The decision to ‘bid for business’: Municipal behavior in granting property tax abatements

We investigate the timing of local economic development incentive offers by estimating duration models of the time to adoption of the first manufacturing property tax abatement offered by a municipal government. The effects of municipal characteristics, incentive prevalence measures, and fiscal stress indicators on the duration of non-abatement regimes are investigated using data for 112 municipalities in metropolitan Detroit during 1974–1992. Median household income and the local property tax price of local public services are found to affect the hazard rates. Most importantly, there is evidence of positive duration dependence, or an emulation effect, with first-time abatement offers.     

The Spatial Effects of Wage or Property Tax Differentials, and Local Government Choice between Tax Instruments

This paper considers the spatial effects (on wages, employment, and business capital as functions of location) of a localized differential in source-based wage tax rates or business property tax rates between (for example) a central city and the surrounding suburbs. A simple model is used in which business production uses only labor and capital inputs. Consumers have fixed residential locations but may commute to work. Wage and property tax differentials have effects that are similar in some ways but different in other ways. If given a choice, a local government would choose to set its business property tax rate equal to zero and use only a wage tax.     

The impact of positive property tax differentials on the timing of development

To date, few empirical studies have focused on the location decision by residential developers in response to changes in the property tax. Based on a dynamic time-to-development model by Turnbull, this paper finds, using 17 years of parcel level data from Saint Louis County, Missouri, that higher than average tax rates increase the time-to-development for vacant parcels by between 4 and 11%, all else equal. Additionally this paper finds that the tax differential effect is cumulative, resulting in about a 20% increase in the time-to-development for the parcel facing the average number of years with a higher than average rate. These results support the analytical results by both Turnbull [Turnbull, G.K., 1988. The effects of local taxes and public services on residential development patterns. Journal of Regional Science, 28 (4), 541–562.] and McMillen [McMillen, D.P., 1990. The timing and duration of development tax rate increases. Journal of Urban Economics, 28, 1–18.] that the property tax can distort residential capital markets leading to inefficient urban growth, or sprawl.     

Agricultural Land Conversion and Inheritence Tax in Japan

In this paper we investigate theoretically the extent to which the development timing of agricultural land conversion would be hastened by the introduction of inheritence tax. We extend the optimal timing of wealth maximizing value use models by Scouras (1978), Anderson (1993) and Kanemoto (1996) to examine cases where tax rates vary according to land use with (i) almost no income and (ii) high income use, such as rental housing. We first model landowner's behavior within the life cycle dynamic optimization framework and then simulate the impact of inheritence tax on the optimal timing of development. Some notable predictions about optimal timing of development emerge from our numerical analysis: no inheritence tax effect is observed for landowners whose inheritence probability is less than 1% (that is, landowners in the age group 40 or below) and whose inheritence tax rate is less than 10%. However, the optimal timing of development drops to below one year for landowners whose inheritence probability is more than 18% and whose tax rate is 30%.     

1. The Role of Land Markets in Economic Crises

It is widely recognized that the economic crisis of 2009 was caused by unsound lending for real estate. Largely ignored, however, is that this contraction was easily predicted on the basis of a well-established pattern of land speculation, premature subdivision, and excessive building on marginal land that recurs approximately once every 18 years. Capital locked up in projects that are started during a land bubble is effectively lost during the downturn, leaving the nation without sufficient capital to finance ordinary business operations during the recovery period. The best instrument for avoiding this boom-bust cycle is the property tax and, more specifically, the portion that falls on land. We explore here the ways in which the property tax influences the intensity, timing, and location of development. We also examine why frequent and accurate assessment are essential to make the property tax an effective method of preventing speculative real estate bubbles.     

Site Value Taxation and the Timing of Land Development

A bstract . Recent writers have challenged the traditional view that a tax on site value is neutral, but there is still disagreement as to the effects of the tax. The site value tax affects the timing of land development in that it provides an incentive for landowners to develop land sooner than under a property tax levied on improvements also. Confusion has resulted from a failure to distinguish market value from development value. The incidence of the site value tax must take into account the dynamics of untaxing capital and of the capitalization of the tax increase on land values , as well as of the resulting increase of land supply and its effect in further reducing land values. The increased profitability of capital improvements could then increase land rent from the demand side. Obviously, amidst such dynamic changes, the overall effect on land values and rents is unsettled pending further research.     

Optimal property taxation in the presence of interregional capital mobility

A single region's optimal property tax policy is examined in a model with interregional capital mobility. In this model, property taxation is used to finance local public expenditures. Different tax rates may be imposed on property used to produce goods which are traded between regions and property used to produce nontraded goods (e.g., residential property). The key determinants of the difference between the optimal tax rates are identified, and it is argued that there exists a bias towards relatively low tax rates on property used to produce traded goods. The role of labor mobility is also investigated.     

Three-rate property taxation and housing construction

This paper examines the effect of property taxation on housing construction. In 2001, Finnish municipalities were allowed to levy an extra property tax on undeveloped land zoned for housing. Municipalities that adopted the new tax instrument have a three-rate tax property tax system with different tax rates on land before development, land after development and buildings. The remaining municipalities have a two-rate system with a uniform land tax and a building tax. A theoretical model of decisions by landowners suggests that the pre-development land tax ought to lead to faster development, but also the density of development may be affected. In the two-rate system land tax is neutral. The empirical results suggest that landowners respond to the tax incentives. Municipalities that adopted the three-rate property tax system saw an increase in single-family housing starts of roughly 12 percent.     

Property Tax Rate Changes and Rates of Development

Theoretically, unanticipated and anticipated property tax rate increases should reduce and increase, respectively, residential development rates. A discrete-time event history analysis of 224 originally undeveloped parcels presents a first empirical test. Property tax rate changes one year in the future are anticipated; increases strongly increase the probability of development in the current year. Rate increases in the current year reduce the probability of development in the current year but with somewhat less certainty, probably because they are only partially unanticipated. Accordingly, pre-announced property tax increases might accelerate the underlying rate of development as effectively as would tax concessions.     

Property Tax Equalization Rates: Implications of Their Use in Tax Inequality Cases in the City of New York

A bstract . The New State Board of Equalization and Assessment annually determines for each taxing jurisdiction within the state, an estimate of the ratio of its assessed values to market values. The methods used in constructing such ratios are reviewed as well as the ways in which the ratios are used. Special emphasis is given to the use of the ratio by taxpayers in tax inequality or certiorari cases. Using data on New York City , it is estimated that maximum use of the ratio in such cases could lead to as much as a 22 percent reduction in the City's property tax base. As well, estimates are made of the redistributive effects across different property types in the city under the assumption that tax rates are increased to just offset the revenue effects of the tax base erosion. The most obvious effect is the increased burden on residential housing owner-occupiers.     

Sooner or Later? – Paradoxical Investment Effects of Capital Gains Taxation under Simultaneous Investment and Abandonment Flexibility

This paper analyzes the impact of capital gains taxation on investment timing decisions for risky investment projects with entry and exit flexibility under differential tax rates for ordinary income and capital gains. We investigate whether capital gains taxation influences immediate and delayed investments asymmetrically, given the optimal abandonment decision. If capital gains taxation induces a lock-in effect, this effect is anticipated in the investment timing decision. In contrast to prior research, our numerical simulations show that this lock-in effect of capital gains taxation can induce normal as well as paradoxical effects on investment timing under simultaneous entry and exit flexibility. A paradoxical timing effect, i.e., investment accelerated by capital gains taxation, especially emerges for high liquidation proceeds or, more conservative tax accounting, low interest rates, and low volatilities. In these cases, capital gains taxation reduces the value of the option to invest and hereby increases the propensity to invest immediately. As a second paradoxical tax effect, capital gains taxation may favor delayed real investment over financial investment. Facing these results, tax legislators should not use capital gains taxation as a short-term tax policy instrument to influence investors' timing decisions.     

Property Tax Circuit-breakers: Good Causes but Bad Economics

A bstract . Since 1965, 30 states and the District of Columbia have enacted programs designed to reduce the effective rate of property taxation for some low income households and for the elderly. Most often this relief is provided by so-called "circuit-breakers." It is contended that the economic arguments favoring circuit-breakers are empirically unproven and theoretically suspect. The tax may be progressive , not regressive , and the device may transfer income from low to high income households. Any short run redistribution of income to favor the poor or the elderly would, in the long run, merely shift the timing of their tax payments. Circuit-breakers encourage over-consumption of housing and misallocation of housing resources. Reducing the tax base, they produce higher rates and so increase the tax burden.     

On the Degree of Property Tax Assessment Inequity in Complex Tax Jurisdictions

A bstract . The extent of interest in the degree of inequity in property assessment is indicative of the importance of identifying determinants of assessment inequity. Previous attempts to identify such determinants were certainly incomplete. An additional variable is offered for the list that would be expected to explain statistically the degree of inequity in the distribution of property tax liabilities , in general, and to examine specifically the relationship between assessment, inequity and the degree of complexity for assessing Jurisdictions. The latter are often complex in the sense that individual properties, although subject to a set of two or more nominal tax rates on assessed values, are not subject to the same set of nominal tax rates. It is argued—to the extent that individual property tax liabilities are capitalized in sale prices for individual properties —that the greater the number of specific property tax rates on assessed value , the greater is the expected frequency of change in such specific property tax rates and, therefore, the higher the expected value of the measure of the degree of inequity.     

Taxation for Low Cost Wood Fiber*

Abstract . If forest industry taxation is to be put on a sound economic basis, the Federal Government, the largest land owner, should pay the same taxes as any other landowner, so that the social and economic effects of taxation are realized. Specialists report that the form of the property tax preferred for the taxation of the property of the forest industry, under most circumstances, is land value taxation, not the property tax based on income realized at some point In the future which presumed the continued existence of virgin forests. This paper recognizes that the forest industry now is based on harvests of tree crops and proposes a further development of the land value taxation principle in the form of a forest tax composed of a land value tax combined with a tax on tree growth which increases as growth as a percentage of volume growth decreases with the tree's increasing age.     

Modeling returns to owner-occupied single-family residences

This paper expands previous models of the returns to owner-occupied single-family residences by modelling returns to a specific property of an individual homeowner instead of determining an average market return based on appraised values. Included in the model are transaction costs, degree of leverage, level of price appreciation, the implied rental cost in ownership, tax bracket, and duration of home ownership. Simulation results suggests that the level and timing of transaction costs are important to homeowners and rates of return to owner-occupied single-family residences increase to a point in time and thereafter decline.     

Do Urban Tax Rates Converge?

A bstract . Using a multiple regression model that seeks to explain why tax rates vary, the hypothesis is tested that similarly sized cities with similar economic functions would tend to have property tax rates that converged. What variations there are in an array of urban tax rates of 20 cities in the 100,000 to 200,000 class seem to be explained by density of settlement and by the extent to which non-property tax sources bulk importantly in total urban revenues. The inference is drawn that convergence is in fact observable. Convergence would, of course, imply tax competition as among these cities.     

Mobile Labor, Multiple Tax Instruments, and Tax Competition

The tax competition literature shows that local governments keep property tax rates inefficiently low to prevent capital outflows, thereby underproviding local public goods. This paper adds mobile labor and an alternative tax instrument to the model. Jurisdictions have access to a property tax levied on land and capital, plus either a head tax or a labor tax. Scale economies in public good provision create incentives to use the property tax, but these incentives are not accompanied by increased incentives to underprovide public goods. In contrast, underprovision is associated with the use of a distortionary labor tax.     

Alternative Methods of School Finance: An Empirical Analysis of Cities in San Diego County

. Two alternatives to the local school property tax are explored using a simulation model: a power equalizing property tax and a state-wide property tax. The effects on residents’tax burdens and service levels are estimated and compared for residents of 13 cities in San Diego County. Under each of the available options shifts in tax burdens would occur. One high income city is a major beneficiary. Three others which would be required to contribute more to education are otherwise dissimilar; one is already taxing itself heavily. When tax effort is considered, cities intended to be prime beneficiaries do benefit but not greatly. The principal gainer is a city with high income and high property values. This analysis does not indicate that these alternative programs are more equitable than the present property tax.     

The Impact of Differential Assessments on the Property Tax*

Abstract . This paper is focused on the interaction between property tax revenue and assessment policy in New York City between 1961 and 1971. It examines the observed changes in real rates at which different types of property are taxed and examines possible rationales for the different real rates of taxation applied to properties of different types.