Harmonising European Insolvency Law: The Emerging Role of Stakeholders

In recent years, the European Commission has given increased room for stakeholder involvement in the area of insolvency and restructuring. In revising the European Insolvency Regulation in 2012–2015 and preparing the proposal for a directive on preventive restructuring frameworks 2016, the role and direct influence of stakeholders has been noteworthy. In these efforts, the Commission touched upon a field of law characterised by diverse stakeholders with strongly opposing interests. Following the active involvement of all stakeholders by the Commission, this study examines what relevant stakeholders are, what their positions are with respect to European Union insolvency legislation and what their role has been and can be in legislative processes in the area of insolvency and restructuring. Copyright © 2018 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reconsidering Procedural Consolidation for Multinational Corporate Groups in the Context of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation

Procedural consolidation, as a solution to the rescue of insolvent multinational corporate groups (‘MCGs’), is said to be able to preserve group value for creditors. This article explores the desirability of procedural consolidation in the EU in the light of theories of corporate rescue law, cross‐border insolvency law, multinational enterprises and relevant EU cases with reference to the European Insolvency Regulation. It argues that, based on current cross‐border insolvency rules in the EU, there is an inherent difficulty for procedural consolidation in balancing the goal of preservation of group value and the goal of certainty. The article also considers the new ‘group procedural coordination proceedings’ offered by the Recast European Insolvency Regulation and argues that it may help to supplement the gap left by the procedural consolidation in the EU. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Some Observations on the New Group Coordination Procedure of the Reformed European Insolvency Regulation

The recast of the European Insolvency Regulation introduces a new coordination procedure for handling insolvencies of groups of companies. The procedure relies on a group coordinator to create a helpful group insolvency plan while the individual insolvency proceedings remain independent. Albeit being a step into the right direction, the procedure has significant shortcomings such as the weak position of the coordinator, a liberal opt‐in and opt‐out mechanism and the problem of forum shopping. In the end, the new procedure can be a valuable tool in limited cases and should be merely seen as an addendum to a variety of possibilities to handle group insolvencies. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

What is in a Name? Group Coordination or Consolidation Plan—What is Allowed Under the EIR Recast?

The European Insolvency Regulation Recast allows for group coordination proceedings if insolvency proceedings have been opened against different companies belonging to a single group. Group coordination proceedings imply the drafting of a group coordination plan in order to define an integrated solution to the group's problems. This plan shall not include recommendations as to any consolidation of proceedings or insolvency estates. Against the backdrop of the evolving notion of ‘procedural consolidation’ and the fact the insolvency practitioners and courts concerned have to cooperate and communicate with each other, this prohibition is misplaced and should be interpreted to mean only that main or secondary proceedings opened in a member state cannot be transferred to another jurisdiction. The effective administration of insolvency proceedings of related group companies often demands an integrated solution to the group's problems, which will inevitably lead to some form of consolidation. Copyright © 2016 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The EU Insolvency Regulation,Revisited

After 10 years of use, the EU Insolvency Regulation was assessed and recast. The changes are intended to improve its functioning as market practice has moved on, and deal with, among other things, the processes subject to the Regulation, centre of main interests, secondary proceedings, co‐operation between courts and office‐holders, groups and interlinked insolvency registers. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Bridge over Troubled Water: The Revised Insolvency Regulation

The EU legislature has used the last two and a half years to negotiate a modernised framework for cross‐border insolvencies largely outside the spotlight of public debate. The revised Insolvency Regulation introduces new rules on secondary proceedings and innovative provisions on insolvency proceedings for groups of companies. Some parts of the final reform package were not originally envisaged by the European Commission, and it was the European Parliament and the Council that, in an unusual display of unity, agreed on more ambitious steps than the EU executive had proposed. However, not all that glitters is gold. The legislature missed the opportunity to clarify the concept of Centre of Main Interest, and it is still for the courts to establish international jurisdiction on the basis of rather vague criteria. It will soon be time to give life to the rules and ensure that cross‐border insolvencies are conducted more effectively than they are today. The new rules entered into force on 25 June 2015 and apply from 26 June 2017. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Cross‐Border Debt Adjustment – Open Questions in European Insolvency Proceedings

At present, 18 European Union member states have some form of legislation on adjustment of the debts of a private individual. Only half of these debt adjustment proceedings are mentioned in Annex A of the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR) and therefore fall within the scope of it. As most of the debt adjustment proceedings are not included in the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, there is a regulatory gap in the European insolvency proceedings with unpleasant impacts on the free movement of labour. Fortunately, changes are coming, in the form of the EIR reform. In order to bring debt adjustment within the scope of the EIR, the Commission proposes to loosen the prerequisite concerning the legal effects, which the opening of the proceedings has on the debtor. Regarding the jurisdiction to open main proceedings, the Commission proposes that COMI (the debtor's centre of main interests) would be the place of habitual residence. The open question is, whether residency requires a certain continuity or stability. This issue is discussed in the paper taking into account recent Court of Justice of the European Union case law. The challenge of the EIR reform is that only provisions on scope and jurisdiction have been modified as to debt adjustment. One may ask, e.g. when the prerequisites concerning the opening of secondary proceedings are fulfilled if the debtor is a private individual. Copyright © 2013 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency

This article compares the Recast European Insolvency Regulation of 2015 with the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency of 1997, focussed on their scope of application, international jurisdiction and the coordination of main and secondary proceedings. The scopes of both catalogues of norms and their rules on coordination of main and secondary insolvency proceedings reflect one another. However, the Recast EIR makes a significantly greater contribution to the unification of law and is also more fully differentiated and more precise, even if this comes at a price, namely, limited flexibility. The UNCITRAL Model Law made an important contribution to the harmonisation of international insolvency law but requires now modernisation. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Grounds for Refusal of Recognition of (Quasi‐) Annex Judgements in the Recast European Insolvency Regulation

Insolvency‐related (annex) actions and judgements fall within the scope of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation (‘Recast EIR’). That instrument both determines international jurisdiction regarding annex actions and sets up a simplified recognition system for annex judgements. However, tension between the Recast EIR's provisions on jurisdiction and recognition arises when a court of a state different from the state of insolvency erroneously assumes jurisdiction for annex actions. Such ‘quasi‐annex’ judgements rendered by foreign courts erroneously assuming jurisdiction threaten the integrity of the insolvency proceedings. Besides, the quasi‐annex judgements may violate the effectiveness and efficiency of the insolvency proceedings as well as the principle of legal certainty. In this article, it is argued that even the current legal framework may offer some ways to avoid the recognition of such quasi‐annex judgements. First, the scope of the public policy exception may be extended in order to protect the integrity of the insolvency proceedings from the quasi‐annex judgements rendered by foreign courts erroneously assuming jurisdiction. Second, it may be argued that quasi‐annex judgements do not equal real annex judgements and therefore do not enjoy the automatic recognition system provided by the Recast EIR. At the same time, their close connection to the insolvency proceedings – disregarded by the forum erroneously assuming jurisdiction – may exclude quasi‐annex judgements from the scope of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, as well. As a consequence, those quasi‐annex judgements may fall within the gap between the two regulations, meaning that no European instrument instructs the courts of the member state addressed to recognise quasi‐annex judgements. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Brexit’ and International Insolvency Beyond the Realm of Mutual Trust

The outcome of the referendum held in the UK in June 2016 is of far‐reaching and unpredictable consequences. This article focuses on the particular field of international insolvency with a view to identifying some of them, all arising out of the fact that the UK will be leaving the EU area of justice and the strong cooperation based on mutual trust between member states. This will make UK–EU insolvency cases clearly less efficient and effective. The consequences of Brexit could be mitigated by the already existing coordination among the international instruments dealing with these matters, in particular the European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency. However, not all EU member states have in place rules dealing with these issues as regards to third states. In order to lessen the impact of Brexit in this sensitive area of law, the implementation of the Model Law in order to deal with extra‐EU cross‐border insolvency could be of avail. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Towards adoption of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on cross‐border insolvency in Kenya

Kenyan Insolvency Bill has been in the Kenyan government website since 2010. The analysis of the Bill reveals that if it were to be passed into law, it will have significant implications for the Kenyan insolvency legal regime. The regime which is currently in use is based on the law that was inherited from the colonial administration. This review article focusses on the potential implication that the Bill is, if it were to be passed into law, likely to have for cross‐border insolvency reform and proceedings. The analysis is informed by the international insolvency benchmarks, particularly the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on cross‐border insolvency and the emerging trends of its adoption in various countries including in sub‐Saharan Africa. Copyright © 2013 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Rwanda Legal Framework on Insolvency: Problems and Proposals for Reform

The purpose of this article is to explore some key insolvency issues, which will be highly selective for this article, and to identify the weaknesses and inconsistencies in the existing framework on insolvency. Rwanda does not have an efficient and effective framework on insolvency, and the article argues that there is a need for an improved insolvency law regime. In view of the weaknesses and inconsistencies, it is vital to consider international best practices such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Legislative Guide on Insolvency and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐border Insolvency as the basis needed to deal with different aspects or elements of the Rwanda insolvency law. The value of this article lies in the insights it offers into the current framework on insolvency and the opportunity given to address the inconsistencies, weaknesses and uncertainties that invariably arise from the law. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Chinese cross‐border insolvencies: current issues and future developments*

This article deals with several problems pertaining to cross‐border insolvency, an important but ignored area in China. In this article, the current status of Chinese bankruptcy laws has been firstly addressed, with a focus on its legal blank on cross‐border insolvency and unsatisfactory judicial practice. Thereafter, the influential Guargdong International Trust and Investment company case has been analysed, which further highlights the inadequacy of Chinese bankruptcy legislation and crying needs for its reform. Basing on the essential principles embodied in the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law and European Union Regulation, the gaps between Chinese bankruptcy laws and international practice have been made clear. Accordingly, the developments of Chinese cross‐border insolvency have been proposed in order to provide helpful references for the future legislation. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Comparative Analysis of the Informal Pre‐Insolvency Procedures of the UK and France

The aim of this paper is to provide a brief overview of the informal pre‐insolvency proceedings available in the UK and France. In addition, the aim is to provide a comparative analysis of the approach taken towards corporate rescue at this early stage by the ‘key players’ in insolvency. In particular, emphasis will be placed on the role of insolvency practitioners and creditors as well as the involvement of the courts in pre‐insolvency restructurings. Finally, the paper considers the effectiveness of the pre‐insolvency mechanisms available in the two jurisdictions and assesses whether or not these promote and encourage a corporate rescue culture. Copyright © 2016 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Copyright © 2016 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Tripping the Light Fantastic: A Comparative Analysis of the European Commission's Proposals for New and Interim Financing of Insolvent Businesses

The European Commission published a Draft Directive in November 2016, with the aim of ensuring that all Member States have in place an effective mechanism for dealing with viable, but financially distressed, businesses. The Draft Directive includes provisions designed to encourage financing for the debtor company, both interim financing to ‘keep the lights on’ for a brief period while the debtor negotiates with its creditors for a resolution to its financial distress, and, where possible, to finance implementation of a restructuring plan, called ‘new financing’ in the Draft Directive. Creating such a financing regime is a complex and difficult issue, as the law's intervention in this area often involves constraints on the rights of existing creditors, requiring that a careful balance is maintained between existing creditors' rights and the rights of the interim financier. This article examines the underlying policy rationale and benefits of having new and interim financing available to financially distressed debtor companies and discusses the risks involved. It examines the EU Commission's proposals in light of the experience of jurisdictions that have already tackled these issues, notably the USA and Canada, or have developed a market‐based solution to this problem, such as the UK. While the European Commission's wish to include such measures in its restructuring proposals is laudable, the measures as drafted raise concerns, particularly regarding risks associated with priority for the grantors of such finance. The authors suggest that there are four fundamental aspects of such financing on which the Directive could give guidance to Member States, namely, effective notice to pre‐filing creditors, thresholds for the debtor to qualify, a menu of relevant criteria to balance benefit and prejudice, and a role for the court in resolving disputes, ensuring fairness to stakeholders, and serving as an accountability check on interim financing arrangements, all aimed at maintaining the integrity of the insolvency process. Copyright © 2018 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Groups of Companies in Insolvency: A German Perspective

Based on an analysis concerning the disadvantages of the previous understanding of handling groups of companies by means of consolidation of jurisdiction, the following article illustrates the basic idea of group‐specialized proceedings (konzernspezifisches Sachwalterverfahren), avoiding ‘domino effects’ and thereby unnecessary insolvencies of profitable subsidiaries and preserving the assets of these parts of the group to a greater extent than an insolvency situation can. Copyright © 2013 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Conflicts of interest,intra‐group financing and procedural coordination of group insolvencies

Modern insolvency law instruments recognise the specificity of enterprise group insolvencies, premised on the existence of close operational and financial links between group members. It is widely accepted that maximisation of insolvency estate value and procedural efficiency depend on coordination of insolvency proceedings opened with respect to group entities. Such coordination is prescribed in the European Insolvency Regulation (recast), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency and the recently reformed German insolvency law. Yet in insolvency, group members retain their own insolvency estates and pools of creditors. This is based on the traditional company law principle of entity shielding. Active communication and cooperation between insolvency practitioners and courts do not sit well with the separate (atomistic) nature of insolvency proceedings, as well as different and oftentimes conflicting interests of creditors in such proceedings. As a result, communication and cooperation may be restricted in a situation of conflicts of interest. This article explores how in the context of group distress the risks arising from conflicts of interest can be controlled and mitigated, while ensuring efficient cross‐border cooperation and communication to the maximum extent possible. It analyses three cutting‐edge coordination mechanisms, namely (a) cross‐border insolvency agreements or protocols, (b) special (group coordination and planning) proceedings and (c) the appointment of a single insolvency practitioner. It concludes that both the likelihood and significance of conflicts of interest correlate with the degree of procedural coordination. Therefore, conflict mitigation tools and strategies need to be tailor‐made and targeted at a specific level and coordination mechanism.     

The Inherent Power of Common Law Courts to Provide Assistance in Cross‐Border Insolvencies: From Comity to Complexity

The weighty and difficult issues associated with cross‐border insolvency have generated considerable debate over the last two decades. Legislative reform has typically proven slow and fragmented. This article analyses the inherent power of common law courts to grant assistance in cross‐border insolvency proceedings and the basis on which the inherent power is exercised. In doing so, it seeks to explore how the inherent power may continue to be of utility to common law courts. In particular, it considers the position in jurisdictions that are yet to adopt the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency or enact a substantial statutory regime for recognising and cooperating with foreign courts or representatives in insolvency proceedings. The article considers the benefits and disadvantages of continuing to recognise – and extend – the inherent power. It suggests that although there are fundamental differences concerning the exercise of the inherent power, it may be possible to agree on a number of principles that inform the application of the inherent power and its future development. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Recognition of Debt Restructuring and Resolution Measures under the European Union Regulatory Framework

Under the proposed Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), member states will be required to provide for bail‐in powers to restructure failing financial institutions. At this moment, the Dutch, French, UK and German legislator already provide public authorities with resolution powers. In order to be effective in debt restructuring of failing (non‐)financial institutions, the measures taken by the resolution authorities need to be enforceable (before all courts) and effective in the entire European Union. Given the fact that not all the firm's debt is issued in the home jurisdiction, the question of recognition is critically important. In regard of non‐financial firms, the Dutch, UK, French and German jurisdictions provide for court proceedings to impose a collective settlement reached by the debtor and the majority of its creditors binding on the opposing minority. Out‐of‐insolvency plans approved by the court are recognised under the Brussels I Regulation. If the EU Insolvency Regulation reform proposal is adopted, these court‐approved debt restructuring plans in insolvency situations will be subject to the recognition regime of this regulation. Credit institutions, insurance undertakings, investment undertakings holding funds or securities for third parties and collective investment undertakings are excluded from the scope of the Insolvency Regulation whereas the scope of application of the Reorganisation and Winding Up Directive is limited to credit institutions. The regime under the future BRRD and the Single Resolution Mechanism is limited to credit institutions. National (private international) law determines the recognition of resolution measures taken by the authorities of another member state. Copyright © 2014 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd