Fairness in supply chain contracts: A laboratory study

Various contracts can be designed to coordinate a simple supplier–retailer channel, yet the contracts proposed in prior research and tested in a laboratory setting do not perform as standard theory predicts. The supplier, endowed with all bargaining power, can neither fully coordinate the channel nor extract all of the channel profit. We report on a sequence of laboratory experiments designed to separate possible causes of channel inefficiency. The three causes we consider are inequality aversion, bounded rationality, and incomplete information. It turns out that all three affect human behavior. Inequality aversion has by far the most explanatory power regarding retailers’ behavior. Incomplete information about the retailer's degree of inequality aversion has the most explanatory power in regards to the suppliers’ behavior. Bounded rationality affects both players, but is of secondary importance.     

Trading bargaining weights

We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric versions of the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be traded in an exchange economy. With equal initial endowment of bargaining power there exists a Walrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium coincides with the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Equilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems.     

Trading bargaining weights

We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric versions of the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be traded in an exchange economy. With equal initial endowment of bargaining power there exists a Walrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium coincides with the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Equilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems.     

A note on the feasibility of incomes policies

It has been argued recently that collective bargaining reform will contribute towards a successful incomes policy. The author in this note suggests that it is too soon to predict the demise of decentralised bargaining and the emergence of co-ordinated private sector bargaining with favourable outcomes for incomes policy.     

On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set

We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elaboration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person non-transferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.     

Trade unions,collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance: a review

Coordination through collective bargaining is recognised as an influential determinant of labour market outcomes and macroeconomic performance. This article provides a systematic review of the empirical literature on the subject. What emerges from the review is that it is different types and coverage of bargaining coordination, rather than cross‐country variation in trade union density, that matter for economic performance. High levels of bargaining coverage tend to be associated with relatively poor economic performance, but this adverse relationship can be at least mitigated by high levels of bargaining coordination. In the absence of formal bargaining arrangements, economies often develop informal bargaining mechanisms whose effects are similar to those arising from formal bargaining provided they both operate at similar levels of coordination. The consequences of labour market coordination or absence thereof depend on the monetary policy regime as non‐accommodating monetary policy can eliminate some of the adverse unemployment consequences otherwise associated with industry‐level collective bargaining. Finally, bargaining coordination seems to matter most in times of rapid economic change rather than under more stable conditions. Overall, we conclude that it is the total ‘package’ of (formal and informal) labour market institutions that matters for the performance of the economy rather than unionisation as such or individual aspects of unionism.     

Investment, expropriation, and unionization

In this paper, I examine an economy where output is produced from labor, capital and public services, and where firms and labor unions bargain over labor conditions and lobby the government over union bargaining power and public services. I compare three institutional cases: (a) competitive wage settlement, (b) bargaining over wages and employment, and (c) bargaining over wages only. I show that in cases (a) and (b) the government expropriates investment rents, but right-to-manage bargaining (c) protects investors from this expropriation.      

Bargaining power in alliance governance negotiations: evidence from the biotechnology industry

Alliance partners negotiate how they will govern their alliance. This study shows bargaining power, not just efficiency considerations, influences the outcome of this negotiation. Whereas previous research on this phenomenon associates bargaining power with firm size, this study employs more nuanced measures of bargaining power applicable to biotechnology firms while controlling both absolute and relative firm size. We find small biotechnology firms with partners that are over five times larger can still have the bargaining power to get their interests met when the two parties have opposing governance interests.     

Antecedents of concession bargaining in the Great Recession: evidence from Ireland

Concession or ‘give back’ bargaining involves firms seeking changes in pay and conditions of employment from trade unions in return for pledges of enhanced job security and sometimes other forms of reciprocation. Several distinct modes of concession bargaining are distinguishable in the literature, and three modes of concession bargaining have been identified in Ireland during the Great Recession: integrative, distributive and minimal engagement. Deploying qualitatively informed quantitative data on the conduct of collective bargaining during the Great Recession, this article examines a series of antecedent influences on the choices firms make in conducting concession bargaining with unions.     

供应链中双方供应的竞争和合作博弈研究

针对当前供应链中供应方面存在的相关局限性。构造了双方供应和制造商之间的博弈模型。该模型主要特点是双方 供应之间的二阶段博弈所形成的质量和价格策略。在此条件下制造商和供应商之间进行讨价还价。以分配整体利润。指出了供 需双方在讨价还价时存在惟一的子博彝精炼纳什均衡。     

What has been happening to collective bargaining under New Labour? Interpreting WERS 2004

The late 20th century saw the rapid decline of collective bargaining, which had hitherto been the dominant means of regulation of employment in Britain. The article uses a comparison of the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys for 1998 and 2004 to assess how far this changed during the later period of economic growth and sympathetic labour legislation. Contrary to expectations, the data show that collective bargaining coverage has continued to fall, although much of this decline is concentrated in small firms in the private sector. The article goes on to analyse the recent change at sectoral level and examines evidence on the extent to which the character, as well as the extent, of collective bargaining had changed. The locus of management decision making has continued to move down organisations, both where collective bargaining occurs and also where unions are absent. Finally, the article evaluates how the perceptions of those involved in the bargaining process have shifted at a time of greatly diminished trade union influence.     

渠道博弈视角下粮食最低收购价政策的效果研究

中国是人口和粮食大国,促进粮食生产、保证粮食安全是国之大事。由于市场利益主体之间存在博弈行为,收购价格由农户与粮食收购企业共同决定。采用纳什议价模型表示议价过程,运用2006年至2014年的小麦价格数据,研究农户和企业在粮食收购过程中的议价问题,从而判断粮食最低收购价的政策效果。结果表明：政策确实能改变农民的议价能力,保护农民利益,但政策实施存在时滞;更重要的是,政策会导致农户议价能力从绝对劣势到绝对优势的突变,造成农户凭借最低收购价获得主导价格的能力,即政策扭曲了市场定价机制。最后,给出模型结果、实证结论和政策建议。     

Productivity bargaining: a reassessment

While governments tend to regard productivity bargaining as a long term anti-inflationary weapon, the author's research points out its weaknesses in this direction, and indicates that productivity bargaining may ultimately have far more important effects on the structural and behavioural development of collective bargaining at plant level.     

Price discrimination and bargaining power in the U.S. vaccine market: Implications for childhood immunization policy

The U.S. vaccine market exhibits a pricing structure in which the major purchaser of vaccines, the public sector, receives substantial discounts. This outcome is consistent with three theories of market behavior: third-degree price discrimination; bargaining power; and cost differences. The true nature of this pricing structure has important efficiency and policy implications. This paper uses a longitudinal data set of private catalog and federal contract prices to empirically determine whether price discrimination or bargaining power is being practiced in this market. I find that, while it is not possible to eliminate other factors, the results favor the bargaining power hypothesis.     

The future of collective bargaining

Kevin Hawkins argues that collective bargaining, long regarded as the most effective method of controlling industrial conflict, is no longer in accordance with accepted norms of behaviour. He contends that this is the most important single factor which should influence the future development of collective bargaining.     

Bargaining: separately or together?

This paper explores conditions under which economic agents will want to bargain collectively instead of individually with a common third party—when, for example, two firms (or unions), who are bargaining with the same, indispensable, outside party, will want to merge and bargain as one. I use a non-cooperative sequential bargaining model to analyze this question. Previous work has shown that agents prefer to bargain collectively if they are substitutes for each other in production. This result, however, depends on an exogenously fixed sequence of bargaining. I allow the bargaining sequence to be determined endogenously and investigate how incentives for collective bargaining vary with heterogeneity when delay is costly. The previous results are not robust when the agents are substitutes. In particular, substitute agents prefer individual to collective bargaining if they are heterogeneous and sufficiently patient. In the presence of transaction costs, substitutability of agents is no longer the sole determinant of collectivization. Rather, the degree of heterogeneity in production, in conjunction with the degree of substitutability between agents determine the incentives for collective action.     

Understanding wage restraint in the German public sector: does the pattern bargaining hypothesis really hold water?

German public sector wage restraint has been explained through the presence of a specific type of inter-sectoral wage coordination in the industrial relations system—that is, export sector-led pattern bargaining. First, as a literature-assessing exercise, this paper reviews the literature in industrial relations and comparative political economy (CPE) and finds that (i) the origins and mechanics of inter-sectoral wage coordination through pattern bargaining have never been laid out clearly; (ii) that the mechanisms of the pattern bargaining thesis have never been tested empirically; and (iii) that the CPE literature reveals an export-sector bias. Second, as a theory-testing exercise, hoop tests are performed to verify the pattern bargaining hypothesis. The key finding is that Germany cannot be considered a case of export sector-driven pattern bargaining, opening a new research agenda for the study of public sector wage setting centred on public sector employment relations, public finance, public administrations and the politics of fiscal policy.     

Ambiguous effects of tax progressivity — theory and Danish evidence

Recent tax reforms in the OECD area have aimed at reducing the progressivity of labour income taxation by reducing marginal taxes for given average taxes. Theory has shown that this reduces employment/production when workers and firms determine wages through bargaining. This paper shows that an opposite effect arises when both wages and working hours are subject to bargaining. This may reverse the traditional result and this is especially likely if the bargaining power of workers is low and if labour supply is relatively elastic. In conclusion, the overall effect of a reduction in progressivity is ambiguous. The empirical estimates for Denmark indicate that the overall effect is negative for blue-collar workers and neutral for white-collar workers.     

Nash bargaining in ordinal environments

We analyze the implications of Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the scale invariance axiom needs to be strenghtened to take into account all order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. This axiom, called ordinal invariance, is a very demanding one. For two-agents, it is violated by every strongly individually rational bargaining rule. In general, no ordinally invariant bargaining rule satisfies the other three axioms of Nash. Parallel to Roth (J Econ Theory 16:247–251, 1977), we introduce a weaker independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom that we argue is better suited for ordinally invariant bargaining rules. We show that the three-agent Shapley–Shubik bargaining rule uniquely satisfies ordinal invariance, Pareto optimality, symmetry, and this weaker IIA axiom. We also analyze the implications of other independence axioms.     

Integration of collective bargaining and formal worker participation processes: Boon or barrier to worker rights?

Many employers are extending workplace rights by allowing for more employee voice in decision making. Numerous unionized organizations have established formal worker participation processes to help achieve this end and to improve organizational performance. Based largely on theory, such processes are normally designed to operate independently from the bargaining process. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between participation and bargaining processes, and the effect of this relationship on workplace satisfaction. A total of 712 Midwest union officials were surveyed, and the results indicate that the processes tend to become integrated in the workplace. Further, union officials' workplace satisfaction was greater where formal worker participation is institutionalized within the bargaining process.