Foreign currency debt, risk premia and macroeconomic volatility

This paper studies the relationships between foreign currency debt, macroeconomic volatility, and risk premia in a model of a small open emerging market economy. The external value of the local currency is counter-cyclical, so that foreign currency debt requires larger repayments than local currency debt in bad states of nature. The level of foreign currency-denominated debts, therefore, affects the volatility of aggregate demand and by extension of the exchange rate. Exchange rate volatility is in turn an important determinant of the risk premium on local currency debt. Finally, this risk premium is a major factor in the choice of local versus foreign currency for emerging market borrowers. The mutual endogeneity of foreign currency debt, risk premia, and macroeconomic volatility creates important feedback effects in the economy: small increases in international risk aversion may entail large amplification effects on macroeconomic volatility since domestic borrowers substitute towards cheaper but riskier foreign currency debt finance.     

Currency Boards when Interest Rates are Zero

In a fixed exchange rate system, any expectation that the peg may be abandoned will normally be reflected in an interest rate differential between instruments denominated in domestic and anchor currencies: the possibility of a revaluation will drive domestic interest rates below those in the anchor currency, for example. However, when interest rates are close to the zero lower bound, there is limited scope for exchange rate expectations to be reflected in interest rate differentials. Here we introduce a new mechanism, based on the central bank balance sheet, which works to bring about equilibrium in currency markets even when interest rates are zero. An expectation of exchange rate appreciation will cause foreign exchange reserves to swell, increasing the cost to policy‐makers of allowing an appreciation and, therefore, lowering the likelihood of the fixed exchange rate being abandoned. Under normal circumstances, this channel reinforces the equilibrating effect of interest rate differentials. When interest rates cannot adjust only this channel operates, implying that much larger changes in reserves are required to equilibrate currency markets. We develop a simple model to illustrate these arguments and find support for the predictions of the model using data for Hong Kong, the world's largest economy with a currency board.     

A Theory of Exchange Rates and the Term Structure of Interest Rates

This paper defines the concepts of indirect and direct risk premium effects and analyzes their properties in an exchange rate model. In the model, these effects are endogenously determined in a rational expectations equilibrium. For the effect of an interest rate shock, they have the opposite signs and the indirect risk premium effect can dominate the direct risk premium effect under reasonable parameters. This means that domestic short‐term bonds and foreign bonds are complements in the model even though domestic long‐term bonds and foreign bonds are substitutes. This model, focusing on the indirect risk premium effect and on the term structure of interest rates, can be combined with a small sample bias approach to explain stylized facts about the forward premium anomaly, which is found for short‐term interest rates, but not for long‐term interest rates.     

MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND COUNTERFACTUAL INFLATION‐TARGETING IN HONG KONG

The present paper evaluates macroeconomic adjustment in Hong Kong with an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model under a fixed exchange rate regime. We find that exports and world inflation shocks are the dominant sources of GDP volatility, with the risk premium taking on importance during the Asian crisis after 1997. A counterfactual simulation, assuming a flexible exchange rate regime with inflation targeting, shows that inflation would have decreased slightly, but interest‐rate volatility would have increased significantly. The welfare gains from switching out of the currency board system appear to be marginal.     

The Government's Foreign Debt in the Argentine Crisis

Though the government had adopted a currency board regime since 1991, the Argentine economy suffered a currency crisis in 2002. It is shown that currency crises can arise, even under currency board systems in which the central bank has enough international reserves to respond to arbitrary withdrawals by individuals. The model implies that a government's rapid accumulation of foreign debt should be included as a major predictor of currency crises.     

A corporate balance-sheet approach to currency crises

This paper presents a general equilibrium currency crisis model of the ‘third generation’, in which the possibility of currency crises is driven by the interplay between private firms’ credit-constraints and nominal price rigidities. Despite our emphasis on microfoundations, the model remains sufficiently simple that the policy analysis can be conducted graphically. The analysis hinges on four main features (i) ex post deviations from purchasing power parity; (ii) credit constraints a la Bernanke-Gertler; (iii) foreign currency borrowing by domestic firms; (iv) a competitive banking sector lending to firms and holding reserves and a monetary policy conducted either through open market operations or short-term lending facilities. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a sunspot equilibrium with currency crises. We show that an interest rate increase intended to support the currency in a crisis may not be effective, but that a relaxation of short-term lending facilities can make this policy effective by attenuating the rise in interest rates relevant to firms.     

Government guarantees and self-fulfilling speculative attacks

We develop a model in which government guarantees to banks’ foreign creditors are a root cause of self-fulfilling twin banking-currency crises. Absent guarantees, such crises are not possible. In the presence of guarantees banks borrow foreign currency, lend domestic currency and do not hedge the resulting exchange rate risk. With guarantees, banks will also renege on their foreign debts and declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. We assume that the government is unable or unwilling to fully fund the resulting bailout via an explicit fiscal reform. These features of our model imply that government guarantees lead to self-fulfilling banking-currency crises.     

UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE PEGS

It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalize this notion by incorporating unemployment persistence into a two‐sided escape clause model of currency crises. We show that unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to ‘busts’ than ‘booms’. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or the economy more flexible.     

Transmission of monetary policy and exchange rate shocks under foreign currency lending

This paper analyses the differences in reaction of domestic and foreign currency lending to monetary and exchange rate shocks, using a panel VAR model estimated for the three biggest Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary). Our results point toward a drop in domestic currency loans and an increase of foreign currency credit in reaction to monetary policy tightening in Poland and Hungary, suggesting that the presence of foreign currency debt weakens the transmission of monetary policy. A currency depreciation shock leads to an initial decline in foreign currency lending, but also in loans denominated in domestic currency as central banks react to a weaker exchange rate by increasing the interest rates. However, after several quarters, credit in foreign currency accelerates, indicating that borrowers start using it to substitute for depressed domestic currency lending.     

Short-term eurocurrency rate behavior and specifications of cointegrating processes

This article presents empirical evidence on short-term behavior based on seven Eurocurrency market rates. Empirical analysis suggests that there is two-dimensional cointegration. First, the domestic short-term interest rate is cointegrated with longer-term interest rates within a particular country. Second, the domestic short-term interest rate is cointegrated with the comparable foreign short-term interest rate adjusted for the foreign exchange forward premium (discount). The empirical evidence confirms that an error-correction model combining both dimensional market-correcting processes better explains short-term interest rate movements.     

Smuggling, non‐fundamental uncertainty, and parallel market exchange rate volatility

Abstract.  We explore a model where smuggling and a parallel currency market arise, owing to government restrictions that prevent agents from legally holding foreign exchange. Despite such restrictions, agents are able to diversify their savings, holding both domestic and parallel foreign cash, basing their portfolio allocation on current and prospective parallel exchange rates. We attribute movements in parallel rates to non‐fundamental uncertainty. The model generates equilibria with both positive and negative parallel premia and correlations between illegal trade and the premium. The model has the novel implication that currency speculation drives smuggling, affecting real activities in all sectors of the economy. JEL classification: F31     

Currency devaluations,aggregate demand,and debt dynamics in economies with foreign currency liabilities

The article uses a post Kaleckian model to analyze how currency devaluations affect aggregate demand and capital accumulation in an economy with foreign currency liabilities in the short-run. In benchmark post Kaleckian open economy models, currency devaluations have two effects. First, they change international price competitiveness and thus affect net exports. Second, devaluations change income distribution and thereby affect consumption and investment demand. The overall effect on aggregate demand and investment is ambiguous and depends on parameter values. Existing models, however, disregard balance sheet effects that arise from foreign currency-denominated external debt. The article develops a novel post Kaleckian open economy model that introduces foreign currency-denominated external debt and balance sheet effects to examine the demand-effects of devaluations. Furthermore, the article models the dynamics of external and domestic corporate debt. It discusses how an economy may end up in a vicious cycle of foreign-currency indebtedness and derives the conditions under which indebtedness becomes stable or unstable. It shows that the existence of foreign currency-denominated debt means that contractionary devaluations are more likely, and that foreign interest rate hikes, and high illiquidity and risk premia compromise debt sustainability. Devaluations only stabilize debt ratios if they succeed in boosting domestic capital accumulation.     

Currency interdependence and dollarization

This paper constructs a search model of currency interdependence, and uses it to examine how in dollarized economies the foreign currency reacts to various shocks to the domestic currency. Currency interdependence is generated by allowing sellers to take into account their outside option of trading with the domestic currency while bargaining with buyers holding the foreign currency. The shocks consist in movements in the domestic interest rate, domestic inflation and the domestic currency’s market power. We show that if the purchasing power of the domestic currency is low, any shock that increases its value, such as a higher domestic interest rate, translates into a depreciation of the foreign currency. However, the result is opposite when the purchasing power of the domestic currency is high. We show that when money is indivisible these shocks can drive in or out the foreign currency. When money is divisible, this currency substitution effect is more limited. We use our results to discuss the opportunity of various de-dollarization policies and show that some can be counterproductive.     

The drivers of foreign currency‐based banking in Central and Eastern Europe

Foreign currency (FX)‐based loans and deposits became very popular in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) over the 2000–2011 period. In this paper, I simultaneously examine the demand‐side (consumer‐related) and supply‐side (bank‐related) determinants of the quick spread of FX banking. I use a newly constructed dataset on FX and domestic currency loans, deposits and interest rates, covering 16 CEECs overtime. Local‐FX interest rate and market share spreads are: (1) lower in managed currency regimes; (2) strongly affected by the prevalence of FX funding, currency mismatch and FX banking restrictions, and (3) wider after economic crises.     

Currency crises and the stock market: empirical evidence for another type of twin crisis

We explore the dependency between currency crises and the stock market in emerging economies. Our focus is two-fold. First, the risk of a currency crisis rises as the foreign stake in the domestic stock market increases. Successful economies with high capital flows into their booming stock markets especially are prone to stock market-induced currency crises. Second, we apply the dividend growth model to show that stock markets crash in the run-up to a currency crisis. This new type of twin crisis is empirically tested by employing a logit framework using quarterly data for 33 emerging economies for 1994Q1–2007Q4.     

Modelling the business cycle of a small open economy: The Reserve Bank of New Zealand's DSGE model

We describe the underlying structure of the new forecast and policy model used at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and evaluate its ability to explain New Zealand data. Unlike other estimated small-open-economy DSGE models, we find that more than one third of the domestic GDP growth is driven by foreign shocks. The elevated contribution of foreign shocks to the domestic economy is driven by our decision to exclude mapping export demand to data on world GDP. Estimating our model without any foreign demand data limits the response of exports to the real exchange variations. This feature makes exports and, consequently, domestic GDP much more sensitive to variations to foreign demand and raises the importance of foreign shocks to the domestic business cycle. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that a model with “adaptive” expectations is preferred by the data relative to the version of the model with “rational” expectations. In that case, the model explains nominal variables using on average much smaller shocks.     

Capital Controls,Public Debt and Currency Crises

This paper examines the possibility that, contrary to conventional wisdom, capital controls accelerate currency crises. Theoretical analysis shows that capital controls can constitute an additional burden on government budget and so bring forward the onset of crises. Since perfect capital mobility does not occur, domestic interest rates may deviate from world interest rates. High interest rates under capital controls create an additional cost of servicing outstanding domestic public debt, precipitating crises. Even though the government can delay crises with capital controls, welfare may be less than in a situation with perfect capital mobility.     

Understanding Exchange Rate Movements during the 2008 Financial Crisis

During the 2008 financial crisis, many advanced economies, whose banking systems suffered significant capital losses, experienced large and rapid exchange rate depreciations followed by prolonged and gradual appreciation in subsequent periods. In order to understand one possible explanation of these observed exchange rate movements, we develop a simple model of a highly leveraged banking sector in which banks obtain part of their funding from abroad. A fall in bank net worth leads to foreign lenders demanding a higher risk premium on credit supplied to domestic banks. This higher risk premium can be met if the exchange rate experiences an appreciation along the adjustment path, since this raises the value of the bank's earnings in terms of the foreign currency for every period that the foreign risk premium is elevated. In order for the exchange rate to appreciate by a large amount along the adjustment path, it must initially become undervalued – relative to its long-run level – so that in equilibrium the market is willing to bid up its value in subsequent periods. This thus gives rise to the large initial depreciation of the exchange rate followed by its prolonged and gradual appreciation.     

Explaining ERM realignments: Insights from optimising models of currency crises

This paper attempts to provide empirical evidence on the determinants of the realignments throughout the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM). Motivated by the implications of optimising currency crisis models, we relate the probability of “crises” to a set of macroeconomic fundamentals. By using a conditional binominal logit model we show that regime switches are strongly influenced by movements in industrial production, foreign interest rates, competitiveness and imports as well as in foreign exchange reserves. These findings are consistent with the general propositions of recent currency crises models.     

Liquidity and Twin Crises

This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for understanding 'twin crises'– i.e. crises where a currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The distinguishing feature of such crises is the spill‐over effects across financial institutions through collateral constraints, declines in market values of assets, currency mismatches on the balance sheet and the endogenous amplification of financial distress through asset sales. We explore the role of liquidity and the role of monetary policy in such crises. In particular, a central question is whether raising interest rates in the face of a twin crisis is the appropriate policy response. Raising interest rates has two countervailing effects. Holding the domestic currency becomes more attractive (other things being equal), but the value of the domestic banking system falls due to the fall in asset prices. When assets are marked to market, there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. It is thus possible that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating both the currency crisis and the banking crisis.