Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution

This paper analyzes a regulator's optimal strategic delay of resolving banks when the regulator's announcement of the intervention delay endogenously affects the depositors' run propensity. Given intervention, the regulator either liquidates the remaining illiquid assets (“prompt corrective action”) or continues managing the assets at a reduced skill level (“resolution under receivership”). In either case, I show that if the regulator tolerates fewer withdrawals until intervention, the depositors may react by preempting the regulator: they run on the bank more often ex ante. A policy of never intervening can leave the bank more stable than a conservative intervention policy.     

Getting the Right Mix of Capital and Cash Requirements in Prudential Bank Regulation*

Cash reserve requirements are useful as a broadly conceived prudential tool, not just as a narrowly focused means of limiting the risks associated with illiquidity. Indeed, illiquidity risk is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing bank liquidity requirements. The primary means of mitigating the systemic costs of bank illiquidity risk is the creation of an effective lender of last resort (LOLR). But instead of focusing narrowly on bank funding risks when designing liquidity requirements, regulators should consider tradeoffs among capital requirements, liquidity requirements, and LOLR policies for achieving the broader prudential goal of limiting bank default risk. When considering the optimal tradeoff between capital ratios and cash ratios as prudential requirements, five “frictions” are identified that favor the use of one or the other: (1) the adverse‐selection costs of raising equity (which favors the use of cash); (2) the opportunity cost of forgone abnormal profits (or “quasi rents”) from lending (which favors the use of capital); (3) the limited verifiability of loan outcomes (which favors the use of cash); (4) the moral hazard that results from costly or postponed loss recognition, given the incentive for risk shifting in bad states (which favors the use of cash); and (5) the prospect of changes in the risk environment (which favors cash since it creates greater option value for maintaining targeted default risk with lower adjustment costs in the face of changing loan risk or illiquidity risk). When viewed from the perspective of achieving the main prudential goal of controlling default risk at a minimum social cost, capital requirements have some limitations that favor liquidity requirements, and vice versa. And thus the optimal regulatory policy will combine liquidity and capital requirements.     

Understanding the Components of Bank Failure Resolution Costs

In this paper, we demonstrate how the resolution costs associated with over 1,000 bank failures from 1986 to 2007 are distributed across the method of resolution, bank size, regulatory periods, and the existence of fraud. In addition, we document the time spent in the resolution by the resolution method and legislative period. Finally, we show how various classes of claimants against the failed banks bear the costs of the failure.     

会计准则改革、会计利润信息与银行债务契约

本文考察了新、旧准则下合并报表净利润对银行信贷决策有用性的变化,以及新、旧准则下合并—母公司净利润差异对银行信贷决策有用性的变化。研究发现,合并报表净利润是银行信贷决策的重要依据,新准则下合并报表净利润与债务契约的相关性减弱,且公允价值变动损益高的公司更明显。论文还发现,新准则实施后,合并—母公司净利润差异与企业获得银行借款的相关性减弱,说明新准则下的合并母公司净利润差异为银行信贷决策提供了新的信息含量。     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: Bank Capital as a Substitute for Prudential Regulation

The Financial CHOICE Act recently passed by the House proposes to create an “off‐ramp” that would allow banks to escape burdensome prudential regulation if the ratio of their equity capital to their total assets is 10% or more. The Financial Economists Roundtable supports this idea as a means of reducing regulatory costs, but believes some additional safeguards are needed. A capital ratio of 10% may not be high enough to discourage banks from excessive risk taking. A solution is to have two capital requirements for banks choosing the off‐ramp: one absolute (as proposed in the act) and one risk‐based. The FER believes that many banks will prefer this regime to the current burdensome prudential regulation, especially if regulators simplify the setting of risk weights and make them more rule‐based. Regulators setting minimum capital requirements should consider not only a bank’s stand‐alone risk, but also the systemic risk posed by banks, as well as the tendency of accounting measures of income and assets to overstate the economic value of banks’ equity capital. The Financial Choice Act would also eliminate useful elements of ongoing supervision and regulation, not all of which can be addressed by higher capital alone. Furthermore, to facilitate regulatory learning about risks, off‐ramped banks should continue to report the data that regulators use for stress tests, even if they are no longer subjected to the discipline of stress tests. Finally, the act is viewed as too permissive in its treatment of off‐ramped banks that get into trouble. To prevent gaming of regulation, FERC recommends that off‐ramped banks that subsequently fall below the minimum requirements should be required to raise new capital immediately.     

金融抑制与商业银行改革

金融抑制一直束缚着我国商业银行的发展，随之带来经营规模、范围、结构、速度和网络的不经济性，造成身份、约束、职能、渠道和纽带的双重错位等一系列问题，须以强化改革，促进金融深化的协同策略予以解决。     

银行业改革、市场化与信贷资源的配置

鉴于我国资本市场弱法律风险和股权高度集中的基本特征,本文提出了一个分析我国银行信贷业务预期违约风险的基本框架。以此为基础,本文考察了我国的银行业改革以及市场化进程对银行信贷资源配置行为的影响。研究发现,银行配置信贷资源时,会认真考虑贷款企业的历史财务绩效和代理成本。并且,银行业改革和地区市场化进程都成功促进了银行信贷资源配置行为的商业化。本文的研究为评价银行业改革的历史进程提供了经验证据,也为进一步的努力方向提供了一些有益的线索。一方面,银行在配置其信贷资源时不仅要进一步关注贷款企业的财务绩效;另一方面,也应当致力于促使银行在确立必要报酬率时进一步关注贷款企业的代理成本。     

汉城银行的内部改革

曾经操作了2000-2002年汉城银行结构改革并将其成功私有化的韩国首席执行官Chungwonkang,叙述了自己在汉城银行内部改革中的经历。     

农业发展银行改革的现状、问题及建议—以吉林省通化市辉南县为例

2004年,农业发展银行管理体制改革正式展开,业务范围和业务主体均得到很大扩展和深化,为农业发展银行的发展创造了新的机遇。本文以吉林省通化市辉南县为例,深入探讨了农业发展银行改革至今所取得的成绩和当前发展面临的问题,并提出相应的建议。     

Basel II and the Need for Bank Distress Resolution Procedures*

It is argued that without increased market discipline Basel II is not likely to resolve the regulatory problem caused by explicit and implicit guarantees of depositors and other creditors of banks. One way to enhance market discipline is to implement proposals for mandatory subordinated debt. For these proposals to achieve their objective, the non‐insurance of holders of subordinated debt must be credible. Increased credibility of non‐insurance of one or several groups of creditors could be enhanced if distress resolution procedures for banks were pre‐specified, and if they made possible bank failures without serious disruption of the financial system. The existence of rules for dealing with banks in distress not only enhances the credibility of non‐insurance of some creditors, it also allows for predictability of distress resolution costs for shareholders and management of banks. Such costs—if predictable—reduce the moral hazard incentives caused by deposit insurance schemes.     

产权、治理结构、竞争与国有商业银行改革

国有商业银行的改革方案主要有三种，或侧重于产权，或侧重于治理结构等，而正确的思路应当是改革国有商业银行市场垄断现状，引入更多的竞争者，并进行产权制度改革，在此基础上要将建立和不断完善法人治理结构贯彻整个改革始终。     

改革预期、动态博弈与专项中央银行票据兑付北大核心

专项票据是新一轮农村信用社改革中主要的资金支持方式。本文通过分析认为,中央银行在专项票据兑付考核中建立的"威胁"具有不完全可置信,农村信用社对改革及专项票据的兑付存有强烈的预期,专项票据兑付是中央银行与农村信用社间的完全但不完美信息动态博弈,博弈的结果取决于中央银行设立的"威胁"的可信性,较低的"威胁"将引致农村信用社较高的作假行为,达不到"花钱买机制"的改革目标。为此,中央银行要提高"威胁"的置信度,降低农村信用社对专项票据兑付的预期,激励农村信用社通过真实努力深化改革,实现改革方案设计的目标。     

在变革中前行--访北京银行董事长阎冰竹

引资助力《银行家》:2005年3月25日和5月25 日,北京银行分别与荷兰ING集团和国际金融公司签订股份认购协议,两家境外金融机构分别占股19．9％和5％。引资工作的完成对北京银行意味着什么? 阎冰竹:北京银行引进境外战略投资者的时间虽然不长,但已初见成效。引资在以下四个方面提升了北京银行的实力: 第一,充实资本金,全面优化资本结     

城商行改革的四个着眼点

抓住有利时机。城商行便能够获得更广阔的业务空间。实际上。由于中小企业是县域和农村经济的重要组成部分。而“服务中小企业”一直是城市商业银行的长处所在。因此。在与其他银行和农信社的竞争中会有一定优势。[编者按]     

我国银行业变革引人注目

银行业变革崭新而深刻 我国银行业目前正经历着一场崭新而深刻的变革,此次变革大体上说应该是酝酿于1997年的第一次中央金融工作会议,开始于2002年的第二次中央金融工作会议。这次变革不是一次普通意义上的改革,而是银行业由变 化走向变革、由量变走向质变的全面提升。     

金融脱媒对商业银行经营管理的影响分析

随着经济金融体制改革的推进,我国商业银行经营环境正经历着前所未有的巨变,金融脱媒态势日益显现。在这种环境下,如何加快改革创新步伐,重塑经营管理体系,已经成为我国商业银行必须高度关注和认真解决的问题。本文对以上现实问题进行了思考和探索。     

供给侧改革下的税负水平、业务结构与银行效率

本文基于2004—2014年我国16家上市银行的面板数据,构建SSBM的三阶段DEA模型计算银行效率,构建面板门槛模型分析税收负担变动时业务结构与银行效率的非线性关系。研究表明:国内商业银行效率整体状况不容乐观,影响银行效率的主要因素为规模效率。在低税负水平环境下,提高中间业务收入占比对改善银行效率更为有效。在供给侧结构性改革背景下,银行应从优化业务结构、控制营业支出和适度扩大规模着手,有效提升银行效率。     

理解银行资本监管改革

正资本监管改革是后危机时期国际金融监管改革的核心。2010年12月,巴塞尔委员会发布了新的资本和流动性的国际规则(巴塞尔协议Ⅲ)。在2011年11月召开的G20领导人戛纳峰会上,各国领导人承诺于2013年1月1日前实施新资本监管标准,并于2019年前全面达标。近期,欧盟、澳大利亚、瑞士、瑞典、新加坡、印度、日本、香港地区、美国等相继公布了新资本监管标准。目前,巴塞尔委员会正在对欧     

台湾中国输出入银行之转型经验

子台湾在经历了成功的经济发展初期之后,为因应出口替代需要,以及持续扩大出口以巩固经济成长,开始以政策性金融之方式,补足一般私有金融未能充分发挥之功能。特别是关于出口产业方面,为提高长期融资之比重,政府在成立了中小企业银行后,依循世界各国对进出口金融之先例,在1979年由财政部100名出资,成立了“台湾中国输出入银行”。该行主要任务为配合政府经贸政策,提供金融服务,协助厂商拓展对外贸易与海外投资,并增进国际合作,以持续推动台湾经济稳定与发展。输出入银的转型,仍将扮演资金供给者角色,有助于其业务触角与利茎,提升知名度。     

关于国有商业银行产权改革模式的思考

国有独资商业银行的产权改革模式是国家控股型股份制银行，还是社会公众型股份制银行？本围绕这一问题，就现代商业银行产权制度特征，国家控股商业银行模式设计的原则及这种模式可能带来的弊端，社会公众型股份制银行的优势特征及对我国银行的意义展开讨论，明确指出我国国有商业银行产权改革的方向是社会公众型股份制银行，并就这一模式的实现方式作进一步探讨。