Commercializing Technological Innovation: Learning from Failures in High‐Tech Markets*

Commercialization is known to be a critical stage of the technological innovation process, mainly because of the high risks and costs that it entails. Despite this, many scholars consider it to be often the least well managed phase of the entire innovation process, and there is ample empirical evidence corroborating this belief. In high‐tech markets, the difficulties encountered by firms in commercializing technological innovation are exacerbated by the volatility, interconnectedness, and proliferation of new technologies that characterize such markets. This is clearly evinced by the abundance of new high‐tech products that fail on the market chiefly due to poor commercialization. Yet there is no clear understanding, in management theory and practice, of how commercialization decisions influence the market failure of new high‐tech products. Drawing on research in innovation management, diffusion of innovation, and marketing, this article shows how commercialization decisions can influence consumer acceptance of a new high‐tech product in two major ways: (i) by affecting the extent to which the players in the innovation's adoption network support the new product; (ii) by affecting the post‐purchase attitude early adopters develop toward the innovation, and hence the type of word‐of‐mouth (positive or negative) they disseminate among later adopters. Lack of support from the adoption network is found to be an especially critical cause of failure for systemic innovations, while a negative post‐purchase attitude of early adopters is a more significant determinant of market failure for radical innovations. There follows a historical analysis of eight innovations launched on consumer high‐tech markets (Apple Newton, IBM PC‐Junior, Tom Tom GO, Sony Walkman, 3DO Interactive Multiplayer, Sony MiniDisc, Palm Pilot, and Nintendo NES), which illustrates how commercialization decisions (i.e., timing, targeting and positioning, inter‐firm relationships, product configuration, distribution, advertising, and pricing) can determine lack of support from the innovation's adoption network and a negative post‐purchase attitude of early adopters. The results of this work provide useful insights for improving the commercialization decisions of product and marketing managers operating in high‐technology markets, helping them avoid errors that are precursors of market failure. It is also hoped the article will inform further research aimed at identifying, theoretically and empirically, other possible causes of poor customer acceptance in high‐tech markets.     

How Canon and Sony Drive Product Innovation Through Networking and Application-Focused R&D

To ensure the ongoing vitality of a company's product offerings, R&D professionals must play a daunting array of roles. The already rapid, yet still accelerating, pace of technological change may lead some companies to devote more resources to intensive internal research efforts. However, the shift toward global competition demands a more market-oriented focus from R&D; clear understanding of current and potential markets must drive R&D efforts. And efficient, cost-effective manufacturing of new products requires an R&D organization that understands and interacts effectively with the production department. How does a company create an environment in which its R&D organization comprises market-savvy, production-friendly experts in diverse technologies? With case studies of R&D efforts at Canon and Sony, Sigvald Harryson identifies and illustrates the key mechanisms that these companies use to foster product innovation. His examples show how Canon and Sony use a combination of external and internal networking mechanisms to identify and acquire key technologies and related skills, gain market knowledge, improve the results of internal R&D efforts, and ensure the successful transfer of these results to efficient production processes. He identifies four key mechanisms underlying successful product innovation at Canon and Sony: strategic training and job rotation for engineers, application-driven R&D, direct transfer of development teams from R&D to production, and extensive networking with external centers of excellence and key suppliers. At Canon, the initial training program for all researchers and engineers begins with three months of work on a production line. Sony's new researchers and development engineers spend one month in production. Both companies also give their new R&D professionals three months of training in sales and marketing. The emphasis on market-driven research at both companies means that researchers have identified some commercial application for almost every initial research proposal that gains approval. Neither company treats research as a long-term assignment; almost all engineers at both companies eventually move from the labs to production. And rather than viewing this job rotation strategy as a drain on the technological expertise in their labs, both companies rely on strong external networks with key suppliers and university-based researchers as important sources for acquiring new technologies and the competencies needed to support them.     

Critical Development Activities for Really New versus Incremental Products

Does the development of really new products require a different approach from that of incremental new products? Current research and management practice seem to suggest that any successful new product development (NPD) process comprises a set of key activities, regardless of a product's innovativeness. It seems almost foolhardy to suggest that NPD could proceed without proficiency in all of the following tasks: strategic planning, idea development and screening, business and market opportunity analysis, technical development, product testing, and product commercialization. Suggesting that the difference may be in the details, X. Michael Song and Mitzi Montoya-Weiss present the results of a study that examines the development of 163 really new products and 169 incremental new products. The study's objective is to compare the NPD processes and performance outcomes of really new and incremental products. In other words, the study examines the interplay between a product's innovativeness, the NPD process, and the product's performance in the marketplace. For the firms in the study, four sets of NPD activities—strategic planning, market analysis, technical development, and product commercialization—are key determinants of new product success for both really new products and incremental products. However, strategic planning and business and market opportunity analysis activities play contrasting roles for the two types of products. Working to improve proficiency in business and market opportunity analysis may be counterproductive for really new products, but it can increase the profitability of incremental products. Conversely, improving the proficiency of strategic planning activities has a positive effect on the profitability of the really new products, but it has a negative effect for the incremental products. Overall, the really new products in the study surpass the incremental products in meeting profit objectives. Comparing current practice to best practice, the firms in the study have room for improvement. For both really new and incremental products, the firms in the study do not place sufficient emphasis on product commercialization activities. The participants also need to reassess the relative emphasis they place on strategic planning activities. The projects involving really new products do not place sufficient emphasis on strategic planning, while the incremental projects exhibit a relatively high level of proficiency in this area—exactly the opposite of the order that this study recommends.     

Seller–Buyer Interactions During the Commercialization of Technological Process Innovations

For buyers and sellers alike, high-tech process innovations can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, technological process innovations (e.g., computer hardware and software, factory automation equipment) offer buyers the potential for reduced production costs and enhanced product quality. However, early adoption of such innovations is often a risky proposition. For the seller, successful commercialization requires stimulating not only adoption, but also successful implementation of the innovation. In other words, effective management of seller—buyer relations during the development and commercialization process go a long way toward determining the success of a high-tech process innovation. Gerard A. Athaide, Patricia W. Meyers, and David L. Wilemon examine the relationship marketing activities employed by successful sellers of high-tech process innovations. They identify eight strategic marketing objectives that underlie these relationship marketing activities: product customization, information gathering on product performance, product education and training, ongoing product support, proactive political involvement (to encourage support for the innovation from the various affected parties in the buyer's organization), product demonstration and trial, real-time problem-solving assistance, and clarification of the product's relative advantage. Their findings suggest that successful sellers engage in relationship marketing activities throughout all phases of the commercialization process. Rather than simply trying to close a deal, these firms seek active involvement from potential customers, ranging from codesigning of products to seeking feedback on product-related problems or desired modifications. This broader scope of customer involvement necessitates cooperation among various groups in the seller's organization. Product development and engineering work closely with the customer during product customization. Those groups must communicate effectively with the salespeople who demonstrate the product and with the customer support people who obtain feedback and provide real-time problem-solving support. In other words, these relationship marketing activities cut across functional barriers. Consequently, a clear understanding of the buyer's needs and environment is essential throughout the seller's organization, not just in the sales and marketing departments.     

The Keisho1 of Development Technology: The Case of the Japanese Aircraft Industry

In many respects, development of highly innovative products such as fighter aircraft comes down to a quest for technological superiority. If such products lack best-in-class technologies, they face almost certain defeat at the hands of the competition (or, in the case of fighter aircraft, the enemy). In addition to the latest and greatest technologies, however, this type of development effort must draw on the past. Takashi Nakayama explores the role that keisho—or inheritance—of development technology plays in the Japanese aircraft industry. He illustrates the concept of keisho through examples ranging from the projects that culminated in development of the famed Zero fighter aircraft during the 1930s to those that produced the FSX (recently renamed the F-2) support fighter during the 1990s. Drawing on these historical perspectives, he addresses three key questions regarding keisho. First, why do Japanese manufacturers insist on keisho of development technology, even in the development of the latest aircraft? Second, what does the term development technology mean? And finally, how is keisho of development technology to be carried out? He then presents two models to show how keisho of development technology is carried out under different circumstances. The term development technology refers to the tacit knowledge that each member of the organization brings to a development effort. In other words, development technology comprises fieldwork knowledge, which consists of intuition, experience, and analogy. In essence, development technology represents the insight necessary for understanding the overall circumstances of a project and actively reframing or integrating various technologies to fit the needs of that project. During a development effort, each member of the organization internalizes this tacit knowledge (that is, development technology). By retaining and assigning these people to subsequent developments, an organization carries out the keisho of development technology. In this straight inheritance (optimal) model of keisho, engineers move from a completed project to another large-scale, next-generation project, continually using, refining, and enhancing the tacit knowledge shared by all members of the organization. The result is successive generations of new, excellent products. In intermediary inheritance (the minimal requisite keisho model), the core of development technology is inherited through various medium-scale intermediate projects, rather than directly from one large-scale project to the next.     

Incapability of Technological Capability: A Case Study on Product Innovation in the Japanese Facsimile Machine Industry

Technological leadership in an industry certainly seems like a ticket to ongoing success. However, overemphasis on existing technological capabilities may produce a form of myopia in product development. In other words, by focusing primarily on developing and improving their core technologies, organizations miss opportunities to exploit new technologies and thus create breakthrough products. Ken Kusunoki proposes that problem-solving approaches in a technologically leading firm paradoxically may impede radical product innovation. Suggesting that such firms are inherently oriented toward incremental innovation, he presents a conceptual framework of the dynamic interaction between technological and product development problem-solving in the context of product innovation. He then illustrates this conceptual framework by examining a case of radical innovation in the Japanese facsimile industry. For a technological leader, product innovation typically is driven by technology development. In other words, such a firm quite reasonably relies on the technological advantage it holds over competitors as the basis for its product developments. By refining and enhancing its industry-leading technological capabilities, the firm can successfully introduce incremental innovations in its products. Because of this strong emphasis on exploiting existing technological capabilities, however, the technological leader may fail to capitalize on new technologies that can produce radical innovations. In the race to develop high-speed, digital facsimile equipment during the early 1970s, for example, Matsushita held a decided technological advantage over competitors such as Ricoh. Notwithstanding Matsushita's technological edge, however, Ricoh brought this radical innovation to market two years before Matsushita introduced its first digital machine, causing a serious decline in Matsushita's market share. Ricoh's approach to technological and product problem-solving—an autonomous team structure, with a strong project manager and frequent transfers of engineers among interdependent units—contrasts dramatically with Matsushita's functional structure and strong emphasis on technological problem-solving. Interestingly, Matsushita regained its technological advantage by 1976, thanks to a rapid series of incremental innovations in its product technologies.     

Key Factors Affecting Customer Evaluation of Discontinuous New Products

Common sense, as well as plenty of research, tells us that customer feedback can play an important role in successful product development efforts. By understanding the key factors that affect customers' evaluations of a new product, a project team improves its chances of making the right decisions throughout the design and development effort. However, customers typically lack a useful frame of reference for evaluating discontinuous, or really new products. In all likelihood, the key factors that affect customers' evaluations of radically new products differ from those for incremental innovations. Robert Veryzer describes the results of a study that examines the customer research efforts and findings of seven firms involved in the development of discontinuous new products. This study has the following objectives: gaining insight into the customer research inputs such companies use during the development of discontinuous new products, and exploring the critical factors that influence customers' evaluations of these really new products. The subjects in this study conducted relatively little formal customer research during the early stages of the NPD projects. The methods used for obtaining customer input during the concept generation and exploration stages were primarily qualitative. Although the companies in the study still did not focus consistently on customer issues during the technical development and design stage, the less discontinuous projects did use such traditional quantitative techniques as concept tests, clinics, and experiments during this phase of NPD. Throughout the projects in this study, the real opportunities for obtaining customer input came during the prototype testing and commercialization phases of the NPD projects. Several key factors appeared to influence customer evaluations of the products that were being developed by the NPD teams in this study. Lack of familiarity was manifested in customers' resistance to the new products in the study. Similarly, unfamiliarity with these new products often seemed to lead customers to focus on product attributes that development team members viewed as relatively unimportant. Other factors that affected customer evaluation of the products in this study included customer uncertainty about the benefits and risks associated with the product, customers' ability to understand how the product operates, perceptions of the product's safety, and product aesthetics.     

Technology Commercialization in Road Infrastructure: How Government Affects the Variation and Appropriability of Technology

Successful technology commercialization is important for business profitability, and government policies can help or hinder firms' success. As a regulator, government affects standard setting and the nature and scope of property rights. As a sponsor, government can empower technology commercialization by its financial support of new technology. As a first user, government can significantly enhance the chances of successful technology commercialization. And as a buyer, government accounts for a substantial part of the world economy. Previous research on government's roles in technology commercialization mainly addressed the effects of specific roles. However, there is little understanding about the combined impact of these roles on technology commercialization. This article develops a conceptual model to analyze the combined effect of these roles on technology development projects. This model is based on a review of the literature on large technical systems, technological regimes, and technology policy that enabled this study on government's diverse roles in technology commercialization. To refine the conceptual model, an in‐depth analysis of three technology development projects was conducted. The empirical findings are drawn from road infrastructure. In that sector, government is the dominant customer and first user of most new technologies. Therefore, government has to create a market for those technologies and strongly affects their viability. This research has produced several major results. First, the developed model is the first to conceptualize the relevant relationships between the various roles of government in technology commercialization. Second, this study has shown that government's behavior as a regulator and sponsor conflicts with its preferences as a buyer and user. Consequently, the support of and demand for new technology is inconsistent and uncoordinated, leaving firms with significant uncertainties in assessing market opportunities. Third, the dominant position of government as a buyer in road infrastructure weakens the effectiveness of intellectual property rights. Fourth, existing studies on technology for partially public goods are mainly historical accounts, and only a few are empirical studies on innovation processes. This study provides an in‐depth analysis of the development and commercialization of technology for partially public goods. This article concludes with policy implications and suggestions for future research. An important policy implication is that government could improve technology commercialization by either stimulating the commercialization of various competing technologies or developing various competing products based on the same technology. A central issue for future research is how firms can involve government in its diverse roles in technology commercialization. Most of the existing research on customer involvement deals with consumer and business‐to‐business markets. A better understanding of government involvement could help firms to overcome the impediments they face in dealing with government.     

Policies and structures for spinning off new companies from research and development organizations#

This paper develops five alternative structural 'models' for formal efforts aimed at spinning off new companies from universities, government laboratories, and other research and development organizations. In various ways the models combine the roles of the technology originator, the entrepreneur, the R&D organization itself, and the venture investor. The paper also presents the policies and structures of technology commercialization operations from investigations at eight R&D organizations in the United States and the United Kingdom. The data indicate that a R&D organization operating in an environment where venture capital and entrepreneurs are readily available (e.g., MIT and Stanford) can appropriately: (1) exercise a low degree of selectivity in choosing technologies for spin-off creation, and (2) provide a low level of support during the spin-off process. The spin-off process is more difficult in environments where venture capital and entrepreneurs are scarce (e.g., ARCH) and mechanisms for high-selectivity and a high level of support must be in place by the R&D organization to compensate for this scarcity.     

Agricultural technologies for climate change in developing countries: Policy options for innovation and technology diffusion

Climate has obvious direct effects on agricultural production. The reverse is more apparent than ever as greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture are tallied. The development and effective diffusion of new agricultural practices and technologies will largely shape how and how well farmers mitigate and adapt to climate change. This adaptation and mitigation potential is nowhere more pronounced than in developing countries where agricultural productivity remains low; poverty, vulnerability and food insecurity remain high; and the direct effects of climate change are expected to be especially harsh. Creating the necessary agricultural technologies and harnessing them to enable developing countries to adapt their agricultural systems to changing climate will require innovations in policy and institutions as well. Potential constraints to innovation involve both the private and public sectors in both developing and developed countries. The process of transferring agricultural innovations across agroecological and climatic zones is often subject to agronomic constraints. Often, the most binding constraints occur at the adoption stage, with several factors that potentially impede poor farmers’ access to and use of new technologies. Based on discussions of these constraints, we derive six policy principles and use these principles to suggest several specific investments and policy priorities.     

Identifying Technology Commercialization Opportunities: The Importance of Integrating Product Development Knowledge

New product development (NPD) is a knowledge‐intensive activity, perhaps even more so in recent years given the shift toward more open innovation processes, which involve active inward and outward technology transfer. While the extant literature has established that knowledge is critical for NPD performance, knowledge generated through NPD can have an additional impact on external technology exploitation—as when firms go beyond pure internal application of knowledge to commercialize their technologies, for example, by means of technology outlicensing. Grounded in the knowledge‐based view of the firm, this paper examines how the integration of domain‐specific knowledge, procedural knowledge, and general knowledge generated through NPD affects a firm's proficiency in identifying technology commercialization opportunities. Additionally, analysis of how technology opportunity identification relates to technology commercialization performance is provided. Empirically, the paper draws on survey data from 193 Swedish medium‐sized manufacturing firms in four industries active with NPD, and regression analyses and structural equation modeling were used to test the hypotheses. The results highlight the importance of integrating domain‐specific and general NPD knowledge to proficiently identify technology licensing opportunities. The empirical findings also provide strong support for a subsequent link between technology opportunity identification and technology commercialization performance. Altogether, these results point to strong and previously unexplored complementarities between inward and outward technology exploitation, that is, between NPD and technology licensing. As such, the results provide important theoretical implications for research into the fields of knowledge integration, technology exploitation, opportunity identification, and technology markets. Moreover, the results have significant managerial implications concerning how knowledge generated through NPD can help firms to achieve both strategic and monetary benefits when trying to profit from technology. In particular, to set up proficient technology commercialization processes, it appears beneficial for firms to integrate knowledge that is gained through the ordinary activities of developing and commercializing products. Specifically, the integration of domain‐specific knowledge and general knowledge helps firms to match their technologies with new applications and markets, which is often the critical barrier to successful technology commercialization activities. Managers are thus encouraged to integrate domain‐specific knowledge and general knowledge from NPD to reap additional benefits in profiting from investments in innovation and technology.     

Are really new product development projects harder to shut down?

Just as a good houseguest knows when it's time to say good-bye, effective managers must recognize when it's time to terminate a new product development (NPD) project. As a product progresses toward commercialization, a manager's reluctance to terminate a failing project becomes increasingly expensive. Despite this growing expense, however, many managers are reluctant to shut down failing NPD projects. Jeffrey Schmidt and Roger Calantone hypothesize that this reluctance may be even more pronounced for innovative new products than for incremental NPD efforts. They suggest that perhaps the excitement that really new products engender within a company makes managers more reluctant to shut down the NPD project, even in the face of clear-cut evidence that the project is not a winner. To test these assumptions, they conducted a decision-making experiment in which managers were asked to make go/no-go decisions at each stage in a hypothetical NPD project. One project involved an innovative new product; the other project involved an incremental development—that is, a line extension that offered only marginal size and cost reductions compared to current models. At the outset of the experiment, participants were given market share and profit objectives for assessing the new product's performance. At each stage in the hypothetical NPD project, the participants then received updated performance data. The performance data provided to participants was identical for the two hypothetical projects, and fell increasingly farther below the performance objectives as the project progressed. The results of the experiment support the hypothesized relationship between product innovativeness and managers' reluctance to terminate a failing NPD project. Given identical, poor, performance forecasts, the managers who participated in this experiment were more optimistic about the likelihood of success, were more committed to the project, and were more likely to opt for continuing the project when it involved the more innovative product. In fact, the participants were more likely to allow the highly innovative NPD project to proceed all the way through commercialization, notwithstanding the progressively ominous performance feedback.     

A critical look at technological innovation typology and innovativeness terminology: a literature review

A plethora of definitions for innovation types has resulted in an ambiguity in the way the terms ‘innovation’ and ‘innovativeness’ are operationalized and utilized in the new product development literature. The terms radical, really‐new, incremental and discontinuous are used ubiquitously to identify innovations. One must question, what is the difference between these different classifications? To date consistent definitions for these innovation types have not emerged from the new product research community. A review of the literature from the marketing, engineering, and new product development disciplines attempts to put some clarity and continuity to the use of these terms. This review shows that it is important to consider both a marketing and technological perspective as well as a macrolevel and microlevel perspective when identifying innovations. Additionally, it is shown when strict classifications from the extant literature are applied, a significant shortfall appears in empirical work directed toward radical and really new innovations. A method for classifying innovations is suggested so that practitioners and academics can talk with a common understanding of how a specific innovation type is identified and how the innovation process may be unique for that particular innovation type. A recommended list of measures based on extant literature is provided for future empirical research concerning technological innovations and innovativeness.

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Changing Patterns in Industrial R&D Management

A successful R&D manager is, in many ways, an agent of change. R&D managers must respond effectively to changes in domestic and global competition, product and process technologies, customer requirements, regulatory matters, and senior management's perception of the role R&D plays in a firm. The responses to these changes flow downstream from R&D to other parts of the organization, in the form of new materials, methods, processes, and products. To help us understand the changes facing R&D management, Ashok K. Gupta and David Wilemon present the results of a study that examines the ideas and experiences of 120 R&D directors from technology-based companies. The study explores the major changes that R&D management has undergone in recent years, the changes R&D managers expect to encounter during the next few years, and the causes of those changes. The respondents also identify the skills and knowledge they view as necessary for effective R&D management, and they assess their organizations' capabilities in those areas. According to the respondents, major changes that R&D has encountered include increased emphasis on such issues as cross-functional teamwork, R&D's contribution to both short- and long-term business results, R&D's capability to quickly bring to market new products that customers value, efficient use of R&D resources, and R&D alliances. Other changes noted by respondents include greater pressure to find new markets, increased attention on the effective management of technical personnel, and increased regulations and sensitivity to environmental issues. The knowledge domains that the respondents highlighted as having the greatest effect on R&D performance include such capabilities as understanding customer needs, monitoring market developments, commercializing new technologies, building cross-functional teams, managing multiple R&D projects, and accelerating new product development. According to the respondents, the largest gaps between required and current capabilities exist in several of the areas listed as being most important to effective R&D management, including monitoring market developments that can affect R&D activities and overall business performance, maintaining a spirit of inquiry while ensuring that R&D contributes to overall corporate performance, developing technology commercialization capabilities, fostering mutually profitable strategic alliances, and accelerating the development and commercialization of new products.     

The commerciaIization of stagnant technologies

Abstract
This paper focusses on technologies which have failed to reach the marketplace for reasons which are connected more with the organization in which they were developed than with the technology itself. They are referred to as stagnant technologies.
Such technologies can clearly be exploited via joint ventures; however there can be problems of finding a suitable partner and managing the partnership when one has been found. To overcome such problems a role for a third party is suggested which has been called the catalyst firm. Such a firm can be involved in identifying stagnant technologies, locating a suitable partner, and assisting in the management of the partnership through to commercialization.
This approach is central to the activities of Aprotec, a Manchester-based company specializing in the development and commercialization of new technologies, which plays the role of the catalyst firm. Experience to date is described in the paper, and a case study is used to show how the approach has been successfully applied in practice.     

Commercial exploitation of new technologies arising from university research: start-ups and markets for technology

The creation of start-up firms is an important method of commercializing new technologies arising from R&D at universities and other research institutions. Most research into start-ups presumes that these firms develop products or services. However, start-ups may operate through markets for technology by selling or licensing rights to use their technology to other firms – typically established firms – who develop and sell new products or services based on the technology. In this study of 57 public start-up firms created to commercialize the results of university research, we find evidence that (1) operating through markets for technology is a common approach to commercialization, (2) start-ups that operate in markets for technology can be effectively distinguished in practice from start-ups operating through product markets, and (3) there are substantive differences in the business activities of firms depending on whether they operate through product markets or markets for technology.     

Organizing for value appropriation: Configurations and performance outcomes of price management

Value creation and value appropriation are fundamental strategic processes. Both can be analyzed at the level of the individual manager, an organization or at the systemic level. On the organizational level, empirical research so far has put strong emphasis on aspects of value creation, while value appropriation has received less attention. We analyze value appropriation through the organizational implementation of pricing processes in the context of formalization, specialization, centralization, dispersion of influence, and top-management involvement in firms' pricing organization. Through a large-scale exploratory study of 419 European companies in the B2B area, we identify five empirical organizational configurations of pricing organization for value appropriation. Testing the effects of pricing configurations relating to pricing performance as well as overall firm performance reveals that more systematic approaches to pricing organization significantly improve value appropriation outcomes.     

Improving the New Product Development Process: A Fractal Paradigm for High-Technology Products

Those professionals who are charged with improving the new product development (NPD) process may well feel as though they have been asked to bring order out of chaos. For every level in the organization, and for every step in the NPD process, they must contend with myriad, often interdependent choices—of products and processes; of tools and technologies; of proven best practices and hypothesized solutions. In turn, each choice may cascade into several additional decisions. With so many issues to address and so many variables to consider, practioners and researchers alike need a clear, but complete, framework for exploring, understanding, and improving the NPD process. To help bring some order to the study and the practice of NPD management, W. Austin Spivey, J. Michael Munson, and John H. Wolcott introduce a new metaphor, or paradigm, for product development: a fractal paradigm. Like some fractal images, their framework for understanding the essence of NPD rests on the concept of self-similarity. In other words, the picture their framework provides for understanding and managing the NPD process consists of the same set of concerns, regardless of the level at which the process is viewed. They developed this fractal paradigm during an empirical study of technology transition in a highly successful federal laboratory organization. Whether the focus is on the organization, the division, the team, or the individual, the essence of the NPD process as viewed through their framework comes down to two sets of factors: management factors and resource factors. In turn, each of these factors cascades into several interrelated sets of concerns. For example, the management factors comprise concerns about leadership and the management system. The resource factors include concerns about information, infrastructure, time, and money. Regardless of the level of detail at which the framework is viewed, improving the NPD process requires attention to all of these factors, by all levels within the organization. For example, visionary leadership on the part of senior management will have little effect if middle management and line supervisors fail to provide the necessary leadership for their respective groups of subordinates. Notwithstanding the complexity of the NPD process, the fractal paradigm focuses attention on those few key factors that must be managed continually, throughout all levels of the organization, to ensure successful commercialization of new products.     

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Implementing Technologies for Financial Service Innovations in Base of the Pyramid Markets

This study examines how information communications technologies (ICTs) can be implemented effectively to provide financial service innovations to the poor who live in developing countries, a market collectively known as the “Base of the Pyramid” or BOP. The BOP needs—but commonly lacks—basic financial services, a situation that perpetuates poverty. With a dearth of formal banks especially in rural areas of developing countries, the BOP has almost no access to savings accounts, credit lines, and other necessary services. However, ICTs have the potential to overcome cost, infrastructure, and other barriers to service delivery, and are being used to offer new financial services such as mobile phone banking to the BOP. The purpose of this study is to determine ways of successfully implementing these technology‐enabled service innovations. The study draws on the Socio‐Technical View for theoretical girding, and uses case method to examine multiple ICT implementation projects in five sub‐Saharan African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, and Uganda). The projects, which were carried out by a leading microfinance banking organization named Opportunity International, provided mobile banks, point‐of‐service, and mobile phone banking services to the BOP. Several techniques were applied to gather data in the field over a two‐year period: depth interviews, direct observations, and internal document and data analysis. Multiple forms of evidence were triangulated against one another, and analyzed across cases until themes emerged and converged. In doing so, two specific forms of analysis, explanation building and cross‐case synthesis, were employed to make sense of the data. The findings, summarized as research propositions, collectively conclude that implementation is effective when the unique socio‐human, governmental‐regulatory, and market conditions of the BOP are accounted for, such that fit is achieved between the technologies and environments they are situated in. More specifically, effectiveness comes when implementation (1) addresses customer and agent limits with the technologies, and is accepted and supported by trained staff who monitor technology use and make responsive system adjustments; (2) exploits and promotes supportive governmental regulations and actions, as well as leverages sound electronic fund transfer (EFT) switches, whether government or bank established; and (3) accounts for low business capabilities and evolving market competition, along with the underdeveloped financial sector and financial literacy of the population. In sum, there are multiple factors that should be considered in the design and installation activities surrounding these technologies to ensure they provide cost‐effective, quality financial services to the poor.