A Post-Consumer Waste Management Model for Determining Optimal Levels of Recycling and Landfilling

The present study examines the optimal recycling rate for municipal solid waste. First, an optimal control model is developed to account for the physical costs of recycling, the social costs of landfilling, and consumers' environmental preferences. Second, an optimal solution is simulated using waste disposal data from the Helsinki region in Finland. The benefits from recycling are included in the simulation using the results of a recent contingent valuation study. The results of the present research suggest that mandates for achieving 50% recycling in municipalities are not far-fetched and are both economically and environmentally justified.     

Technological Change Bias In The U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utility Industry Following Potential Deregulation

This paper estimates regulated and poientially deregulated costs of production for a multiproduct electric utility industry. The empirical evidence suggests technological regression with respect to costs in both regulated and deregulated environments. Analysis of factor cost shares indicates that technological change in a deregulated environment is expected to be less apital saving than technological change in the regulated environment. In addition, this study finds that overall diseconomies of scale may be nduced over time and to a greater extentunder deregulation than under regulation. Also, cost complementarities may be enhancedover time, but to a lesser extent under deregulation. Hence. tendencies toward natural monop oly may be increased or decreased by deregulation, and advancing deregulation may or may not be an appropriate policy.     

Environmental Quality and Industry Protection with Noncooperative Versus Cooperative Domestic and Trade Policies

This paper characterizes environmental quality and industry protection in a large-country Grossman–Helpman model when production or consumption externalities exist and governments decide noncooperatively or cooperatively on domestic and trade policies. Governments choose policies efficiently from among those available, but competitive lobbies may prefer less efficient regimes. Under restricted policy availability, political-support effects can offset terms-of-trade effects on equilibrium outcomes, and inefficient trade policies can lead to higher environmental quality than efficient domestic policies. If governments cooperate, they can satisfy particular organized industries at lower costs to other lobbies and total welfare. This may result in lower environmental quality than noncooperation.     

Local environmental regulation and plant-level productivity

This paper examines the impact of environmental regulation on the productivity of manufacturing plants in the United States. Establishment-level data from three Censuses of Manufactures are used to estimate 3-factor Cobb-Douglas production functions that include a measure of the stringency of environmental regulation faced by manufacturing plants. In contrast to previous studies, this paper examines effects on plants in all manufacturing industries, not just those in “dirty” industries. Further, this paper employs spatial-temporal variation in environmental compliance costs to identify effects, using a time-varying county-level index that is based on multiple years of establishment-level data from the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures survey and the Annual Survey of Manufactures. Results suggest that, for the average manufacturing plant, there is no statistically significant effect on productivity of being in a county with higher environmental compliance costs. For the average plant, the main effect of environmental regulation may not be in the spatial and temporal dimensions.     

Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve

In the political discussion, it is often emphasized that the environmental service industry (which produces a clean factor of production) benefits from an early and strong environmental policy. This is especially likely if the costs of production are decreasing over time due to learning curve effects. Surprisingly, the environmental service industry has not been integrated into the theory of strategic environmental policy yet. Our main question is whether a national leadership in environmental policy can pay off if profits of the environmental service industry are taken into account. We consider a two-period model with one firm in each country competing on a third market. Emissions can be substituted by the clean factor when deciding upon the production technology. The unit costs of producing the clean factor in the second period are decreasing in the quantity produced in the initial period. We derive the optimal environmental policy for both periods from a national point of view and show that the presence of the environmental service industry can indeed lead to a national leadership in pollution control.     

PROPERTY RIGHTS, REGULATORY TAKING, AND COMPENSATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The 104th Congress considered several proposals requiring compensation for regulatory actions that diminish property values. Aimed primarily at weakening environmental protection, the bills focus on property rights independent of the public benefits from regulation. By significantly broadening the constitutional standard for compensation, the bills generate a government liability well in excess of compliance costs and thus discourage regulatory agencies from carrying out their mandates. The bills would increase transactions costs and undermine the efficient provision of environmental quality, public safety, and other public goods.     

Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits

Federal environmental laws in the U.S. can be enforced by government agencies or by private parties through citizen suits against polluters. Here, I extend the standard enforcement model to examine the role played by citizen suits. The main results from the paper suggest that in a model with limited enforcement power and citizen suits the regulator fully exercises his enforcement power when the expected penalty from a citizen suit is low, but increases his reliance on citizen suits as the expected penalty rises. Whether an enforcement regime that allows private enforcement is efficient depends not only on the relative costs of private and agency enforcement, but also on the changes in inspection costs that may be caused by private enforcement and the expected penalty from losing a citizen suit. These results suggest that in practice private enforcement may lower social costs as long as relatively inexpensive agency enforcement options, such as administrative proceedings, do not preclude citizen suits.      

Distance,skill deepening and development: will peripheral countries ever get rich?

This paper models the relationship between countries' distance from global economic activity, endogenous investments in education and economic development. Firms in remote locations pay greater trade costs on both exports and intermediate imports, reducing the amount of value added left to remunerate domestic factors of production. If skill-intensive sectors have higher trade costs, more pervasive input–output linkages or stronger increasing returns to scale, we show theoretically that remoteness depresses the skill premium and therefore incentives for human capital accumulation. Empirically, we exploit structural relationships from the model to demonstrate that countries with lower market access have lower levels of educational attainment. We also show that the world's most peripheral countries are becoming increasingly economically remote over time.     

A SPATIAL MODEL OF CARTEL STABILITY: THE INFLUENCE OF PRODUCTION COST CONVEXITY

We uniquely introduce convex production costs into a cartel model involving spatial price discrimination. We demonstrate that greater convexity improves cartel stability and that for sufficient convexity first best locations will be adopted. We show that allowing locations to vary over the game reduces cartel stability but that greater convexity continues to improve that stability. Moreover, when the degree of convexity does not support the first best collusive locations, other collusive locations exist that require less stability and these may either increase or decrease social welfare relative to competition. Critically, these locations that require less stability are more dispersed in sharp contrast to the known result assuming linear production costs.     

Environmental regulations and innovation activity in UK manufacturing industries

We examine the relationship between environmental regulations and innovation, using data from UK manufacturing industry during 2000-2006. We estimate a dynamic model of innovation behaviour, and explicitly account for the likely endogeneity of our measure of the stringency of environmental regulations (pollution abatement costs). Our results indicate that while on the one hand environmental R&D and investment in environmental capital are stimulated by greater pollution abatement pressures, on the other hand there is not a positive impact of environmental regulation on total R&D or total capital accumulation. We find some evidence that this is because more stringent environmental regulations directly lower the optimal expenditure on non-environmental innovations. In addition, we find that environmental R&D may crowd out non-environmental R&D, although there is no evidence that environmental capital crowds out non-environmental capital.     

Environmental Regulations,Producer Responses,and Secondary Benefits: Carbon Dioxide Reductions Under the Acid Rain Program

This paper derives a production analysis framework for modeling secondary benefits from environmental regulation, i.e. induced changes in yet unregulated pollutants. We emphasize the various ways in which the producers can respond to environmental regulations, and evaluate them in terms of their costs and their generation of secondary benefits. An application on the US electricity sector illustrates our main point: In our case, abatement technologies that reduce regulated emissions while leaving the plants’ unregulated emissions unchanged appear to be among the least costly producer responses to the existing sulfur and nitrogen regulations, but at the expense of limited secondary reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. This finding raises questions about the magnitude of the much debated secondary benefits from future regulations on carbon dioxide emissions, since similar abatement technologies are currently being developed for carbon dioxide. With new environmental issues emerging over time, our findings suggest that regulators should signal the possibilities of new regulations on connected pollutants to producers. Such information may be relevant for producers when choosing current abatement strategies—with minor cost increases to deal with today’s issues, overall compliance costs for near-future environmental problems may be lowered.     

Consumption aspirations in dirty and clean goods and economic growth

This paper builds a two-sector, two-factor environmental model in which agents optimally choose the clean and dirty goods in order to display their social status. In contrast to the conventional notion, we show that greater social aspirations in consumption regardless of either clean or dirty goods have an ambiguous impact on growth, depending on whether the production of conspicuous goods is relatively labor- or capital-intensive, whether the production of conspicuous goods generates more or fewer emissions, and whether labor supply is or is not responsive to social status seeking. By connecting two conflicting aspects of consumer preference involving social aspirations and environmental concerns, our analysis offers a novel explanation for the environmental Kuznets curve and a theoretical support for the empirical possibility of a negative employment-growth relationship and the so-called Green New Deal. Our welfare analysis shows that social comparisons in consumption may increase, rather than decrease, social welfare. The Pigovian tax may only be socially sub-optimal in the two-sector economy because it is unable to completely correct the distortion caused by consumption externalities.     

Trade,Strategic Environmental Policy,and Global Pollution

This paper examines the effects of international trade in a model with global pollution that accumulates over time because of production emissions in each country. If countries cooperatively determine their environmental policies, autarky and free trade in the absence of trade costs generate the same optimal solution. By contrast, if environmental policies are determined noncooperatively, the effects of trade on global pollution and welfare are ambiguous because policy games can result in multiple equilibria. Although trade increases both the lower and upper bounds of the pollution stock, whether trade expands the range of possible steady‐state pollution levels is ambiguous. The analysis then extends to consider trade costs.     

Trade and the governance of ecosystem services

We work with a basic general equilibrium model of an economy with an industrial good and a rural good. Industrial good production results in pollution that affects the provision of ecosystem services and thereby the production of the rural good. The assignment of ecosystem rights to the industrial polluters or to the rural pollutees results in differential transaction costs that affect production possibilities between the two goods. Ecosystem rights are assigned to maximize social welfare. Over time, technological change and differences in income superiority affect the choice of the assignment of rights. Opening to trade affects the choice of the assignment of ecosystem rights depending on the nature of technological change, but the relative income superiority of goods no longer affects the assignment of ecosystem rights in a small economy. Thus, among other findings, we demonstrate that the phenomena known as the environmental Kuznets curve does not hold for the protection of ecosystem services in production, or production externalities generally, because trade separates consumption from production.     

Westward movement of new polluting firms in China: Pollution reduction mandates and location choice

This paper provides a systematic study of the location choice of new polluting firms driven by the 11th Five-Year Plan's water pollution reduction mandates in China. We explore a unique dataset of environmental statistics, which contains 31380 polluting manufacturing firms newly established in the period 2006–2010. Our conditional logit model provides strong evidence for the changes of new polluting firms’ location choice from the coastal provinces, which have strict environmental mandates, to the western provinces, which have lax environmental mandates, and demonstrates the distinct location patterns of heterogeneous polluting firms. While foreign polluting firms were generally driven by the mandates, domestic polluting firms were more resistant and were driven to the western provinces only after 2007. As a result, the potential pollution transfer would threaten the more fragile water environments and public health in western provinces. We thus posit a perverse incentive of current environmental policy and recommend integrated water management as well as close coordination of local governments to improve the efficacy of environmental regulation in China.     

Offshoring along the production chain

Abstract In this paper, we analyze the offshoring decision of firms whose production process is characterized by a particular sequence of steps. International cost differences vary non‐monotonically along the production chain, and moving unfinished goods across borders incurs transport costs. We show that, in such a setting, firms may refrain from offshoring even if relocating individual steps would be advantageous in terms of offshoring costs, or they may offshore (almost) the entire production chain to save transport costs. Small variations in model parameters may thus have a substantial impact on offshoring activities.     

Allocation of pollution abatement under learning by doing

This paper examines how learning by doing affects the allocation of pollution abatement between heterogeneous technologies over time. The optimal policy balances current abatement costs against reductions in future costs and infant technologies may be preferred to mature technologies despite greater initial costs. We characterize when a technological winner might emerge and we identify conditions under which optimal abatement is shared across all technologies. Pigouvian taxes can implement the first-best, but may need to be differentiated across technologies. When technical change is induced, an important role of environmental policies is to put abatement on the right technological trajectories.     

Technology,property rights and organizational diversity in the software industry

Why do open- and closed-source productions co-exist? To address this question, the paper studies the viability of distinct systems for software development. The model shows that: (a) for low design costs of modularity, both open- and closed-source productions are viable systems; (b) closed-source production is more likely to be adopted the greater the expected rents on software; and (c) production efficiency is not a necessary condition for the stochastic stability of a system to obtain. These three results can shed light on the emergence of organizational diversity in the software industry. The paper adds to the literature in three ways: first, it considers property rights and technology as endogenous variables in the process of system design; second it argues that in producing software multiple equilibrium designs may exist; and third, it shows that, in because of high rents and low design costs of modularity, production inefficiency can be persistent.     

Long-Run Implications for Developing Countries of Joint Implementation of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation

Joint Implementation (JI) calls for cooperation between industrialized and developing countries in the mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, a major concern of potential host countries is that, if they utilize their low-cost options for JI now, they will be left with only high cost options in the future, thereby penalizing them at a time when they may be obligated to mitigate GHGs themselves. This paper formalizes this hypothesis by utilizing an optimal control framework analogous to the Hotelling model of non-renewable resource extraction. The results are that cumulative abatement effects can impose costs on the future, but that they can be offset by technological change, market power, or compensation.     

跨国公司全球化生产模式的理论分析——基于行业的视角

本文在迪克希特-斯蒂格里茨(D-S)垄断竞争模型的基础上,建立了一个3×2×2模型,分析了不同行业特性对跨国公司生产模式的影响.结果表明,跨国公司的生产模式和其自身行业特性有很大关系,某一生产环节投资的固定成本越低,跨国公司越倾向于将其转移到低成本国家;东道国市场规模越大,越有利于吸引跨国公司投资;成品的交易成本越高,跨国公司越倾向于采取本地组装的生产模式;中间品交易成本越高,跨国公司越倾向一体化的生产模式,将中间品和组装放在一起,分散在多国生产.该模型的分析结果和现实情况基本吻合,对分析跨国公司如何在全球组织其生产活动具有很好的解释力.