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利用市场集中度和荷芬达指数两种指标测度我国农村金融市场的结构现状,发现目前农村金融市场具有较高垄断性;运用均衡论、成本最小化理论、博弈论等分析工具,诠释了市场结构是怎样影响整个农村金融市场运行的;并从正规金融市场和非正规金融市场角度探讨了垄断形成的原因。在对农村金融市场垄断性进行再探讨基础上,提出了培育真正竞争性农村金融供给主体、推动金融中介体的创新及以需求衔接供给的制度创新等优化路径。 相似文献
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房地产的高交易成本特征、准公共产品属性和一定的垄断性特征决定了单纯依靠市场机制,不能实现市场供求均衡,更不可避免地出现种种市场失灵。政府宏观调控目标可分为投机抑制目标、均衡供应目标与福利保障目标。我国宏观调控的总体目标是抑制甚至局部性遏止市场投机炒作行为,调整市场不合理供应结构,促进房地产市场供求实现最优均衡,使得中低收入居民享有基本住房保障。 相似文献
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<正> 垄断性行业的改革是当前的国际潮流,许多国家将其上升到提高国家总体竞争力的战略高度,试图通过垄断性行业的改革,降低相关产品和服务的价格,为经济发展提供一个低成本的平台,进而增强国际竞争力。在此背景下,必须继续推进和深化我国垄断性行业的改革,不进则退,别无选择。五大遗留问题亟需解决一是竞争机制的引入仅停留在"分拆"原垄断企业的层面,尚未形成规范的准入制度。通过产业重组或对原垄断企业实行"分拆",是打破垄断性市场结构的初 相似文献
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公路行政在国家行政活动中具有不可替代的重要地位,其合理构建对我国经济发展有着深远影响。本文针对我国公路行政中行政主体确定不明的问题,运用行政法相关原理,在法理学基础上对我国公路行政主体进行界定。使我国公路行政主体内容更加明确,权责更加清晰,从而对我国的公路行政有所脾益。 相似文献
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部门行政代替公共行政,弊端丛生:它导致权力性资源或垄断性资源的滥用,公共福利流入了少数人的口袋;它使立法效率和行政效率低下,背离便民利民的原则;它导致地方利益过大,小团体利益盛行;它必然动摇改革决心,模糊改革目标,增加改革成本,贻误改革时机。 相似文献
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本文从经济学角度分析了出口补贴与反补贴税对出口国福利和进口国福利的影响,认为补贴措施会降低出口国的总福利并容易遭到进口国的反补贴报复,反补贴税的效果受多种因素影响,具有不确定性,指出我国在实施出口补贴政策时应考虑产品市场的供求弹性,选择合适的补贴类型、数量和形式,以求在达到补贴的预期目的的同时尽量降低补贴的不利影响。 相似文献
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基于RabahAmir模型,运用产业组织理论建立了由船舶市场结构以及规模经济决定的船舶产业市场绩效模型,分析了不同船舶企业数量条件下船舶产业利润和福利状况的变化。通过对船舶产业的总体发展状况、市场集中度、产业利润率以及技术进步状况等方面实证统计分析,得出了我国船舶产业市场结构为中等垄断程度的寡占型市场,船舶类企业的生产效率与技术创新能力亟待提高,船舶产业的总体利润水平较低的结论,并提出了破除市场壁垒、消除垄断、推进技术自主创新和规模经济等一系列政策建议。 相似文献
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本文拟从信息经济学的理论结构出发,分析竞争性企业和垄断性企业在新信息创造中的相对作用,以及跨国公司与信息创新的关系。结论指出,垄断性市场上的企业比竞争性市场上的企业更具有信息创新的积极性,跨国公司会进行大量的复杂技术创新。 相似文献
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我国目前的市场结构具有典型的分散竞争型特征,这种市场结构制约了规模经济的实现,不利于企业的技术创新,也不能适应经济全球化条件下激烈的国际竞争需要.因此,我国应充分利用跨国公司对我国的投资,改善我国的市场结构,提升我国产业的国际竞争力,参与全球范围的垄断性竞争. 相似文献
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国有企业垄断是一个经济学问题,与所有制性质没有必然关系,需要从理性的经济学视角来审视。基于中国国情,从由国有企业构成的双寡头垄断市场出发,分析并比较由国有企业、私有企业及混合所有制企业组合而成的各种双寡头垄断市场的价格、产量及社会福利。可以发现,私有化对社会福利的提升作用是有条件的,完全的私有化未必能提升社会福利;在当前的社会经济条件下,混合所有制是解决国有企业垄断问题可行、务实的途径,其股权结构十分重要。 相似文献
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房地产业垄断利润及其消除方法探析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
我国房地产业存在超额利润的根源在于其垄断实质。将以往行政垄断的研究成果应用于房地产行业,可以看出房地产业的垄断不但造成效率损失,还导致社会福利损失。在引入心理福利概念之后,我们发现此前对福利损失的估算只是实际发生损失的一部分。为了提高经济效率,减少福利损失,身为特许权拍卖商的政府可以借用德姆塞茨方案,改进土地使用权的交易模式,即通过市场化的限价转让的方法,令房地产售价报价最低的开发商获得土地使用权。这样市场将发挥力量,将房地产业的赢利能力限制在正常利润水平上。转让之后,中标开发商要按限价价格完成“合同”,政府则需要进行事后监督。在交易市场,政府的需求管理应该以投机需求为目标,更好地维护交易秩序、稳定市场。 相似文献
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我国中小银行发展制约与对策 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
随着金融市场的开放和金融体制改革的深入,中小银行的发展越来越引起人们的关注,市场垄断和公司治理缺陷是目前影响我国中小银行发展的主要因素,中小银行发展应首先找准市场定位,进行市场细分,同时寻求理想的战略投资者,形成多元化的股权结构和健全的公司治理机制,而政府则应逐步打破银行业的垄断结构,为中小银行的持续健康发展营造一个公平竞争的市场环境。 相似文献
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文章首先厘清中国电信业的双边市场特征,然后通过构建双边市场模型分析了垄断平台和竞争性平台的均衡价格,同时考虑了不同收费形式下中国电信业的定价策略,最后分析了其双边市场中反垄断政策的含义.研究主要结论是:双边市场定价通常对需求价格弹性较小一边的价格加成比较高;网络外部性越强,价格结构越不对称;价格结构与用户数量或平台交易量是动态相互影响;差异化程度越大,平台对用户的价格加成越大.这对于我国“三网融合”的背景下电信产业市场结构、定价策略和反垄断问题具有一定的借鉴意义. 相似文献
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T. Randolph Beard Roger D. Blair David L. Kaserman Michael L. Stern 《Southern economic journal》2009,76(2):500-512
This paper focuses on third‐degree price discrimination by an upstream firm with some degree of monopoly power. Downstream firms fall into two categories: efficient and inefficient, according to their relative costs of transforming a unit of the upstream good into a unit of final product. Under ordinary static conditions, price discrimination favors the inefficient firms, which have more elastic demands. We consider, however, the possibility that discrimination in the opposite direction can alter the downstream market structure toward greater efficiency. Discriminatory pricing, then, involves charging a higher price to the less efficient firms. Such pricing is shown to be both potentially profitable for the upstream firm and welfare improving as average consumer prices fall. 相似文献
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Miguel ngel Ropero 《Southern economic journal》2021,87(3):1010-1030
In this article, we present a two‐period model in which one firm operates in two markets: a monopoly and a duopoly. Assuming that this firm has private information on the cross‐price elasticity of demand between the products sold in both markets, it limits its quantity supplied in the monopoly market in order to make its rival in the other market believe that entry into the monopolized market is unprofitable. As a result of this strategy, the average prices observed in both markets increase. This result suggests that the detrimental effects of entry deterrence on consumers' welfare are stronger than those predicted by previous literature. 相似文献
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Diana Costea 《Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics》2003,6(3):47-62
Conclusion Built on Rothbardian insights, our attempt to show the peculiarities of Misesian monopoly theory results in a few conclusions.
First of all, in Mises’s theory of monopoly two of the three conditions for the emergence of monopoly prices belong to different
realms of scientific inquiry. On the one hand, Mises points out the idea of a counterfactual comparison between competitive
price and monopoly price; on the other hand, he stresses the importance of an empirical method to discover monopoly prices.
The latter, even if it describes a true statement about market conditions, i.e., the entrepreneurs do not know (beforehand)
the market demand curve, does not help us to identify the monopoly price on market.
Second, Mises erroneously founds his welfare arguments on value theory. His utilitarian endeavor to show that “consumers’
sovereignty” is infringed by monopolistic restriction of production does not succeed. He based his arguments on nonscientific
interpersonal and intertemporal comparisons of utility.
Third, Mises is not consistent in the use of a standard of comparison for “monopoly prices”: on the one hand, the market prices
are not distinguishable from “monopoly prices”; on the other hand, the transfer of the discussion to the equilibrium framework
does not help us either, as we try to explain real market phenomena.
Thus, Mises’s attempts to incorporate the neoclassical concept of monopoly price into the framework of the market process,
as depicted by Austrians, do not succeed.
Our inquiry supports the largely shared opinion among Austrian economists that monopoly price (at least in its present definition)
does not exist on the free market; it appears only, and is logically identifiable, as a result of a privilege given by the
State. 相似文献
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Conclusion This paper has shown that under conditions of both linear and constant price elasticity demand functions, market power as measured by the Lerner index and profit rates may easily move in the opposite direction of the welfare losses from monopoly. This means that changes in monopoly power, as measured by either Lerner indexes or profit rates, are not adequate to predict qualitative changes in allocative inefficiency.More (less) market power does not necessarily imply more (less) allocative inefficiency whether one is comparing different industries at a point in time or a given industry at different points in time. For these reasons, interpretation of the relation between market power as measured by the Lerner index or profit rates and market performance must proceed with caution. 相似文献