A critical review of the “ladder of investment” approach

The “ladder of investment” is a regulatory approach proposed by Cave (2006), which has been widely embraced by national regulatory authorities in the European telecommunications sector. The approach entails providing entrants, successively, with different levels of access—the “rungs” of the investment ladder, while inducing them to climb the ladder by setting an access charge that increases over time or by withdrawing access obligations after some pre-determined date (i.e., by setting sunset clauses). Proponents of the ladder of investment approach claim that such regulatory measures would make service-based entry and facility-based entry complements—albeit they have been traditionally viewed as substitutes—in promoting competition. The regulators, thus, have shown a strong interest in this approach. The paper provides a critical review of the ladder of investment approach by setting out its two underlying assumptions and discussing their validity with references to the related industrial organization literature.     

A CDS approach to induce facilities-based competition over NGA networks

The current regulatory framework in the European NGA market provides the basic principles for the gradual migration from service-based competition over the legacy copper access networks to facilities-based competition over fiber-based Next Generation Access (NGA) networks. This paper initially reviews the related literature and shows that: (i) an unbundling policy that boosts entry by alternative operators promotes service-based competition but provides operators with disincentives to invest in network upgrade; (ii) there is no consensus about the optimal regulatory policy that promotes competition and encourages investments in NGA networks; and (iii) the reviewed research articles are not consistent with the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market in terms of both the evolution of the regulatory goals over time and the recommended regulatory settings. This paper aims to propose a novel approach in order to effectively meet the current regulatory goals using the recommended settings. It is shown that the proposed approach, which is based on the basic principles governing a Credit Default Swap (CDS), provides an effective migration path towards facilities-based competition over NGA networks.     

Access regulation, competition, and broadband penetration: An international study

The evolution of broadband penetration has shown substantial differences between OECD countries. This paper empirically investigates to what extent different forms of regulated competition explain these international differences. It distinguishes three modes of competition between broadband internet access providers that result from regulatory policies: (1) inter-platform competition; (2) facilities-based intra-platform competition; and (3) service-based intra-platform competition. In most countries these forms of competition co-exist although their intensity varies from country to country. Intra-platform competition may differ among countries depending on the degree of mandatory access obligations imposed by the regulator on the dominant network firm. Based on a sample of OECD countries, the analysis finds that inter-platform competition has been a main driver of broadband penetration. The two types of intra-platform competition have a considerably smaller effect on the broadband penetration. Linking these findings back to access regulation suggests that the “stepping stone” or “ladder of investment” theories might not provide the justification to impose extensive mandatory access obligations on DSL incumbents.     

Access pricing: A comparison between full deregulation and two alternative instruments of access price regulation,cost-based and retail-minus

In this paper, two instruments of access price regulation, cost-based and retail-minus, are compared with the full deregulation hypothesis. For this purpose, a model that considers an upstream monopolist firm that sells a vital input to an independent firm and to a subsidiary firm in the downstream market is developed. The main conclusion of the paper is that retail-minus regulation avoids foreclosure and leads to better results than cost-based regulation in terms of investment level and consumer surplus. Moreover, retail-minus regulation allows a higher consumer surplus than deregulation of access price as long as the regulator carefully defines the retail-minus instrument.     

Access regulation and the incumbent investment in quality-upgrades and in cost-reduction

This papers studies if access price regulation has an impact on incumbents’ incentives to invest in their network that might differ according to the nature of investments, that is, quality-upgrading and cost-reducing. It is shown that if the marginal cost of quality-upgrading is very low both types of investment are increasing in the access price. If the marginal cost of cost-reducing is very low, both investments decrease after an increase in the access price. Otherwise, a high access price increases the incentives for quality-upgrading and reduces the incentives for cost-reducing. Therefore, regulators should set a higher access price the lower is the marginal cost of quality-upgrading as compared to the marginal cost of cost-reducing.     

Triple play: How do we secure future benefits?

Recent technological developments make it possible to provide all telecommunications services (TV, telephony and internet) via the TV cable and fixed telephony network. Moreover, a new infrastructure based on optical fibre (to the home) is emerging in some places, which may in the future replace both existing networks. Making use of the available economic literature, the paper analyzes some of the consequences of the emergence of one electronic communications market. It focuses on two policy issues: the consequences of convergence of technologies and competition between networks for regulation in the short and medium runs, and the role of public investment in the rollout of optical fibre. It concludes that the present state of regulation may have some undesirable effects in the face of convergence and that public investment in a new general purpose infrastructure may have important advantages.     

Different paths to universal access: The impact of policy and regulation on broadband diffusion in the developed and developing worlds

The authors examine the broadband digital divide by analyzing the impact of policy and regulation on broadband Internet diffusion. Their multiple regression analysis shows factors that determine broadband diffusion in technologically developed countries do not necessarily have the same impact in less developed countries. They show that in technologically developed countries, there is greater broadband diffusion in countries that make a higher financial investment in information and communication technologies (ICTs), have effective governing practices at the national level, have higher levels of education, and are more urban. In technologically developing nations, a competitive telecommunications sector and higher investment in ICTs lead to greater broadband diffusion, with investment having an even larger impact in the developing world than in the developed world. In addition, stronger democratic political institutions, higher levels of national income and lower levels of income inequality increase diffusion, but the presence of a national telecommunications regulatory authority has a negative impact. These results suggest that the path to widespread availability and use of broadband requires different strategies depending on a nation's level of technological development.     

区域贸易协定中竞争政策对外商直接投资的影响

本文利用2005—2017年经济合作与发展组织(OECD)国家对外直接投资流量数据,对区域贸易协定中纳入的专门竞争政策规定进行分类统计,实证检验区域贸易协定中的这些竞争政策条款水平深度对OECD国家对外直接投资的影响。实证结果发现:区域贸易协定中竞争政策水平深度的提升对整体双边外商直接投资流量有明显的提高作用,主要是有利于提高外延边际外商直接投资流量,但对集约边际外商直接投资没有明显影响。其中,区域贸易协定中竞争政策监管水平深度的提升不利于提高双边的外商直接投资流量;但竞争政策合作水平深度的提升有利于提高双边的外商直接投资流量;竞争政策“横向原则”、国有企业水平深度的提升对双边外商直接投资有明显的提高作用,特别是有利于提高外延边际外商直接投资,但是对集约边际外商直接投资没有明显影响。本文还发现,“北—北”型、“南—北”型区域贸易协定中竞争政策条款水平深度对外商直接投资流量具有异质性影响;而且区域贸易协定中竞争政策条款水平深度以及分项条款水平深度会通过东道国市场经营环境和监管质量这一中介机制对外商直接投资流量产生影响。     

"十一五"期间我国电信监管改革的方向与内容

“十一五”期间我国电信产业将在新的环境下进入新的发展阶段。本文从我国电信监管面临的新环境和主要问题出发，按照反映技术进步要求、符合WTO规则又适应我国电信业发展阶段和市场特点的原则．提出“十一五”期间我国电信业监管改革的指导思想、核心内容和政策建议。     

自然垄断行业的竞争与管制问题研究——以中国民航运输业为例

本文用实证分析的方法系统分析了中国民航运输业的竞争和管制状况，提出了政府过度管制下民航运输业存在的产业规模偏小、高进入壁垒和高退出壁垒的市场结构、刚性成本结构、低效率和低利润率等问题，并从放松政府管制、引导产业升级、改善公司治理、制定反垄断和公平竞争法规等方面提出了促进竞争、提高民航生产效率的政策建议。     

Regulation and the promotion of investment in next generation networks—A European dilemma

The paper discusses the dilemmas facing European regulators (the European Commission and the national regulatory authorities) over the promotion of investment in Next Generation Access Networks (NGANs). Whereas the US has adopted a deregulatory approach and parts of Asia takes an approach linked to industrial policy considerations, the EU has largely left the process to operators working subject to a framework of regulation of access. While this may be enough to elicit investment where there is competition among networks, the incentives to invest are weaker where there is only one fixed network, as is the case in most of the territory of the EU. In reaching this view, the paper examines the prospects for competition from both wireless and municipal networks. It recommends that steps be taken fully to mobilise incentives to invest in NGANs where there is competition. Elsewhere, it may be necessary to consider a broader range of policies to create conditions for investment.     

Regulation and investment behaviour in the telecommunications sector: policies and patterns in US and Europe

This paper reports the results of the quantitative analysis of international experience of the relationship between infrastructure investment in the deployment of capacity that can carry large volumes of voice and data traffic and regulatory policy changes in the telecommunications sectors. It looks at the relationship between infrastructure investment for these infrastructure assets and the access pricing régimes for local exchange carriers in the United States and Europe. It then looks at the relationship between various aspects of regulatory and institutional policy changes in Europe and how they affect access prices.The paper finds that a lower access price promotes greater deployment of digital technology among US incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). Based on this finding, it suggests that it is in the ILECs interest to have access to their networks encouraged.The European data for interconnection are recent and far reaching conclusions are not feasible, but the findings, however, suggest that competition has worked by facilitating new entry through decreasing interconnection prices, although path dependencies, of existing and traditional concepts, in the mindsets of operators as well as regulators, may account for these findings.     

我国自然垄断产业市场化改革的几个关键问题研究

近20年来，放松管制、引入竞争、产权私有已成为世界各国自然垄断产业市场化改革的主导趋势，与此同时，我国在相关领域的改革也已展开。本文对改革过程中亟需解决的有关市场开放的路径选择、产权改革与市场结构调整相适应、市场开放后的管制变革以及独立监管和依法监管等关键性问题进行了论述，并提出了一些有针对性的建议。     

我国公用事业运营和监管改革研究

我国公用事业正处于规模扩张和制度变革并举的新阶段。这个阶段公用事业改革核心是处理好非网络环节、网络环节和监管环节之间的关系。在开放竞争、健全监管的基础上推进民营改革。非网络环节引导和推动各类资本进入。加强市场结构评估和监管,着力营造多元投资主体、多家企业相互竞争的格局;网络环节注重发挥政府投资的拉动和引导功能．健全和推行特许经营制度,加强市场行为评估和监管。建立开放条件平等、接入价格合理、设施使用充分的制度;监管环节着力实现政企分离、政监分离,健全中央和地方两级监管机构．科学配置监管权。确保终端用户能够以合理价格取得充分、可靠、满意的公用事业产品和服务。