Spectrum auctions: Distortionary input tax or efficient revenue instrument?

Spectrum license auctions are widely recognized by economists as more efficient than lotteries or administrative approaches to allocate exclusive rights to spectrum. But whether spectrum auctions are the most efficient spectrum policy still generates debate, in part because the answer may vary depending on exactly what is being optimized, what else is assumed or held constant, and the policies to which one is comparing spectrum auctions. This paper examines the complex confluence of US spectrum policy and fiscal policy. It concludes that economically efficient spectrum policy requires several distinct optimizations, including devolvement of an efficient set spectrum rights and the optimal approach to raising and recycling government revenue in that devolvement process. It also requires allocation policies that take into account possible distortions of the secondary market for spectrum via the capital gains tax. The paper argues that there is no compelling theoretical case or empirical evidence that spectrum auctions are distortionary, and examines cases in which the most efficient policy is to auction spectrum and “recycle” the revenue to offset more distortionary revenue instruments. This paper also examines cases in which it is most efficient to allocate spectrum rights without raising revenue, for example when transactions costs are high or distributional concerns can prevent or delay efficiency-enhancing reforms.     

Hiccups in US spectrum auctions

While an increasing number of countries have embraced auctions to assign radio frequency, many other countries have decided to retain selection by the administration. Of the many factors that might have influenced those countries that have rejected auctions, one of the most visible in Europe has been frequent media reports of the problems experienced with auctions in the US between 1995 and 1997. In my experience, these reports have been accepted at face value by many European industry commentators and policy officials. It seems clear that the repeated reporting of these problems has influenced the evolution of spectrum management policy in Europe. This paper tries to set the record straight by providing an analysis of the problems that were reported in Europe regarding US spectrum auctions, specifically the declarations of bankruptcy by several winning bidders and overbidding by participants, the enormous revenue shortfall on the WCS block auction, and reports of collusion among bidders.     

Analysis of spectrum auctions in India—An application of the opportunity cost approach to explain large variations in spectrum prices

The remarkable growth of mobile communication has reinforced the significance of the radio spectrum for mobile network operators. The availability of spectrum varies considerably between different countries due to national regulatory decisions. The focus in this paper is on India where operators have access to a limited amount of spectrum. This paper analyses the value of spectrum by estimating the opportunity cost, which is calculated by the savings that can be achieved by acquiring appropriate amount of spectrum rather than investing in additional base stations. The applied approach combines network deployment, user demand levels, cost, and capacity issues, which are integrated in the application in the opportunity cost approach for spectrum. The opportunity cost of spectrum is compared with prices paid at spectrum auctions. The analysis includes a discussion of drivers that determine the willingness to pay for spectrum. The results show that the opportunity cost of spectrum in relation to auction prices is lower than prices operators paid for 3G spectrum in the metro circles (service areas) while the value derived from the opportunity cost is higher than auction prices in the remaining circles.     

Riding the US wave: spectrum auctions in the digital age

Given its significant technological advantages compared to analog broadcasting, digital television (DTV) will be the television system of the future. However, it requires a full replacement of analog television sets by digital receivers, as DTV can only be watched with special equipment. In order to make this transition happen smoothly without losing the analog television audience, both signals have to be simulcasted until a substantial coverage with DTV broadcasting has been achieved. Australia and the US meanwhile have established a regulatory framework to lead this transition towards the end of analog broadcasting, the so-called analog switch-off. Part of the US regime is the FCC's obligation to reassign analog frequencies after the switch-off has taken place by means of auction. Spectrum auctions, however, originate not from the US but from New Zealand, where they have been used since the end of 1989 and ever since been subject to legal and political criticism. The article outlines the principles of both the DTV and spectrum auctions regulation and shows the links between both areas of telecommunications regulation. It concludes by suggesting that the analog switch-off is a unique opportunity to reconsider current spectrum policies, as it frees large amounts of the radio spectrum that are today occupied by analog broadcasting and will soon be subject to one of the biggest frequency reassignment processes in the history of telecommunications regulation.     

Economics at the FCC, 2016–2017: Auction Designs for Spectrum Repurposing and Universal Service Subsidies

The Federal Communications Commission is responsible for federal regulation in the telecommunications and electronic media sectors, and for management of the nation’s non-federal radio frequency spectrum. During the past year, Commission economists contributed to the agency’s ongoing efforts to use market-based mechanisms—such as auctions—to allocate spectrum and distribute universal service subsidies efficiently. This includes repurposing broadcast television spectrum for more efficient use by wireless service providers through the recently concluded Broadcast Incentive Auction and structuring auction mechanisms to promote efficient allocation of universal service subsidies for the increased build-out of mobile wireless and fixed broadband service in unserved and underserved areas.     

Setting licence fees for renewing telecommunication spectrum based on an auction

This paper presents a methodology for setting fees for the renewal or extension of spectrum licences, by using the outcome of an auction for comparable licences but with a different licence period. The methodology is a combination of market and cash flow valuation and consists of two main steps. First, prices for spectrum corresponding to that of the licences to be extended are derived from the auction outcome. Second, the relative value addition of the extension period for the new licensee, compared to the value of the licences auctioned, is derived by using a model for the development of EBITDA for an operator over time. A combination of these two is used to calculate fees that match the opportunity costs of extension. Thus, optimum alignment is achieved with the policy objective of using licence fees only to promote efficient use of spectrum, while avoiding state aid at the same time.     

Analysing the C-Band spectrum auctions for 5G in Europe: Achieving efficiency and fair decisions in radio spectrum management

This paper offers a detailed analysis of selected regulatory parameters used as instruments to promote efficiency with fairness for all stakeholders (in the legal sense of equity) in 5G spectrum auctions. Data were collected from sixteen auctions for the C-band that took place in the Member States of the European Union (EU) and in the United Kingdom (UK) between 2017 and 2020 for the introduction of the fifth generation (5G) of mobile communication technology. The selected instruments of intervention are: spectrum packaging, spectrum caps, set-asides, geographical scope of the license, license duration, various forms of license obligations, reserve prices and auction format.Significant differences were observed in national approaches to spectrum packaging, license obligations and reserve prices for efficiency purposes. Our analysis also shows that European national regulators are paying increasing attention to concerns over fairness of decisions on spectrum, or equity, especially by creating opportunities for local private networks to access the spectrum and by imposing requirements on network operators to guarantee more uniform population coverage of newly created 5G networks.     

Construction Procurement Auctions: Do Entrant Bidders Employ More Aggressive Strategies than Incumbent Bidders?

Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak bidders will bid more aggressively when facing strong bidders, while strong bidders will bid less aggressively when facing weak bidders. This paper finds empirical evidence to support this hypothesis regarding the behavior of weak bidders in construction auctions. Examining a comprehensive data set of more than 7,500 Utah construction procurement auctions, we find that entrants bid more aggressively than do incumbents for most subcontractor types. Reflecting their inexperience and uncertainty regarding the true cost of projects, entrants’ bids are found to be more widely dispersed around the central tendency of bids.     

Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The PCS spectrum was sold via a simultaneous multi-round auction, which forces bidders to compete for licenses individually even though they typically value certain combinations. This exposes bidders to risk when they bid aggressively for a desired combination but end up winning an inferior subset. Foreseeing this possibility, bidders may act cautiously with adverse effects for revenue and efficiency. Combinatorial auctions allow for bids on combinations of licenses and thus hold the promise of improved performance. Recently, a number of countries worldwide have switched to the combinatorial clock auction to sell spectrum. This two-stage auction uses a core-selecting payment rule. The number of possible packages a bidder can submit grows exponentially with the number of licenses, which adds complexity to the auction. For larger auctions with dozens of licenses bidders cannot be expected to reveal all their valuations during such an auction. We analyze the impact of two main design choices on efficiency and revenue: simple “compact” bid languages versus complex “fully expressive” bid languages and simple “pay-as-bid” payment rules versus complex “core-selecting” payment rules. We consider these design choices both for ascending and sealed-bid formats. We find that simplicity of the bid language has a substantial positive impact on the auction?s efficiency and simplicity of the payment rule has as a substantial positive impact on the auction?s revenue. The currently popular combinatorial clock auction, which uses a complex bid language and payment rule, achieves the lowest efficiency and revenue among all treatment combinations.     

Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Disposition: Search Versus Auction

We propose a model of mechanism choice in the disposition of real estate assets where we consider two alternatives: a search market and an auction. Within the search framework, we derive an equilibrium whereby buyers incur search costs and sellers incur holding costs for the period during which the property is not sold. In the auction alternative, the seller joins an existing pool of sellers in undertaking a multiple–object auction and pays a commission upon sale. Buyers and sellers freely choose their mechanisms, which in equilibrium are optimal given each group's conjectures about the mechanism choice of their counterpart. In equilibrium, an agent cannot benefit from deviating from his choice and each agent's beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium outcome. It is shown that (a) buyers with high search costs will choose auctions because the auction payoff imposes an upper bound on buyers' gains from search, and (b) prices at auctions will be higher. Using vacant lot sales data and a method–of–moment estimator which accounts for the presence of an endogenous discrete mechanism choice variable, we estimated a hedonic regression to detect the price effect. It was determined that, on average, lots sold for $1.44 per square foot more in auctions than in the search market, as predicted by our model.     

Spectrum auctions in a thin market: The Korean case

In 2010, the Korean government adopted spectrum auctions and introduced a market mechanism into spectrum management. However, the government has often been confronted with conflicts between diverse policy goals of spectrum auctions. A thin spectrum market, where only three incumbent MNOs bid for spectrum, has led to concerns that the government may fail to maximize revenues.Based on the past experiences in Korea, this paper examines the Korean government's choice of auction rules in the face of conflicting policy goals. This paper also recommends that the government implement the following regulatory reforms and consider the auction related measures to deepen its spectrum market or increase the number of bidders: (i) relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions, (ii) introduction of regional or site-specific spectrum licenses, and (iii) modification of auction formats. Spectrum markets tend to be thin in many countries, and the Korean experience may offer implications for those countries when they implement spectrum auctions.     

An optimal way to licence the radio spectrum

Radio spectrum licences are generally specified in terms of the power a holder is allowed to transmit. However, if licences become flexible, allowing change of use and technology, then this licensing approach could result in significant interference between users. A new approach is proposed termed “spectrum usage rights” (SURs) which restricts the interference a licence holder is allowed to cause rather than the power they are allowed to transmit. This approach is shown to protect users against interference while providing the maximum flexibility possible and its implementation is discussed.     

Spectrum auctions in India: lessons from experience

Spectrum auctions have been used with significant success in many developed countries. From a regulatory and policy perspective, spectrum auctions ensure the efficient use of spectrum by allocating it to those entities that value it most, while also generating revenues for governments. But auctions may lead to unexpected outcomes due to unanticipated problems with their design leading to unexpected bidder behavior such as collusion and over-bidding. The key challenge before regulatory agencies is to design auctions in such a way as to meet the objective of fostering competition while at the same time ensuring that bidders can effectively use the spectrum for their business. While India was one of the early adopters of spectrum auctions, its success in service provision has been low. This paper critically examines issues in auction design that contributed to this delay and reviews the key elements in the design process namely a coherent regulatory framework, choice of service areas, flexibility for service area consolidation, standards and their role, convergence, managing public service regulation and managing defaults. The paper compares the handling of these elements in auctions in the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Australia with the objective of drawing lessons for Indian policy makers.     

Governance and game theory: When do franchise auctions induce firms to overbid?

The use of auctions as an instrument of public policy has been hailed as evidence of the utility and validity of game theory. In this paper, we focus on extreme cases – centrally, spectrum auctions in the UK and Germany in 2000 – to argue that the canonical game theoretic interpretations of firm behaviour in some (highly “successful”) auction outcomes are inadequate, that the economics of governance critique of franchise bidding can be extended to provide a better interpretation, and that under specified conditions, notably high uncertainty, policy-makers should design franchise auctions to avoid overbidding, rather than attend to the more conventional challenge of underbidding.     

Optimal Selling Mechanism,Auction Discounts and Time on Market

This article examines the optimal selling mechanism problem in real estate market using mean‐variance analysis and downside risk analysis. When sellers can choose between accepting the first offer above a reservation price or auctions (waiting an optimal and fixed time), sellers having higher risk aversion choose auctions and wait a fixed time while sellers having lower risk aversion choose an optimal reservation price and wait a random time. Positive auction discounts are compensated by reduced risks, and there exists a connection between liquidity risk and conditional auction discount. More (Fewer) sellers will choose to sell their houses through auctions in a hot (cold) market or when holding cost increases (decreases). When sellers choose auctions, sellers having higher risk aversion who have lower holding cost wait longer and obtain higher sale price. Loss‐averse sellers unanimously choose the mechanism of setting an optimal reservation price.     

Liberalizing US spectrum allocation

In the US, adjudication of wireless entry under the “public interest” standard protects incumbent service providers. Excess demand exists for access to radio spectrum, despite a common misperception that license auctions held by regulators are tantamount to selling spectrum. Would-be suppliers are slowed by the regulatory process. After discussing the financial tolls extracted, the author suggests a number of structural policy reforms, applicable both to the USA and perhaps spectrum markets elsewhere. These include: permissive airwave use (within emission limits implicitly defined by the license); endowing licensees with use of adjacent buffer zones; exhaustive allocation of remaining bandwidth to new applicants and streamlining the process for entrants to gain access to unoccupied bandwidth, using liability rules and post-entry dispute resolution mechanisms.     

Penny auctions

This paper studies penny auctions, a novel auction format in which every bid increases the price by a small amount, but placing a bid is costly. Outcomes of real-life penny auctions are often surprising. Even when selling cash, the seller may obtain revenue that is much higher or lower than its nominal value, and losers in an auction sometimes pay much more than the winner. This paper characterizes all symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria of penny auctions and studies penny auctions’ properties. The results show that a high variance of outcomes is a natural property of the penny auction format and high revenues are inconsistent with rational risk-neutral participants.     

On Strategic Quantity Bidding in Multiple Unit Auctions

Standard studies of multiple unit auctions generally overlook the strategic role of bidders' quantity decisions. Using a simple equilibrium model of bidding I analyze bidders' incentives to choose quantities in discriminatory and competitive auctions. The main result is that bidders have a stronger strategic incentive to bid for fewer units in competitive auctions. Since under competition a bidder pays the lowest accepted price for each unit she gets, she may benefit from dropping her quantity to let lower-valuing bidders enter the set of winners. This prediction is consistent with empirical observations from foreign currency and spectrum auctions.     

An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions

This paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions. We find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents. The differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant's costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent's and relations of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs. We also find that more efficient firms bid, on average, more aggressively and firms with greater backlogs bid less aggressively.     

Economic and policy implications of spectrum license fee payment methods

This paper argues that “Do auctions raise consumer prices?” is a misleading question. License fee payment methods, rather than spectrum assignment methods, are key factors that bring forth different market outcomes in the wireless telecommunication industry. This paper analyzes and discusses the effects of three spectrum license fee payment methods—upfront lump-sum fees, royalties, and profit sharing—on economic efficiency, spectrum supply, and government revenue. Royalties create distortions in product and factor markets but can induce the government to increase spectrum supply and encourage firms’ investments. A caveat is that the analyses are based on the model assuming monopoly market and information certainty.