Collective bargaining and new work regimes: ‘too important to be left to bosses’

The formal negotiations process remains perhaps the least‐studied moment of collective bargaining. Drawing on ideal types of ‘distributive’ and ‘integrative’ bargaining and the ‘formal/informal’ distinction, this article reports non‐participant observation and ethnographic research into the negotiations process that enabled a change agreement in a British multinational, hereafter anonymised as FMCG. Informal bargaining relations provided the backdrop to—and emerged within—the formal negotiations process. Formal bargaining established new employment contracts based on a simplified internal labour market and generated the joint governance processes to enable and regulate the change process. Neither management nor union strategy was wholly derived from rational, interest‐based positions. The negotiations process was essential to strategy formation and to the emergence of sufficient ‘integrative’ bargaining for all parties to devise and approve new processual institutions and norms to deliver a more flexible labour process and to restore the long‐run viability for ‘distributive’ bargaining.     

Rent-seeking in a unionised monopoly

A unionised monopoly firm, benefitting from some kind of anti-competitive regulation, and its corresponding trade union have a common interest in spending resources to protect the monopoly rents created by the regulation. In the present paper, a situation in which the unionised monopoly is challenged by a consumer organisation fighting for deregulation is analysed as a standard Tullock rent-seeking contest. With unequal sharing of monopoly rents, the free-riding incentives among the rent-defending players turn out to be overwhelming, in the sense that the unique Nash equilibrium is characterised by zero effort contribution by the player with the lower valuation of the contested prize. This implies that being “strong”, in terms of bargaining strength, is not necessarily an advantage for neither player in a unionised monopoly that is threatened by deregulation. Received: June 2000 / accepted: January 2001     

The “I quit” syndrome

Managements, unions, and arbitrators have been plagued by a very simple but long-standing problem involving what might be termed a routine human resource action. The problem stated simply is: When is a quit a quit? Where employees are represented by a bargaining agent, the company cannot always be sure that a “quit is a quit.” It is clear that employers who do not understand the “I quit” syndrome are in an uncertain position with respect to handling such problems. The authors have also discovered that unions do not understand the “I quit” syndrome either and at times go to arbitration with all of its attendant costs when the employee has actually “quit.” The purposes of this article are to study how arbitrators have ruled, to establish the principles involved in this little-known area of union/management relations and to provide parties to such cases with information to guide them. Arbitrators have upheld grievances and reversed company actions often enough that there is a need to clarify what is a “quit” as well as a need to clarify what the rights are of both parties under the collective bargaining agreement. The authors found that many managements use the “I quit” syndrome as a substitute for disciplinary action. It is clear from arbitral decisions that it is best from the company point of view to allow the disciplinary system to handle problem employees. The authors also found that reasonable resignations by employees were upheld by arbitrators. If employers carefully handle and document employee resignations, the resignations will stand. Further, it is clear that employers must issue clear policy statements concerning resignations; this includes avoiding resignations under duress. Finally, parties to collective bargaining agreements need contract language defining a quit.     

Union suppression and union substitution strategies of multinational enterprises in Ghana

This article complements the literature by furthering the understanding of an ‘African dimension’ of multinational enterprise (MNE) union avoidance. The evidence suggests that MNEs engaged in both union suppression and union substitution strategies by (i) exploiting young employees' apathy to promote opposition and indifference for union organisation (evil stuff), (ii) implementing union member‐centred employee retrenchment (fear stuff), (iii) using enterprise‐level collective bargaining arrangement to suppress union bargaining power (fear and fatal stuff), (iv) exploiting the fragmented labour union environment to suppress union organisation (fatal and evil stuff) and (v) promoting individual employee voice and involvement mechanisms (sweet stuff). Although MNEs in Ghana engaged in both union suppression and union substitution strategies, they appear to particularly favour the adoption of ‘union suppression’ strategies and what might be termed as ‘corridor tactics’. Our article highlights four transitional issues underpinning the emerging success of ‘corridor tactics’ in union suppression in a less developed host country.     

Ever larger unions: organisational restructuring and its impact on union confederations

Unions have responded to current membership decline and other organisational problems by restructuring via mergers, increasing union concentration within and across union confederations. A particular noted feature are amalgamations to form ‘super‐unions’. These conglomerate unions threaten to undermine the role played by confederations in respect of political voice, bargaining coordination, and service provision. Despite these mergers, union pluralism still prevails in many European countries with separate peak associations organised along employment/occupational status or political and religious lines. After comparing the recent merger waves and increased union concentration in western European countries, the consequences for union movements are discussed.     

Shaping the bargaining agenda. The Audit Commission and public service reform in British local government

This article examines the role of the Audit Commission (AC) in local government collective bargaining. While the AC has no official role in such bargaining, it has a role in monitoring the performance of local government services. In this role the AC has a clear potential, in the context of the government's ‘modernization’ agenda – as manifested in its ‘Best Value’ regime, for influencing both the content of collective agreements, and the process of collective bargaining, where these are seen to conflict with other Best Value objectives – particularly in relation to external competition. The research conducted involved a content analysis of AC inspection reports on human resource services and longitudinal case studies of two local authority union branches' experiences of Best Value and the role of the AC. The findings from the inspection reports indicate that, while the AC is actually acting to promote activities that could be seen as supportive of union bargaining agendas, notably in relation to equality type issues, they are also supporting service externalisation and thereby acting to limit the scope of their impact. The reports also indicate that, despite there being prescribed ‘best practice’ for local government employment relations (‘social partnership’ with unions), the AC is not promoting any such engagement with unions. Evidence from the case studies add weight to these observations: the AC, in one case, was deeply suspicious of an attempted union management agreement on procurement, while in the other, the AC made no criticism of the costly effects that externalization had on union-management relations.     

Union effects on pay levels in Britain

The contraction of union representation in Britain raises the question of whether or not unions still achieve a wage premium. Analysis of matched employer–employee data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey shows that there is now no demonstrable premium for private sector workers in general. However, unions do achieve a wage premium of around 9% for about half of employees covered by collective bargaining arrangements. The effect of union bargaining spills over to other employees in the same workplaces. The paper identifies circumstances where union effects are strongest—employer endorsement of union membership, high collective bargaining coverage and multi-unionism.     

Regulating a Manager‐controlled Natural Monopoly with Unknown Costs

We study the regulation of a manager‐controlled natural monopoly with unknown costs, borrowing from Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982), where the monopoly is controlled by the owner. We consider the case where the regulator can tax the owner as well as the case where she cannot. We find that the optimal price schedule generally lies below the one in the BM model and that it can be as low as the marginal cost if the compensation parameter is sufficiently small and the regulator cannot tax the monopoly owner. We also identify the cases where the monopoly owner prefers to delegate the control to a manager. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trade unions,collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance: a review

Coordination through collective bargaining is recognised as an influential determinant of labour market outcomes and macroeconomic performance. This article provides a systematic review of the empirical literature on the subject. What emerges from the review is that it is different types and coverage of bargaining coordination, rather than cross‐country variation in trade union density, that matter for economic performance. High levels of bargaining coverage tend to be associated with relatively poor economic performance, but this adverse relationship can be at least mitigated by high levels of bargaining coordination. In the absence of formal bargaining arrangements, economies often develop informal bargaining mechanisms whose effects are similar to those arising from formal bargaining provided they both operate at similar levels of coordination. The consequences of labour market coordination or absence thereof depend on the monetary policy regime as non‐accommodating monetary policy can eliminate some of the adverse unemployment consequences otherwise associated with industry‐level collective bargaining. Finally, bargaining coordination seems to matter most in times of rapid economic change rather than under more stable conditions. Overall, we conclude that it is the total ‘package’ of (formal and informal) labour market institutions that matters for the performance of the economy rather than unionisation as such or individual aspects of unionism.     

Free riders: the rise of alternative unionism in Denmark

In this article we analyse some disturbing trends in the Danish labour market: while collective bargaining coverage is still relatively high, union density has been declining and—worse than that—there has been a substantial shift away from recognised and in favour of alternative unionism. The alternative unions are not parties to collective agreements, and they offer membership much cheaper than the recognised unions, in effect taking a free ride on the institutional supports that used to be effective only for the recognised unions. The article explains this conundrum by pointing to the political and institutional backgrounds to this development, which threatens to erode the very basis for the Danish collective bargaining system. On the background of general statistics and of a general employee survey, we point out the reasons behind the challenges confronting the recognised unions, pointing out that the recognised unions must become both more efficient in the member services and more cost efficient, if they wish to halt the present downhill trend.     

European dimensions to collective bargaining: new symmetries within an asymmetric process?

The impact of economic and monetary union on the structures, processes and agenda of collective bargaining at sector and company levels is explored. Drawing on cross–national evidence from two sectors, considerable differences between sectors within national boundaries are identified, but also some striking parallels within sectors across national boundaries. Convergence and greater diversity are simultaneously evident.     

The resurgence of national‐level bargaining: union strategies in Spain

Spain has witnessed an oscillating pattern of bargaining in which national‐level agreements were first present, then declined, and have since resurfaced. While economic pressures may have motivated changing union responses, the specifics of the bargaining patterns can be better understood if domestic institutions are included in an explanation of union strategies.     

Politics in wage setting: does government colour matter?

This paper studies the relationship between wage formation and the political colour of the government in an economy with a centralized wage bargaining system. Ideological, organizational and personal ties between the central trade union and the social democratic political party suggest that the trade union may behave significantly different in wage negotiations under a social democratic than under a conservative government. Using time series data for Norway, we estimate that changing from a conservative to a social democratic central government significantly reduces manufacturing wages and makes wages more responsive to unemployment. This result is consistent with a wage bargaining model augmented by political preferences of the union leaders and suggests that the effect of bargaining coordination depends on the political colour of the government. The estimated effects are both robust with respect to model specification and stable over time. We are grateful to Fredrik Wulfsberg, participants at seminars in Trondheim and Oslo, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments.     

Workplace unionism under decentralised bargaining in France: a case study of the CGT in the car industry

Considering recent theoretical accounts on the trajectory of French unionism under localised bargaining, this article examines potential consequences for the country's traditionally largest radical union, Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). Deploying a case study of CGT at PSA Peugeot Citroёn and Renault in the years since the 2008 automotive crisis, the article observes a persistent pattern of militant opposition within company and plant union sections. Company bargaining structure, interunion reformist collaboration and electoral considerations are identified as workplace mechanisms reinforcing CGT actions at this level.     

Endogenous codetermination

This research introduces endogenous codetermination in a Cournot duopoly. Unlike the received literature (Kraft, 1998), this work assumes that firms bargain with their own union bargaining units under codetermination if and only if they can choose an ad hoc bargaining effort by maximising profits (three-stage non-cooperative game). There are remarkable differences compared with the main findings of the exogenous codetermination literature. Indeed, there may exist asymmetric multiple (Pareto efficient) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Mandatory codetermination, therefore, is Pareto worsening. Each firm can then use the union bargaining power as a strategic device in a Cournot setting.     

Union recognition in Britain's offshore oil and gas industry: implications of the Employment Relations Act 1999

The Employment Relations Act 1999 (ERA) has provided trade unions in the UK with new opportunities for achieving recognition. After a long history of anti‐unionism in the offshore oil and gas industry, employers have voluntarily ceded recognition to Trades Union Congress (TUC)‐affiliated trade unions. The legitimacy of this recognition process has been contested by the non‐TUC Offshore Industry Liaison Committee (OILC), an offshore workers’ union, seeking to act as a recognised bargaining agent. The ERA may be promoting ‘business friendly’ agreements at the expense of claims to recognition of other bargaining agents and of democratic employee choice.     

Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly

Review of Economic Design - In this paper, we integrate the bargaining theory with the problem of regulating a natural monopoly under symmetric information or asymmetric information with complete...     

Why So Unhappy? The Effects of Unionization on Job Satisfaction*

Using linked employer–employee data we investigate the job satisfaction effect of union membership in Britain. We develop a model that simultaneously controls for the determinants of individual membership status and for the selection of employees into occupations according to union coverage. We find a negative association between membership and satisfaction. However, having accounted for selection effects, we find that the negative association is confined to non‐covered employees. This is consistent with ‘voice’ effects, whereby non‐covered members voice dissatisfaction to achieve union goals, and with the possibility that membership increases preferences for collective bargaining, thus lowering members’ satisfaction in non‐covered environments.     

Bargaining power in alliance governance negotiations: evidence from the biotechnology industry

Alliance partners negotiate how they will govern their alliance. This study shows bargaining power, not just efficiency considerations, influences the outcome of this negotiation. Whereas previous research on this phenomenon associates bargaining power with firm size, this study employs more nuanced measures of bargaining power applicable to biotechnology firms while controlling both absolute and relative firm size. We find small biotechnology firms with partners that are over five times larger can still have the bargaining power to get their interests met when the two parties have opposing governance interests.     

To merge or not to merge? The impact of union merger decisions on workers' representation in Germany

Union mergers have been widely studied in a variety of countries; however, little is known about their impact on union effectiveness. This article draws on in‐depth interviews with officials and works councillors from four German unions, as well as on a representative survey of German works councils, to analyse how a union's merger status shapes its effectiveness in three spheres of activity: political lobbying, collective bargaining and establishment‐level interest representation. We compare two cases of merger with two cases of continued organisational independence, finding that merger outcomes for individual unions vary considerably across our three union functions.