Regional Integration as Diplomacy

Regional integration agreements are examples of second-bestpolicies and have an ambiguous impact on welfare. This articlebuilds a model in which regional integration agreements unambiguouslyraise welfare by correcting for externalities. It assumes thattrade between neighboring countries raises trust between themand reduces the likelihood of conflict. The optimum interventionin that case is a subsidy on imports from the neighbor. Thearticle shows that an equivalent solution is for the neighboringcountries to tax imports from the rest of the world—thatis, to form a regional integration agreement—togetherwith some domestic taxes. The article shows that (1) the optimum tariffs on imports fromthe rest of the world are likely to decline over time; (2) deepintegration implies lower optimum external tariffs if it isexogenous; (3) optimum external tariffs are higher before deepintegration and lower thereafter if deep integration is endogenous;and (4) enlargement of bloc size (in terms of symmetric countries)has an ambiguous impact on external tariffs but raises welfare,and some form of domino effect exists.     

Trade Policy and Poverty Reduction in Brazil

A multiregion computable general equilibrium model is used toevaluate the regional, multilateral, and unilateral trade policyoptions of Mercosur from the perspective of the welfare of allpotential partners in several proposed agreements. The focusfor Brazil is on poverty impacts. The results show that thepoorest households in Brazil experience gains of 1.5–5.5percent of their consumption, which are about three to fourtimes the average gains for Brazil. Protection in Brazil favorscapital-intensive manufacturing relative to unskilled labor-intensiveagriculture and manufacturing. So trade liberalization raisesthe return to unskilled labor relative to capital and disproportionatelyhelps the poor.     

Trade Policy Options for Chile: The Importance of Market Access

This article uses a multisector, multicountry, computable generalequilibrium model to examine Chile's strategy of "additive regionalism"—negotiatingbilateral free trade agreements with all of its significanttrading partners. Taking Chile's regional arrangements bilaterally,only its agreements with Northern partners provide sufficientmarket access to overcome trade diversion costs. Due to preferentialmarket access, however, additive regionalism is likely to provideChile with gains that are many multiples of the static welfaregains from unilateral free trade. At least one partner countryloses from each of the regional agreements considered, and excludedcountries as a group always lose. Gains to the world from globalfree trade are estimated to be vastly larger than gains fromany of the regional arrangements.     

Import Tariff and Exchange Rate Transmission in a Small Open Economy

ABSTRACT

We present a small open economy DSGE model with internal and external sticky prices in an incomplete exchange rate pass-through environment. Import tariff is included as another variable that affects the law of one price. The model is calibrated for the Brazilian economy, and the responses of endogenous variables to shocks in import tariff, aggregate supply, monetary policy, and foreign interest are analyzed. The long-run effect of the first shock is deterioration in the terms of trade because the exchange rate appreciation following this shock offsets the initial effect of the increase in import tariff.     

Tracking NAFTA's Shadow 10 Years on: Introduction to the Symposium

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is arguablythe first "case study" of what might be expected from the increasingnumber of preferential trade agreements involving both developedand developing economies. Ten years after the treaty’sinception, it is time to assess how its outcomes compare withinitial expectations. The articles in this symposium issue provideinsights into the effects of NAFTA on economic geography, trade,wages and migration, and foreign investment from Mexico’sperspective. The contributions paint a complex post-NAFTA realitycharacterized by persistent intrabloc trade barriers, interregionalinequality within Mexico, labor market outcomes that seem closelytied to migration patterns and international trade and investment,and foreign investment flows that appear weakly related to tradeagreements. NAFTA seems to be the first trade agreement in historyfor which the traditional static trade creation or diversioneffects are likely negligible—and hard to identify inany case.     

Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico since the Approval of NAFTA

Cross-country panel data are used to assess the effect of free-tradeagreements on flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Free-tradeagreements are found to have a significant positive effect onFDI flows, and free-trade agreements are found to matter morefor the smaller members of the agreement. For example, the NorthAmerican Free-Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) effect on FDIflows into Mexico is much larger than its effect on flows intothe United States. These cross-country results are used to assessNAFTA’s effect on FDI flows into Mexico. After controllingfor a set of other factors—such as an increase in worldwideFDI flows—the trade agreement is found to generate FDIflows nearly 60 percent higher than they would have been withoutthe agreement.     

Preference Erosion and Multilateral Trade Liberalization

Because of concern that tariff reductions in Organisation forEconomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries willtranslate into worsening export performance for the least developedcountries, the erosion of trade preferences may become a stumblingblock for multilateral trade liberalization. An econometricanalysis of actual preference use shows that preferences areunderused because of administrative burdens—estimatedto be equivalent to an average of 4 percent of the value ofgoods traded. To quantify the maximum scope for preference erosion,the compliance cost estimates are used in a model-based assessmentof the impact of full elimination of OECD tariffs. Taking intoaccount administrative costs eliminates erosion costs in theaggregate and greatly reduces the losses for countries mostaffected by preference erosion.     

十年来香港地区与大陆之间贸易与资本流动的结构性变化——基于国际收支框架的分析

近10年来,香港地区与大陆均经历了若干重大的内部变化与外部冲击,香港与大陆之间也签订了一系列CEPA协议。这些内部变化、外部冲击与制度性安排必将对两地之间的贸易与资本流动产生重大影响。本文从国际收支表框架出发,系统梳理了近10年来两地之间在商品贸易、服务贸易、FDI与证券投资等方面的资金流动趋势,并利用余额法估算了两地之间的其他跨境资本流动。结果表明,两地之间的贸易和投资在规模增长的同时也发生了一些显著的结构性变化,而其他跨境资本流动的变化则反映了两地之间可套利机会的变化。     

Economic Reform and Labor Unions: A General-Equilibrium Analysis Applied to Bangladesh and Indonesia

Noting the trend toward more independent trade unions in developingcountries, this article examines whether the presence of unionsstrengthens or weakens the benefits to be gained from economicpolicy reform. We show that the presence of "passive" unions—onesthat choose their wage-employment contract given the firm'scost-minimizing strategy—increases the welfare gains fromtrade liberalization, because trade reform lowers the wage premiumenjoyed by the unionized sector, reducing a distortion in thelabor market. These gains are amplified when the unions are"active", namely, when they negotiate a contract with the firmthat is off its labor demand curve. Such a contract resultsin featherbedding—paying workers more than their marginalproduct—and trade reform reduces the amount of featherbedding.The policy implication for Bangladesh—a country with strongtrade unions and a protected unionized sector—is thatthe benefits of further trade liberalization may be greaterthan otherwise predicted. In Indonesia, where both unionizationand import tariffs are low, allowing greater independence tounions may preserve flexibility and reward workers better thanthe current minimum-wage policy.     

Saving Transitions

This article takes a systematic cross-national approach to identifyingsaving transitions— defined as sustained increases inthe saving rate of 5 percentage points or more—to studytheir determinants and to reexamine the question of causalitybetween growth and saving. Countries that undergo saving transitionsdo not necessarily experience sustained increases in their growthrates. In fact, growth rates typically return to their levelsbefore the transition within a decade. By contrast, countriesthat undergo growth transitions—arising from improvedterms of trade, increased domestic investment, or other sources—doend up with permanently higher saving rates. Hence saving transitionsdo not appear to be causal with respect to superior economicperformance.     

如何通过贸易促进经济包容性发展

合理运用贸易政策工具、加强国际经贸协作是促进美国经济恢复的必然选择。美国政府应研究加入CPTPP,终止2017年起实施的关税政策,建立医疗用品和药品的国际市场信息系统,推动达成多边自由贸易协定,以确保生产和贸易渠道畅通,创造更多的就业机会,最终实现经济包容性发展。     

Fuel taxation,emissions policy,and competitive advantage in the diffusion of European diesel automobiles

Economic integration agreements have significantly decreased import tariffs. We investigate whether national policies can be an effective replacement for tariffs to protect domestic industry. We show that (a) European fuel taxes and vehicle emissions policy favored diesel vehicles, a technology popular with European consumers but largely offered only by domestic automakers; (b) European automakers benefited from pro‐diesel fuel taxes and a lenient NO_x emissions policy to earn significant profits from diesel cars; and (c) that both policies amounted to significant nontariff trade policies equivalent to an import tariff between two to three times the official rate.     

Trade and investment liberalization as determinants of multilateral environmental agreement membership

Environmental agreements represent voluntary coalitions which mostly regulate emissions and the exhaustion of natural resources. The analysis of why and under which conditions countries (or policy makers) may be inclined toward ratifying such agreements or not has been the focus of a body of theoretical work at the interface of environmental economics and the economics of coalition games. Traditional theoretical work predicted that environmental agreements are hard to sustain due to the lacking enforceability of associated contracts and the incentive to free-ride. This hypothesis is at odds with the enormous surge of such agreements in reality over the last few decades. Recent work by Rose and Spiegel (J. Money, Credit Bank. 41:337–363, 2009) suggests that environmental agreements will be signed and are stable, because they work as a signal and help economies to get access to export (and possibly other) credits. Hence, the reason for a ratification of such agreements is their interdependence with other policies, especially ones that are related to international business. This paper sheds light on the determinants of multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) participation. In particular, we pay attention to the role of a country’s international openness by means of chosen trade and investment policies for such participation. The results support the view that wealthier countries with a strong inclination towards trade and investment liberalization are more in favor of committing themselves voluntarily to environmental standards, pollution reduction, and other means of environmental protection through MEA memberships than other countries, all else equal.     

Service Sector Protection: Considerations for Developing Countries

The inclusion of services in the Uruguay Round of multilateraltrade negotiations has focused attention on the protection ofdomestic service suppliers against competition from foreignsuppliers. Issues arising from these negotiations, however,may obscure another and more important issue: the case for unilateralliberalization. This article first surveys methods of protectionin the service sector, and then examines the likely cost ofprotection. Particular attention is given to developing countries.What evidence there is suggests that the costs of protectionmay be high. The article also discusses economic principlesthat could guide a review of policy toward international transactionsin the service sector. Quantitative restrictions or bans onforeign service suppliers—whether they wish to supplythrough trade or establishment—cannot easily be defendedin economic terms, and provide an obvious first target.     

贸易摩擦、宏观经济波动与经济开放程度的选择

本文构建一个包含关税冲击以及外汇风险溢价的两国开放经济DSGE模型,创新地揭示了关税冲击造成实际汇率波动的“直接效应”与“间接效应”,刻画了关税变动、贸易条件与实际汇率之间的动态关系与作用机制。我们深入分析了不同经济开放程度下贸易摩擦造成的宏观经济波动以及经济福利损失。模拟结果表明,在一定贸易开放程度下,外国加收关税一方面会导致本国贸易条件恶化,引发出口及产出下降;另一方面会导致本国汇率贬值,引发出口及产出增长。关税冲击发生后短期中汇率贬值效应占优,本国产出会出现小幅上升,随后贸易条件恶化效应逐步显现,产出持续下降。福利分析结果表明,本国适度提升贸易开放度,虽然经济福利损失会小幅上升,但福利损失增加幅度小于外国,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对优势;如果本国过度提高贸易开放度,则会导致本国福利损失大幅增加,并且大于外国福利损失增幅,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对劣势。因此,应适度逐步有序地提升贸易开放度。此外,本国适度推进资本账户开放的政策能够改善贸易条件,促进本国经济增长。     

贸易摩擦、宏观经济波动与经济开放程度的选择

本文构建一个包含关税冲击以及外汇风险溢价的两国开放经济DSGE模型,创新地揭示了关税冲击造成实际汇率波动的“直接效应”与“间接效应”,刻画了关税变动、贸易条件与实际汇率之间的动态关系与作用机制。我们深入分析了不同经济开放程度下贸易摩擦造成的宏观经济波动以及经济福利损失。模拟结果表明,在一定贸易开放程度下,外国加收关税一方面会导致本国贸易条件恶化,引发出口及产出下降;另一方面会导致本国汇率贬值,引发出口及产出增长。关税冲击发生后短期中汇率贬值效应占优,本国产出会出现小幅上升,随后贸易条件恶化效应逐步显现,产出持续下降。福利分析结果表明,本国适度提升贸易开放度,虽然经济福利损失会小幅上升,但福利损失增加幅度小于外国,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对优势;如果本国过度提高贸易开放度,则会导致本国福利损失大幅增加,并且大于外国福利损失增幅,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对劣势。因此,应适度逐步有序地提升贸易开放度。此外,本国适度推进资本账户开放的政策能够改善贸易条件,促进本国经济增长。     

Trading Arrangements and Industrial Development

This article outlines a new approach for analyzing the roleof trade in promoting industrial development. It offers an explanationas to why firms are reluctant to move to countries with lowerlabor costs and shows how trade liberalization can change theincentives for firms to locate in developing countries. It modelseconomic development as the spread of concentrations of firmsfrom country to country. Different trading arrangements mayhave a major impact on this development process. By changingthe attractiveness of countries as a base for manufacturingproduction, they can potentially trigger—or postpone—industrialdevelopment. The analysis shows that unilaterally liberalizingimports of manufactures can promote industrialization but thatmembership in a preferential trading arrangement is likely tocreate larger gains. South-South preferential trading arrangementswill be sensitive to the market size of member states, whileNorth-South arrangements seem to offer better prospects forparticipating southern countries, if not for excluded countries.     

Tariff evasion in sub-Saharan Africa: the influence of corruption in importing and exporting countries

Multilateral organizations recommend sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries to increase international trade in order to attain sustainable economic growth. The benefits of trade can be hampered, however, by tariff evasion. Using trade data from 2008–2014 of 31 SSA countries, we examine how the association between tariff rates and value and quantity gaps (which are indicative of tariff evasion) is enhanced by corruption in both importing and exporting countries (SSA countries are referred to as importing countries, and their trade partners from outside SSA are referred to as exporting countries). Results of a series of tests show that corruption levels in both sides of the trade partnership reinforce the (positive) association between tariff rates and value and quantity gaps. This indicates that counteracting tariff evasion in SSA is a co-responsibility between trade partners.     

中国与TPP国家关税减让的宏观经济效应：基于GTAP模型的分析

采用GTAP模型,模拟分析中国与TPP国家关税减让合作的宏观经济效应.结果显示:中国与TPP国家双边关税减让会强化双边的贸易联系,其中,制造业双边关税壁垒的取消比农业双边关税壁垒取消对中国及TPP国家的对外贸易影响更大;双边关税减让将提升双边的福利水平,同时也会使中国与TPP国家的贸易不平衡进一步扩大.结果表明,考虑到单边关税减让将损害减让国福利水平,采用双边关税减让以平衡双方利益是一个可行的合作途径.     

FISCAL DEFICITS AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Although fiscal adjustment was urged on developing countriesduring the 1980s to lead them out of economic malaise, considerableuncertainty remains about the relations between fiscal policyand macroeconomic performance. To illustrate how financial markets,private spending, and the external sector react to fiscal policies,the behavior of holdings of money and public debt, private consumptionand investment, the trade balance, and the real exchange rateis modeled for a sample of ten developing countries. The studiesfind strong evidence that over the medium term, money financingof the deficit leads to higher inflation, while debt financingleads to higher real interest rates or increased repressionof financial markets, with the fiscal gains coming at increasinglyunfavorable terms. Consumers respond differently to conventionaltaxes, unconventional taxes (through inflation or interest andcredit controls), and debt financing, in ways that make fiscaladjustment the most effective means of increasing national saving.Private investment—but not private consumption—issensitive to the real interest rate, which rises under domesticborrowing to finance the deficit. Contrary to the popular presumption,in some countries private investment increases when public investmentdecreases. There is strong evidence that fiscal deficits spillover into external deficits, leading to appreciation of thereal exchange rate. Fiscal deficits and growth are self-reinforcing:good fiscal management preserves access to foreign lending andavoids the crowding out of private investment, while growthstabilizes the budget and improves the fiscal position. Thevirtuous circle of growth and good fiscal management is oneof the strongest arguments for a policy of low and stable fiscaldeficits.