Optimal Management of Environmental Externalities with Time Lags and Uncertainty

Many environmental externalities occur with time lags that can range from a few days to several centuries in length, and many of these externalities are also subject to uncertainty. In this paper, we examine the key features of an optimal policy to manage environmental externalities that are both lagged and stochastic. We develop a two-period, two-polluter model and obtain closed-form solutions for optimal emissions levels under different combinations of damage functions and stochastic processes. These solutions show that it is not obvious whether greater control should be exerted on polluters that generate externalities with longer lags or on polluters that generate externalities with shorter lags. We find that the optimal ranking of polluters with respect to the length of the time lag associated with their externality will depend on (a) the discount rate, (b) conditional expectations of future states of the polluted resource, (c) persistence of the pollutant, and (d) initial conditions.     

网络外部性条件下的技术革新

自然彼特创新理论提出之后,创新研究在众多学者的努力下不断丰富和完善,但是传统上对技术革新的分析大多立足于企业角度（即技术提供者角度）,消费者对技术推广的影响分析尚未深入,本文以Ozshy模型出发,讨论消费者态度对技术革新的影响。     

Transboundary Externalities in the Environmental Transition Hypothesis

The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is a hypothesis which implies that it is possible to grow out of environmental degradation. Most theoretical models of the EKC relation have not accounted for transboundary and intergenerational externalities nor have empirical studies provided evidence that validates an inverted U shaped relation between environmental degradation and economic growth for pollution problems where the effects are far-displaced or are long-delayed.This paper integrates the theory of transboundary externalities into the most common theoretical framework applied to the EKC hypothesis. It shows that where a significant proportion of the environmental impacts of economic activity occurs outside the territories in which those activities take place, the de-linking of growth and environmental degradation is less likely to happen. This proposition is demonstrated by assuming that decisionmakers have a Nash-type non cooperative strategic behavior.     

Environmental Externalities in the Presence of Network Effects: Adoption of Low Emission Technologies in the Automobile Market*

The paper considers a market currently dominated by a dirty technology that imposes significant environmental costs. A clean technology, with zero environmental costs, is introduced after the maturity of the dirty technology’s network. Adoption of the clean technology is not possible due to the network benefits in favour of the dirty technology. The paper considers two types of policy intervention to correct for the environmental externality. First, we find that the tax necessary to induce adoption of the clean technology is very high implying that a tax equal to the marginal environmental damage would not resolve the externality problem in many cases. Second, if tax revenues are earmarked towards subsidizing the clean technology, the tax is lower than in the previous case and can be set equal to the marginal external damage. *The authors are indebted to two anonymous referees for their insightful comments. We would also like to thank Robert Androkovich, Jim Seldon, Gordon Tarzwell, Christos Constantatos, participants of the EAERE 2002 conference, and the Sevilla Workshop on Public Economics and the Environment 2004 for their suggestions. Financial support by the Scholarly Activity Committee of the University College of the Cariboo is acknowledged by both authors. Eftichios Sartzetakis acknowledges also financial support by the Pythagoras I research grant of the Greek government.     

污染产业转移视角下FDI环境外部性的跨界效应

通过FDI方式的污染产业转移会产生环境负外部性,在空间上存在跨界效应.这体现在承接污染产业会直接带来环境污染,从而引起居民福利的大量损失,而且还会因为自然因素导致跨界污染.目前,FDI的环境影响主要集中在东部地区,但有向中西部地区转移的趋势.许多地方政府为吸引FDI而进行的环境竞争,对这种跨界效应会起到相当的放大作用.因而需要采取调整政府人员业绩考核机制、鼓励地方政府增加环境投资、中西部地区按照全国主体功能区划要求制定分类的FDI环境管理政策、实行跨区域联合治理等措施,尽可能减少甚至消除FDI环境外部性的跨界效应.     

Environmental Policy in the Presence of Induced Technological Change

We examine the hypothesis that induced technological change (ITC) can dramatically lower the cost of a carbon tax in a static optimal tax model. The research and development sector is represented by an aggregate stock of energy-saving technology, which acts as a weak substitute with a polluting resource in the energy generation sector. Using this model, we analytically show how ITC occurs and affects the cost of a carbon tax. Applying quantitative estimates of the size of ITC to numerical simulations calibrated to the US economy, we find that existing empirical evidence can reduce the welfare cost of environmental tax reform by 12%. Our tests of alternative parameters show that this result is highly sensitive to the assumptions used, suggesting that ITC could result in much larger reductions in cost.     

Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze strategic environmental standards in the presence of foreign direct investment. A number of foreign firms located in a host country compete with a domestic firm in another country to export a homogeneous good to a third country. When the number of foreign firms is exogenous, the host country applies a stricter environmental regulation than the other producing country. However, under free entry and exit of foreign firms, the host country may apply a less severe standard under both non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium. We also find that the nature market structure does not affect the equilibrium values of total pollution if export subsidies are also used.JEL Classification: F2, H2     

Policy Instruments for Groundwater Management in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands agriculture andnature have conflicting interests with respectto groundwater management. Insight into thesuitability of policy instruments to achieveoptimal groundwater level and extractionmanagement in the Netherlands is, however,missing. In this paper the suitability ofpolicy instruments for groundwater managementis studied. Changes in the institutionalenvironment and voluntary agreements seem to bemore suitable for groundwater level managementthan economic instruments. The currenthistorical groundwater extraction rightssystems together with the low groundwaterprices encourage low-value agriculturalgroundwater usage, whereas sprinkling bans andirrigation scheduling currently aim to reducelow-value use of groundwater. These extractioninstruments are less efficient than a systemthat considers externalities in the price ofwater or diverts water away from agriculturewhile encouraging trading.     

试论森林环境资源核算

环境资源核算是当前国际社会最关注的热门课题之一,作者指出了现行国民经济核算体系的缺陷,论述了世界环境资源核算的研究现状及发展前景,重点介绍了环境资源核算研究的指导思想、环境资源核算的新概念及其分类、价值和计算方法、环境产业问题等,并对我国开展森林环境资源核算研究提出了几点建议。     

浙江省地下水资源战略储备体系研究

科学合理地开发利用地下水资源、实施地下水资源储备战略,是保障浙江经济可持续发展和未来水安全的一项重要措施.本文针对浙江省水资源储备的形式和地下水使用状况,分析了建立地下水资源战略储备的作用,说明了建立地下水资源储备所需的条件,并提出实施地下水资源战略储备建议.     

浙江省地下水资源战略储备体系研究

科学合理地开发利用地下水资源、实施地下水资源储备战略,是保障浙江经济可持续发展和未来水安全的一项重要措施。本文针对浙江省水资源储备的形式和地下水使用状况,分析了建立地下水资源战略储备的作用,说明了建立地下水资源储备所需的条件,并提出实施地下水资源战略储备建议。     

Joint Management of Emission Abatement and Technological Innovation for Stock Externalities

We investigate how emission abatement and technological innovation provide different solutions to reduce pollutant emissions. In the case of a stock externality emission abatement leads to a smooth and continuous adjustment of emissions. Conversely, technological innovation has to be interpreted as an option on a less polluted environment and can justify the use of a pollution threshold above which it is optimal to start a research and development programme for a less polluting technology. It is shown that technological innovation interferes with the traditional emission abatement approach. The optimal abatement level is logically lowered once the less polluting technology is available; nevertheless a temporary increase in emissions is optimal during the research and development period. The usual Pigouvian tax system proves to remain an efficient corrective instrument. A numerical application to the Greenhouse effect is provided.     

Groundwater Management in a Food Security Context

This article analyzes the sustainability of market-based instruments such as tradable permits for the management of a renewable aquifer used for irrigated agriculture. In our dynamic hydro-economic model, a water agency aims at satisfying a food security constraint within a tradable permit scheme in the presence of myopic heterogeneous agents. We identify analytically the viability kernel that defines the states of the resource yielding inter-temporal feasible paths able to satisfy the set of constraints over time and the associated set of viable quota policies. We then illustrate the theoretical results of the paper with numerical simulations based on the Western La Mancha aquifer.     

Product Emulation Strategies in The Presence of Reputation Effects And Network Externalities: Some Evidence From The Minicomputer Industry

A model of firm performance in the minicomputer industry is developed and estimated. We use an hedonic price formulation to analyze product design and pricing issues and a market share model to assess the demand effects of price-performance characteristics, installed base advantages and manufacturer reputation. The results, which are based on 1976–1983 data, demonstrate the importance of network externalities, price-performance competition and reputation. We utilize the estimated models to quantify the implications of several emulation strategies and several defensive strategies of incumbent manufacturers.     

动态环境税外部性、污染累积路径与长期经济增长——兼论环境税的开征时点选择问题

本文构建了包含动态环境税、污染累积与经济增长的理论模型,采用Shooting方法计算鞍点路径上各个时期的均衡解,分析了动态环境税的外部效应,主要结论为:渐进递增的动态环境税政策通过对能源过度使用的纠正,不但体现了促进经济增长与降低污染水平的双重红利,而且实现了整条鞍点路径上福利最大化的目标。与之相对,不征收环境税时,能源过度消耗不能得到有效抑制,环境污染产生了较高的生产效率损失与社会福利损失。严格环境税政策对于经济增长依赖能源的行为则存在"矫枉过正",进而出现消费过度的问题,由于投资不足迅速造成产出增长乏力,并使得鞍点路径上社会福利长期处于较低水平。此外,通过设定政府的优化目标函数对动态环境税最佳开征时点的研究表明,政府应尽早开征环境税,以及时减弱经济增长对能源的过度依赖性,实现经济科学发展与社会福利不断改善。     

Joint Quantity/Quality Management of Groundwater

Economic literature on groundwater managementhas traditionally been split into two areas: there are papers that evaluate different schemes of dynamicaquifer management, considering that pumping costs vary with stock but ignoring water quality. On the other hand, there are papers that considercontamination problems caused by specificpollutants. This paper presents two alternative models for joint quantity-quality management, and it shows that existing models are in fact special cases of these. The framework isdynamic and considers both the stock of waterquantity and a stock measure of water quality. Optimal taxes are derived, and shown to be different from those in existing quantity-only or quality-only models. Implementationproblems are briefly discussed.     

Regulation and Coordination of International Environmental Externalities with Incomplete Information and Costly Public Funds

In this article, we study cross-border externalities in a game played by two principal-agent pairs with adverse selection. Each firm/agent is located in one country and generates pollution by producing complementary or substitute goods, sold on a common market. A fraction of pollution is transferred from one country to another. Each regulator/principal is imperfectly informed about the marginal cost of his domestic firm and accordingly uses secret incentive contracts with costly public funds. We show the necessity of cooperation between competing regulators to effectively internalize all the damages caused to the environment, while reaching the first best. If the level of uncertainty is sufficiently low, we obtain an infinity of noncooperative Bayesian differentiable equilibria, which may necessitate competing regulators to coordinate on an equilibrium. Such coordination constitutes an incentive for competing regulators to cooperate. Our major result states that under some circumstances asymmetric information relaxes the transborder externality problem. Indeed, we show that, when there is a major transfer of pollution and firms' marginal costs are sufficiently high, competing regulators are better off under uncertainty. Therefore, asymmetry of information can have the very consequence of generating regulation that is too strict from the domestic viewpoint but that improves social efficiency when the benefits to both countries are taken into account.     

环境管理正式制度与非正式制度研究

经济增长中有两种制度安排:正式制度和非正式制度.正式制度通过法律规定来约束人们的行为;非正式制度通过意识形态、道德潜规则等发挥作用.在环境治理过程中也存在着环境管理的正式制度与非正式制度,二者以不同的形式,对污染治理起到了积极的管制作用.我国环境管理亟需建立正式管理制度与非正式管理制度共同作用的制度体系.     

Optimal Tax Policy, Market Imperfections, and Environmental Externalities in a Dynamic Optimizing Macro Model

This paper develops a dynamic real business cycle model that highlights pollution externalities (on welfare and production) and market imperfections and uses it to determine the socially optimal tax policy that encompasses labor income, capital income, and emission taxes. We show that the optimal tax on capital and labor income only addresses the production inefficiency (and is time-invariant), while the tax on the environmental externalities affects both the production inefficiency and the environmental spillovers (and is time-varying). More interestingly, the socially optimal emission tax will be characterized by a Keynesian-like stabilizer that is designed to mitigate business cycle fluctuations, i.e., that will stimulate the economy with a lower emission tax during recessions. In a positive analysis, we show that the beneficial effects arising from pollution taxation will become larger the greater is the degree of the firms' monopoly power. In addition, a triple dividend in terms of improving environmental quality and increasing employment and firms' profit can be simultaneously realized if the environmental production externality is more significant and if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is relatively small.