Manager‐Union Bargaining Agenda Under Monopoly and with Network Effects

This paper investigates the bargaining agenda selection in a unionised monopoly with managerial delegation (MD). In contrast to the conventional wisdom, monopoly profits with MD under sequential Efficient Bargaining (SEB) exceed those under Right‐to‐Manage (RTM), while the union can prefer RTM to SEB: paradoxically, a conflict of interests between the parties may still exist but for reversed choices of the agenda. Consumption externalities change the picture. The monopolist still prefers SEB; however, provided that network effects are sufficiently strong, the union prefers SEB even for a relatively low bargaining power. Thus, the parties endogenously choose the SEB agenda which is also Pareto‐superior. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Monopoly and Anti‐Monopoly in China Today

For three decades after liberation in 1949, the Chinese economy consisted almost entirely of state monopolies. Economic reforms, starting in 1979, sought to increase the efficiency of the economy by introducing competitive practices in many sectors of the economy. But the Chinese economy has been partially administered by the state for over two millennia. As a result, both state‐managed and private monopolies are still an intrinsic part of the Chinese economy today. Despite two decades of anti‐monopoly reforms, state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to dominate key sectors of the economy, particularly in resource extraction and financial services. The government is aware of the inefficiencies and corruption caused by monopolies, both public and private. But Chinese tradition takes a balanced view of social harms and weighs the damage caused by monopoly against the stability that SOEs have provided China in recent decades. There is less reason for China to tolerate private monopolies, but most of them have arisen in conjunction with digital technology because of its distinctive cost structure (high entry costs, low marginal costs). China has made some use of antitrust law, but most economic regulation in China is administrative. Thus the anti‐monopoly activities that are used to restrain monopoly power in China are different from Western practices.     

Match‐Fixing in a Monopoly Betting Market

A monopolist bookmaker may set betting odds on a fairly even contest to induce match‐fixing by an influential corrupt punter. His loss to the corrupt punter is more than made up for by enticing enough ordinary punters to bet on the losing team. This result is in sharp contrast to competitive bookmaking, where even contests have been shown to be immune to fixing. The analysis also reveals a surprising result that the incidence of match‐fixing can dramatically fall when match‐fixing opportunities rise. This is shown by comparing two scenarios—when only one team is corruptible and when both are corruptible. For both teams corruptible, the bookmaker is uncertain about to which team the influential punter will have access, so carefully maneuvering the odds to induce match‐fixing is too costly.     

Second‐Price Auctions with Different Participation Costs

This paper studies equilibria of second‐price auctions in independent private value environments with different participation costs. Two types of equilibria are identified: monotonic equilibria in which a bidder with a lower participation cost results in a lower cutoff for submitting a bid, and nonmonotonic equilibria in which a lower participation cost results in a higher cutoff. We show that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further, that the monotonic equilibrium is unique for either concave distribution functions or strictly convex distribution functions with nonincreasing reverse hazard rates. There exist nonmonotonic equilibria when the distribution functions are strictly convex and the difference of the participation costs is sufficiently small. We also provide comparative static analysis and study the limiting properties of equilibria when the difference in bidders’ participation costs approaches zero.     

The Profit‐Maximizing Case for Corporate Social Responsibility in a Bilateral Monopoly

We analyze a stylized distribution channel (bilateral monopoly) model where an upstream manufacturer sells output to a downstream retailer. In a two‐stage linear demand game setting, we show that a two‐part contract, consisting of a wholesale price and corporate social responsibility (CSR) component, can be utilized by the manufacturer to fully coordinate and control its retailer. Thus, a CSR contract can be used in place of the traditional two‐part tariff scheme (wholesale price and fixed franchise fee) to optimally coordinate the marketing channel. Our model provides a novel theoretical profit‐maximizing rationale for the strategic use of CSR. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Simulating the Reform of Means‐tested Benefits with Endogenous Take‐up and Claim Costs*

Microsimulation models are commonly used to examine the distributional impact of reforms of the means‐tested benefit system. Take‐up behaviour is related to the level of entitlement, so reform may induce changes in take‐up. We develop a stochastic simulation method and apply it to a probit model of ‘income support’ take‐up by the UK pensioners. The method allows us to adjust net income for the welfare losses because of tangible or intangible claim costs. Endogenous take‐up and claim costs both have an important impact on the simulated outcomes of the policy reform.     

Contracting Costs and Information Asymmetry Reduction in Cross‐Border M&A

This paper explores the contracting costs of conducting mergers and acquisitions (M&A), creates a theoretical model of the information asymmetry involved, and shows how buying firms employ several mechanisms to reduce such asymmetry. Extending prior literature, the paper examines these costs in both domestic and cross‐border settings using a sample of over 3000 M&A deals. I consider both the fees paid and the time required in the bargaining phase to be contracting costs, and model them simultaneously to help explicate their endogenous relationship. The results show that buyers in cross‐border deals are more likely to employ mechanisms to affect information asymmetry, while the employment of these mechanisms affects contracting costs. The results help to explain why cross‐border M&A are more costly yet more quickly executed. Finally, modelling the use and effects of the mechanisms is sufficient to explain the contracting cost differences between domestic and cross‐border M&A.     

Second‐Mover Advantages with Asymmetric Costs and Information Updates: A Product Life Cycle Perspective

Two firms with asymmetric costs engage in a Stackelberg game under multiple levels of uncertainty with information updating. A product life cycle perspective is employed to reveal when and why a second‐mover may have an advantage. At early stages in the product life cycle, when uncertainty is the dominating factor, the impact of uncertainty may be either positive or negative. As a result, the Stackelberg leader faces the possibility of either overshooting or losing its market leadership position to the second‐mover. In later market stages, when cost is more important, a process‐innovating second‐mover may accrue higher profits. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why a Multinational Firm Chooses Expatriates: Integrating Resource‐Based,Agency and Transaction Costs Perspectives*

abstract This paper develops an integrative organizational economics framework explaining and predicting multinational firms' managerial resource deployments based on resource‐based, agency, and transaction costs theories. Our empirical findings suggest that the governance decision for managerial services of multinational firms is influenced not only by the comparative capabilities of managers, but also by the economic costs to the firm of influencing the behaviours of managers through managerial contracting.     

Entry‐Timing Advantages in Renewable Natural Resources Industries

In this paper, we explore the conditions of entry‐timing advantages in renewable natural resource industries. Drawing from behavioural theory of the firm, we classify firms in two groups depending on the different heuristics used to make entry decisions when facing the cyclical endogenous nature of these industries: crowd firms are procyclical, making decisions based on the current phase of the industry cycle, whereas anti‐crowd firms follow a countercyclical strategy, making uncertain, and risky decisions by estimation of the next phase of the cycle. Therefore, anti‐crowd firms anticipate the deployment of resources each cycle, potentially gaining entry‐timing advantages beyond those provided by traditional competitive isolating mechanisms. Through a mathematical simulation of a performance feedback model, we reveal that the entry‐timing advantage of the anti‐crowd group becomes possible when the rivalry in the industry and the price sensitivity of competitors are high, and when the time required to deploy the resources is short.     

Subjective Well‐Being and Income: A Re‐Examination of Satiation Using the Regression Kink Model With an Unknown Threshold

A methodological challenge in testing Easterlin's paradox, which states that increasing income fails to boost happiness beyond a satiation point, lies in the determination of this threshold if it exists. In the existing literature, various levels of GDP per capita have been chosen based upon visual inspection of the scatter plots of the data. The estimated income–well‐being gradients are sensitive to the choice of such kink points. We first replicate the results in Stevenson and Wolfers (American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 2013; 103 (3): 598–604), then apply the methods proposed in Hansen (Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 2016), which estimate the regression kink model with an unknown threshold, to the data in Stevenson and Wolfers ( 2013 ) to re‐examine the two modified versions of Easterlin's hypothesis. In most cases, we do not find the existence of any kink point. In the few cases where a kink point is detected, the estimated kink point thresholds are different from those chosen in the previous literature. Overall, we find no evidence of a satiation point, which is in support of Stevenson and Wolfers ( 2013 ). Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of State‐Owned Enterprises in an Artificial Monopoly Market: The Case of Turkey

State‐owned enterprises (SOEs) benefit from many privileges based on their unique structure, their substantial capital, and their position in the economic system. Like all business corporations, they have no fixed duration, which makes them effectively immortal. In addition, they are adjuncts of the state, which enables them to survive in noncompetitive markets with little effort. Therefore, under today's ruthless global market conditions, SOEs engage in unfair competition with privately financed businesses. By relying on their identity as state operations, they do not follow the rules of the market—they define those rules. In addition to SOEs, which are direct arms of the state, some privately financed businesses dominate markets in which the state allows them to develop an artificial monopoly and thus increase their power day by day. These artificial monopolies distort market processes and create conditions that frequently give rise to corruption. This study examines the problems associated with monopolies, with a special emphasis on establishing more efficient market structures for SOEs in Turkey. The original mission of SOEs was to balance markets through regulation and to be transparent and accountable to the public. Simply striving to meet those criteria would go a long way toward preventing the abuse of power and unfair competition. In addition, SOEs and artificial monopoly markets distort public institutions by promoting rent‐seeking behavior that corrupts politics and blocks innovation from potential competitors. Privatization has been employed by international financial institutions in recent decades, but it has mostly transferred monopolies from the public sector to private owners, which has made the problem worse and done little to enhance competition. Establishing genuinely competitive economies will require a new political culture around the world.     

Regulating Work: Measuring the Scope and Burden of Occupational Licensure Among Low‐ and Moderate‐Income Occupations in the United States

This study examines the scope and burden of occupational licensing laws in the United States for 102 low‐ and moderate‐income occupations. Findings indicate that the licences studied require of aspiring workers, on average, $US209 in fees, one exam, and about nine months of education and training, plus minimum grade and age levels. Data also indicate striking disparities in requirements within and between occupations and within and between states. These inconsistencies likely reflect not the relative public health and safety risks of occupations, but instead the lobbying prowess of practitioners in securing laws to shut out competition.     

Sweatshops,Opportunity Costs,and Non‐Monetary Compensation: Evidence from El Salvador1

Using evidence from field interviews, this article examines the alternative employment opportunities of thirty‐one sweatshop factory workers in El Salvador and their perceptions about what types of non‐monetary benefits they receive in their current employment. Interview subjects provide insights into the benefits of their own and peers' employments, their next‐best alternative employment, and other aspects of total compensation. We find that workers perceive factory employment to provide more desirable compensation along several margins.     

The Impact of Degree Duration on Higher Education Participation: Evidence from a Large‐scale Natural Experiment

This paper investigates the effects on enrolment, retention rate and on‐time graduation of a nationwide Bologna Process reform introduced in Italy to establish BAs with a duration of three years, followed by optional second‐tier degrees of two years, in place of single‐tier degrees of four or five years. The analysis exploits exogenous delay of treatment conditions and the unique availability of microdata that cover the universe of the departments. We estimate that the reform boosted first‐year enrolments by 14.5–17.3 percentage points, compared to a counterfactual status of no reform. This enrolment shift was due to participation gains rather than substitution effects, and it is likely to have persisted in the longer term. Moreover, no trade‐off between increased participation and deteriorated retention and on‐time graduation emerged.     

Member Coordination Costs and Spatial Entry Deterrence in a Mixed Duopsony with a Cooperative

This paper investigates cooperative spatial entry deterrence. To this end, it employs a dynamic game where an investor-owned firm (IOF) competes with a farmers’ processing cooperative which incurs a fixed coordination cost per member. The results indicate that as the value of coordination cost per member increases or the processing margin rises, it becomes more likely for the IOF to use cooperative limit pricing, that is, to deter the cooperative’s market entry. The opposite is true for an increase in the freight rate.     

Mixed‐frequency models with moving‐average components

Temporal aggregation in general introduces a moving‐average (MA) component in the aggregated model. A similar feature emerges when not all but only a few variables are aggregated, which generates a mixed‐frequency (MF) model. The MA component is generally neglected, likely to preserve the possibility of ordinary least squares estimation, but the consequences have never been properly studied in the MF context. In this paper we show, analytically, in Monte Carlo simulations and in a forecasting application on US macroeconomic variables, the relevance of considering the MA component in MF mixed‐data sampling (MIDAS) and unrestricted MIDAS models (MIDAS–autoregressive moving average (ARMA) and UMIDAS‐ARMA). Specifically, the simulation results indicate that the short‐term forecasting performance of MIDAS‐ARMA and UMIDAS‐ARMA are better than that of, respectively, MIDAS and UMIDAS. The empirical applications on nowcasting US gross domestic product (GDP) growth, investment growth, and GDP deflator inflation confirm this ranking. Moreover, in both simulation and empirical results, MIDAS‐ARMA is better than UMIDAS‐ARMA.     

Simulating non‐normal distributions with specified L‐moments and L‐correlations

This paper derives a procedure for simulating continuous non‐normal distributions with specified L‐moments and L‐correlations in the context of power method polynomials of order three. It is demonstrated that the proposed procedure has computational advantages over the traditional product‐moment procedure in terms of solving for intermediate correlations. Simulation results also demonstrate that the proposed L‐moment‐based procedure is an attractive alternative to the traditional procedure when distributions with more severe departures from normality are considered. Specifically, estimates of L‐skew and L‐kurtosis are superior to the conventional estimates of skew and kurtosis in terms of both relative bias and relative standard error. Further, the L‐correlation also demonstrated to be less biased and more stable than the Pearson correlation. It is also shown how the proposed L‐moment‐based procedure can be extended to the larger class of power method distributions associated with polynomials of order five.     

D‐optimal designs for a continuous predictor in longitudinal trials with discrete‐time survival endpoints

In designing an experiment with one single, continuous predictor, the questions are composed of what is the optimal number of the predictor's values, what are these values, and how many subjects should be assigned to each of these values. In this study, locally D‐optimal designs for such experiments with discrete‐time event occurrence data are studied by using a sequential construction algorithm. Using the Weibull survival function for modeling the underlying time to event function, it is shown that the optimal designs for a linear effect of the predictor have two points that coincide with the design region's boundaries, but the design weights highly depend on the predictor effect size and its direction, the survival pattern, and the number of time points. For a quadratic effect of the predictor, three or four design points are needed.