乡镇长经济责任审计研究

乡镇作为最基层的一级政府，负有发展区域经济，直接带领农民致富，自觉实践“三个代表”重要思想的历史重任。改革开放以来，我省乡镇经济得到了快速发展，乡镇经济的规模迅速增长。据调查，我省最发达100个乡镇创造了全省乡镇36％的农村经济总收入，平均每个乡镇农村经济总     

乡镇区域经济发展战略的制定与实施

在我国农业现代化发展中,节约了大量农村劳动力。大量剩余劳动力进入乡镇、城市寻求发展,促进了乡镇经济的活跃。随着现代乡镇经济的不断发展,乡镇经济的发展已经成为了我国经济结构体系中的重要组成部分。为了实现乡镇区域经济的科学发展、促进和谐社会的构建,我国各乡镇政府加快了经济结构的调整。以市场需求为导向进行乡镇区域经济结构的优化,促进乡镇区域经济的发展。现通过对现代乡镇区域经济发展现状的分析,论述了乡镇区域经济发展战略的制定与实施。     

乡镇审计新模式初探

改革开放以来,农村经济得到了迅速发展,乡镇审计也从无到有逐步壮大,在乡镇经济生活中发挥着越来越重要的作用。     

探究乡镇经济增长模式之转变

近几年,由于经济发展,许多农村地区也逐渐发展成乡镇。不过,我国的乡镇经济的发展还有待加强。本文就针对我国乡镇的经济增长模式进行探究,了解一些现阶段我国乡镇经济发展的方式。     

乡镇经济发展中存在的问题剖析及对策

乡镇经济是连接城市经济与农村经济的桥梁。本文就乡镇经济发展中存在的问题进行了剖析并提出了几点对策,以促进乡镇经济顺利发展。     

取消农业税之后乡镇财政的困境和出路

取消农业税之后,我国很多地区出现了乡镇财政收入锐减、农村公益事业难以发展、农村义务教育面临困境等一系列问题,如果不从根本上解决乡镇财政的缺口和债务问题,乡镇政府将不得不再次向农民乱集资、乱摊派和乱收费,从而使农业税改革重走历史的老路。本文对取消农业税之后乡镇财政所面临的主要问题进行了初步探讨,以寻求乡镇财政走出困境的出路。     

税费改革后乡镇农经站的改革与发展

一、农村税费改革后乡镇农经站工作内容的变化 自1999年全国农村税费改革试点开始到2006年全面取消农业税,农村社会经济情况发生了很大的变化。取消农业税和农村的三提五统,乡镇机构正常运转开支和公益事业的建设及村级管理经费均由国家财政转移支付解决;过去乡村干部催收催缴农业税和各项提留的复杂而艰巨的工作不存在了;     

农村公益事业的现状及发展

自从农业税取消以来,农村人面临的经济负担相对减少很多,但农村公益事业的发展仍然止步不前,本文就农村公益事业的发展现状以及前景进行了简要探讨。     

加强乡镇审计初探

随着农村经济体制改革的完善，乡镇经济近年来得到了蓬勃发展，已成为我国经济的重要支柱。因此，大力加强乡镇审计，对进一步形成乡镇自我约束机制，逐步实现乡镇企业自我监督、自我发展、自我提高，促进乡镇经济的健康发展，越来越显得重要。     

积极开展集体资产评估开拓乡镇审计新领域

积极开展集体资产评估开拓乡镇审计新领域万晓保乡镇审计的建立是农村经济发展的客观需要。抓住乡镇经济发展新热点，开拓新领域，切实为地方经济发展服务是乡镇审计发展壮大的根本。一、发展乡镇经济的新热点为对现有乡镇企业进行股份制改造乡镇企业由责、权、利不分明的...     

The Role of Symmetry between the Revenue and the Expenditure Side of the Government Budget in the Debate about the Potential Negative Effects of Tax Competition

The effects of capital tax competition are reconsidered in this paper incorporating the argument that the expenditure structure of public budget should reflect its revenue structure. The paper offers a small open economy model where capital and labour tax revenues are used exclusively on the provision of public inputs. It is shown that if the revenue side of the government budget exactly matches the expenditure side that is if industrial public goods are financed by both private production factors with the weights reflecting the contributions of public inputs to the private factor productivity then public inputs are provided optimally even in the presence of tax competition.     

Reducing government debt in the presence of inequality

What are the welfare effects of government debt? In particular, what are the welfare consequences of government debt reductions? We answer these questions with the help of an incomplete markets economy with production. Households are subject to uninsurable income shocks. We make several contributions. First, by targeting the skewed wealth and earnings distribution of the US economy in our calibration, we identify inequality as the major driver of the welfare effects of public debt/GDP changes. Second, we show that in order to fully gauge the welfare consequences and the political feasibility of government debt changes, it is crucial to consider the transitional dynamics between stationary equilibria. Our results therefore have important implications for the design of debt reduction policies. Since the skewed wealth distribution generates a large fraction of borrowing-constrained households, a public debt reduction should be non-linear, such that the tax burden is postponed into the future.     

“营改增”对地方财政收支负面影响思考

营业税改征增值税的税制改革一直是中国近年来财税体制改革领域的热点问题,其涉及改革范围、政府间财政关系的调整等诸多方面,堪称中国“十二五”时期财税体制改革的“牛鼻子”。文章以上海市为例就“营改增”税制改革从系统循环角度出发,分析此次改革对上海市地方财政收入规模结构的影响,从而对其地方财政支出规模结构的影响,最终影响到其地方经济的发展,并在这个基础上又对其地方财政收入开始新的一轮的循环影响。由于“营改增”税制改革现已在全国范围内开展,为顺利推进此次改革．保持其地方政府财力不变．文章也提出了一些改革的相应配套措施．     

我国公益性捐赠的税收政策缺陷分析

税收激励是鼓励公益性捐赠的重要方式,有效的税收优惠政策可以实现社会财富的再分配,促进社会公益事业的发展。     

How economic integration affects the vertical structure of the public sector

This paper investigates the impact of economic integration on the vertical structure of the public sector within a country. To tackle this issue we set up a model of fiscal federalism, where economic integration is assumed to affect central government tax revenues. The main findings are that when an increase of the impact of economic integration brings about a reduction in central government tax revenues, under certain conditions: (a) it reduces central government expenditure; (b) it reduces general government expenditure; (c) it increases local taxation; (d) it increases the degree of public sector decentralization. Quite interestingly, these results are consistent with different patterns of local public spending and grants to local government.     

乡镇企业税收负担、利润水平与农民非农就业——基于协整分析方法

利用1978年至2009年的乡镇企业有关数据,采用协整检验方法、误差修正模型和Granger因果关系检验方法,对乡镇企业税收负担、利润水平与农民非农就业三者之间的相互关系进行实证研究,结果表明:三者之间存在显著的长期均衡关系;安置就业和税收负担在短期内影响企业盈利情况;安置就业与企业盈利在长期内互为Granger因果关系.因此,国家应综合采取税收优惠、金融支持与政府培训等政策,以提高乡镇企业盈利水平和扩大农民非农就业.     

浅议农业税取消后农民的负担

自2006年开始全国范围内取消农业税,这对于长期处于税负之下的农民和农村经济来说无疑具有重大的积极影响,然而农业税并不是中国农民唯一的负担,即取消农业税并不能完全取消农民负担。     

财政购买性支出激励与经济持续增长——兼论确立服务型政府的合理性

本文建立了政府支出创新激励经济增长的理论模型,模型表明政府支出对经济增长的效应取决于预算、投资生产率和支出结构.借助VAR实证模型,中国的经验实证分析表明:公共花费是公共投资的基础,也是GDP增长的主要影响变量;公共投资不一定能促进GDP增长.为此,我们提出政策建议:必须转变政府职能,由投资型政府变为服务型政府,以促进经济持续增长.     

On the role of government in a stochastically growing open economy

The relationship between the size of government, economic growth, and volatility in a small open economy is analyzed. First, we characterize the stochastic equilibrium for a centrally planned economy, contrasting it with a closed economy. The role of government consumption expenditure both as a stabilizing and a destabilizing factor is discussed. The optimal size of government is derived and we find that an open economy will have a larger government if and only if it is a net creditor. Second, the stochastic equilibrium in a decentralized economy is characterized and the optimal tax structure derived. Finally, the role of government production expenditure and its impact on risk is briefly discussed.     

The welfare effects of intergovernmental grants in an economy with independent jurisdictions

A general equilibrium model is presented of an economy where mobile and immobile households engage in decentralized market behavior and where immobile households control the expenditure and tax policy of each local government, subject to a local budget constraint. It is shown how central government grant policy (which is a formula with lump-sum, matching, and population elements) affects the general equilibrium of the system determined through market and local political decisions. The welfare effects of grants are discussed, with particular emphasis on distortions that may arise at lower levels of decision making that grants may be useful in (partially or completely) correcting.