如何面对网络经济

当前,全球范围内迅猛发展的网络经济,在推进经济全球化的进程中改变着世界经济和贸易的总体格局,通过转变传统的社会生产方式对经济结构调整产生着深刻的影响。发展网络经济已经成为世界经济新的增长点和国际竞争新的制高点。一、网络经济及其影响网络经济是指由于计算机互联网络在经济领域中的普遍应用,使得经济信息成本得以急剧下降,从而导致信息替代资本在经济中的主导地位,并最终成为核心经济资源的全球化经济形态。信息正在成为核心经济资源。一种经济资源之所以具有核心地位,一般说来应该归因于这种资源的相对稀缺性。在农业经济时代,…     

网络经济发展的瓶颈及其对策

一、网络经济及其发展概况 网络经济的发展使经济信息成本大幅度降低,导致信息替代资本在经济中起主导作用,并最终成为核心经济资源的一种全球化经济形态。在这种新的经济形态下,信息流动速度大大加快,信息成本大幅度地降低,经济全球化加速,企业的管理理念、运行方式、组织结构发生变迁,生产、交换、分配和消费等环节的成本结构和其他特征随之发生重大改变,     

基于物联网技术的再制造闭环供应链信息服务系统研究

为了实现资源节约、环境保护,加快制造业由传统型向服务型转变,推进智能信息化在闭环供应链中的应用,通过分析现有闭环供应链物流与信息流流程,针对其目前面临的主要问题和发展需求,将最新物联网技术与再制造信息服务体系相结合,构建了基于物联网技术的再制造闭环供应链信息服务系统,通过需求实时对接、资源优化分配、设备合理调度、服务迅捷集成以实现对闭环供应链的信息化、自动化、智能化、服务化管理,提出实现该信息服务系统所需要的3个关键技术并进行分析,最后通过应用实例验证了该信息服务系统的可行性与科学性,为物联网技术在闭环供应链领域及其它科学领域的应用与设计提供借鉴与参考。     

信息化转变经济增长方式与促进可持续发展的机制

信息化已经对经济增长和经济发展过程产生了广泛而显著的影响。经济学家从不同角度和不同层面对信息化的经济效应进行了许多研究。基于已有研究和先行国家的实践经验,我们对信息化影响经济增长和经济发展的机理进行了归纳。信息化对经济增长和经济发展的影响主要源自两种生产要素的引入:一是信息和通信技术的引入;二是信息资源的引入。其中,信息和通信技术在知识的“编码化”中起了重要作用,即通过信息技术将知识转变为“信息”,从而使信息作为一种资源进入生产过程。这两种生产要素的引入,在微观层次上改变了企业和市场经济活动的流程和组…     

网络经济的四大影响及对策

网络经济是指由于计算机互联网络在社会经济生活中的广泛应用,使得所有的经济活动都基于统一在互联网平台上的信息流的传递和处理,经济信息成本急剧降低。从而导致信息替代资本在经济中起主导作用,并最终成为核心经济资源的一种全球化经济形态。在这种新的经济形态下,信息流动速度加快。信息成本降低,经济全球化加速,企业的管理理念、运行方式、组织结构发生变迁。生产、交换、分配和消费等环节的成本结构和其他特征随之发生重大改变。     

论政府在发展循环经济中的作用

中国目前经济增长受到资源和环境的约束瓶颈,要解决资源匮乏和环境污染矛盾,就必须转变经济增长方式,大力发展循环经济,实现经济社会的可持续发展。发展循环经济必然要对传统的生产经营、社会管理及消费方式等诸多方面提出改革和更新的要求,政府在推动和促进循环经济加快发展的过程中承担着不可替代的作用。     

科研管理与项目管理中的信息化元素

科研管理与项目管理的信息化是一项复杂的系统工程，通过信息化系统的建设，有效提高科研管理以及项目管理的工作效率与研究进展，实现各个环节之间的信息互通，以及相关信息系统之间的信息交换和信息共享。本文在对科研管理的流程与内容的论述基础上，探讨信息化管理对科研管理的帮助。     

论发展循环经济与实施可持续发展战略之关系

作为一种可持续的经济发展模式，循环经济是对“大规模生产、大规模消费、大规模废弃”的传统经济发展模式深刻反思的产物，它是以资源循环利用和环境友好为基本特征的社会生产（包括生产、流通、交换、消费和废弃的全过程）方式，是经济发展理念上的一个重大转变，是实施可持续发展战略的必然选择。     

关于企业转变经济增长方式的探讨

一、经济增长方式转史的内涵和意义（一）经济增长方式转变的内涵所谓经济增长方式的转变，是指从粗放型经济向集约型经济的转变，这一转变，根源于资源利用方式的转变，因为经济增长是以资源要素的投入为前提的。有两种方式，一是以单纯的资源投入量的扩张为特征的利用方式。可称之为资源的粗放式利用，由此带来的经济增长为粗放型经济增长。在这种增长方式中，资源投入后，其利用效率是否提高并不重要，而重要的在于如何能通过高积累或其他手段，把资源更多地投入生产过程，尽可能地扩大生产的外延，即依靠高投入实现扩规模、高产出；二是…     

从乌兰水泥循环经济看资源型企业的集约化经营

循环经济是把传统的依赖资源消耗的线形增长的经济，转变为依靠生态型资源循环来发展的经济。其目的是实现物质资源的有效利用和经济与生态的可持续发展。乌兰水泥厂将水泥、热电联产及资源综合利用，形成循环经济，从而使资源利用与环境保护找到了最佳的结合点，保持社会生产与自然环境的协调稳定发展，最终实现经济效益、社会效益与环境效益和谐完美的统一。通过对乌兰水泥循环经济特点的分析，看资源型企业以循环经济实现集约化经营的必要性，并从中得到许多有益的启示。     

Resource Rights and Markets in a General Equilibrium Model of Production

Rights to a free resource lead to distributional deadweight losses in partial equilibrium. The present paper examines related distortions in a general equilibrium model of production with output prices constant for the small open economy. The free resource can result in lower output than a market with weak substitution in the other sector. The free resource also leads to a convex production frontier implying a price increase lowers output in the sector. Regarding policy, an import tariff, export subsidy, or price support would lower sector output. These general equilibrium distortions increase the incentives to favor resource markets over rights.     

Accounting for technical substitution in the input-output model

Input-output analysis is a general equilibrium economic model that is being applied with increasing frequency to situations in which the input patterns of various economic activities are bound to change. Applications of the model in this context unduly strain the model's customary assumption of fixed coefficients, an assumption which precludes the substitution of inputs in production processes. The focus here is on the development of a general procedure for incorporating input substitution under various sets of conditions into the input-output model.     

Stable alliance formation in distributional conflict

This paper develops a positive analysis of alliance formation, building on a simple economic model that features a “winner-take-all” contest for control of some resource. When an alliance forms, members pool their efforts in that contest and, if successful, apply the resource to a joint production process. Due to the familiar free-rider problem, the formation of alliances tends to reduce the severity of the conflict over the contestable resource. Despite the conflict that arises among the winning alliance's members over the distribution of their joint product, under reasonable conditions, this effect alone is sufficient to support stable alliance formation in a noncooperative equilibrium.     

All-pay war

We study a model of conflicts and wars in which the outcome is uncertain not because of luck on the battlefield as in standard models, but because countries lack information about their opponent. In this model expected resource levels and production and military technologies are common knowledge, but realized resource levels are private information. Each country decides how to allocate its resources to production and warfare. The country with the stronger military wins and receives aggregate production. In equilibrium both comparative and absolute advantages matter: a larger resource share is allocated to warfare by the country with a comparative advantage in warfare at relatively low realized resource levels, and by the country with an absolute disadvantage in warfare at relatively high realized resource levels. From an ex-ante perspective the country with a comparative advantage in warfare is more likely to win the war unless its military potential is much lower.     

Papers to appear in forthcoming issues

Decisions concerning the production level of a substitue for a natural resource must often be taken well ahead of the time when the substitute is supplied. If the natural resource is owned by a monopolist, this may lead to an equilibrium in which the resource extracting firm takes the output path of the substitute as given. In this equilibrium the transition from resource extraction to substitute production takes place gradually. Furthermore, the price path of this equilibrium is lower than the price path one finds when the decision period of substitute production is ignored.     

Environmental degradation as engine of undesirable economic growth via self-protection consumption choices

We analyze growth dynamics in an economy where the well-being of economic agents depends on three goods: leisure, a free access environmental good and a private good that can be consumed as a substitute for the environmental resource. The processes of production and consumption of the private good by each agent impose negative externalities on other agents through the depletion of the environmental good.This paper shows that, in such context, the existence of private substitutes for environmental goods may fuel an undesirable economic growth process. This process is driven by the continuous increase in agents' needs for private consumption generated by the progressive reduction in free consumption of the environmental good.     

FACTOR SUBSTITUTION,MECHANIZATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This paper tries to explain the polarization of economic growth through mechanization. We derive a complementary relationship between capital accumulation and mechanization. While we assume an external effect that occurs as a result of mechanization, given the external effect, mechanization yields a constant‐elasticity‐of‐substitution production function in which the elasticity‐of‐substitution is greater than unity as the envelope of Cobb–Douglas production functions. When mechanization is difficult, which implies a low value for the elasticity‐of‐substitution, and the external effect is weak, there is potential for multiple steady states to exist.     

可持续发展背景下中国资源型城市的双重结构转型

在我国可持续发展的战略背景下,资源型城市经历了由资源型部门向非资源型部门、由国有部门向非国有部门的双重结构转型过程。以全国24个省份的110个资源型城市作为样本,实证分析了双重结构转型与我国资源型城市经济发展的关系,得出长期过程中国有部门和资源型部门占比呈现先上升后下降的倒“U”型趋势的结论,并分析了金融抑制和市场垄断程度这两种外部约束因素对双重转型过程的影响。研究发现,金融抑制主要通过间接效应扭曲了资源配置,进而影响了体制转型的过程,减缓了国有经济占比下降的速度;而资源型城市的市场垄断性越强,其发展转型就越难以进行。根据以上结论为我国资源型城市的结构转型和可持续发展提出了政策建议。     

MARKET ECONOMIES WITH AN ENDOGENOUS SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

I consider a general equilibrium model of a competitive market economy in which production is conducted through an endogenous social division of labor. I represent economic decision makers as “consumer–producers,” who consume as well as produce commodities. In this approach, the emergence of a nontrivial social division of labor is guided by Increasing Returns to Specialization (IRSpec) in production. Under IRSpec, I show existence of competitive equilibria, the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, and characterize these equilibria. Markets equilibrate through the adjustment of the social division of labor; the production technologies completely determine the equilibrium prices.