基于N&P冲突分析模型的审计独立性比较研究

独立性是审计工作的灵魂,丧失了独立性,也就丧失了审计的价值。只有保证了审计的独立性,审计质量才能有保证。审计独立性含义宽泛,包含民间审计独立性、政府审计独立性和内部审计独立性。N&P冲突分析是专门用来研究审计独立性的模型,利用N&P冲突分析能更深入的了解影响审计独立性的内在因素,并通过比较分析不同主体的审计独立性,为探讨审计独立性提供新视角。     

内部审计的独立性

内部审计的独立性，即内部审计人员(机构)需独立于他们所需要审计的活动，以便不受约束，客观地开展工作。内部审计人员只有具备应有的独立性，才能正确地实施审计，才能做出公正的、不偏不倚的鉴定和评价。这里特别强调内部审计的独立性是一定程度的独立性，因为内部审计组织在组织、人事关系和经费来源方面都隶属于本部门和本单位，内部审计人员切身的经济利益也与本部门、本单位的经济利益密切相关，它只能是独立于被审计对象，因此它也是单向独立。     

关于审计独立性含义与经济性质的辨析

独立性是审计的精髓,是审计职业生存和发展的基石.没有独立性,审计就不能获得公众信任,从而失去存在价值.文章分析了审计独立性的含义和经济性质,对审计独立性的应用与研究具有指导作用.     

影响审计独立性的几个因素

从审计产生至今,审计职业界和学术界对于审计的独立性在实践和学术这两方面的讨论研究从未停止过。审计独立性是审计有效实施监督的基本前提和重要约束条件。只有把握好了审计的独立性,才能使审计工作得到正常有效地发挥。随着社会经济的发展,在现代社会中,各种不同的因素都对审计的独立性产生着影响。本文试根据我国审计现状,分析不同因素对审计独立性的影响。     

我国内部审计独立性问题探讨

独立性是内部审计的灵魂,内部审计独立性的提高是完善内部审计的关键.文章从内部审计独立性的内涵入手,探讨了我国内部审计独立性的现状,在此基础上提出了提升内部审计独立性的对策.     

提高注册会计师审计独立性的办法

1．提高会计师事务所保持审计独立性的能力 会计师事务所是注册会计师审计主体的一个层面，其审计独立性是注册会计师审计独立性基本内容之一。注册会计师在会计师事务所工作并以事务所的名义承接业务，注册会计师的独立性和事务所的独立性相互影响。会计师事务所是否有足够的能力保持自己及其注册会计师的独立性，是决定注册会计师审计独立性的内在因素。     

上市公司审计独立性制约因素研究

独立性是审计的灵魂,是审计区别于其他行业的最根本特征,也是审计职业赖以生存和发展的基础。而随着审计行业的发展,上市公司财务舞弊案件的不断发生,使得人们对于审计的独立性和权威性产生了质疑。文章从审计独立性的定义着手,进而从法律、经济以及企业与注册会计师关系等方面对外部审计独立性的制约因素进行分析,提出优化我国审计信息质量的相应对策,促进审计行业的健康发展。     

我国民间审计独立性缺失的主要原因及防范对策

独立性是注册会计师审计的灵魂,决定着审计意见的客观、公正性。近年来,审计失败案件屡屡发生,给会计师事务所、企业和社会造成巨大损失,大量审计失败案件发生,反映了注册会计师审计缺乏独立性。本文结合我国实际,分析了审计失败中独立性缺失的原因,并提出了若干改善审计独立性的途径。     

论事业单位内部审计的独立性

事业单位内部审计是一项独立客观的咨询活动。内部审计的独立性是内部审计一项非常重要的原则。内部审计独立性的一个最主要标志,就是内部审计机构设置的独立性。然而,如何实现内部审计的独立性却一直被人们所忽视。文章从内部审计独立性的"职能、重要意义、存在的问题、改进措施"四个方面进行分析探讨。     

内部审计独立性的制约因素及相关措施

独立性是内部审计的灵魂,是审计工作质量的保证.现阶段我国企业存在一些制约内部审计独立性的因素.加强内部审计独立性,必须加强内部审计的法制建设;建立独立、健全的内审机构;保证审计人员的独立性;提高内部审计人员的业务素质.     

Can Audit Committee Expertise Increase External Auditors' Litigation Risk? The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence

This study examines whether the perceived independence and financial expertise of audit committee members affect external auditors' exposure to legal liability. We use an experiment in which potential jurors make judgments about auditor independence and legal liability for a case involving an audit failure. We find that perceptions of audit committee independence from management are positively associated with judgments of auditor independence and negatively associated with auditor liability. However, financial expertise of audit committee members can be a double-edged sword. Our experiment finds that judgments of auditor liability are higher when the audit committee is perceived to have higher financial expertise but lower independence from management. In assessing litigation risk of current and prospective clients, auditors may want to carefully consider the independence of audit committee members from management, particularly when audit committee members have financial expertise. In the event of an audit failure, the financial expertise of nonindependent audit committee members can negatively affect jurors' perceptions of auditor independence and liability.     

低价进入式审计定价与审计独立性:一项实验研究

会计公司为招揽审计业务,采用低价进入式定价策略,期望通过签订较长期的审计约定来弥补前期的损失,美国会计协会认为这种审计定价策略会损害注册会计师的独立性。通过借鉴自然科学实验的方法,设计可控的实验,实验结果表明低价进入式审计定价策略在实验室市场环境里普遍存在。低价进入式定价策略在经营者拥有聘用和解聘审计师的权利时,会损害审计独立性;在所有者拥有聘用和解聘的审计师的权利时,不会损害审计独立性。     

我国上市公司内部审计的独立性研究

上市公司的有效治理必须有内部审计的参与,这已是国际、国内公司管理界和内部审计界的共识。当前由于大量的国内外上市公司造假案的涌现,内部审计的独立性越来越受到人们的重视。文章就此论题探讨其科学内涵,结合我国现状,研究如何加强上市公司内部审计的独立性。     

Board Characteristics and Audit Fees*

This paper examines the relations between three board characteristics (independence, diligence, and expertise) and Big 6 audit fees for Fortune 1000 companies. To protect its reputation capital, avoid legal liability, and promote shareholder interests, a more independent, diligent, and expert board may demand differentially higher audit quality (greater assurance, which requires more audit work) than the Big 6 audit firms normally provide. The audit fee increases as the auditor's additional costs are passed on to the client, such that we expect positive relations between audit fees and the board characteristics examined. We find significant positive relations between audit fees and board independence, diligence, and expertise. The results persist when similar measures of audit committee “quality” are included in the model. The results add to the growing body of literature documenting relations between corporate governance mechanisms and various facets of the financial reporting and audit processes, as well as to our understanding of the determinants of audit fees.     

上市公司审计委托制度的弊端分析及解决对策

我国现行上市公司审计委托制度存在的固有缺陷是审计的独立性严重受损。由公司管理层代行所有者的审计委托权,使审计人与被审计人的利益相关联,造成了财务造假屡屡发生,解决这一问题的根本途径是建立新的审计委托制度。     

对商业银行内部审计独立性的思考

文章试图通过商业银行内部审计独立性的经济学涵义,从公司治理、内外部监管与审计理念发展等理论的角度来阐述对商业银行内部审计独立性的要求。     

会计师事务所受证监会处罚影响因素实证研究

近几年来我国频频出台政策促进会计师事务所通过合并重组扩大规模及从有限责任制向特殊普通合伙制转变来提高审计质量。规模的扩大和合伙制的组织形式,是否有利于会计师事务所审计质量的提高？本文从会计师事务所受证监会处罚的角度,实证考察会计师事务所的规模、组织形式和独立性对审计质量的影响。研究表明,会计师事务所的独立性和受到证监会的处罚负相关;采用合伙制的组织形式,更有助于提高会计师事务所的审计质量,防止事务所受到处罚;会计师事务所的规模和受到证监会的处罚并不显著负相关。     

Auditor Fees and Fraud Firms

The issue of whether auditor fees affect auditor independence has been extensively debated by regulators, investors, investment professionals, auditors, and researchers. The revised Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements that resulted from the implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (2002) limit nonaudit services (NAS) and mandate NAS fee disclosure. The SEC's requirements are based on the argument that auditor independence could be impaired—and hence audit quality may be reduced—when auditors become economically dependent on their clients or audit their own work. Economic bonding leads to reduced independence, which can lead to reduced audit quality. We study a sample of firms sanctioned by the SEC for fraudulent financial reporting in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (SEC‐sanctioned fraud firms) and examine whether there is a relationship between auditor fee variables and the likelihood of being sanctioned by the SEC for fraud. We use SEC sanction as a measure of audit quality that has not previously been used in the auditor fee literature and is more precise than some of the other proxies used for flawed financial/auditor reporting. We find, in univariate tests, that fraud firms paid significantly higher (total, audit, and NAS) fees. However, in multivariate tests, when controlling for other fraud determinants and endogeneity among the fraud, NAS, and audit fee variables, we find that while NAS fees and total fees are positively and significantly related to the likelihood of being sanctioned by the SEC for fraud, audit fees are not. These findings suggest that higher NAS fees may cause economic bonding, thereby leading to reduced audit quality. Our findings of significantly higher NAS fees and total fees in fraud firms hold after controlling for latent size effects and other rigorous testing. These results contribute to the literature that examines the SEC's concerns regarding NAS and can be used by policy makers for additional consideration.     

Nonaudit Services and Earnings Conservatism: Is Auditor Independence Impaired?*

We examine whether the provision of nonaudit services (NAS) by incumbent auditors is associated with a reduction in the extent to which earnings reflect bad news on a timely basis (that is, news‐based conservatism). Reduced conservatism is expected to occur if relatively high levels of NAS result in reduced auditor independence and, ultimately, lower‐quality auditing. Because client‐specific demand for NAS is expected to vary, our proxy for the auditor‐client economic bond is the extent to which NAS purchases (relative to audit fees) are greater or less than expected. Using several different methods for identifying news‐based conservatism, we consistently find that higher than expected levels of NAS are not associated with reduced conservatism. This result is robust to allowing for endogenous NAS demand, as well as several explicit factors that may be associated with differences in conservatism. Similar conclusions arise from tests that use alternative measures of the economic bond between auditors and their clients, as well as in tests confined to either the Big 6 or non‐Big 6 audit firms. Our results are consistent with factors such as market‐based incentives, the threat of litigation, and alternative governance mechanisms offsetting any expected benefits to the audit firm from reducing its independence. We therefore conclude that recent legislative intervention aimed at restricting the supply of NAS is unlikely to result in increased independence in fact, although independence in appearance may be improved.