Does the presence of professional football cause crime in a city? Evidence from Pontiac,Michigan

Using daily panel data from Detroit, we empirically explore the relationship between the National Football League (NFL) and crime in a city. We exploit the natural experiment of the Detroit Lions’ move from Pontiac, Michigan, to downtown Detroit in 2002. Pontiac is used as the treatment city and non-game day crime, other suburban cities, and other cities outside Detroit MSA are used as the comparison groups. Employing a difference-in-difference approach, we find decreases in assaults and vandalism on home game days in Pontiac relative to the control cities after the Lions’ move. We find weak evidence of a net decrease in larceny and vandalism in Pontiac on home game days following the loss of professional football. No changes in assaults and auto theft are reported. While not conclusive, our results suggest that professional football leads to additional larceny and vandalism incidents but no effects on assaults and auto theft.     

The trickle-down effect: how elite sporting success affects amateur participation in German football

The trickle-down effect assumes that sporting success at the elite sport level descends down to the amateur sport level in the sense that people are inspired by sporting success to participate themselves. Previous research failed to find convincing evidence for this relationship, mostly because the data used and the methods applied (e.g. cross-sectional data, primary data, correlations) were not adequate. This study addresses these shortcomings and examines the effect of national sporting success on amateur sport participation in German football using longitudinal data from 1950 to 2014. Since an individual’s decision to participate in sport also depends on other factors, the regression models also control for working hours, real wages etc. The results show that only World Cup title wins of the men’s national team have a positive and statistically significant impact on the number of and percentage changes in individual club memberships, clubs and teams. The coefficients of European Championship titles and title wins of the women’s national team turn out to be mostly insignificant. Future research should examine the reasons as to why only title wins by the men’s team have a measurable inspirational effect on amateur sport participation in football.     

FAVORITISM AND REFEREE BIAS IN EUROPEAN SOCCER: EVIDENCE FROM THE SPANISH LEAGUE AND THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE

In this paper, we test for, and find evidence of, referee bias in favor of home teams in European football using minute‐by‐minute analysis to control for within‐game events. The context for the analysis is Spain's Primera Liga and the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) Champions League. We find that the award of sanctions by Spanish referees in the Champions League are not significantly different to those of the referees from other countries and as such are subject to the same sources of bias. In Primera Liga matches where the crowd is separated from the pitch by running tracks, we find that the probability of the award of a yellow card to the home team is higher and that of the away team is lower compared to matches played at stadia without running tracks. Similar results are found in the Champions League, where efforts are made to hire “neutral” referees. Referee behavior is also influenced by the size of the crowd in attendance. (JEL D8, J2)     

How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?

We use a human-subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers’ disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with randomly drawn asymmetric disagreement outcomes that vary over plays of the game, and with complete information about disagreement payoffs and the cake size. We find that subjects only respond about half as much as theoretically predicted to changes in their own disagreement payoff and to changes in their opponent’s disagreement payoff. This effect is observed in a standard Nash demand game and a related unstructured bargaining game, in both early and late rounds, and is robust to moderate changes in stake sizes. We show theoretically that standard models of expected utility maximisation are unable to account for this under-responsiveness, even when generalised to allow for risk aversion. We also show that quantal-response equilibrium has, at best, mixed success in characterising our results. However, a simple model of other-regarding preferences can explain our main results.     

When expectations become aspirations: reference-dependent preferences and liquidity constraints

A large body of literature suggests that consumers derive utility from gains and losses relative to a reference point. This paper shows that such reference dependence can affect savings in opposite directions depending on whether people face liquidity constraints. Existing models for wealth and intertemporal choice predict that reference dependence reduces savings, but these models abstract from liquidity constraints. Introducing a liquidity constraint, I find that reference dependence can increase optimal savings for people without access to credit. Ex post, after reference points have been formed, liquidity constraints force consumers to take part of an income loss in early periods, inducing those who are reference dependent to concentrate the full loss in early periods and save in order to eliminate future losses. Further, anticipating a liquidity constraint raises the expected level of future consumption and thus the expectations-based reference point for future periods, creating an ex-ante savings motive. These findings underscore that it is important to account for financial market imperfections when applying or testing reference-dependent models in low-income settings, and potentially explain heterogeneity in how much the poor save when facing binding liquidity constraints.     

Teams take the better risks

One reason why decision makers are often teams and not individuals may be that team decisions comply more closely with economic rationality. We compare individual and team decisions, when systematic deviations from the expected utility theory (EUT) and the portfolio selection theory (PST) are to be expected. We find almost no evidence for the greater compliance of team decisions with the principles of EUT. However, there is substantial evidence for the consistency of team decisions with the PST. Compared to individuals, teams accumulate significantly more expected value at a significantly lower total risk (measured in standard deviation, S.D.).     

OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY AND THE COUCH POTATO AUDIENCE

Previous studies of attendance demand for professional team sports have failed to yield clear‐cut findings on the importance of outcome uncertainty to consumers. But potentially fewer problems should arise in examining the link between outcome uncertainty and demand in the television market for team sports, which of the case of English Premier League football is in fact a more important component in total club revenue. This study models both the choice of which games to show and the size of audience attracted by each game, exploiting data on audience sizes for games between 1993 and 2002. We propose a new measure of match outcome uncertainty and, from our results, both the broadcaster and the audience appear interested in competitive balance.     

The determination of transfer fees in English nonleague football

In recent years a number of studies have analysed the player transfer market in English professional football. This paper examines whether similar factors operate to determine transfer fees in the semiprofessional, or nonleague, game. An empirical model of the nonleague player transfer market is developed in which observed transfer fees are determined by player characteristics, time effects, selling-club characteristics and buying-club characteristics. Using data on 114 transfer fees covering the period 1988 to 1997, we find evidence that the data generating process for transfer fees is broadly similar in both professional and nonleague football.     

Pay for play: the financial value of NCAA football players

We explore the financial value of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) football recruits and establish a wage schedule based on the star ratings assigned to high school athletes by an independent talent evaluation agency. Evidence suggests that the contribution of higher-ranking recruits to team wins significantly increases revenues. While the NCAA currently prohibits universities from paying student-athletes, we estimate that if amateurism rules were rescinded and college football players were compensated according to their revenue-generating abilities then five-, four-, three-, and low-star players would be entitled to annual salaries of $799,000, $361,000, $29,000, and $21,000, respectively, in addition to athletic scholarships covering tuition, books, and room and board.     

Identity,nostalgia and happiness among migrants: The case of the Kōshien High School Baseball Tournament in Japan

Public broadcasting of all games of high school baseball tournaments attests to their popularity in Japan. The present study uses individual‐level data to test the hypothesis that nostalgia influences the level of happiness of Japanese people. Its key findings were: (i) the number of wins by a prefecture team increased the happiness level of its residents; (ii) this effect applied only to residents of large cities; and (iii) for urban migrants, originally from rural areas, the effect of their home team wins exceeded that of the wins of their host area team. This effect was significant in cases where the host area cultural climate differed from that of the migrant home area. These findings suggest that a scarcity of ‘identity’ goods related to the residential community increases high school baseball influence on happiness. Furthermore, the influence of nostalgia for home on migrants’ happiness is greater than their attachment to their current residential community.     

Morale,performance and disclosure

We study the optimal disclosure policy in a sender–receiver communication game where the receiver's morale, defined as his expected state of the world, affects his performance. The sender observes the state and chooses whether to disclose it to the receiver, who then decides whether to participate in a task. The receiver wins if his performance in the task meets a target. No disclosure is optimal if the receiver wins with average morale in each state. Otherwise, in the threshold disclosure equilibrium that Pareto-dominates full disclosure, the receiver quits as the sender discloses the worst states and wins as the sender withholds the rest. The receiver wins in more states in the Pareto-optimal equilibrium as the sender chooses a non-monotonic disclosure policy. Our theory reveals a trade-off between transparency and efficiency when morale affects performance. It has applications in a broad range of areas including military, family, education and business.     

Gambling in contests

This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Unlike the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solution of a Nash equilibrium outcome. In equilibrium, highest expected losses occur at an intermediate negative value of the drift.     

Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: Experimental Evidence

Why do individuals participate in charitable gambling activities? We conduct a laboratory investigation of a model that predicts risk-neutral expected utility maximizers will participate in lotteries when they recognize that lotteries are being used to finance public goods. As predicted by the model, we find that public goods provision is higher when financed by lottery proceeds than when financed by voluntary contributions. We also find support for other comparative static predictions of the model. In particular we find that ticket purchases vary with the size of the fixed prize and with the return from the public good: lotteries with large prizes are more effective, and ticket purchases drop dramatically when the public good is not valued by subjects.     

Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information

We obtain the optimal contract for the government (principal) to regulate a manager (agent) who has a taste for empire-building that is his/her private information. This taste for empire-building is modeled as a utility premium that is proportional to the difference between the contracted output and a reference output. We find that output is distorted upward when the manager’s taste for running large firms is weak, downward when it is strong, and equals a reference output when it is intermediate (in this case, the participation constraint is binding). We also obtain an endogenous reference output (equal to the expected output, which depends on the reference output), and find that the response of output to cost is null in the short-run (in which the reference output is fixed), whenever the manager’s type is in the intermediate range, and negative in the long-run (after the adjustment of the reference output to equal expected output).     

Soccer and national culture: estimating the impact of violence on 22 lads after a ball

Sports have been recently conceptualized as an effective tool for development. Questioning that argument, recent evidence suggests that the practice of soccer reveals national cultures of violence prevailing in players’ countries of origin. We model violent behaviour in the soccer pitch as a function of game specific controls as well as socioeconomic, political, cultural and conflict variables characterizing players’ home countries. We construct a database for the Latin American 2008 Libertadores Cup Competition and find that across multiple specifications and estimating techniques, only game specific variables determine sanctions to violent actions. There are three compatible explanations for this result: highly skilled soccer players may not be representative average citizens; violent conflicts may not necessarily cause a violent culture affecting all corners of society; and even when violent cultures are transmitted to individual players, those values do not condition significantly their behaviour during games. After all, sports may not be a pernicious activity that intrinsically transmits violent values to youths.     

团队生产的纳什均衡及合作博弈空间

本文在霍姆斯特姆所做贡献的基础上认为团队生产问题在本质上等同于囚徒困境问题,并指出霍姆斯特姆的实施强制契约的解决方法存在逻辑漏洞,在现实社会中一般是无效的.本文依据社会经济人个人效用最大化的条件定义了团队生产的合作战略博弈空间,合作战略博弈空间的均衡极点(即个人效用最大化点)就是团队生产收益分配博弈的纳什均衡解.如果个人收益的总和等于集体收益的最优值,那么个人理性与集体理性之间就达到统一,处于帕累托最优状态,即不存在道德风险;反之,则说明存在道德风险.并给出了在团队生产中通过改变合作战略博弈空间达到帕累托最优的一个特例,指出了科学合理地改变合作战略博弈空间在社会经济发展中的重要作用     

Asymmetric search and prospect theory: choice experiment on consumer willingness to search in the gasoline retail market

We use an internet survey conducted among a representative random sample of drivers in the State of Ohio consisting of a choice experiment designed to examine the mechanism driving asymmetric search. The internet survey affords us the opportunity to overcome endogeneity difficulties by imposing exogenous price changes on gasoline consumers to examine the decision-making process behind intended search decisions. We randomly assigned participants to one of five price treatments (either 2.5 or 5% above or below their reported expected price, or no change). We provide a simple empirical model to derive testable implications under prospect theory and use the internet survey to test them. Results indicate that among the respondents who faced prices below their expected price, only 12% chose to search, whereas 45% searched when prices were above. Further, we find results consistent with asymmetric search being driven by prospect theory. The change in consumers’ willingness to search is twice as large when prices exceed expectations by 2.5% relative to when prices exceed them by 5% suggesting that consumers derive utility of finding a good deal evaluated relative to a reference price. We show that this result is inconsistent with standard utility theory or consumers using alternative reference prices.     

Competitive balance versus competitive intensity before a match: is one of these two concepts more relevant in explaining attendance? The case of the French football Ligue 1 over the period 2008–2011

The aim of this article is to investigate the determinants of attendance at French football Ligue 1 matches over the period 2008–2011 with an emphasis on examining the effects of both competitive balance and intensity before a match. Competitive balance is measured by the point difference between the two teams concerned by a match in the championship. Competitive intensity is measured by the point difference for the home team in relation to ranks with sporting stakes. Results show that competitive balance has an insignificant impact whereas competitive intensity has a significantly positive impact. Implications are drawn.     

Hooliganism and Police Tactics

In this paper, we introduce a model of hooliganism to study how different types of policing can be expected to affect violence and the number of hooligans in violent supporter clubs. Hooligans differ in their preferred level of fighting, and obtain utility also from social identity that belonging to a supporter club gives. We find that an increase in discriminative policing, like intelligence units, always reduces violence. Indiscriminate policing, such as the use of teargas or random jailing of potential law breakers, may, however, backfire and result in smaller and more brutal groups.     

NOVELTY EFFECTS OF NEW FACILITIES ON ATTENDANCE AT PROFESSIONAL SPORTING EVENTS

We investigate the effect of new facilities on attendance in professional baseball, basketball, and football from 1969 to 2001. We find a strong, persistent effect in baseball and basketball, and little effect in football. Size and duration estimates imply that baseball teams sell 2,500,794 additional tickets over the first eight seasons, basketball teams 293,878 over the first nine seasons, and football teams 137,792 over the first five seasons, implying an increase in revenues that could defray public subsidies that state and local governments provide for new sports construction projects. Rough calculations suggest that stadium subsidies are an inefficient method of subsidizing professional sports franchises. (JEL R39 , D12 , L83 )