Hours Worked in Europe and the United States: New Data,New Answers*

We use national labor force surveys from 1983 to 2015 to construct hours worked per person on the aggregate level and for different demographic groups for 18 European countries and the United States. We apply a harmonization procedure to measure hours worked consistently across countries and over time. In the recent cross‐section, Europeans work 14 percent fewer hours than US Americans. Differences in weeks worked and in the educational composition each account for one quarter to one half of this gap. In addition, lower hours worked per person than in the United States are driven by lower weekly hours worked in Scandinavia and Western Europe, but by lower employment rates in Eastern and Southern Europe.     

COMPARISONS OF PURCHASING POWER, REAL OUTPUT AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND THE U.S.A., 1975–85

This study presents binary comparisons of real output and labour productivity in manufacturing in Japan, South Korea and the U.S.A. in 1975, made according to an "industry of origin approach." The 1975 benchmark comparisons have been updated to 1985. Value added per hour worked in Japanese manufacturing increased from 54 percent of the U.S. level in 1975 to 76 percent in 1985. In certain important branches such as electrical machinery, metal products and machinery and transport equipment, productivity leadership shifted to Japan. In South Korea, labour productivity in manufacturing increased rapidly from 1975 to 1985, both in absolute terms and relative to the U.S.A. Nevertheless, in 1985 value added per hour worked was only 14 percent of the U.S. level.     

Productivity and convergence across U.S. States and industries

We examine the sources of aggregate labor productivity movements and convergence in the U.S. states from 1963 to 1989. Productivity levels vary widely across sectors and across states, as do sectoral output and employment shares. The main finding is the diverse performance of sectors regarding convergence. Using both cross-section and time series methods, we find convergence in labor productivity for both manufacturing and mining. However, we find that convergence does not hold for all sectors over the period. Decomposing aggregate convergence into industry productivity gains and changing sectoral shares of output, we find the manufacturing sector to be responsible for the bulk of cross-state convergence.     

A multivariate time series analysis of the United States aggregate production function

This study examines the effects of hours of work per unit of private sector capital, the relative price of energy, government capital per unit of private sector capital, and inflation on private sector output per unit of capital in the U.S. over the period 1952–90. A small vector autoregressive model that comprises the variables typically employed in single-equation estimates of the aggregate production function is used. Variance decompositions and cumulative impulse response functions indicate that hours of work per unit of private sector capital, the relative price of energy, and the inflation rate have significant effects on private sector output per unit of capital over the 1952–90 period. However, there is no evidence of a significant effect for government capital per unit of private capital. An historical decomposition that begins in 1973 with the emergence of a “productivity slump” and continues through 1990 indicates that shocks to hours of work per unit of capital, the relative price of oil, and inflation appear important in explaining output per unit of capital but shocks to government capital are not important.     

The role of agriculture in aggregate business cycles

There are substantial differences in business cycle fluctuations across countries. These differences are systematically related to the share of agriculture in the economy: Countries with a high share of employment in agriculture feature high fluctuations in aggregate output, low relative volatility of aggregate employment, and low correlation of aggregate output and employment. In addition, agriculture has certain distinctive features over the business cycle: Output and employment in agriculture are more volatile than and not positively correlated with output and employment in the rest of the economy and output and employment are less correlated in agriculture than in non-agriculture. Because of these features, agriculture may play a role in accounting for aggregate business cycles across countries. We calibrate an otherwise standard two-sector indivisible-labor business cycle model with agriculture and non-agriculture to aggregate and sectoral data for the United States. We find that an increase in the employment to population ratio in agriculture from 2 to 30 percent in our model increases fluctuations in aggregate output by almost 40 percent. This is about 2/3 of the difference in aggregate fluctuations between countries such as Turkey and the United States.     

Let's Get Real: A Factor Analytical Approach to Disaggregated Business Cycle Dynamics

This paper develops a method for analysing the dynamics of large cross-sections based on a factor analytic model. We use "law of large numbers" arguments to show that the number of common factors can be determined by a principal components method, the economy-wide shocks can be identified by means of simple structural VAR techniques and that the parameters of the unobserved factor model can be estimated consistently by applying OLS equation by equation. We distinguish between a technological and a non-technological shock. Identification is obtained by minimizing the negative realizations of the technology shock. Empirical results on 4-digit industrial output and productivity for the U.S. economy from 1958 to 1986 show that: (1) at least two economy-wide shocks, both having a long-run effect on sectoral output, are needed to explain the common dynamics; (2) although the technological shock accounts for at least 50 per cent of the aggregate dynamics of output, it cannot by itself explain dynamics at business cycle frequencies; (3) sector-specific shocks explain the main bulk of total variance but generate mainly high frequency dynamics; (4) both the technological and the non-technological component of output show a peak for positive sectoral comovements of output at business cycle frequencies; (5) technological shocks are strongly correlated with the growth rates of the investment in machinery and equipment sectors and their inputs.     

The utilization of capital and the growth of output in a developing economy: The case of South Korean manufacturing

This paper presents the utilization rate of capital equipment in the S. Korean manufacturing industry during 1962–1971. The aggregate utilization rate is shown to have increased at an annual rate of about 8%. The level of utilization in S. Korea is found to be generally lower even in 1971 than in the U.S. in 1962, both at the aggregate and sectoral levels. The rise in the utilization rate is shown to have contributed nearly as much as investment has in the growth of manufacturing output. The influence of the residual component declines from 36% to 8% of the recorded growth of output when the increase in the utilization rate is properly allowed for.     

Lessons for Europe from the U.S. Growth Resurgence

This paper analyses the sources of U.S. labour productivitygrowth in the late 1990s and presents projections for both outputand labour productivity growth. We show that investment in informationtechnology (IT) played a substantial role in the U.S. productivityrevival and that similar trends are evident in data for otherleading OECD countries. We then outline a methodology for projectingtrend output and productivity growth for the broadly definedU.S. economy. Our base-case projection puts trend productivitygrowth at 1.78 percent per year over the next decade with arange of 1.14 to 2.38 percent, reflecting fundamental uncertaintiesabout the rate of technical progress in IT-production and investmentin IT-equipment and software. Our central projection is belowthe average growth rate of 2.07 percent during 1995 -2000. Similarprojections for Europe must await more complete information.(JEL J2)     

The Great U.K. Depression: A Puzzle and Possible Resolution

The United Kingdom was depressed for 20 years between the two world wars. The decrease in output was entirely due to lower hours per worker and lower employment. Our main finding is that generous unemployment benefits, in conjunction with large negative sectoral shocks, are the most plausible candidate explanation for this depression. We also find that the conventional Keynesian monetary story for this period is unconvincing. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E30, E24.     

THE SECTORAL PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE O F JAPAN AND THE U.S., 1885–1990

This paper provides a disaggregated productivity comparison between Japan and the U.S. for the period 1885–1990. It combines two detailed productivity comparisons for 1939 and 1975 with time series to provide a long-term sectoral perspective. There is much diversity in the Japanese experience. The agricultural sector has shown relative stagnation since 1885. The service sector showed considerable growth before the Second World War and reached high productivity levels in the post-war period. Within services there is great diversity in productivity levels. Japan's manufacturing sector has shown the fastest catch-up and its productivity level is currently close to that of the U.S.     

Analysis of sectoral credit default cycle dependency with wavelet networks: Evidence from Turkey

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between industrial production and sectoral credit defaults (non-performing loans ratio) cycle by wavelet network analysis in Turkey over the period January 2001–November 2007. We use feedforward neural network based wavelet decomposition to analyze the contemporaneous connection between industrial production cycles and sectoral credit default cycles at different time scales between 2 and 64 months. The main findings for Turkey indicates that industrial production cycles effect the sectoral credit default cycles at different time scales and thus indicate that the creditors should consider the multiscale sectoral cycles in order to minimize credit default rates.     

The extensive margin,sectoral shares,and international business cycles

Abstract This paper documents some previously neglected features of sectoral shares at business cycle frequencies in OECD economies. We find that the non‐traded output share is as volatile as aggregate GDP and for most countries is countercyclical. While the standard international real business cycle model has difficulty in accounting for these properties of the data, an extended model that allows for sectoral adjustment along both the intensive and the extensive margins does a much better job of replicating these statistics. The model also matches better the correlation between relative consumption growth and real exchange rate changes, a key measure of international risk‐sharing.     

Sectoral shocks and business cycles: a disaggregated analysis of output fluctuations in the UK

In this paper we first show that it is possible to modify linear real business cycle models to allow for disaggregate (industry-specific) factors in the generation of macroeconomic fluctuations. We then try to determine the relative importance of aggregate and sectoral shocks by doing principal components analysis on the residuals from a VAR of output growth rates in 19 UK industrial sectors. We find that a significant percentage of the innovations in sectoral output growths can be accounted for by a single unobserved component. However, since the model only sets an upper bound to the explanatory power of aggregate impulses, the importance of using sectoral data to extract additional information to bear on the analysis of economic fluctuations is confirmed by our findings.     

Do technology shocks lower hours worked? – Evidence from Japanese industry level data

We examine the response of productivity and hours worked to technology and nontechnology shocks using the Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP) Database. We find that, at the aggregate level, positive technology shocks increase hours worked both in the manufacturing and the nonmanufacturing sector, accounting for a large fraction in the variances of hours worked. At the two- and three-digit industry levels, in contrast, we find that the correlation between productivity and hours worked in response to sectoral technology shocks tends to be negative. Further, we find that neither aggregate nor sectoral technology shocks appear to be the dominant factor underlying fluctuations in hours worked at the disaggregate level. The productivity decline in response to nontechnology shocks is not related to a permanent change in the relative size of industries.     

WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR JAPAN'S HIGH RATE OF GROWTH?*

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the sources of economic growth in Japan and to compare the results with those in the U.S. and Europe as studied by E. F. Denison. The method used by Denison is followed as far as possible. The character of this paper is of fact finding, and the interpretation of results or the originality of methodology is not dealt with here. The results may be summarized as follows. (1) Japan's growth rate is two times that of Europe and three times that of the United States. (2) The contributions of labor, capital, and the residual to economic growth are all higher for Japan than for the U.S. or Europe. (3) Factors which account for the higher contribution of labor to economic growth are (a) the higher rate of increase in employment, (b) less shortening of working hours, and (c) improved age and sex composition. (4) Factors which account for the higher contribution of capital to economic growth are a higher rate of increase in capital input and the high elasticity of production with respect to capital. (5) Other notable points include: (a) the contribution of education is lower for Japan; (b) the capital-labor ratio in Japan increased remarkably; (c) capital's share of national income is higher; and (d) 60% of Japan's economic growth is accounted for by the residual.     

State-level FDI and within-occupation wage inequality in the United States

Our paper explores the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and within-occupation wage inequality at the state level in the U.S. We argue that sectoral FDI may affect different occupations differently, and our study looks at possible heterogeneous effects of sectoral FDI on wage inequality for 22 occupations. Using data over 1999–2007, our results show that state-level manufacturing FDI tends to reduce wage inequality, measured by the ratio of the 90th percentile wage and the 10th percentile wage in an occupation. Manufacturing FDI is significantly associated with less wage inequality in the production occupations and the construction and extraction occupations. In contrast, non-manufacturing FDI is associated with increased within-occupation wage inequality in the arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations, as well as the transportation and material moving occupations. Non-manufacturing FDI is associated with decreased wage inequality in the sales and related occupations.     

Taxes, Regulations, and the Value of U.S. and U.K. Corporations

We derive the quantitative implications of growth theory for U.S. corporate equity plus net debt over the period 1960–2001. There were large secular movements in corporate equity values relative to GDP, with dramatic declines in the 1970's and dramatic increases starting in the 1980's and continuing throughout the 1990's. During the same period, there was little change in the capital–output ratio or earnings share of output. We ask specifically whether the theory accounts for these observations. We find that it does, with the critical factor being changes in the U.S. tax and regulatory system. We find that the theory also accounts for the even larger movements in U.K. equity values relative to GDP in this period.     

Some thought experiments on the changes in labor supply in Turkey

Turkey has the lowest hours worked (the product of total employment and annual hours per worker, divided by the size of the working-age population) among the OECD countries. We study the changes in hours of work following Ohanian, Raffo, and Rogerson (Journal of Monetary Economics, 2008) and find that the intratemporal first-order condition from the neoclassical growth model accounts for the decline in total hours worked during 1998–2009 in Turkey. Hours worked increased in Turkey since 2009 and the model accounts for half of that increase between 2009 and 2011. Our findings suggest that time-varying taxes on consumption and labor play significant roles in explaining the hours worked in Turkey. The model without subsistence consumption provides a better fit with the data after 2003. The presence of government consumption in the utility function does not seem very important.     

PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN SERVICE INDUSTRIES: ARE THE TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES MEASUREMENT‐DRIVEN?

Since the mid-nineties, U.S. labor productivity outgrows its European counterpart by a wide margin. van Ark et al. (2003 ) have found three service industries where productivity growth has accelerated in the U.S., but not in Europe, to account for most of the difference. These three industries are wholesale and retail trade, and trade in financial securities. However, since measurement methods differ on both sides of the Atlantic, Europe's shortfall in productivity growth could be a statistical artifact. This paper tries to answer the question whether this is indeed the case by quantifying the extent to which the U.S. growth rates in trade and banking are pulled upward by measurement methods that are unusual in Europe. In addition, some observations are offered on whether the recent upswing in productivity growth in the U.S. services sector has cured "Baumol's Cost Disease."     

Ricardian productivity differences and the gains from trade

This paper evaluates the role of sectoral heterogeneity in determining the gains from trade. We first show analytically that in the presence of sectoral Ricardian comparative advantage, a one-sector sufficient statistic formula that uses total trade volumes as a share of total absorption systematically understates the true gains from trade. Greater relative sectoral productivity differences lead to larger disparities between the gains implied by the one-sector formula and the true gains. Using data on overall and sectoral trade shares in a sample of 79 countries and 19 sectors we show that the multi-sector formula implies on average 30% higher gains from trade than the one-sector formula, and as much as 100% higher gains for some countries. We then set up and estimate a quantitative Ricardian–Heckscher–Ohlin model in which no version of the formula applies exactly, and compare a range of sufficient statistic formulas to the true gains in this model. Confirming the earlier results, formulas that do not take into account the sectoral heterogeneity understate the true gains from trade in the model by as much as two-thirds. The one-sector formulas understate the gains by more in countries with greater dispersion in sectoral productivities.