An evaluation of Chinese macroeconomic forecasts

This article evaluates the quality of professional macroeconomic forecasts in China for the years 1995–2009. Using a large panel of forecasts on four macroeconomic variables (GDP, inflation, consumption and investment), we reject the hypothesis of unbiasedness, and find that forecasters have been, on average, overly pessimistic. The source of the bias lies primarily in forecasters' slow adjustment to structural shocks to the level of economic growth. We also reject the hypothesis that forecasters use information efficiently, and find that a large number of forecasters overreact to economic news. Finally, we document large differences of forecast accuracy across both forecasters and variables.     

Directional accuracy tests of Chinese renminbi forecasts

This study investigates the directional accuracy of Chinese renminbi exchange rate forecasts by professional forecasters. The forecast with a horizon of one year is useful, whereas the forecasts with forecast horizons of one and three months are not useful in predicting the direction of the exchange rate change. The results for the long-term forecasts suggest that forecasters believe that the government maintains its foreign exchange rate policy of renminbi appreciation. In contrast, short-term forecasts show consistent evidence of exchange rate unpredictability.     

Expectations on the yen/dollar exchange rate – Evidence from the Wall Street Journal forecast poll

We use the foreign exchange forecasts of the Wall Street Journal poll to analyze forecasters’ expectation formation process for the yen against the US dollar for the period 1989–2007. We also contrast the expectation formation process with the actual exchange rate process. We find that most forecasters have contrarian and stabilizing exchange rate expectations. Our results also indicate significant heterogeneity between forecasters. However, forecasters on average underestimate the degree of contrarian and stabilizing behavior.     

Valuation Implications of Unconditional Accounting Conservatism: Evidence from Analysts' Target Prices

We examine whether financial analysts understand the valuation implications of unconditional accounting conservatism when forecasting target prices. While accounting conservatism affects reported earnings, conservatism per se does not have an effect on the present value of future cash flows. We examine whether analysts adjust for the effect of conservatism included in their earnings forecasts when using these forecasts to estimate target prices. We find that signed target price errors (actual minus forecast) have a significant positive association with the degree of conservatism in forward earnings, suggesting that target prices are biased due to accounting conservatism. Cross‐sectional analysis suggests that more sophisticated analysts and superior long‐term forecasters adjust for conservatism to a greater extent than other analysts. In additional analyses, we explore the mechanism through which conservatism leads to bias in target prices. We first show that analysts' earnings forecasts are negatively associated with the degree of conservatism; that is, analysts include the effect of unconditional conservatism in their earnings forecasts. Based on alternative earnings‐based valuation models that analysts may use, our evidence suggests that analysts fail to appropriately adjust their valuation multiple for the effect of conservatism included in their earnings forecasts when using these forecasts to derive target prices. As a consequence, we find that, for extreme changes in conservatism, the bias in analysts' target prices due to conservatism leads to a distortion of market prices. The evidence highlights the concern that analysts may not appreciate the valuation implications of conservative accounting which could inhibit price discovery.     

Direct Evidence on Sticky Information from the Revision Behavior of Professional Forecasters

We provide evidence on the sticky‐information model of Mankiw and Reis ( 2002 ) by examining how often individual professional forecasters revise their forecasts. We draw interest rate and unemployment rate forecasts from the monthly Wall Street Journal surveys. We find evidence that forecasters frequently leave forecasts unchanged but revise more often the larger the changes in the information set; additionally, the information sensitivity of revision frequencies increased after 2007. We also find that, on average, forecasters in our sample revise more frequently than found in previous research but that revised forecasts are not consistently more accurate.     

A Re-Examination of Financial Analysts' Differential Earnings Forecast Accuracy*

Abstract. This research re-examines whether there are differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts through a comparison of their annual earnings per share forecasts. The comparison of analyst forecast accuracy is made on both an ex post (within sample) and an ex ante (out of sample) basis. Early examinations of this issue by Richards (1976), Brown and Rozeff (1980), O'Brien (1987), Coggin and Hunter (1989), O'Brien (1990), and Butler and Lang (1991) were ex post and suggest the absence of analysts who can provide relatively more accurate forecasts over multiple years. Contrary to the results of prior research and consistent with the belief in the popular press, we document that differences do exist in financial analysts' ex post forecast accuracy. We show that the previous studies failed to find differences in forecast accuracy due to inadequate (or no) control for differences in the recency of forecasts issued by the analysts. It has been well documented in the literature that forecast recency is positively related to forecast accuracy (Crichfield, Dyckman, and Lakonishok 1978; O'Brien 1988; Brown 1991). Thus, failure to control for forecast recency may reduce the power of tests, making it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no differences in forecast accuracy even if they do exist. In our analysis, we control for the differences in recency of analysts' forecasts using two different approaches. First, we use an estimated generalized least squares estimation procedure that captures the recency-induced effects in the residuals of the model. Second, we use a matched-pair design whereby we measure the relative forecast accuracy of an analyst by comparing his/her forecast error to the forecast error of another randomly selected analyst making forecasts for the same firm in the same year on or around the same date. Using both approaches, we find that differential forecast accuracy does exist amongst analysts, especially in samples with minimum forecast horizons of five and 60 trading days. We show that these differences are not attributable to differences in the forecast issuance frequency of the financial analysts. In sum, after controlling for firm, year, forecast recency, and forecast issuance frequency of individual analysts, the analyst effect persists. To validate our findings, we examine whether the differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts persist in holdout periods. Analysts were assigned a “superior” (“inferior”) status for a firm-year in the estimation sample using percentile rankings on the distribution of absolute forecast errors for that firm-year. We use estimation samples of one- to four-year duration, and consider two different definitions of analyst forecast superiority. Analysts were classified as firm-specific “superior” if they maintained a “superior” status in every year of the estimation sample. Furthermore, they were classified as industry-specific “superior” if they were deemed firm-specific “superior” with respect to at least two firms and firm-specific “inferior” with respect to no firm in that industry. Using either definition, we find that analysts classified as “superior” in estimation samples generally remain superior in holdout periods. In contrast, we find that analysts identified as “inferior” in estimation samples do not remain inferior in holdout periods. Our results suggest that some analysts' earnings forecasts should be weighted higher than others when formulating composite earnings expectations. This suggestion is predicated on the assumption that capital markets distinguish between analysts who are ex ante superior, and that they utilize this information when formulating stock prices. Our study provides an ex ante framework for identifying those analysts who appear to be superior. When constructing weighted forecasts, a one-year estimation period should be used because we obtain the strongest results of persistence in this case.     

Voluntary Disclosure,Information Asymmetry,and Insider Selling through Secondary Equity Offerings*

This paper examines the relation of voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts and information asymmetry to insider selling through secondary equity offerings. We hypothesize that the pattern of voluntary disclosure and level of information asymmetry prior to secondary equity offerings differs systematically based on the identity of the seller. Specifically, we predict a greater frequency of voluntary disclosure and decreased level of information asymmetry when managers sell their stock through a secondary offering. We examine this hypothesis in a cross-sectional analysis of 210 secondary equity offerings from 1984-91, using a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood simultaneous equations estimation procedure, which allows for possible endogeneity in the manager's decision to sell stock. Consistent with our predictions, we document a significantly positive association between managerial participation and voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts in the nine-month period prior to registration of the offering. We also document a significantly negative association between managerial participation and two proxies for information asymmetry. The findings provide evidence that managers act as if reduced information asymmetry correlates with a reduced cost of capital.     

An Empirical Examination of the Divergence between Managers’ and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts

We study circumstances when analysts’ forecasts diverge from managers’ forecasts after management guidance, and the consequences of this divergence for investors and analysts. Our results show that investors’ return response to earnings surprises based on analyst forecasts is significantly weaker when analyst and management forecasts diverge, and that this attenuating effect is stronger when the management forecast is more credible. When the divergent management forecast is more accurate than the analyst consensus forecast, the subsequent‐quarter analyst consensus forecast is significantly more accurate than that of the current quarter, and exhibits less serial correlation. Overall, our findings suggest that, when analyst and management forecasts diverge, investors find the two sources to contain complementary information, and analysts learn to improve their subsequent forecasts.     

Are Analysts' Cash Flow Forecasts Naïve Extensions of Their Own Earnings Forecasts?

We examine the sophistication of analysts' cash flow forecasts to better understand what accrual adjustments, if any, analysts make when forecasting cash flows. As a preliminary step, we first demonstrate that prior empirical tests used to evaluate the sophistication of analysts' cash flow forecasts are not diagnostic. We then present three sets of evidence to triangulate our conclusion that analysts' cash flow forecasts incorporate meaningful accrual adjustments. First, we review a stratified random sample of 90 analyst reports and find that the majority of these analysts include explicit adjustments for working capital and other accruals in their cash flow forecasts. Second, using a large sample of analysts' cash flow forecasts from 1993–2008, we find that these forecasts outperform time‐series cash flow forecasts in correctly predicting the sign and magnitude of accruals. Finally, we find a significant market reaction to analysts' cash flow forecast revisions, suggesting that investors find these revisions informative. Collectively, our findings demonstrate that analysts' cash flow forecasts are not simply naïve extensions of their own earnings forecasts, but that they reflect meaningful and useful accrual adjustments. These findings are relevant to researchers who examine analysts' cash flow forecasts in a variety of settings, and to investors and practitioners who employ these forecasts for valuation purposes.     

Asymmetric Inventory Management and the Direction of Sales Changes*

We study manufacturing firms' asymmetric inventory investment in response to sales changes. Focusing on the costs of resource adjustment and stockout that likely differ in sales‐increasing and sales‐decreasing periods, we predict and find that inventory investment declines less during periods with sales decreases than it rises during periods with sales increases. We validate this claim by showing that managers' expectations of future demand and desire to avoid inventory stockouts are important determinants of this asymmetry. In addition, we find that asymmetric inventory investment provides useful information for predicting future sales growth, and that both managers' and analysts' sales forecasts are positively associated with the asymmetry. Lastly, we document that forecasts of future sales growth that incorporate asymmetric inventory investment are associated with lower absolute forecast errors than benchmark forecasts. Overall, we highlight the importance of inventory information in understanding managers' resource adjustment and utilization decisions that have implications for forecasting future demand. Our findings on asymmetric inventory management provide new insights to fundamental analysis based on inventory signals.     

An Examination of the Statistical Significance and Economic Relevance of Profitability and Earnings Forecasts from Models and Analysts

In this paper, we propose and empirically test a cross‐sectional profitability forecasting model which incorporates two major improvements relative to extant models. First, in terms of model construction, we incorporate mean reversion through the use of a two‐stage partial adjustment model and inclusion of a number of additional relevant determinants of profitability. Second, in terms of model estimation, we employ least absolute deviation (LAD) analysis instead of ordinary least squares because the former approach is able to better accommodate outliers. Results reveal that forecasts from our model are more accurate than three extant models at every forecast horizon considered and more accurate than consensus analyst forecasts at forecast horizons of two through five years. Further analysis reveals that LAD estimation provides the greatest incremental accuracy improvement followed by the inclusion of income subcomponents as predictor variables, and implementation of the two‐stage partial adjustment model. In terms of economic relevance, we find that forecasts from our model are informative about future returns, incremental to forecasts from other models, analysts’ forecasts, and standard risk factors. Overall, our results are important because they document the increased accuracy and economic relevance of a cross‐sectional profitability forecasting model which incorporates improvements to extant models in terms of model construction and estimation.     

Does Tax Planning Affect Analysts' Forecast Accuracy?

We investigate whether firms' tax planning affects the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. Tax planning can exacerbate the complexity of firms' operations through strategic choices to exploit tax laws. Because of its effect on firms' operations, tax planning can influence analysts' efforts to understand and forecast earnings. Specifically, if the additional complexity arising from tax planning makes firm attributes less representative of expected earnings, analysts may issue less accurate forecasts. Using auditor‐provided tax services (APTS) as a measure of tax planning, we find that, as firms spend more on tax planning, the accuracy of analysts' forecasts of both earnings per share and tax expense declines. We also document that firms with higher levels of APTS have greater year‐to‐year volatility in, and lower persistence of, effective tax rates and earnings. Our results suggest that increased firm complexity, due to greater tax planning, makes earnings and tax expense more difficult to forecast and that analysts do not properly adjust for these effects. Thus, when deciding to engage in tax planning, firms appear to make trade‐offs between potential tax savings and negative effects on earnings properties and analysts' forecasts.     

An evaluation of Chinese economic forecasts

This paper analyses the real GDP growth and inflation forecasts prepared by the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the private forecasters between 1999 and 2010. The empirical results show that the long-term growth forecasts were inferior to a naïve model and were biased. The average of a number of short-term private forecasts dominated those made by the international organisations.     

Investors' Misweighting of Firm-Level Information and the Market's Expectations of Earnings

Prior studies use fundamental earnings forecasts to proxy for the market's expectations of earnings because analyst forecasts are biased and are available for only a subset of firms. We find that as a proxy for market expectations, fundamental forecasts contain systematic measurement errors analogous to those in analysts' biased forecasts. Therefore, these forecasts are not representative of investors' beliefs. The systematic measurement errors from using fundamental forecasts to proxy for market expectations occur because investors misweight the information in many firm-level variables when estimating future earnings, but fundamental forecasts are formed using the historically efficient weights on firm-level variables. Thus, we develop an alternative ex ante proxy for the market's expectations of future earnings (“the implied market forecast”) using the historical (and inefficient) weights, as reflected in stock returns, that the market places on firm-level variables. A trading strategy based on the implied market forecast error, which is measured as the difference between the implied market forecast and the fundamental forecast, generates excess returns of approximately 9 percent per year. These returns cannot be explained by investors' reliance on analysts' biased forecasts. Overall, our results reveal that market expectations differ from both fundamental forecasts and analysts' forecasts.     

Who Herds? Who Doesn't? Estimates of Analysts’ Herding Propensity in Forecasting Earnings

We develop parametric estimates of the imitation‐driven herding propensity of analysts and their earnings forecasts. By invoking rational expectations, we solve an explicit analyst optimization problem and estimate herding propensity using two measures: First, we estimate analysts’ posterior beliefs using actual earnings plus a realization drawn from a mean‐zero normal distribution. Second, we estimate herding propensity without seeding a random error, and allow for nonorthogonal information signals. In doing so, we avoid using the analyst's prior forecast as the proxy for his posterior beliefs, which is a traditional criticism in the literature. We find that more than 60 percent of analysts herd toward the prevailing consensus, and herding propensity is associated with various economic factors. We also validate our herding propensity measure by confirming its predictive power in explaining the cross‐sectional variation in analysts’ out‐of‐sample herding behavior and forecast accuracy. Finally, we find that forecasts adjusted for analysts’ herding propensity are less biased than the raw forecasts. This adjustment formula can help researchers and investors obtain better proxies for analysts’ unbiased earnings forecasts.     

Measuring the Accuracy of Federal Reserve Forecasts

Markets across the world pay enormous attention to every economic forecast made by Federal Reserve governors, particularly those from the chair. This article develops a new way that the academic literature can assess the accuracy of these Federal Reserve forecasts. In particular, our proposed method allows for both general and specific predictions to be assessed, while also accounting for the macroeconomic volatility that prevails at the time of the forecast. To develop this measure, we expand upon a methodology proposed by the Wall Street Journal to score the accuracy of forecasts made by the Fed. Our results show that Alan Greenspan was consistently the most accurate forecaster among Fed governors, while the most recent chair in our sample, Janet Yellen, has performed relatively poorly. More generally, we find that the chairs have become less accurate over time with their forecasts and have also tended to make fewer specific predictions.     

Conditional forecast selection from many forecasts: An application to the Yen/Dollar exchange rate

This paper proposes a new method for forecast selection from a pool of many forecasts. The method uses conditional information as proposed by Giacomini and White (2006). It also extends their pairwise switching method to a situation with many forecasts. I apply the method to the monthly yen/dollar exchange rate and show empirically that my method of switching forecasting models reduces forecast errors compared with a single model.     

The impact of central bank intervention on exchange-rate forecast heterogeneity

We investigate the impact of official foreign exchange intervention on forecast heterogeneity, on the basis of a sample of forecasts made by a large number of commercial banks over two distinct periods, for the DEM (or EUR) and the JPY against the USD. We show that heterogeneity increases as a result of foreign exchange intervention. In the case of the DEM–EUR/USD market this increase is due to unexpected intervention, while for the JPY/USD it is due to expected intervention. Our results also emphasise the role of rumours, especially for the JPY/USD. In sum, official interventions are shown to move market opinions, albeit differently across the two markets. J. Japanese Int. Economies 21 (1) (2007) 38–63.     

Pricing to market, firm heterogeneity and the role of quality

We build a pricing-to-market (PTM) model with firm heterogeneity, which allows for imperfect competition and market segmentation in the presence of flexible exchange rates, horizontal and vertical differentiation and different tastes of consumers in destination markets. We derive firm’s pricing behaviour in response to price and quality competition shocks. We show that there is PTM heterogeneity across firms if quality has a role. We empirically assess the main predictions of our theoretical framework on Italian firm-level data. We document that export-domestic price margins are significantly affected by price and quality competitiveness factors even controlling for foreign demand conditions, size, export intensity, destination markets and unobservables. Finally, we provide evidence of strong heterogeneity across firms in their reaction to price and quality competitiveness.     

Do Firms Use Tax Reserves to Meet Analysts’ Forecasts? Evidence from the Pre‐ and Post‐FIN 48 Periods

We examine whether firms decrease tax reserves to meet analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts in the period prior to FIN 48, and whether that behavior changed following FIN 48. We use analysts’ forecasts of pretax and after‐tax income to impute premanaged earnings, or earnings before any tax manipulation. Pre‐FIN 48, we observe that firms reduce their tax reserves (i.e., increase income) when premanaged earnings are below analysts’ forecasts. Specifically, 78 percent of firm‐quarters that would have missed the analyst forecast if not for the tax reserve decrease, meet that target when the decrease is included. Furthermore, we find a significant positive association between the decrease in tax reserves and the deviation of premanaged earnings from analysts’ forecasts. In contrast, post‐FIN 48, we find no evidence that firms use changes in tax reserves to manage earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts. Thus, our results suggest that FIN 48 has, at least initially, curtailed firms’ use of tax reserves to manage earnings.