Measuring and Utilizing Corporate Risk Tolerance to Improve Investment Decision Making

Strategic investment decisions are generally characterized by financial risk as well as an irrevocable commitment of significant amounts of capital. The firm's willingness to undertake financial risks plays an important role in the investment decision making process. A comprehensive economic decision analysis to evaluate strategic investment decisions requires a measure of the firm's tolerance for financial risk. This article describes a decision analysis–based technique for assessing managerial risk tolerance as well as managers' ability to be consistent in terms of their financial risk taking. These assessments are then utilized to assist the firm in establishing a corporate risk policy that can guide strategic decisions under uncertainty. The study firm is a business unit within a U.S.-based major oil company with an annual capital budget of approximately $400 million. Our findings suggest that managers are generally risk averse but struggle in terms of being consistent in their financial risk-taking decisions. This work enabled the firm to implement a financial risk tolerance that could be utilized in the economic decision analysis of investment decisions.     

An Approach to Assess the Importance of Brand Equity in Acquisition Decisions

Many firms acquire other firms with well-known and proven brands to hedge against the high costs and risks of new product development. A critical question in these acquisition decisions involves the assessment of the importance of brand equity to the acquiring firm. Since the brand equity benefits can vary by firm (and also by the decision maker within a firm) a critical question is how can one systematically decipher the effect of brand equity in acquisition decisions. Using the balance model [8,15], Vijay Mahajan, Vithala Rao, and Rajendra Srivastava present a methodology to determine the importance of brand equity in acquisition decisions. By capturing the idiosyncratic perceived importance of brand equity of every decision maker involved in acquisition decisions, the methodology enables members of a committee within a firm to understand and reconcile their differences in evaluating potential acquisitions. This methodology is applied in a pilot study for the all-suites segment of the hotel industry with data collected from senior executives of five major hotel chains. The authors also discuss benefits, limitations, and further extensions of the suggested approach.     

Short-term financing in a cash-constrained supply chain

In this paper we consider a two-level supply chain with a single retailer and a manufacturer, where both the firms are facing financial constraints and can not produce/order their optimal quantity. Our work shows that a lender who finances the manufacturer has a motivation to finance the retailer as well. Motivated by this, we investigate lender's problem of financing both the firms by making a joint decision on the loan amount and comparing it with the case when lender makes independent decision on loan amount for both the firms. Our numerical study indicates that if one of the firms in the supply chain has sufficiently low cash, joint decision (we refer to it as supply chain financing) may be better not only for the lender but for the retailer and manufacturer as well.     

A Search Model Where Consumers Choose Quantity Based on Expected Price

I describe a price game in which consumers face search costs and base their quantity decision on the expected price. Because of search costs, the choice of the firm they will buy from is described by a random process. I show that the expected equilibrium price is above the monopoly price. This result does not change if demand comes from a small share of perfectly informed consumers with zero search costs.     

Experimenting to Learn about Demand in Duopoly with Forward‐Looking Consumers

Using a two‐period model, I show that competition between two symmetric duopolists trying to learn about unknown features of demand results in an informationally suboptimal process. Because a firm’s marginal return to price experimentation equals zero if the rival’s price is matched in the first period, myopic symmetric pricing arises in equilibrium even though a firm’s expected second‐period profit attains a local minimum. Furthermore, forward‐looking consumers suffer from ratcheting because their first‐period purchase decisions partly reveal their preferences, which exacerbates the informational suboptimality of the firms’ experimentation process without affecting their pricing. The role of firm asymmetries is also analyzed.     

Consumer referrals

In many industries, firms reward their customers for making referrals. We analyze a monopoly’s optimal policy mix of price, advertising intensity, and referral fee when buyers choose to what extent to refer other consumers to the firm. When the referral fee can be optimally set by the firm, it will charge the standard monopoly price. The firm always advertises less when it uses referrals. We extend the analysis to the case where consumers can target their referrals. In particular, we show that referral targeting could be detrimental for consumers in a low-valuation group.     

Ordering and pricing policies in a manufacturing and distribution supply chain for fashion products

In the paper, we develop a model of manufacturing and distribution supply chains that are operating to meet price-sensitive random demand for products with short life cycles such as fashion products. Two specific scenarios are considered. The manufacturer-controlled scenario is one where the distributor shares price-sensitive random demand with the manufacturer, and the manufacturer controls the supply chain stocking decisions and bears the risk of overstocking costs. The distributor-controlled scenario works in the opposite direction. Prevailing wisdom suggests that the manufacturer should control supply chain decisions (e.g., via vendor-managed inventory). Our results indicate that such an arrangement is against the interest of a distributor selling short life-cycle products. Furthermore, we find that the total supply chain profit is generally higher when the distributor controls the supply chain stocking decisions and bears the risk of overstocking costs.     

Entry,imperfect competition,and futures market for the input

We analyze firms' entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with one another. Each firm faces uncertainty in the input cost when making production decision, and has access to the futures market to hedge the random cost. We provide two sets of results. First, under general assumptions about risk preferences, demand, and uncertainty, we characterize the unique equilibrium. In contrast to previous results in the literature (without entry), both production and output price depend on uncertainty and risk aversion. Specifically, when entry is endogenized and the futures price is not actuarially fair, access to the futures market does not lead to separation. Second, to study the effect of access to the futures market on entry and production, we restrict attention to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a linear demand, and a normal distribution for the spot price. In general, the effect of access to the futures market on the number of firms and production is ambiguous.     

The Dominant Firm Model Revisited

This paper extends the standard Forchheimer dominant firm model by making more explicit shifts in the fringe supply when the market price set the dominant firm deviate from its limit price. It demonstrated how, when a dominant firm engages in short-run profit maximization, the market price it sets in the long run will equal its limit price and that, in certain situations, increased production cost for fringe lead to an increase in the number of fringe firms in the long run.     

Collusion and leadership

The paper explores the role of price or quantity leadership in facilitating collusion. It extends the standard analysis of tacit collusion by allowing firms to make their strategic choices either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that price leadership indeed facilitates collusion by making it easier to punish deviations by the leader. In case of pure Bertrand competition, price leadership restores the scope for (perfect) collusion in markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise. When firms face asymmetric costs or offer differentiated products, price leadership can also enhance the profitability of collusion—in case of asymmetric costs, the less efficient firm must act as the leader. Finally, such leadership is less effective in case of Cournot competition since, following an aggressive deviation by the leader, the follower would rather limit its own output, making it more difficult to punish the deviation. Still, quantity leadership may enhance collusion when it is already somewhat effective in a simultaneous move setting.     

Risk Sharing,the Cost of Equity and the Optimal Capital Structure of the Regulated Firm

This paper considers the relationship between the regulator’s pricing decision and the allocation of risk between consumers and shareholders. Consumers are willing to trade-off price variations against a lower expected price. Prices are higher in adverse economic conditions, but shareholder returns are not necessarily lower. It might be optimal to insure shareholders against market risk, so that consumers could thereby achieve a lower expected price. The allocation of risk between consumers and shareholders depends on the capital structure of the regulated firm, and a very special set of conditions must apply for the social optimum to be 100% debt finance with the firm operating on a ‘not-for-profit’ basis.      

Strategic marketing in global supply chains: Four challenges

Supply chain management has emerged as a critical arena in which firms can find significant cost reduction opportunities, giving them a cost advantage over competitors. When supply chain management orientations are adopted by several firms in a supply chain, together they can significantly reduce supply chain costs pitting supply chain against supply chain. However, the pursuit of cost savings opportunities is not the only objective of supply chain management. Superior supply chain management can facilitate marketing strategy and lead to the creation of superior customer value, satisfaction, and loyalty, which in turn lead to improved product profit margins, overall firm profitability, and overall corporate growth. However, marketing strategy is problematic in global supply chains. Specifically, four significant strategic marketing challenges exist that relate to the development and execution of marketing strategy in global supply chains. This article draws attention to these challenges to stimulate managerial and research efforts that will move marketing strategy through the 21st century.     

Decision models in global supply chain management

Integrative decision making is key to effective supply chain management (SCM). This article examines five illustrative supply chain decision models that demonstrate the importance of integrating the decisions across the supply chain. The models that are discussed illustrate the diversity of analytical approaches and their usefulness in managing global supply chain issues. The paper identifies potential areas of additional research where analytical modeling can generate useful insights. The paper also presents a short categorization of decision models from literature.     

Prominence,complexity, and pricing

This paper analyzes prominence in a homogeneous product market where two firms simultaneously choose both prices and price complexity levels. Market-wide complexity results in consumer confusion. Confused consumers are more likely to buy from the prominent firm. In equilibrium, there is dispersion in both prices and price complexity. The nature of equilibrium depends on prominence. Compared to its rival, the prominent firm makes higher profit, associates a smaller price range with lowest complexity, puts lower probability on lowest complexity, and sets a higher average price. However, higher prominence may benefit consumers and, conditional on choosing lowest complexity, the prominent firm’s average price is lower, which is consistent with confused consumers’ bias.     

基于CVaR的第三方回收闭环供应链的优化与协调

利用条件风险值理论研究了第三方回收闭环供应链的优化与协调问题。在随机需求与收益共享———费用共担契约下,建立了由单个风险规避零售商、单个风险规避制造商和单个风险中性第三方回收商组成的三阶闭环供应链的条件风险值模型和基于条件风险值的最优订购与定价决策模型。在对模型进行分析的基础上,揭示了制造商和零售商的风险规避水平对最优订购量、最优定价、条件风险值及闭环供应链协调性的影响。最后通过一个算例验证了研究结论。     

Outcome-based contracting from the customers' perspective: A means-end chain analytical exploration

Within the context of servitization, manufacturing firms increasingly offer outcome-based contracts (OBCs) which sell the outcome of a manufacturing process instead of the resources required for outcome creation. While extant studies have focused on the provider's viewpoint, this research explores industrial customers' requirements and goals when sourcing OBCs. We report the results of laddering interviews with purchasing and engineering managers from 32 actual and potential OBC customers. Based on a means-end chain analysis we find that, in addition to organizational goals, such as reducing costs or ensuring reliable supply, individual goals of the decision-makers also play a key role when purchasing OBCs. Specifically, the risk of being held accountable for problems that may occur in an OBC's implementation and operation emerges as an important concern of decision-makers. In contrast to extant research, that highlights how OBCs transfer operational risk from the customer to the supplier firm, our study indicates that customers also perceive elevated levels of individual and organizational risk when making OBC purchase decisions. Against this backdrop, OBC salespeople should address both individual and organizational goals of key decision-makers in the customer firm and focus on building trust in the supplier's ability to realize and operate an OBC.     

Production costs, scope economies, and multi-client outsourcing under quantity competition

Two game models are developed based on production costs and scope economies to investigate the widely observed multi-client outsourcing (MCO) phenomenon. Analytical results demonstrate that outsourcers’ high in-house production costs and the advantage of scope economies motivate firms to outsource collectively to an independent vendor. Under certain conditions, if both firms make their outsourcing decisions simultaneously, collective outsourcing is one of the two equilibria; if both firms make decisions sequentially, collective outsourcing becomes the unique equilibrium. Furthermore, the comparative statics of the critical degree of scope economies are examined for the occurrence of MCO with regard to diverse market parameters. Finally, it is proved that market prices decrease as the degree of scope economies increases when MCO occurs. This research helps explain some widely observed phenomena such as malls, supply chain cities, and the China price.     

Assessing introduction factors for a new industrial product

The present research involves determinant component analysis [3]. Specifically, the study assesses which components—price, product or environmental—are most important in the design of new entry strategy. Under conditions of abundance, industrial firms primarily analyzed price and product characteristics when making new product decisions. In choosing one supplier over another the stalwart buying motives have been quality, service and price [4]. However, these decision components were conceptualized in a period of abundance. Under conditions of scarcity, are price and product characteristics still important? Are environmental dimensions perhaps more important under shortage conditions when making new product decisions? Besides describing the key components that may be considered in new product programming, the article also outlines an approach that may be used to find determinant decision components.     

Timing the Start of Material Substitution Projects: Creating Switching Options under Volatile Material Prices

Firms developing new products often face the challenge of making investment decisions under uncertain input–cost conditions due to the price volatilities of the materials they use. These decisions need to be made long before the final products are launched on the market. Therefore, firms that invest in the opportunity to switch materials in a timely manner will have the flexibility to react to material price changes and realize competitive advantages. However, volatile material prices may also cause a firm to delay investment. Using real‐options reasoning, this paper studies the influence of input‐cost fluctuations on the timing decision to start new product development (NPD) and thus create the follow‐on opportunity to later replace an existing product. A model that combines waiting and switching options to derive influencing factors of the flexibility value that triggers the investment is developed and tested on a sample of material substitution projects from manufacturing firms. The results show how price uncertainty of the new and the old material, their joint price development, the expected project duration, and competitive preemption are related to the propensity to delay the start of NPD. The findings provide new insights on how timing in adopting materials can be used to hedge exposure to volatile material prices. The insights are relevant for adopters and producers of new materials, as well as for policy makers who strive for supporting the diffusion of new materials.     

Pioneering Advantages and Entrepreneurs' First‐mover Decisions: An Empirical Investigation for the United States and China

New ventures are often launched for the purpose of pioneering an innovative new product or service in the marketplace. Entrepreneurs or founders of new ventures thus often have to make the decision whether to be the market pioneer or the first mover. While being a first mover potentially is advantageous, it also involves taking risks and facing uncertainties. Entrepreneurs must assess the benefits and risks of pioneering in the first‐mover decision‐making process to realize the potential competitive advantages associated with being a pioneer. Previous research has shown how entrepreneurs perceive potential gains and losses associated with exploring opportunities as the key defining element of entrepreneurial decision‐making. Past studies have also indicated that cultural and business environmental factors affect both perceptions and decision‐making. However, studies to date have insufficiently addressed the relationship between entrepreneurs' perceived pioneering advantages/disadvantages and their first‐mover decisions, with little attention to cross‐national differences. This study includes hypotheses postulating how entrepreneurs' perceived advantages and disadvantages of pioneering affect the number of first‐mover decisions made by entrepreneurs in two different cultural contexts, the United States and China. We collect data from 152 U.S. entrepreneurs and 140 Chinese entrepreneurs over a four‐year period and carry out empirical tests on the hypotheses using Poisson regression models. Our results provide insight on how culture affects perceptions of advantages and disadvantages of pioneering, and how these perceptions impact the likelihood of making a first‐mover decision. We find that a higher level of perceived advantages will drive first‐mover decisions, whereas perceived disadvantages will deter first‐mover decisions. The negative effect of perceived erosion disadvantages on the number of first‐mover decisions was higher for Chinese entrepreneurs, consistent with the high risk‐aversion culture in China. However, this effect was not found for perceived uncertainty disadvantages, suggesting that the risk‐averse characteristics of Chinese entrepreneurs is an oversimplification, and that the Chinese cultural, business, and legal environment helps offset uncertainty disadvantages. We also find an interesting positive moderating effect of perceived advantage on the relationship between perceived disadvantages and the number of first‐mover decisions in China only. That is, if perceived advantages are low, Chinese entrepreneurs are more risk averse than U.S. entrepreneurs; but if perceived advantages are high, Chinese entrepreneurs are more risk‐seeking than U.S. entrepreneurs. This finding again challenges the risk aversion conclusion found by previous studies of Chinese managers.