time, it combines the assessment of microprudential capital requirements under Pillars 1 and 2 and macroprudential buffers in a unified, coherent framework. Its core element is an advanced credit portfolio model—SystemicCreditRisk—built upon a rich, nonlinear dependence structure for correlated bank portfolios. The model is applied to a sample of 12 systemically important German banking groups and delivers measures for systemic credit risk and the banks' contributions to it in both baseline and stress scenarios.     

The role of securitization in bank liquidity and funding management

This paper studies the role of securitization in bank management. I propose a new index of “bank loan portfolio liquidity” which can be thought of as a weighted average of the potential to securitize loans of a given type, where the weights reflect the composition of a bank loan portfolio. I use this new index to show that by allowing banks to convert illiquid loans into liquid funds, securitization reduces banks' holdings of liquid securities and increases their lending ability. Furthermore, securitization provides banks with an additional source of funding and makes bank lending less sensitive to cost of funds shocks. By extension, the securitization weakens the ability of the monetary authority to affect banks' lending activity but makes banks more susceptible to liquidity and funding crisis when the securitization market is shut down.     

The Impact of Trust-Preferred Issuance on Bank Default Risk and Cash Flow: Evidence from the Debt and Equity Securities Markets

Trust‐preferred stock is a debt‐equity hybrid that offers the tax deductibility of dividends but is treated as equity capital by bank regulators and rating agencies. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether holders of bank debt securities benefit from trust‐preferred issuance in the form of lower default premia and whether bank shareholders benefit from the tax deductibility of trust‐preferred dividends. Using daily returns surrounding the Federal Reserve's announcement that trust‐preferred securities would be included as a component of commercial banks' Tier I equity capital, we find evidence to support both hypotheses.     

The success of bank mergers revisited. An assessment based on a matching strategy

The question of whether or not mergers and acquisitions have helped to enhance banks' efficiency and profitability has not yet been conclusively resolved in the literature. We argue that this is partly due to severe methodological problems involved. In this study we analyze the effect of German bank mergers from the period 1995-2000 on the banks' profitability and cost efficiency. We suggest a new matching strategy to control for the selection effects arising from the fact that pre-dominantly under-performing banks engage in mergers. Our results indicate a neutral effect of mergers on profitability and cost efficiency. Comparing our results with those obtained from a naive performance comparison of merging and non-merging banks indicates a severe negative selection bias with regard to the latter.     

Regulatory and “economic” solvency standards for internationally active banks

One of the most important policy issues for financial authorities is to decide at what level average capital charges should be set. The decision may alternatively be expressed as the choice of an appropriate survival probability for representative banks over a horizon such as a year, often termed a “solvency standard”. This article sheds light on the solvency standards implied by current and possible future G10 bank regulation and on the “economic solvency standard” that banks choose themselves by their own capital setting decisions. In particular, we employ a credit risk model to show that the survival probability implied by the 1988 Basel Accord is between 99.0% and 99.9%. We then demonstrate that if a new Basel Accord were calibrated to such a standard, it would not represent a binding constraint on banks' current operations since most banks employ a solvency standard higher than 99.9%. To show this, we employ a statistical analysis of bank ratings adjusted for the impact of official or other support as well as credit risk model calculations. Lastly, we advance a possible explanation for the conservative capital choices made by banks by showing that swap volumes are highly correlated with credit quality for given bank size. This suggests that banks' access to important credit markets like the swaps markets may provide a significant discipline in the choice of solvency standard.     

GSIB status and corporate lending

Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) face additional capital requirements and closer supervision. We study how closer supervision affects corporate credit supply and investigate consequences for firms. GSIB designations reduce lending on average by 5.9% but to risky firms by 7.2%. The consequences are lower asset, sales, and investment growth, especially among high-risk borrowers, and reduced R&D expenditures among all GSIB-dependent firms. Closer supervision therefore reduces banks' risk-taking but has potentially unintended implications for firms' ability to finance innovation, which seems to crucially depend on bank credit. The supervision-induced effects are larger than those attributed to GSIB-specific capital surcharges.