Mobile termination charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays

In many countries there is widespread concern at the level of mobile termination charges. This is attributable to the bottleneck monopoly created by the Calling Party Pays (CPP) principle. It has led to increasingly severe price controls on termination charges. Regulatory experience in the three foremost such countries (UK, Australia and New Zealand) suggests that price controls are of limited effectiveness in aligning termination charges with costs, that net welfare gains from controls are small and that costs of setting controls are high.The Receiving Party Pays (RPP) principle, which applies in North America and several Asian countries, avoids the bottleneck monopoly problem. After allowing for various economic and technical average revenue (price) per call is significantly lower with RPP, average minutes of usage per subscriber are significantly higher and the mobile penetration rate is not significantly different. Handset subsidies seem to be lower in the US (with RPP) than in the UK (with CPP). Surprisingly, CPP regulators have either ignored RPP or rejected it for various alleged disadvantages. These do not withstand investigation. However, in CPP countries there is still concern about the idea of paying to receive calls.There is a way to get the benefits associated with RPP without this disadvantage. RPP is based on a ‘bill and keep’ regime. Some mobile operators in RPP countries are now offering customers the option of calling plans with free incoming calls. Changing to a ‘bill and keep’ regime would avoid the bottleneck monopoly and associated distortions of conventional CPP regimes, yet enable operators and customers themselves to choose how to pay for calls—in effect, to choose between CPP and RPP.     

The consumer loss of the minimum duration for mobile telephone calls

This article estimates price elasticities of demand for the duration of mobile telephone calls for Portugal, as well as the monetary loss per consumer of the existence of a minimum duration of calls. The demand for the duration of calls is estimated using a Tobit model for panel data with individual random effects. The elasticity of demand is found to be small and to vary across firms. At current prices, the average duration of calls ranges between 101 and 109 s, while the estimated average length of calls without minimum duration ranges between 63 and 66 s. Hence, the existence of a minimum duration for calls results in a monetary loss of 35–40% of the average invoice.     

Termination notice of mobile network operator customers after a tariff switch: An empirical study of postpaid subscribers in Germany

Proactive subscriber churn management strategies of mobile network operators (MNOs) require that steps are taken to keep customers before they hand over a formal notice of termination to their provider. Therefore, several studies have analyzed how MNO customers who gave a termination announcement differ from individuals who did not communicate this message. However, no work has examined such differences among subscribers who recently switched to another tariff of their MNO. Therefore, this paper explores socio-demographic, service consumption and tariff change differences between contract cancellation “announcers” and “non-announcers” in a sample of 1810 postpaid customers who had changed their rate plan not long ago. Cancellation announcers were more likely to be males who decreased their mobile voice consumption after their tariff switch, had already attempted to churn in the past, had moved from an unmetered to a metered rate type, paid higher monthly bill amounts and received no discounts on their current rate plan that was introduced on the market some time ago. Among subscribers who gave a termination notice, early (late) cancellation announcers were more likely to be older (younger) customers with a growing (shrinking) SMS consumption after their tariff switch, had not attempted (had already tried) to leave their current MNO in the past, and were in a rate plan that was (not) recently introduced. The findings contribute to the literature on mobile customer retention and have implications for practitioners and scholars.     

Diffusion of mobile telephony: Analysis of determinants in Cameroon

This paper explores the diffusion of mobile telephone technology in Cameroon by identifying and analyzing the determinants of this diffusion. Studying the diffusion of mobile communications in African countries by integrating them into panels of developing countries is problematic. This approach is likely to mask the intrinsic differences as concerns the diffusion process. This survey shows, through the estimation of an S-shaped growth curve, that the Logistic model best describes the diffusion of mobile phone technology in Cameroon. Income, openness to competition and the use of SMS are key forces driving this diffusion. Forecasts indicate an increase of almost 70% in the demand by 2026 as far as mobile phone use in Cameroon is concerned. This implies not only an improvement in operators' and State's revenues, but also, the need to invest in infrastructures. Our recommendation therefore calls for a greater liberalization of the mobile phone market in Cameroon. In addition, given the complementary relationship between the core and the mobile networks, infrastructural investments are also needed in both sectors.     

Network effects and preference heterogeneity in the case of mobile telecommunications markets

This paper demonstrates how revealed- and stated-preference analyses can be used for modeling network effects in the field of mobile telecommunications. The aim of this study was to verify if network effects may still play a role in the Polish mobile telecommunications market, measure their strength, identify their sources and variability across consumers by accounting for consumers' observable and unobservable preference heterogeneity, evaluate their monetary value to consumers, and finally, to verify if the marginal utility associated with network effects is constant. The analysis of consumers' revealed choices (currently used mobile telephone operator) allowed the identification of major differences between customer bases of incumbent and new entrant operators, and insight into the business strategies adopted in the presence of asymmetric regulation of mobile termination rates. The second part of the study—the analysis of the consumers' stated choices (made in carefully prepared and designed hypothetical choice situations, known as the choice experiments) made it possible to directly model consumers' utility functions and, in this way, investigate the nature of network effects in mobile telecommunications markets. From the results, the presence of strong network effects, which are related to the ratio of consumers' social network group using the same operator, and to the magnitude of on-net price discounts, is confirmed. These network effects can be disaggregated to pecuniary and non-pecuniary effects. Through the utilization of the random parameters multinomial logit model, consumers' observable and unobservable preference heterogeneity can be accounted for, which proved a scientifically revealing and potentially policy-relevant approach. The results might be of a particular interest to other researchers aiming at modeling consumers' preferences as well as to mobile telephone operators and regulatory authorities—it is shown that capacity for vigorous price competition between mobile operators is limited by non-price factors, which affect subscriber's choices, especially in the presence of asymmetric mobile termination rates.     

The welfare effects of mobile termination rate regulation in asymmetric oligopolies: The case of Spain

This paper examines the effects of mobile termination rate regulation in asymmetric oligopolies. It extends existing models of asymmetric duopoly and symmetric oligopoly where consumer expectations about market shares are passive. First, demand and product differentiation parameters are calibrated using detailed data from the Spanish market from 2010. Next, equilibrium outcomes and welfare effects under alternative scenarios of future termination rates are predicted. Lowering termination rates typically lowers profits of all networks and improves consumer and total surplus.     

Termination-discriminatory pricing,subscriber bandwagons,and network traffic patterns: the Taiwanese mobile phone market

This article studies network effects induced by termination-based price discrimination in the evolving Taiwan mobile phone market. An econometric model that estimates the effects attests to the formation of bandwagon behavior among network subscribers. It is shown that networks with a large subscriber base will recruit a disproportionately greater share of new users ceteris paribus compared with low-penetration operators. The strength of the subscriber bandwagon varies closely with the price differential of intra- and inter-network calls. Also, analysis of network traffic reveals that an average mobile phone user consumes considerably less inter-network than intra-network airtime; consequently, mobile phone use is largely clustered within respective networks and hindered from traversing others.     

International network competition under national regulation

We extend the workhorse model of network competition to international calls. This model enables us to show that national regulatory authorities (NRAs) maximizing domestic welfare have incentives to increase termination rates above the social optimum to extract rent from international call termination. Excessive termination rates distort prices but transfer surplus from foreign to domestic consumers via intensified network competition. The model can explain the regulation of termination rates through rate floors. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives to combat the incentives of NRAs to distort termination rates. We identify conditions under which each of these policies increases aggregate welfare.     

Diffusion of mobile telephony: An empirical study in Taiwan

Mobile telephony penetration is a major indicator of mobile telephony diffusion. Taiwan had a mobile telephony penetration of 108% in 2002, ranking first in the world. This study analyzes this accelerated diffusion in terms of growth model and determinants of the diffusion rate. To eliminate the inherent uncertainty associated with choosing the optimal growth model, this study compares the performance of three conventional models, namely Gompertz, Logistic and Bass, to identify the most appropriate model, and to distinguish the forces driving the diffusion rate. Empirical results indicate that the most appropriate model is the Logistic model. Network externalities, which this study shows to be the same as the imitation effect in the Bass model, explain the superiority of the Logistic model. Moreover, market competition, which markedly reduces service prices, is identified as a primary driver of the diffusion rate of mobile telephony in Taiwan. Economic conditions, technological innovation and number of operators are insignificant factors. Finally, mobile telephony is a substitute for fixed-line telephony in Taiwan.     

Link between termination rates and retail prices in Namibia,Kenya and South Africa

This paper analyses the link between mobile termination rate reductions and retail prices. It draws on in-depth case studies of South Africa, Namibia and Kenya where regulators have reduced termination rates towards the cost of an efficient operator. To varying degrees these have all led to lower retail prices and significant market expansion. While retail prices in both Namibia and Kenya dropped following substantial termination rate reductions, the South African case demonstrates that termination rate reductions are not always passed on to consumers as is hoped by such regulatory interventions. In South Africa, it was only after the second reduction in March 2012 that smaller operators were able to reduce their off-net prices to a level that could tempt the subscribers to dominant operators to switch. All the case studies confirm nevertheless that retail prices do not go up in response to termination rates going down as contended by dominant mobile operators around the world. This is in contrast to a body of literature stating that termination rates and mobile retail prices constitute a two-sided market and that termination rate reductions will lead to a so-called “waterbed effect”.     

Tariff-mediated network effects versus strategic discounting: Evidence from German mobile telecommunications

Mobile telecommunication operators routinely charge subscribers lower prices for calls on their own network than for calls to other networks (on-net discounts). Studies on tariff-mediated network effects suggest this is due to large operators using on-net discounts to damage smaller rivals. Alternatively, research on strategic discounting suggests that small operators use on-net discounts to advertise with low on-net prices. We test the relative strength of these effects using data on tariff setting in German mobile telecommunications between 2001 and 2009. We find that large operators are more likely to offer tariffs with on-net discounts but there is no consistently significant difference in the magnitude of discounts. Our results suggest that tariff-mediated network effects are the main cause of on-net discounts.     

That pesky last mile: Call termination strategies for mobile satellite systems

This article will examine call termination strategies of several representative mobile satellite service (MSS) operators with an eye towards identifying the strengths and weaknesses of their terrestrial call routing strategies. MSS traffic must easily flow into and out from public switched telephone networks even if it triggers an accounting rate settlement. To provide a flat, per minute rate of $3.00 or less per minute, MSS operators must recognize the strategic importance of where they install gateways, and the potentially adverse financial impact of the current accounting rate regime.     

The impact of regulating mobile termination rates and MNO-MVNO relationships on retail prices

A mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) provides mobile telecommunication services by eluding the constraints of the radio communication infrastructure and establishing an agreement with a hosting network operator (HNO) for the use of its spectrum. Thus, MVNOs offer a wide range of mobile services and directly compete with every mobile network operator (MNO). This paper studies the economic justifications for potential regulatory intervention that defines the level of mobile termination rates (MTRs) and negotiations and agreements among MVNOs and HNOs. The results show that symmetric MTR reduction leads to competition growth among operators, forcing every operator to reduce retail prices and, consequently, to enhancing consumer welfare. The paper also finds that a collaborative strategy adopted by an HNO and an MVNO is advantageous for both and induces a reduction in retail prices, thus weakening other MNOs.     

Access Pricing under Competition: An Application to Cellular Networks

A new class of access pricing problems is analyzed in which upstream firms compete for customers and access to these customers is required by downstream markets. Using fixed–to–cellular calls as an example, a model is presented which shows that the determination of cellular termination charges is quite different to standard access pricing problems. Competition between cellular firms leads to access prices being set either at, or above, the monopoly level. Applications are given for other market settings, including the termination of long–distance calls on competing local exchange networks and the setting of interchange fees in payment systems.     

Diffusion and competitive relationship of mobile telephone service in Guatemala: An empirical analysis

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the characteristics of diffusion process of mobile telephone service and the competitive relationships between mobile and fixed-line services in Guatemalan telecommunications market. We investigated the best-suited model to explain the diffusion process of mobile telephone in Guatemala by estimating diffusion curves using empirical data. Moreover, we explored affecting factors which characterize the diffusion pattern of mobile telephony in Guatemala through statistical analysis. Finally, in order to understand the effects of competition in the diffusion process of Guatemalan mobile phone service, we attempted to clarify the competitive relationship between mobile and fixed-line services using the Lotka-Volterra model. As a result, the logistic model was found to be the best model for describing the diffusion pattern. Moreover, investment in telecommunications, the subscribers of fixed-line services, and the number of operators in mobile market were found as significant determinants of mobile diffusion process. Results from the Lotka-Volterra model showed that the relationship between mobile and fixed-line services has changed from pure competition to amensalism.     

Analysis of consumer preferences for mobile telecom plans using a discrete choice experiment

In this paper, we present a study of consumer preferences for mobile telecommunications plans and operator characteristics. The objective of the study was to identify consumer preferences for the following characteristics of mobile plans: the importance of using the same provider as friends and family (calling club network effects), the market share of the provider (pure network effects), the length of the commitment period, monthly fee/recharge obligations and per minute call charges for calls made within and outside the provider network. A discrete choice experiment was used as a preference elicitation method and implemented in face-to-face interviews. We present results regarding willingness to pay for the described features as well as their relationship to socio-demographic variables. Consumers are willing to pay 1.3 Euro per month more to reduce the commitment period from 1 year to 6 months and willing to pay 2.5 euros per month more to be part of a larger network. Consumers are also twice as much more sensitive to within-network price variations than extra-network price variations. These results remain unchanged in the sub-sample of those that have internet access suggesting that a web-based surveys are capable of producing unbiased results. The implications of these results for regulatory policy are discussed.     

Effects of mobile networks and Covid-19 on mobile shopping sales in South Korea

Covid-19 has driven us abruptly to a new world of contactless society. It also compelled us to use online shopping, especially mobile shopping in South Korea, where the dominant mode of wireless communication was already 4G services when Covid-19 broke out. This paper examines the different roles of mobile networks and the Covid-19 pandemic in transforming mobile shopping submarkets in South Korea by estimating the long-term and short-term effects of these two factors on mobile shopping sales. We used a cointegration and an error correction model to estimate long-term and short-term effects separately. This paper finds that Covid-19 was a major short-term factor affecting sales in mobile shopping submarkets, while mobile network subscribers were a key long-term driving factor of mobile shopping sales growth.     

Mobile phones,mobile Internet,and employment in Uganda

We analyze the relation between mobile phone use – mobile Internet in particular – and employment, self-employment and job regularity in Uganda. We find no evidence of any positive impact of mobile Internet use on employment or job quality, suggesting that either respondents do not use mobile Internet for job search practices or as a job tool, or that these uses are ineffective. However, we find that the adoption and use of basic mobile phones are positively related to employment and job quality, and we argue that regulators should focus on promoting the affordability of basic phones and mobile airtime.