Optimal multilateral contracts

Summary The purpose of this paper is to derive the structure of optimal multilateral contracts in a costly state verification model with multiple agents who may be risk averse and need not be identical. We consider two different verification technology specifications. When the verification technology is deterministic, we show that the optimal contract is a multilateral debt contract in the sense that the monitoring set is a lower interval. When the verification technology is stochastic, we show that transfers and monitoring probabilities are decreasing functions of wealth. The key economic problem in this environment is that optimal contracts areinterdependent. We are able to resolve this interdependency problem by using abstract measure theoretic tools.We wish to thank Mark Feldman, Wayne Shafer and Nicholas Yannelis for useful comments. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 89-09242).     

Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example

Summary. We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less discriminating the optimal menu of contracts is.Received: 24 September 2004, Revised: 5 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, D8, G3.L. Renou: Correspondence toWe thank Anne Villamil for insightful comments.     

Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions

Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI's objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in pro-poor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment. It then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives. When audit costs are large, pro-poor MFIs may have to forego selection on wealth — and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations. Driven by donor concerns with ‘mission drift’ away from the poor, audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of MFIs. We show that introducing pro-poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents.     

Parchment,guns, and the problem of governance

The genuine problem of governance is one that pays equal attention to both incentive and knowledge issues in private and public contexts. This work brings together Austrian, Public Choice and theory of the firm insights to address such problem. By taking into account incentives and knowledge, it proposes a framework that accommodates comparisons not just of kind (firm or market), but also of degree (e.g., among different types of internal organization). Moreover, although the suggested framework derives from considerations about private governance, it equally accommodates public and private settings. (89 words.)     

Collective Organizations versus Relative Performance Contracts: Inequality, Risk Sharing, and Moral Hazard

This paper studies collective economic organizations that share risk and mitigate moral hazard and compares them with relative performance contracts. Information-constrained optimal distributions of organizations and contracts are shown to be functions of the underlying primitives, in particular, the distribution of Pareto weights, and hence degree of inequality. Internal inequality of a potential, local group is a force for collective organization. That is, multi-agent organizations exist in order to extract wealth from some but not necessarily all members. The group organization is also shown to be information-constrained Pareto optimal at extremes of local wealth relative to an outsider. But the group organization is susceptible to both agents simultaneously deviating, colluding against the outsider, and this distortion makes an individualistic, relative performance contract an attractive alternative. More generally, organizations, contracts, and allocations are jointly determined. These implications could be distinguished in cross-sectional, time series data. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D82.     

Wealth Dynamics and the Endogenous Design of Firm Organization

The purpose of this paper is to explore a dynamic interaction between wealth distribution and firm organization design using a model of growth in altruism in which a consideration of moral hazard on the part of agents with risk-averse preferences prevents complete insurance and generates inequality. I show (i) that there exists an ergodic invariant distribution of wealth to which the stochastic process of lineage wealth converges globally, and (ii) that the firm form with direct evaluation of the agent's effort is more likely to be chosen as wealth is distributed more equally.     

Why Do Some Households Save So Little? A Rational Explanation

This paper offers an explanation for the puzzle of low wealth holdings among a significant fraction of the elderly. Instead of invoking irrational, nonrational, or nonoptimal behavior to resolve the puzzle, it is shown that widespread low wealth holdings are consistent with a rational life-cycle model of saving with uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint. When there is uncertainty about the length of life, it is optimal for some individuals to save little and exhaust their wealth early. The characteristics of these individuals are derived. The simulation results support that the model can account for low wealth holdings as well as early terminal wealth depletion. The analysis also rejects the common perception that uncertain lifetime reduces dissaving. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D11, D91, E21, I12, J14.     

财富不平等会抑制金融素养对家庭借贷行为的作用效果吗*——基于CHFS数据的经验分析

本文基于2013年中国家庭金融调查（CHFS）数据,选用工具变量法,考察了金融素养对城乡家庭借贷行为影响的差异性,并验证了财富不平等扩大会抑制金融素养对家庭借贷行为的影响。研究发现：（1）金融素养是影响家庭借贷行为的重要因素。户主金融素养水平的改善显著提高了家庭发生借贷的概率与家庭借贷规模。（2）金融素养对城乡家庭借贷行为的影响存在明显差异,金融素养的提高对信贷约束较为严重的农村家庭借贷行为的促进作用更大。（3）财富不平等对家庭借贷行为存在明显的抑制作用,财富不平等的扩大减少了家庭借贷需求,降低了家庭发生借贷的概率和家庭负债规模。（4）随着家庭财富不平等程度的扩大,金融素养对家庭借贷行为的促进作用受到抑制。基于以上结论,政府应该大力开展消费者金融素养教育,注重家庭收入分配合理性,从而推动我国消费金融市场的健康发展。     

Aggregate fluctuations, financial constraints and risk sharing

Summary. Private information and costly state verification often result in credit rationing in models with smooth investment, affecting both loan size and total investment. The optimal contract is derived in a dynamic stochastic growth model with capital for two types of models: one with symmetric information and the other with asymmetric information and costly state verification. When all information is observed costlessly, the equilibrium optimal contract provides complete insurance to risk-averse savers against aggregate fluctuations. When information is asymmetric and there is costly state verification, the equilibrium optimal contract provides only partial insurance against aggregate shocks. The extent of insurance is measured by the marginal rate of transformation of consumption between borrowers and lenders which is closely linked to the user cost of capital. The deadweight monitoring costs create a wedge between a borrower's cost of capital and a lender's stochastic discount factor, with two results: (i) fluctuations in the user cost of capital provides a mechanism by which aggregate shocks can be␣propagated; (ii) the distribution of capital's share of output among borrowers, lenders, and monitoring costs varies even if capital's share is constant. Capital market frictions not only amplify aggregate fluctuations but also generate cross-sectional fluctuations that may not be observable in aggregate data. Received: November 17, 1997; revised version: April 20, 1998     

Wealth Effects, Incentives, and Productivity

Comparative static effects of varying the wealth level of a risk-averse agent in a moral hazard setting with limited liability constraints are investigated. There are two principal opposing effects of increasing wealth: the incentive effect, which allows stronger punishments for poor performance, thereby encouraging higher effort; and the preference effect, which reduces the agent's effort incentives owing to income effects in the demand for leisure. It is shown that optimal effort levels are initially constant, subsequently increasing and eventually decreasing in wealth. Hence agents with intermediate wealth levels are the most productive.     

Credit contracting and bidding under wealth constraints

Summary. We model credit contracting and bidding in a first-price sealed-bid auction when bidder valuation and wealth are private information. An efficient separating equilibrium exists only if the wealth levels of both bidder types are sufficiently different. If not, high-valuation bidders signal by borrowing more and using less of their wealth – this is inefficient as wealth is a cheaper source of funds. An increase in the amount of borrowing required to signal does not necessarily decrease seller expected revenue. In contrast to separating equilibria, high-valuation bidders adopt pure strategy bids in pooling equilibria. Conditions are identified under which the lower bound on winning bids is higher in pooling than separating equilibria. Received: January 22, 2001; revised version: August 28, 2001     

The existence, uniqueness, and optimality of the terminal wealth depletion time in life-cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint

In life-cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint, the consumer's wealth must be depleted before the maximum lifetime. This paper investigates the existence, uniqueness, and optimality of the terminal wealth depletion time. It is proved that the optimal terminal wealth depletion time, if such exists, must be unique. If the equation that determines the optimal terminal wealth depletion has multiple solutions, then the location of the optimal solution will depend on the configuration of the solutions. An optimality test is developed to verify whether a candidate solution for the terminal wealth depletion time is indeed optimal. The paper introduces a method new to economics, the Dubovitskii-Milyutin adjoint equation, to analyze the properties of the optimal control problem.     

Timing and Commitment of Environmental Policy,Adoption of New Technology,and Repercussions on R&;D

We investigate the interplay between environmental policy, incentives to adoptnew technology, and repercussions on R&D. We study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms. We consider four different timing and commitment regimes of environmental tax and permit policies: ex post taxation (or issuing permits), interim commitment to a tax rate (a quota of permits) after observing R&D success but before adoption, and finally two types of ex antecommitment before R&D activity, one with a unique tax rate (quota of permits), the other one with a menu of tax rates (permit quotas). We study the second best tax and permit policies and rank these with respect to welfare. In particular, we find that commitment to a menu of tax rate dominates all other policy regimes.     

Unemployment, credit rationing, and capital accumulation: a tale of two frictions

Summary. This paper develops a model in which two information frictions are embedded into an otherwise conventional neoclassical growth model; an adverse selection problem in the labor market and a costly state verification problem in the credit market. The former allows equilibrium unemployment to arise endogenously while the latter is responsible for equilibrium credit rationing. This structure is used to investigate a theoretical link between the level of unemployment and the extent of credit rationing (and capital formation). The presence of the labor market friction is enough to generate scope for multiple steady state equilibria. The model also generates a large class of endogenous cyclical and chaotic dynamical equilibria. Development trap phenomena may also appear. Received: April 10, 1998; revised version: May 20, 1998     

Poverty Traps, Indeterminacy, and the Wealth Distribution

We consider a one-sector growth model in continuous time with a production externality and endogenous labor supply. There is a continuum of households who have identical preferences but differ with respect to their initial wealth. We show that there exist economies such that an indeterminate steady state exists for some wealth distribution but not for others. A second result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive output to a poverty trap in which output converges asymptotically to zero. These results indicate that differences in the wealth distribution may be responsible for drastic differences in the long-run standard of living. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D50, O41.     

How does the design of international environmental agreements affect investment in environmentally-friendly technology?

In this paper, we investigate how the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) affects the incentives for the private sector to invest in environmentally-friendly technology. The givens are a transboundary pollution problem involving two asymmetric countries in terms of benefits arising from global abatement. There is a single polluting firm in each country. We account for two types of IEAs: an agreement based on a uniform standard with transfers and an agreement based on differentiated standards without transfers. To carry out this study, we use a two-stage game where the private sector anticipates its irreversible investment given the expected level of abatement standards resulting from future negotiations. Our findings indicate that the implementation of the agreement based on a uniform standard with transfers may be preferable for the two countries, as it creates greater incentives for firms to invest in costly abatement technology. This result arises when this technology’s level of the sunk cost of investment is low. If this level is sufficiently high, the implementation of the same agreement is not beneficial to countries, because it takes away the incentive of each firm to invest in new abatement technology. Moreover, this agreement is not able to generate any positive gains for either country through cooperation, thus no country is motivated to cooperate.     

The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth

This paper analyses the link between the internal organization of the firm and the growth process. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which monopoly firms face agency costs due to collusion between managers inside the organization. These costs affect incentives to invest and the rate of innovation in the economy. When collusion is self-enforcing, higher growth and more creative destruction shortens in turn the time horizon of colluding agents in the organization and makes internal collusion more difficult to sustain. We analyse this two-way mechanism between growth and agency problems and show how the transaction costs of side-contracting within the firm and the growth rate of the economy are simultaneously derived.     

Leveraging resistance to change and the skunk works model of innovation

We study a situation in which an R&D department promotes the introduction of an innovation that results in costly re-adjustments for production workers. In response, the production department tries to resist change by improving the existing technology. Resistance to change triggers competition between departments, which, in turn, spurs effort. We show that firms balancing the strengths of the two departments perform better. As a negative effect, resistance to change might distort the R&D department's effort away from radical innovations. The firm can solve this problem by implementing the so-called skunk works model of innovation where the R&D department is isolated from the rest of the organization. Several implications for managing resistance to change and for the optimal design of R&D activities are derived.     

Individual incentives in the supply of public inputs

The free-rider hypothesis states that, in the decision on public-goods and private-good provision, individual incentives are such that public goods will tend to be undersupplied. This paper examines the free-rider argument as it applies to public intermediate goods. It is shown that, unlike in a static model, in a dynamic world there may exist incentives for firms to act cooperatively in determining the supply of public intermediate goods. In a dynamic context there is a cost to free riding: what one firm does now affects what others will do in the future. Provided future profits are not discounted too heavily, the free-rider problem may disappear when a time dimension is added to the theory.     

Privatization and Strategic Mergers across Borders

We present a theoretical model to capture the role of privatization in the incentives for and implications of cross‐border horizontal mergers. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we show that a decrease in the degree of privatization will lower the incentives for diversification of international production. The incentives for diversification for any given degree of privatization will fall when the private and public firms are allowed to move sequentially rather than simultaneously. The presence of the public firm also introduces a new source of asymmetry in the incentives for cross‐border mergers: a reduction in the degree of privatization at home will dampen the potential gains from a take‐over of a home firm by a foreign firm but magnify the potential gains from a take‐over of a foreign firm by a home firm.