引入风险厌恶偏好的供应链部分回购协调契约

研究了由一个风险中性的供应商和一个风险厌恶的零售商组成的供应链系统的部分回购契约。将部分回购契约建模讨论,并进行数值模拟分析。结果表明,当零售商为风险厌恶时,供应链系统仍能达到协调,且回购比例是零售商的风险厌恶程度的增函数,批发价格是零售商的风险厌恶程度的减函数。     

Supply chain finance: A three-party decision model with suppliers' guarantees for retailers

Under the premise that financing constraints frequently occur in the supply chain, this paper investigates the financing model of the supplier providing guarantee for the retailer under symmetric and asymmetric information. The optimal solutions of the retailer, the supplier, and the bank are studied by using the Stackelberg game. Results show that increasing the supplier's guarantee proportion can effectively improve the bank's reasonable margin rate and increase the supplier's profit. Under the condition of asymmetric information, the bank can increase the probability of credit loan in the supply chain by reducing the cost of spot check and setting up a reasonable fine limit.     

Information and profit sharing between a buyer and a supplier: Theory and practice

This paper is about aspects of an optimal relationship between 2 firms, a supplier and a retailer, in a 2‐party supply chain. The focus is on sharing private information when demand uncertainty exists so as to better coordinate the supply chain. It draws inspiration from a real case in Ireland of a new fish‐processing company, Oceanpath, and a supermarket chain, Superquinn, in which information was shared. The argument is that sharing the retailer's information increases supply chain profit, as well as benefiting consumers. Profit sharing will be needed to guarantee that both the retailer and the supplier gain when information is shared.     

Optimizing order policy and credit term for items with inventory-level-dependent demand under trade credit limit

Under the combined effects of inventory-level-dependent demand (ILDD) and trade credit, the retailer is able to order more quantities to stimulate market demand. However, from the supplier's perspective, two important issues are lacking sufficient attention. First, during the credit period, the retailer's higher order quantities imply increases in both the retailer's account payable and the supplier's opportunity cost of capital. Second, given the supplier's fixed production rate, the increased market demand may drive the capacity utilization to be variable. Thus, by formulating a supplier-dominated system, this paper incorporates trade credit limit (TCL) to address its effects on optimal policies vis-à-vis the item with ILDD. Specifically, three indicators can be proposed to reveal which type of financing policy the retailer should choose. Moreover, based on TCL, the supplier can effectively manage the retailer's order quantity and the corresponding account payable. Additionally, the retailer's maximum allowable order quantity is developed to ensure that the supplier can supply the retailer's order quantity on time. Furthermore, when the effects of ILDD become more significant, the manufacturer will reduce the maximum allowable order quantity to control the retailer's order incentive.     

Supply chain decisions under asymmetric information with cost and fairness concern

ABSTRACT

The two-echelon supply chain including single supplier and single retailer is set, and we study the compact of asymmetric information on the decisions in the supply chain when the both supplier’s private cost information and retailer’s private fairness-concern information are asymmetry between the supply chain members, so as to study the effect of misreporting behavior and fairness concern on the supply chain. By mathematical model derivation and numerical analysis, we prove that the misreporting behavior of supplier will intensify the unfair distribution of supply chain and thus make the supply chain operation further deviate from the optimal condition.     

考虑消费者效用的生鲜品双渠道供应链协调

研究了由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的生鲜品双渠道供应链,构建了受保鲜努力影响的新鲜度变化函数以及受价格和新鲜度影响的消费者效用函数。提出“保鲜成本分担+收益共享”契约,以实现供应链的协调。研究表明,零售商通过分担供应商保鲜努力成本,促使供应商投入更高的保鲜努力水平,从而增加市场需求及利润;供应商通过与零售商分享线上收益,促使零售商承担更多的保鲜努力成本。因此,一定的保鲜成本分担和收益共享比例有助于提高供应链效率。最后采用算例验证了“保鲜成本分担+收益共享”契约对于生鲜品双渠道供应链的有效性。     

基于零售商促销努力的混合契约设计

在供应链协作中,供应商与零售商之间的合作尤为重要。零售商的促销水平极大的影响了产品的需求与销量,但促销活动同时也为零售商带来了额外的经营成本,经营成本的增加将导致零售商缺乏足够的积极性加大对促销活动的投入,因此需要供应商分担部分经营成本。利用回购契约与销量返利组合契约,分析了在允许二次进货的情况下供应商和零售商之间的利益关系,并设计了一种混合契约,以激励零售商为获得更多利润而加大促销努力的投入。     

Strategic inventory in capacitated supply chain procurement

We study the strategic role of inventory in a sequential two‐period procurement setting, where the supplier's capacity in the first period is limited and the retailer has the option to hold inventory. We compare the equilibrium under a dynamic contract, where the decisions are made at the beginning of each period, and a commitment contract, where the decisions for both periods are made at the beginning of the first period. We show that there is a critical capacity level below which the outcomes under both types of contracts are identical. When the first period capacity is above the critical level, the retailer holds inventory in equilibrium and the inventory is carried due to purely strategic reasons; as capacity increases, so does the strategic role of inventory. The supplier always prefers lower capacity than the retailer, and the difference between supplier‐optimal and supply‐chain optimal capacities, and the corresponding profits, can be significant. Finally, we find that the retailer's flexibility to hold inventory is not always good for the participants or for the channel. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

供应链成员的谎报行为分析

针对单一供应商和单一销售商组成的供应链系统,在供应商Stackelberg下,分析了信息不对称下销售商的谎报行为,得出了销售商的最优谎报策略。     

激励弱势供应商长期实施VMI的措施分析

文章主要讨论了一个弱势供应商和一个强势零售商组成的二级供应链在长期实施VMI运营模式下的情况,通过定量的方法分析了供应商和零售商各自在实施VMI前后的利润和成本的变化,从而采取相关措施确保供应商和零售商能长期实施VMI运营模式,不会使弱势供应商有退出的动机。     

供应不确定下基于Supply-hub的供应商选择和库存协同决策

针对由供应商、Supply-hub和制造商组成的三级供应链的多产品供应商选择和库存协同问题,考虑供应商存在延迟交付风险、供应数量约束,以供应链运作成本最小为目标,构建整数规划模型。分析结果表明:在一定的条件下,总存在最优的供应商选择方案和库存策略;当供应商的延迟交付概率增加,供应链期望成本上涨;当供应商供应数量无限制时,减少最优订货批量可以弱化供应不确定性增加造成的影响;当供应商选择方案不变,订货提前期增加,供应链的运作成本以及最优订货批量不变;一种零部件提前期的变化不影响其他零部件的供应商选择和库存策略。     

销售商成本信息不对称下的两阶段供应链协调

以往的文章研究了由单个供应商和单个销售商组成的供应链协调问题,给出了双方合作时的供应链协调模型,这些都是以信息共享为基础,但是现实中信息不对称使得供应链协调模型的有效性受到了冲击。为避免这种现象的发生,论文在双方合作的基础上建立了供应链双方在需求信息不对称情形下的协调模型。该模型在供应链双方协商分享供应链利润的条件下,运用激励机制使销售商诚实申报成本信息,在实现供应链利润最大化的同时使供应链成员实现双赢。     

基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链信用风险分析

讨论了由一个供应商和一个销售商组成的简单供应链,在销售商还款不确定的前提下,基于供应商和销售商订货过程是Stackelberg博弈,给出了他们的最优定价和订货策略,并说明了通过合理定价,供应商可以有效地防范信用风险;然后分析了销售商违约对供销双方及供应链的影响,并通过算例进行了说明。     

Joint coordination contract for capital-constrained supply chains under asymmetric information

A two-echelon supply chain considering capital constraints and asymmetric information is established. The supplier provides credit guarantees for the capital-constrained retailer to loan from the bank, and its information about the retailer's capital type is asymmetric. The equilibrium decisions of supply chain participants are analyzed by using the Stackelberg game theory and principal–agent theory. Then, a joint contract is designed to eliminate the double marginalization effect. The results show that the supplier and the bank make different decisions for different types of retailers to avoid adverse selection. The joint contract of revenue-sharing and transfer payment can coordinate the supply chain.     

Supply chain finance and impacts of consumers’ sustainability awareness

Several new methods have been proposed for supply chain finance (SCF) with bank credits, but none of them mentions how to solve the borrowers’ moral hazard problems in SCF. This paper examines the moral hazard problem in supply chain financing with procurement contract (or purchase order). We show that since supply chain is an up-down directed structure, when financing with the procurement contract, the supplier’s effort monitoring task can be rendered to the procurement contract, which can secure the supplier’s optimal effort and capital choices in production. Hence, compared to separate lending, the supplier’s credit rationing problem can be mitigated, and most importantly, banks’ under-estimation on the supplier’s default risk and the over-estimation on the retailer’s default risk will both decrease. We further show that the retailer’s corporate social responsibility expenditure can increase consumers’ brand recognition, thus when facing demand shocks arising from consumer’s unexpected concerns, the retailer can better stabilize the firm value.     

Optimal Two‐part Pricing under Cost Uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal two‐part pricing under cost uncertainty. We consider a risk‐averse monopolistic firm that is subject to a cost shock to its constant marginal cost of production. The firm uses two‐part pricing to sell its output to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion on the firm's optimal two‐part pricing are to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to raise (lower) the unit price and lower (raise) the fixed payment under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm's optimal two‐part pricing is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving spread increase in cost uncertainty induces the firm to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于数量折扣策略的供应链渠道协调分析

针对一个制造商和一个零售商的供应链，就确定需求情况下数量折扣策略AQDP的协调作用做了分析，对不确定需求情况下制造商及零售商的最优决策做了灵敏度分析。     

需求受促销投资影响的供应链协调模型

本文以一个供应商与一个零售商组成的供应链为研究对象。市场需求受零售商进行促销投资的影响,供应商采取了共同补给期和补偿促销投资的协调策略。本文分别建立无协调策略与协调策略下零售商与供应商的利润模型,并对促销投资额与补给期的进行决策。共同补给期条件下,零售商的利润会比无协调策略条件下有所减少。供应商通过补偿促销投资的方式使得双方的利润都有所增加。最终,在共同补给期与补偿促销投资的双重策略下,零售商与供应商可以有效协调。     

供应链集中度与成本结构

企业的成本结构会影响企业通过经营实现利润的能力。企业进行成本结构决策时需要综合考虑各种经营和环境因素，其中客户和供应商集中度对于企业来说是一个关键的环境因素，但现有文献很少研究供应链集中度和公司成本结构之间的潜在关系。利用2012至2016年中国制造业上市公司的成本数据，发现制造商的客户集中度和其成本弹性之间存在正相关关系，并且随着客户议价能力提升，客户集中度高的公司的成本结构灵活性被削弱；随着供应商的集中，下游制造商的变动成本比上固定成本的比值在下降，成本刚性在加强。随着供应商行业议价能力提升，供应商集中度和下游客户成本刚性结构之间的正面关系被削弱。供应链集中度和议价能力是企业成本结构决策的决定因素。     

基于零售商风险厌恶的供应链管理

考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链,在零售商风险中性和风险厌恶的条件下,分别研究了三种不同契约下零售商的最优订单问题,得到零售商风险厌恶时的最优订单量要小于零售商风险中性时的最优订单量,最后给出研究结论及管理学意义。