论公司董事赔偿责任的限制与免除

为激励董事经营的积极性和创新意识,现代公司法与实务在强化董事责任的同时构建限制和免除董事责任的机制,主要以经营判断规则、公司章程、公司机关决议、董事补偿制度、董事责任保险等五种基本途径限制和免除董事责任。基于公司治理和经营规律的共通性,这些制度可以为我国立法和实务所借鉴。     

独立董事的现金薪酬与盈余管理的关系研究

独立董事履行监管职能的同时享有着公司的薪酬补偿,包括股票补偿和现金薪酬。独立董事的现金薪酬具有"激励效应"和"共谋效应"。利用2002—2015年我国上市公司的数据实证分析发现,独立董事现金薪酬影响公司的盈余管理水平,呈现显著正相关关系;独立董事现金薪酬的"共谋效应"占据主导,"激励效应"未能较好地体现,随着独立董事现金薪酬的提高,公司的盈余管理水平也相应提高。同时,引入工具变量进行进一步的稳健性检验,结果支持实证结论。     

我们的经济补偿标准如何来确定？

编辑同志：您好! 我们单位由于经济效益差而将要实行经济性裁员。在单位与我们解除劳动合同时，我们这些工龄十几年的员工都可以按照有关的政策规定享受经济补偿。最近，单位里议论较多的是经济补偿的标准问题。许多人对自己能得到多少经济补偿金心中没底。为此，想请教贵刊编辑，象我们这样的情况，经济补偿标准如何?与其他情况如终止合同、协商解除合同等的情况相比经济补偿标准有否区别?另外还应了解哪些有关的政策问题有助于我们确定经济补偿金。     

连锁独立董事对公司绩效影响的实证研究

在独立董事与公司治理的研究范围内,关于独立董事兼职的经济后果研究尚未得出一致结论。本文在对我国2011年A股上市公司独立董事兼职现状分析基础上,实证检验了连锁独立董事对公司绩效的影响。研究发现,独立董事兼职数量与公司绩效具有u型关系,当独立董事兼职席位不超过3家时,二者呈显著的负相关关系;当独立董事兼职席位超过3家后,随着独立董事兼职席位的增加,公司绩效逐渐上升。     

国内上市公司大股东与独立董事的博弈分析

针对目前上市公司董事会运作不规范、独立董事的作用缺乏充分发挥的问题,本文通过对上市公司在上市时和上市后两个阶段聘用独立董事时,大股东与独立董事的博弈分析,找出其问题产生的部分根源,并提出解决改变独立董事的聘任方法、建立独立董事责任保险制度等建议。     

董事责任保险若干法律问题研究

董事责任保险作为一种董事利益保护机制 ,不仅能有效化解董事的法律风险 ,保障投资人的合法利益 ,而且还能激发董事的经营潜力 ,有利于职业经理人阶层的形成 ,同时 ,保险公司通过对保单的审核还可以有效对公司进行外部监督。与国外相比 ,我国的董事责任保险合同在承保范围、除外责任上还在存在一些问题。     

连锁董事对中小企业技术创新影响研究

目前关于影响企业技术创新因素的研究主要集中在经济、技术、人才等传统影响因素上面,而忽视了企业间连锁董事关系的作用。本文以深交所中小板698家上市公司为样本,重点就连锁董事对中小企业技术创新影响进行了研究。结果发现：连锁董事薪酬、连锁董事学历、连锁董事规模和连锁董事占董事会比例均与企业技术创新投入呈显著正相关。     

上市公司独立董事与公司业绩相关性的实证研究

本文采用面板数据模型,从独立董事的比例、时间精力、职业背景、激励等多个角度考察独立董事与公司业绩的相关性,并测试了独立董事比例的大小对公司业绩的影响。研究发现:独立董事具有代理人的性质,在目前独立董事的胜任力和实现力得不到保证的情况下,独立董事无助于改善公司业绩,当独立董事逐渐成为董事会中的多数甚至绝对多数时,独立董事比例与公司业绩负相关,凸显出独立董事的代理人特征;而且独立董事的薪酬与公司业绩正相关,说明独立董事需要报酬的激励。     

独立董事制度运行研究

我国引入独立董事制度的时间不长,但自从独立董事制度2001年被引入中国后,就一直成为公司制度改革讨论的焦点.不可否认,从独立董事的实践来看,其发挥的作用是必然存在的,但独立董事制度的实施确实还存在着很多方面的问题,有待完善.介绍了独立董事制度的含义与起源,指出我国引入独立董事制度的目的.并进一步分析了独立董事制度在我国实施过程中存在诸如独立董事缺乏独立性,独立董事责任不明、职责不清.独立董事人才欠缺等问题及完善我国独立董事制度的建议.     

完善独立董事制度的对策

构建独立董事制度，完善公司治理结构，已成为目前《公司法》研讨的热点问题之一。虽然证监会于2001年8月制定的《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》对上市公司独立董事的设立做了硬性规定，但其中关于独立董事的资格、选任、独立董事“独立性”的维持等规定还不尽周全。     

Antecedents of New Director Social Capital

Prior research shows that firms benefit from the social capital of their boards of directors but has not explored the antecedents of new director social capital. We argue that firms can attract directors with social capital by offering more compensation. We also argue that more complex firms (firms with a greater scale and scope of operations) are more attractive to such directors because of the greater experience and exposure that such directorships provide. Similarly, we argue that firms with high‐status directors on their current boards will be more attractive to directors with social capital. We analyse the social capital of new outside directors added to boards of semiconductor firms between 1993 and 2007. Surprisingly, we find no support for the hypothesis that higher compensation is associated with adding directors with high status or board ties. However, firm complexity is associated with the ability to add new directors who have social capital, and the status of current board members is associated with the ability to add new directors who also have high status.     

Outside director compensation and firm performance

Compensation given to outside directors has come under increasing scrutiny. However, little empirical work exists which examines outside director compensation. A study of more than 225 major corporations over a five-year period indicates that the number of board meetings and the size of the company are major factors in outside director compensation levels, while organization performance and Chief Executive Officer remuneration do not appear to be significantly related. These findings suggest that market-driven compensation systems are the dominant form used by large organizations to pay outside directors, with a major goal being the attraction and retention of these directors.     

Boards of Directors and Shark Repellents:Assessing the Value of an Agency Theory Perspective

Because shark repellents decrease the vulnerability of firms (and their incumbent managers) to the market for corporate control, the decision to adopt these devices represents an excellent test of agency theory. In this empirical study, we examined the relationships between the adoption of shark repellents and several mechanisms that, according to agency theory, should align the interests of corporate board members and shareholders and/or make directors more effective monitors of management behaviour. Of the variables included, only board stock ownership (especially by employee directors) was linked to a reduced propensity to adopt shark repellents in the predicted manner. Two variables not immediately as- sociated with agency theory — the proportion of inside directors appointed by the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO) and a lower ratio of CEO compensation to the compensation of other top executives — were linked to higher rates of shark repellent adoption. Given that agency theory explains relatively little of the variance in shark repellent adoption, we advocate serious consideration of other theoretical formulations for corporate governance, including two approaches — stewardship theory and agent morality — that take the moral ('other regarding') obligations of directors seriously.     

Why Do Board Members Receive Excess Compensation?

This paper examines compensation to the boards of directors and supervisors for a sample of 656 firms over the period 1999–2008. I find in Taiwan that about 53.21% of firms pay excess compensation to their boards and 13.72% of the boards are overpaid by more than 50%. This paper conjectures that firms reward directors and supervisors in order to retain their valuable human capital and notes a robust positive effect of excess compensation on future firm performance. Because directors and supervisors are rewarded for future success, their excess pay may not be considered all that bad. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

进一步加强国有企业外部董事制度建设的若干思考

健全和完善外部董事制度是推动国有企业董事会建设和改革的重要切入点和落脚点,本文认为,应从立法、工作制度、组织、体制等多方面入手,进一步加强国有企业外部董事制度建设,确保外部董事发挥应有的作用。     

独立董事对家族高管薪酬治理效应分析

高管薪酬契约是现代公司治理结构中的重要组成部分,是所有者用于减轻代理成本的一种手段.通过选取2009-2010年家族类上市公司492家和国有上市公司521家,实证结论表明:家族类上市公司与国有上市公司相比,家族高管薪酬比国有企业高管薪酬水平平均要高,并且薪酬业绩敏感性低;独立董事作为保护外部中小股东利益的监督机制,与国有企业相比,家族企业的独立董事对高管(家族高管)薪酬治理作用更为有限;这一结论表明,独立董事监督作用的发挥还需一个合适的治理环境.     

论湘江流域长株潭区段生态补偿机制的构建

在国家工业化发展进程中,长期粗放型的经济增长方式致使经济社会发展与环境生态失衡,生态和环境问题已经成为阻碍经济社会发展的瓶颈。构建科学合理的生态补偿机制成了解决环境问题的重要途径。湘江流域长株潭区段生态补偿机制存在着资金筹措机制不健全、监督机制不完善、地区协调不一致等方面的问题,应针对这些问题建立起能够统筹全局的湘江流域长株潭区段的生态补偿机制的模式,从机制上解决湘江流域长株潭段生态问题。     

Myth or reality? Assessing the moderating role of CEO compensation on the momentum of innovation in R&D

This study researches the influences of CEO compensation on firm behavior to examine the interactive relationship between the behavioral momentum of innovation in R&D and CEO compensation. The models presented in this study are based on evolutionary, institutional, and agency theories to test hypotheses using data from 107 companies in the high-technology sectors in the United States. The results indicate that the pre-succession innovative behavior of these high-technology firms on R&D can positively affect these firms' post-succession innovative behavior towards R&D. That is, positive momentum in R&D innovation prevails in a firm across a change of the CEO. However, for the role of CEO compensation, short- and long-term compensation does not positively moderate this behavioral momentum in R&D. Hence, the moderating impact of short- and long-term CEO compensation to enhance the momentum of innovation in R&D can be romanticized. These findings provide boards of directors with evidence as to how a CEO succession matters to a firm's behavioral momentum in R&D, and whether CEO compensation can be strategized to change a firm's innovation and momentous behavior.     

国有企业双重目标与投资效率改进——基于独立董事网络和国企混改视角

立足国有企业具有社会和经济双重目标的理论逻辑,本文选取2007~2016年A股国有上市公司作为研究样本,分析了独立董事网络和国有股比例对投资效率的影响以及调节效应。研究发现:独立董事网络降低了国有上市公司的投资效率,较高比例的国有持股抑制了投资效率,但当国企更加关注经济目标时,则有助于改善投资效率;进一步研究发现,相比于特定功能类企业,独立董事网络在商业竞争类企业中发挥投资效率的改善作用更加显著。因此,独立董事应因地制宜在国企中发挥治理作用;政府应分类推进国企混合所有制改革;竞争性国企应引入较大比例的优质民营资本,优化投资决策、提高投资效率。     

When much is not better? Top management compensation,board structure,and performance in Spanish firms

Previous empirical results reveal several contradictions when relating top management compensation, board structure and levels of performance. While fewer directors and more external directors are associated with better supervision, there is no agreement on the effect on top management compensation level. This lack of consensus is even more noticeable when analyzing the effect performance. This paper offers a theoretical framework and a panel data methodology based empirical study to account for how earlier analyses have differed. Given the large board dimension in the Spanish market, information processing perspectives are confirmed which positively link board size with higher top management compensation. Similarly, a higher proportion of external directors reduces top management compensation levels since it improves supervision and reduces insiders' power. Finally, a quadratic relation is obtained between performance and top management compensation. This relation explains a positive effect, supported by agency theory on performance at low levels of management compensation, and a negative effect which is consequence of higher managers' discretion at high levels.