Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion

Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a non-systematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.      

Firm-level determinants of tax evasion in transition economies

Business tax evasion is an important issue for governments. Yet the factors that determine business tax evasion have not been sufficiently examined in the literature in general, and in transition contexts in particular. To address this gap, this study uses the WB/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) database with a sample of over 12,692 firms from 26 transition economies. Applying various modelling strategies, we argue that tax evasion is a function of firm-level and institutional-level variables. We contribute to the literature by providing robust evidence showing that the perceived tax burden has a positive impact on tax evasion. We also find that the tax evasive behaviour of firms is positively influenced by low trust in government and in the judicial system as well as by higher perceptions of corruption and higher compliance costs. We find that smaller firms, individual businesses and firms in sectors that are less visible to the tax administration are more likely to get involved in evasive behaviour. Overall, institutional factors play an important role in determining firms’ tax evasion behaviour in transition economies. This finding has important policy implications.     

Economic, organizational, and political influences on biases in forecasting state sales tax receipts

This paper investigates factors influencing fixed bias in forecasting state sales taxes revenues. By extending an existing model used to explain forecast accuracy to include a series of complex interactions related to the potential political and policy use of revenue forecasts, the paper extends our understanding of the forecasting process in government. Exploratory empirical analysis based on survey data is used to provide evidence that bias in forecasting results, at least in part, from political and policy manipulation. There is also evidence that institutional reforms associated with ‘good management’ practices affect forecast bias, but in complex ways depending upon the extent to which political competition exists within the state.     

The political uncertainty and stock market behavior in emerging democracy: the case of Taiwan

This paper examines the congressional effect between the pre- and post-democratization on the stock market by the asymmetric Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heterosce desticity (GARCH) model in the period 1984–2004. The results found that the congressional effect is negative effect on stock returns but volatility is not significant. However, the democratic effect on stock returns is negative and increased of volatility. Moreover, the congressional effect on stock market returns following democratization significantly exceeds that before democratization, but have no significant effect for the volatility in the same circumstances. These results provide evidences consistent with the contention of liberalization (Hayek, Am. Econ. Rev. 35, 519–530, Individualism and Economic order, The university of Chicago press, Chicago, London, 1945, 1948; Popper, The open society and its Enemies, Princeton university, NJ, 1950).     

基于博弈论的个人所得税逃税行为分析

在我国,由于税制不健全、征管水平比较低以及纳税人依法纳税意识淡薄,个人所得税的逃税问题更是极为严重,给国家经济秩序和税法体制造成了很大的危害。通过建立个人所得税税收稽查博弈模型,分析影响个人所得税纳税人逃税行为选择的因素,以期能对我国税收征管制度的完善提供理论依据。     

Corruption: Theory and evidence from the Russian Federation

In this paper, we provide theory and evidence on the problem of corruption in the Russian Federation. Our theoretical model indicates that in the presence of official corruption, the numbers of tax inspection (collection) employees could be inversely related to per capita tax collection. Our empirical analysis supports our theoretical model, shedding light on one of the most intractable problems in the Russian Federation.     

The political economy of growth in Morocco

This paper is an attempt to explain the relatively low performance of the Moroccan economy during the last four decades using a political economy approach. In that period, the Moroccan society benefited from sophisticated institutions that facilitated policy coordination and commitment. But, the existing institutions hampered the participation of large segments of the population and political parties representing them in the policymaking process. Also, the centralization of administration hindered local initiatives. However, numerous and significant structural reforms have been undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s and in recent years a strategy has been adopted that combines continued economic liberalization, increased democratization, and efforts to reduce poverty and promote human development. These changes have started to bear fruit in the past few years.     

Socio-demographics,political attitudes and informal sector employment: A cross-country analysis

In this paper, we empirically investigate the relationship between informal sector employment and micro-level socio-demographic characteristics, political acts and attitudes, and individual norms. Using self-reported individual micro-level data from the World Values Survey for seven developing countries (China, Ecuador, Egypt, Mexico, Peru, South Africa and Yemen), our cross-country regressions and principal component analysis reveal that socio-demographic characteristics of individuals are strong predictors of their informal sector employment. Our estimations further document that individual preferences for an economically strong, interventionist and egalitarian state and confidence in state and political institutions are positively and significantly correlated with informal sector employment, whereas variables associated with confidence in free market institutions and support for competition are negatively and significantly correlated with informal sector employment. We also show that individuals who participate either actively or inactively in peaceful and lawful political processes are significantly less likely to work in the informal sector. Finally, we document that individual norms, such as religiosity and tax morale, are negatively correlated with informal sector employment. Throughout our analysis, instead of having to rely on ad-hoc informality categorizations of third parties, we base our measurement of informal sector employment directly on the self-evaluation of individuals, who have the best information on the degree of their informality.     

The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development

Economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth, bribery and tax evasion. Corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government. These incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which, in turn, depends on the incidence of corruption. The model produces multiple development regimes, transition between which may or may not occur. In accordance with recent empirical evidence, the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative.     

石英砂中钛含量测量结果的不确定度评定

文章运用等离子体发射光谱法,建立数学模型,定量分析了石英中钛的含量。     

我国税收政策对FDI组织形式影响的实证分析

本文通过对我国历年FDI数据的实证分析,研究了我国税收政策对国内三种FDI主要组织形式的影响。研究结果表明:在1991年涉外税法改变之前,中外合资企业的增长速度超过了中外合作企业和外商独资企业的增长速度,而在其之后,三者的增长速度趋于一致,说明税收政策对FDI组织形式的确有着重要影响。     

我国拟开征物业税的公平性问题探讨

物业税是一种财产税,理论上具有调节贫富差距的作用,但在实施过程中存在诸多不足,影响了其公平功能的发挥。文中在物业税的内涵与特征基础上,通过对现有房地产税公平功能的分析,提出了增强物业税公平的对策建议。     

税务会计与财务会计分离前后的交易费用探析

近年来,我国税法与会计由于根本目标的不同,产生的差异也越来越大。从新制度经济学的角度来看,改变税务会计和财务会计合一的制度安排,是将二者分离,这将有利于降低纳税企业、税务机关和其他会计信息需求主体的交易费用。     

Forecasting and uncertainty in the economic and business world

Forecasts are crucial for practically all economic and business decisions. However, there is a mounting body of empirical evidence showing that accurate forecasting in the economic and business world is usually not possible. In addition, there is huge uncertainty, as practically all economic and business activities are subject to events we are unable to predict. The fact that forecasts can be inaccurate creates a serious dilemma for decision and policy makers. On the one hand, accepting the limits of forecasting accuracy implies being unable to assess the correctness of decisions and the surrounding uncertainty. On the other hand, believing that accurate forecasts are possible means succumbing to the illusion of control and experiencing surprises, often with negative consequences. We believe that the time has come for a new attitude towards dealing with the future. In this article, we discuss the limited predictability in the economic and business environment. We also provide a framework that allows decision and policy makers to face the future — despite the inherent limitations of forecasting and the uncertainty, sometimes huge, surrounding most future-oriented decisions.     

Voluntary internalisations facing the threat of a pollution tax

This paper investigates how the threat of a pollution tax fosters voluntary arrangements under private information and how such arrangements (of the take-it-or-leave-it type) will look like. The objective is (i), to address a topical and policy relevant problem, and (ii), to highlight that the optimal contracts exhibit substantial variations, degrees of complexity and uncommon features. If the pollutee offers an arrangement (and this is the more likely and also more interesting case) the spectrum of solutions covers six different cases: 'no distortion at the top', 'no distortion at the bottom', 'no distortion in the interior' and a boundary solution (a pseudo contract of duplicating the tax outcome) applicable either in all instances of the agent's benefit or coupled with one of the conventional mechanisms. If the polluter offers a contract, the optimal incentive scheme is countervailing with the consequence that the signs of the payments are reversed, that the property of no distortion holds at both ends and that the polluter's best strategy is to duplicate the tax outcome if the actual damage is around the expected value. The government's threat encourages contracting and improves the allocation beyond what an actual intervention could achieve. This provides a potential role for governments in an otherwise Coasean framework. Received: 28 March 2003, Accepted: 10 October 2005 JEL Classification: D62, D82 Both authors acknowledge (exceptionally) helpful and detailed comments from an anonymous referee and suggestions from an associate editor of the journal.     

Fiscal performance and elections in the context of a transition economy

It is widely accepted that, in democratic societies, incumbent governments may use various means, such as discretionary spending, to increase their chances of re-election. In the context of potential budget constraints (e.g., large debt), the incumbent might consider alternative means. Tax collection performance could be one such means that is prone to incumbents’ electoral manipulation, particularly in transition countries with a weak institutional framework. Investigating Albania, we show that fiscal performance, measured by monthly tax revenues, is poor before elections, especially in elections that result in political change. Before all elections, we observe a reduction in tax collection ranging from 3.2 percentage points in the twelve months before elections to 4.0 percentage points in the six months before elections. This implies a drop of more than half in fiscal performance compared with its long-term “natural” or average rate. Moreover, the deterioration in performance is considerably larger, by two- to threefold, before “change elections” (i.e. elections that result in a change of the governing party). After these elections, fiscal performance improves. The key to reducing deterioration in fiscal performance associated with elections is to establish rules and institutional oversight (independent or bipartisan) that reduce the discretion of tax authorities.     

浅谈企业利用投资可以合理避税

合理避税的概念，合理避税与偷税的区别，合理避税要了解企业的基本情况，以及合理避税所需的条件，进而结合国家税收法规举例说明企业利用投资来合理避税的案例。     

资源型城市可持续发展战略——基于税收视角的思考

资源型城市可持续发展是我国目前社会经济发展中面临的重要课题.本文从税收政策角度分析了资源型城市可持续发展所面临的主要问题,指出了现行税收政策存在的诸多不适应性.在此基础上,提出了促进资源型城市可持续发展的税收对策.     

Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management

Abstract.  The issue of groundwater management remains a practical concern in many regions throughout the world, while water managers continue to grapple with the question of how to manage this resource. In this article, we attempt to bring the most advanced and appropriate tools to bear on the issue of resource allocation involving groundwater. Our objective is to demonstrate the state of the art in the literature on ways to think about this complex resource and to deal with the important economic issues emanating from its complexity. We present the conceptual framework within which economists examine the elements interacting in the management of groundwater resources, indicate why the role of the market is limited with respect to the price of this very complex resource, and point to the mechanisms that can pull competitive groundwater price and quality-graded quantity of groundwater in line with their equilibrium levels. In particular, we critically review economic models of groundwater use, examine the potential for groundwater management, discuss the difficulties encountered in the estimation of the relevant control variables of such models, and identify the advantages and limitations of the instruments devised for the efficient use (allocation) of this resource. Finally, we argue that devised regulatory schemes usually ignore the information and knowledge needed for their implementation, and we suggest a core of conditions necessary for successful groundwater management reforms.     

Optimal control theory and the reelection problem: The rise of a political business cycle

Riassunto In questo lavoro gli autori si propongono di evidenziare, tramite tecniche di controllo ottimo, l'insorgere di un ciclo politico economico nell'andamento del sistema economico, cioè l'eventuale manipolazione da parte del governo della situazione economica al fine di essere rieletto per il successivo mandato.Il modello proposto prevede una funzione di costo-popolarità, che determina la rielezione, lineare-quadratica rispetto al reddito nazionale e all'inflazione. La formalizzazione quadratica sia rispetto alla variabile di stato che alla variabile di controllo è motivo di alcune complicazioni analitiche del tutto estranee alla letteratura esistente sul terna. Il modello, da un punto di vista economico, si presenta più ricco e completo rispetto a quelli riportati in letteratura: in esso infatti, oltre alla curva di Phillips, sono presenti anche le equazioni IS-LM. Questa caratteristica rende possibili alcune considerazioni riguardo al ruolo dei fattori monetari e della spesa pubblica all'interno del ciclo politico economico.Dall'analisi svolta nell'articolo risulta confermato l'insorgere, sotto alcune condizioni, di un ciclo politico economico. Per determinati valori dei parametri del modello il comportamento può comunque anche essere caratterizzato da oscillazioni smorzate o da una continua espansione economica.