CEO retention,firm performance and corporate governance

This paper seeks to determine if CEO turnover is a function of firm performance, and therefore attempts to gauge the extent to which CEO interests are aligned with those of stockholders. The methodology in this paper focuses primarily on estimating the relationship between the probability of CEO exit and indices of firm performance and corporate governance structure. A major finding of the paper is that the accountability of CEOs to stockholders is significantly limited by CEO power, and CEO turnover is influenced more by internal governance structure than by firm profit or sales performance.     

CEO ownership and firm value

This paper examines the hypothesis that the amount of CEO ownership has a dominating effect on the value of the firm. Using a diverse sample of firms, firm value as measured by Tobin's q is found to be a nonmonotonic function of CEO ownership. Specifically, Tobin's q rises when the CEO owns between 0 and 15% and declines as CEO ownership increases to 50%. Beyond 50%, the value starts to rise. Firm value also is found not to be a function of management ownership when CEO ownership is separated out, indicating that CEO ownership does have a dominating effect on firm value. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Earnings fraud: board control vs CEO control and corporate performance – 1992–2004

The turn of the millennium is associated with increased corporate fraud, largely attributed to the failure of corporate governance. The compensation committee is expected to minimize fraud by rewarding only appropriate CEO behavior. A causal modeling approach, the Directed Acyclic Graph, was used to estimate the structure of corporate fraud. Corporate fraud was measured as illegal earnings statement(s), not all restatements but only those found illegal. A major finding is that the CEO's stock‐option compensation motivates the CEO to commit corporate earnings fraud, while cash salaries and bonuses are only indirectly related to earnings fraud through those stock options. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Impact of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate sustainability and firm performance

To explore the personality traits and corporate strategy of chief executive officers (CEOs), this study investigates how narcissistic and hubristic tendencies in CEOs affect the relationship between corporate sustainability practices (CSP) and firm performance. The primary purpose is to examine whether CEO narcissism and hubris can moderate the effect of corporate sustainability on firm performance. We investigate the influence of corporate sustainability on firm performance in three dimensions: economic, environmental, and social. The relationship between the mechanisms of supervision and agency theory is explored to assist investors in decision making. The results of this study show that compared to narcissistic CEOs, hubristic CEOs will further enhance the positive influence of CSP on corporate performance, especially in the environmental and social dimensions. This research strengthens the literature on CEO narcissism and hubris by demonstrating that CEO personality traits influence the relationship between corporate sustainability practices and firm performance.     

Management ownership and corporate value

Existing literature on the relation between management ownership and firm value has provided competing hypotheses and conflicting evidence. Using samples of Fortune 500-sized firms in 1976, 1980 and 1984, we find that corporate value measured by Tobin's q is a function of management ownership. Specifically, the q rises when management ownership is between 0% and 5-7%, and falls as the ownership increases to 10-12%. Beyond this range, we find that the q continues to fall in the 1976 sample, and starts to rise in the 1980 and 1984 samples. The evidence supports the hypothesis that there is a nonmonotonic relation between management ownership and corporate value.     

Non-wage benefits,corporate ownership and firm performance in post-communist economies: evidence from Ukraine

The economic reforms in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe have fundamentally reshaped ownership and governance of economic production, notably through the privatization of former state-owned enterprises. These reforms were expected to transform management practices by displacing ‘cradle-to-grave’ welfare arrangements administered by state-owned enterprises. Using data drawn from two large samples of Ukrainian establishments, we investigate, in two different time points, the relationship between non-wage benefits and firm performance during the period of transition to a market economy (1994–2004). We found that non-wage benefits continued to be a critical feature of HRM practices in Ukraine during this period, and were positively associated with firm performance.     

Family ownership,corporate governance,and top executive compensation

In this study we investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single family. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that executive directors' pay is reduced if the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not to stock returns. Our results are consistent with external blockholders and independent non‐executive directors persuading firms to base top management compensation on a firm's profitability. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Common institutional ownership and corporate misconduct

This paper explores the relationship between common institutional ownership and corporate misconduct. Empirical evidence indicates that common institutional blockholders (institutional blockholders with multiple blockholdings), with advantages in information, experience and resources, can effectively inhibit corporate misconduct. Furthermore, the inhibitory effect is stronger in firms prone to commit misconduct. Empirical results also support the role of state blockholders with multiple blockholdings and common institutional blockholders with high ownership proportions in restraining corporate misconduct. This paper contributes to the heated debate on the economic implications of common ownership and provides additional evidence for the role of common blockholders in Chinese capital markets.     

Missing quarterly earnings benchmarks, CEO cash compensation and institutional ownership

Research suggests that transient institutions, i.e., institutions with short-term investment horizon,make management focus on short-term earnings goals. This study examines incentive in terms of CEO cash compensation that explains why management concentrates on short-term earnings results when transient institutions hold high levels of ownership. Using quarterly consensus analysts＇ expectations as a proxy for short-term earnings benchmarks, the author finds that CEO cash compensation and the frequency with which management misses quarterly earnings benchmarks in a year （MISSNUMt） are more strongly negatively associated in firms with high transient institutional ownership than in firms with low transient institutional ownership, suggesting that transient institutions strengthen the inverse relation between CEO cash pay and missing short-term earnings benchmarks and hence increase pressure on management in terms of cash pay for short-term results. Moreover, the author shows that change in CEO cash compensation is positively associated with change in transient institutional ownership, consistent with the idea that selling shares by transient institutions influences the boards of portfolio firms in CEO cash compensation decision. This study contributes to the governance literature and is relevant to business managers by providing additional evidence that transient institutions provide less patient capital and may not benefit long-run firm value creation.     

股权结构对上市公司绩效的影响

文章总结了国外的研究成果,说明股权结构是通过影响公司治理机制来影响公司的业绩,并分析了中国上市公司股权结构的缺陷与成因,以及中国上市公司治理机制的缺陷,同时提出了改善治理绩效的对策。     

国有上市公司金字塔股权结构与公司价值

金字塔结构能一定程度减少政治目标的束缚,寻求高回报的投资项目。但如果控制性股东在上市公司中现金流权比例较少,则会倾向于选择收益不高的项目,从而导致上市公司的价值损失增加。     

The Brazilian bankruptcy law reform,corporate ownership concentration,and risk-taking

We investigate whether a bankruptcy reform, which increased creditors' protection, affected the risk taking of Brazilian firms. Collecting data from Brazilian (treatment group) and Argentinian, Chilean, Colombian, Mexican, and Peruvian firms (control group) and using a difference-in-difference technique, we show that Brazilian firms with concentrated ownership structure decreased risk taking after the reform. Our results suggest that these firms reduced risk in response to increasing creditors' protection, possibly because controlling shareholder fear losing control. Moreover, our results indicate that the reform probably provoked a wealth transfer from minorities to controlling shareholders.     

CEO compensation, shareholder rights, and corporate governance: An empirical investigation

We investigate whether CEO compensation is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our evidence reveals that CEOs of firms where shareholder rights are weak obtain more favorable compensation. It is also found that higher CEO pay is associated with a higher degree of potential managerial entrenchment. Additionally, CEOs of firms with governance provisions that offer them protection from takeovers enjoy more generous pay. We also examine the change in CEO compensation relative to the change in shareholders' wealth. The evidence shows that when there is an increase in shareholders' wealth, the CEO is able to obtain higher incremental compensation when shareholder rights are weak. On the contrary, when shareholders' wealth falls, there is no corresponding decline in CEO compensation when shareholder rights are weak. Given the empirical evidence, we argue that CEO compensation practices reflect rent expropriation rather than optimal contracting.     

CEO duality,information costs,and firm performance

This study investigates the effects of CEO duality on firm performance and the moderating effect of information costs on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in Taiwan. By analyzing listed companies during the period from 2000 to 2012, our empirical results show that a lack of evidence for the links between leadership style and firm performance; however, this relationship is associated with information costs estimated by analysts’ earnings forecasts. Specifically, we find that CEO duality has statistically significant negative impacts on firm performance when information costs are high. This result provides evidence for the coexistence of the agency hypothesis and stewardship hypothesis as determined by the extent of the information costs, and it tends to underscore the importance of corporate governance on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.     

An empirical analysis of the corporate control,tax and incentive motivations for adopting leveraged employee stock ownership plans

This paper examines three motivations for leveraged ESOP adoption: as a takeover defense, as a mechanism for providing incentives to employees and as a vehicle for tax savings. ESOP adoption is more likely for companies with a higher predicted probability of takeover, but ESOP adopters have many characteristics that are different from takeover targets. Companies that adopt ESOPs can be distinguished from non-adopting companies based on characteristics associated with the tax and incentive effects of these plans. The size of the ESOP is shown to depend primarily on the tax and incentive characteristics.     

Institutional investors,corporate governance and the performance of the corporate sector

Proportions of equity held by institutional investors—pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds—are rising across all OECD countries. Meanwhile institutions are becoming more influential in corporate governance, even in bank-dominated countries, inter alia due to international investment, pension reform and EMU. We provide two forms of evidence on the effects of institutional corporate governance on corporate performance. First we offer a literature survey on micro evidence, the outcome of which is mixed, but on balance suggesting a positive effect on equity returns. We contend that these micro studies face a difficulty that they cannot capture effects of governance initiatives whose effects go wider than “target firms”. Accordingly, we present results for the reduced form empirical relationship between institutional share holding and corporate sector performance at an economy-wide level. These are consistent with significant effects which differ between “Anglo-Saxon” and “relationship banking” countries. For example, institutions appear to accompany lower investment and higher dividends in the former.     

A note on equity ownership and corporate value in Greece

This study attempts to investigate whether corporate performance is affected by the ownership structure, using data from companies quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange for the period 1996–1998. Given such an objective, the basic hypothesis examined, is that corporate performance as measured by Tobin's Q ratio is a function of ownership and other control variables. Our econometric approach relies on the use of a combination of time series and cross section data (panel‐data analysis), a procedure that avoids many statistical problems. After examining the role of each identifiable shareholder, we find a positive relationship between institutional investors and corporate performance. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Partial ownership,control, and investment in vertical relationships

This paper examines whether partial ownership of a trading partner can alleviate hold-up problems and promote relationship-specific investments. Unlike a silent financial interest, which does not give the owner control over the partner and promotes both parties' investments, partial control over the partner could reduce the partner's investment and lead the owner to overinvest, thereby decreasing the joint surplus. The inability of the owner to restrain himself from abusing his control limits the effectiveness of partial ownership. An analysis of the control environment should be part of the empirical analysis of partial ownership and the assessment of its potential benefits by competition authorities.     

Manager replacement,employee protest,and corporate control

When faced with the replacement threat, incumbent managers look for support from employees by investing in a non-contractible employee–friendly relationship. Enjoying the relationship, employees help managers preserve their job by protesting against shareholders. When the benefits from the good employee–manager relationship are large enough to cover the loss of managerial inefficiency, shareholders prefer to share the influential power at the firm with employees.