Consistent conjectures and voluntary contributions to public goods: why the conventional theory does not work

The conventional theory of voluntary contributions to public goods assumes that each person maximises his utility taking other people's behaviour as given (Nash conjectures). It is now coming to be recognised that this theory is inconsistent with observed behaviour. This paper argues that the problems of the theory are compounded — and not, as some economists have argued, resolved — by relaxing the assumption of Nash conjectures. If individuals' conjectures are consistent, each person will hold the (correct) belief that other people's contributions are inversely related to his own. Under most reasonable assumptions, equilibrium is a state in which no-one contributes anything.     

Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I prove three theorems. First, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper's strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-negative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions. Third, Arrow's general possibility theorem is proven in a new manner.     

Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge

The paper begins by presenting an axiomatic model of simple and iterated knowledge. A formal definition of the intuitive notion of common knowledge is given and shown equivalent to previous characterizations. It is shown that agents have information partitions. The second part generalizes Aumann's (Ann. Statist.4 (1976), 1236–1239) well-known propositions about common knowledge between two rational agents of each other's probability assignments. It is shown that: common knowledge of decisions—if these are rational—implies a common decision for like-minded agents; and that a “dialogue” in decisions leads to a common decision. A “no-trade” theorem is given which includes trade under complete uncertainty.     

Candidate reputations and the ‘incumbency effect’

A major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction — convergence of platforms to the median voter's ideal — is seldom observed. One reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes. Here we associate voters' expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements, and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their ‘reputations’ are perceived as less risky than challengers. In equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms. Typically neither adopts the median voter's ideal point. Either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent's reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively ‘risky’ the electorate perceives the challenger to be.     

A many-person Ramsey tax rule

Define the social marginal utility of an individual's income as the gain to society of a unit of consumption by the individual plus the value of his marginal propensity to pay taxes out of income. This concept rather than the social marginal utility of consumption (equal to the first term above) seems helpful in understanding optimal tax first order conditions. For example, with many consumers (and a poll tax as well as excise taxes) the change in aggregate compensated quantity demanded is proportional to the covariance between individual quantities demanded and social marginal utilities of income.     

Competitive price adjustment

A study is made of a competitive trading process in which a price-maker calls prices periodically under the obligation of trading for his own account to satisfy excess demand. Characteristics of the price-maker's optimal behavior are derived. The price-maker system is evaluated with respect to an alternative market clearing system.     

The cost of equity capital: A simplification

Modigliani-Miller's theorem, which asserts that corporate financing policy is of no consequence, has been shown to hold true under a set of assumptions which is less restrictive than the original set used by MM. Preceding proofs were based on the theory of general equilibrium. Basically, this paper examines MM's second proposition—the linearity of the cost of equity capital with respect to financial leverage—when dropping a few of their basic assumptions but retaining their assumption about incomplete markets. In particular, this paper relaxes the assumptions that (a) the inflows are perpetual and that (b) the firm's future returns belong to the same risk class. The results of the analysis indicate that the linearity will be sustained. The nature of the financial risk premium (the slope), however, has to be modified.     

Technology and social change: William Fielding Ogburn revisited

This paper reviews William Fielding Ogburn's work on technology and social change. An overview of his basic theory is presented, as well as later refinements found in such works as Recent Social Trends in the United States, Technological Trends and National Policy, The Social Effects of Aviation, and other books and articles. It is suggested that while Ogburn is most widely remembered for his thesis of cultural lag, some of his later work on technology and social change is actually more important and deserves reconsideration and extension. One kind of extension might follow the lines of a systems approach rather than continuing the technological primacy strategy that Ogburn is normally considered to have used. The paper also surveys Ogburn's important work in the areas of technology, planning, and social policy, including materials on technology assessment. Ogburn's nontechnocratic approach to these questions, as well as his insistence that social scientists have a great deal to offer to the formulation of technological and social policies, are some of his most important contributions. Questions of technology and social change remain important contemporary issues, yet there is a surprising paucity of social science work on these crucial topics. Further study, extension, and reformulation of Ogburn's pioneering ideas offer fruitful means of embarking on new social science analyses of technology and society.     

The theory of public goods: non-nash behaviour

Most treatments of equilibrium public goods provision assume zero conjectural variations in the sense that each individual regards the behaviour of the rest of the community as independent of his own. This paper introduces nonzero conjectural variations into the model. A diagram is introduced which can depict both the individual's and the community's equilibrium in the presence of nonzero conjectural variations. Equilibrium and optimal outcomes are compared, and a specific functional form is used to investigate the effect of community size on the nature of equilibrium. Finally, we discuss the requirement that conjectures should be consistent.     

A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties

A simple mechanism for reallocating holdings is described, in which no auctioneer is required: outcomes are determined solely from traders' actions and without any requirement that the mechanism be in equilibrium. The mechanism is shown to exactly duplicate the performance of the Walrasian auctioneer (both in its equilibria and in its disequilibrium path) if individuals are price takers, and, if the number of individuals is large, to approximately duplicate the auctioneer's performance even when individuals behave strategically, each taking account of his own influence on prices.     

Prometheus rebound: An inquiry into technological growth and psychological change

Western Man's philosophy of power over nature has led to the present excesses of technology. The technological environment in turn, has had profound and questionable influence on the human physiological and psychological organism—resulting frequently in both personal and social breakdown. The body-mind needs a new kind of nurturing and educational process involving the potentiation of latent human capacities if it is to successfully withstand and recreate the technological process, as well as facilitate a more humane use of human beings.     

The so-called “transformation problem” revisited: A comment

This comment shows that Lipietz's Marxist transformation theorem represents but a simple, though useful reinterpretation of obvious mathematical consequences of a standard Sraffa model—by making appropriate use of its known degree of freedom. Labor values are not involved in this new interpretation of conventional prices of production. A proposal is therefore made how their role in Marx's transformation may be investigated further on the basis of Lipietz's theorem and its interpretation of the “value of labor power”.     

The Verdoorn law revisited: A note

In his Fattori che regolano lo sviluppo della produttività del lavoro Verdoorn (1949) presented empirical evidence on the constancy of the ratio of productivity growth to output growth. As a theoretical underpinning he used a neoclassical growth model. The main purpose of this paper is to emphasize that in this model the ratio is constant only in the steady state. If Verdoorn's underpinning of his law is to be correct, the steady-state assumption should be empirically tested. Some available evidence for Verdoorn's sample appears to throw doubt upon this assumption.     

Frederic Lee and Post-Keynesian Pricing Theory

Frederic Lee has been a major contributor to post-Keynesian economics, mainly to its theory of pricing. This article summarizes his objections to the neoclassical view of the firm and pricing, as well as his view that changes in quantities, rather than in prices, provide the important information to firms. It also outlines Lee's views on competition, and examines the three pricing doctrines Lee carefully analyzed—markup pricing (associated with Kalecki), normal-cost pricing or full-cost pricing (associated with Andrews), and target-return or administered pricing (associated with Means). The article then discusses the relationship between Lee and three strands of post-Keynesianism: Kaleckian, Sraffian and Eichnerian pricing theories. It explains why Lee objected to some features of each of these. The article concludes by discussing why, towards the end of his life, Lee felt (mistakenly) that his ideas had been dismissed by heterodox economists.     

The so-called “transformation problem” revisited: A brief comment

This comment deals with Lipietz's presentation of a solution which had been proposed to the transformation problem. Lipietz's account can be criticized in two respects. First, his attempt to integrate the familiar Morishima-type approach with the newer one is based on a confusion between the conceptual and factual determination of the value of labor power. Second, his demonstration of the mathematical conditions for the validity of the new interpretation rests on an inappropriate conceptualization of the price and quantity mechanisms associated with capitalist competition. Moreover his results could not be applied to a more general framework which took account, for example, of joint production.     

A sequential stochastic tree problem

We consider here the owner of a plot of land upon which he sequentially plants and harvests trees. The trees' growth paths follow a stochastic process, and the owner must decide when to harvest and replant, given knowledge of the process and each tree's growth history. The results of this analysis are compared with the non-repeated case derived by Brock, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1979) (hereafter B.R.S.) and found to be qualitatively similar.     

Marx's socialism in the context of his typology of economic systems

This paper restates the major structural properties of Marx's conception of socialism in the broader context of his typology of economic systems, commencing with feudalism and ending with his unique vision of postcapitalist economy. It also discusses briefly some of the major applications of this typology to contemporary practice, notably to Soviet experience. Clarification and systematic examination of Marx's views on the basic organizational properties of socialism in the broader context of Marx's views on economic systems, although important in its own right, can also sharpen critical understanding of debates concerning relations between the classical Marxian vision and contemporary practice.     

Monopolistic competition,aggregation of competitive information,and the amount of product differentiation

Consider an industry with a large number of homogeneous firms. Each firm's profits are a function of its own strategy and the strategies the other firms select. Suppose other firms' strategies enter into each firm's profit function only through one or more statistics. For example, average price in the market may parameterize every firm's profit function. We prove that, as a general rule, the industry's firms will in equilibrium follow at most M + 1 distinct strategies, where M is the number of statistics by which competitors' strategies affect each firm's profits.     

Quesnay's model of economic development

The article examines François Quesnay's ideas on economic growth and technical progress in agriculture. It formalizes these ideas as a dynamic model which describes the relationship between a shift to high yielding capital-intensive methods of production and growth and income distribution, taking into account Quesnay's understanding of the institutional aspects of land tenure in his days.     

A general theory of demand for information about product quality

The purpose of this paper is to construct a general theory—analogous to the neoclassical theory of consumer demand—of demand for information about product quality. The model proposed here introduces uncertain product quality by assuming that commodities possess attributes which consumers desire and that an uncertain commodity possesses are unknown quantity of some attribute. It is assumed that information about the quality of uncertain products is available. The consumer's utility function of information is derived and his information demand function is obtained.Partial analogues of the neoclassical theorems are proved for information demand. Roughly, we find that the Slutsky matrix is symmetric and that a submatrix is negative definite. The negative definite submatrix contains those terms which measure the effect of (income compensated) changes in information prices on information demand.The analysis employed to obtain these results parallels—with some important modifications—the neoclassical analysis of commodity demand. The method used to obtain expressions for the Slutsky substitution terms is an extension of the approach introduced by McKenzie [10] and later used by Hurwicz and Uzawa [6]. This approach uses an “income compensation” function to arrive at an “income compensated” demand function.