Institutions,human capital,and growth: The institutional mechanism

This paper contributes to the debate on the relationship between human capital, institutions, and economic growth. The paper first develops a micro-foundation model linking institutions to human capital. The advantage of our modeling strategy is that the human capital accumulation function is derived from an endogenous process. The theoretical model shows that improvements in the quality of institutions foster human capital accumulation, decrease income inequality and change the historical development path. The paper uses cross-country panel data from 1965 to 2005 to test some of the model's propositions and finds that deep structures or structural institutions – which are very persistent and rooted on the historical development path of an economy – affect long-term economic performance, while political institutions are uncorrelated with productivity and long-term economic growth. The empirical estimates also show that growth of physical and human capital – instead of levels – determines long-run economic growth.     

Political institutions and economic volatility

We examine the effect of political ‘institutions’ on economic growth volatility, using data from more than 100 countries over the period 1960 to 2005, taking into account various control variables as suggested in previous studies. Our indicator of volatility is the relative standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP per capita. The results of a dynamic panel model indicate that democracy reduces economic volatility. We also find that some dimensions of political instability and policy uncertainty increase economic volatility.     

中国“两大奇迹”形成逻辑的政治经济学阐释*

在党的百年奋斗历程中，创造了大规模、快速的经济增长，形成了社会领域长期稳定发展的“两大奇迹”。“两大奇迹”的形成原因是：坚持党的领导是创造“两大奇迹”的政治保证；坚持科学理论指导是“两大奇迹”创造的思想保证；社会主义制度和国家治理体系是“两大奇迹”创造的制度保证；党领导下人民创造力的发挥是“两大奇迹”创造的动力保证。从政治经济学的理论逻辑来看，“两大奇迹”形成的理论逻辑是党领导下的国家能力与规模化市场创造的结合造就了经济增长的奇迹，在经济快速增长所奠定的经济基础上形成了社会长期稳定的奇迹。“两大奇迹”历史经验是党领导下国家能力的培育，中央政府与地方政府的协同互补，发展规划与市场机制的结合，选择性产业政策、功能性产业政策与普惠性产业政策的协调。在第二个百年续写“两个奇迹”，并创造高质量发展奇迹需要从中长期发展视角判断未来发展的趋势，继续推动国家与市场的共同演进，重塑高质量发展的增长体系，充分释放内需潜力，确立“以人为本”的经济发展模式。     

转型期中国县级政府的客观治理绩效与政治信任——从“经济增长合法性”到“公共产品合法性”

善治是中国政府的执政要务,政治信任反映着公民对政府治理的认可和支持。文章利用2008年中国公民意识调查及政府统计数据,实证分析了政府治理绩效的主观和客观维度对政治信任的影响。研究发现,公民对政府在经济增长、民生福利、纯公共产品领域治理绩效的回顾性和前瞻性积极评价都正相关于政治信任;纯公共产品提供的主观评价对政治信任的影响大于经济增长和民生福利。县级政府的客观治理绩效对政治信任有重要影响,在高人均福利支出、低基尼系数和低失业率的县级单位,政治信任更高,而人均GDP反而微弱地负作用于政治信任。因此,尽管经济增长仍然是政治信任的重要来源,但民生福利和纯公共产品正赶上并超越经济增长,成为公民提供政治信任的新源泉。     

Borders and Growth

This paper presents a framework to understand and measure the effects of political borders on economic growth and per capita income levels. In our model, political integration between two countries results in a positive country size effect and a negative effect through reduced openness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Additional effects stem from possible changes in other growth determinants, besides country size and openness, when countries are merged. We estimate the growth effects that would have resulted from the hypothetical removal of national borders between pairs of adjacent countries under various scenarios. We identify country pairs where political integration would have been mutually beneficial. We find that full political integration would have slightly reduced an average country's growth rate, while most countries would benefit from a more limited form of merger, involving higher economic integration with their neighbors.     

Regional economic growth disparities: A political economy perspective

Regional differences in economic growth have been observed within many countries. Our story emphasises three region-specific factors driving growth—capital, labour and political factors. Conditional on differences in production factor (i.e., labour and capital) variations across democratic states, what role do differences in underlying “political factors” across regions play in accounting for regional growth disparities? We build a political economy model of endogenous growth where regions have the same political institutions, but experience different (and estimable) distributions over voter political biases (i.e., our “political factors”). In our model, political factors affect regional productivity as a consequence of politico-economic equilibrium. We discipline our regional growth accounting exercises by calibrating/estimating each model to American state-level economic and political-survey data. We show that the capital factor is the predominant driving force behind growth in American states. Nevertheless, regional variations in distributions of voter's political biases also account a great deal for regional growth disparities. We also evaluate how much politics would have distorted agents' welfare and regional growth, were regional economies given the opportunity to live under an efficient social planner's allocation system; and, if agents were to live under the same democratic system but where all voters have equal voting influence.     

Political economy of China’s trade policy: the evidence from industrial protection in 1990s

The theory of the political economy of trade policy, combining public choice and neoclassical trade theories, studies the level and pattern of trade intervention from the perspective of policy decision-making process, by stressing on income distribution instead of economic efficiency. The paper attempts to apply such an endogenous trade theory to an empirical study of China. On the basis of a formal revised model of political economy of trade protection, it tests theoretical hypotheses concerning the political and economic determinants of cross-sector trade protection in the Chinese industry at various periods. The results show that trade protection in China fits into China’s national development strategy of fast catching-up with the developed world.     

The effect of political factors on sovereign default

This aricle examines the effect of political factors on sovereign default. Using a theoretical model, we find that political instability increases the likelihood of default. To test this theoretical implication, we use a panel logit model to estimate the effect of long- and short-run political factors, along with other macroeconomic variables, on the probability of default. Data from 68 developed and developing countries between 1970 and 2010 is used to conduct the study. Our findings suggest that a country is more likely to default when (i) it has a relatively younger political regime in place; (ii) it faces a higher chance of political turnover; and (iii) it has a less democratic political system. Economic factors are also vital; a country with stronger growth and less external debt is less likely to experience sovereign default. Robustness tests using alternative measures of political risk, trade balance and EMBI sovereign bond spreads also support the baseline findings.     

INSTITUTIONAL TRAPS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This article's point of departure is that low-quality institutions, concentration of political power and material wealth, and underdevelopment are persistent over time. Its analytical model views an equal distribution of political power as a commitment device to enhance institutional quality, thereby promoting growth. The politically powerful coalition contemplates relinquishing of its power through democratization, weighing this advantageous consequence against the limit on own appropriative ability that it entails. The possibility of two developmental paths is exhibited: with concentration of political and economic power, low-quality institutions, and slow growth; and a more equal distribution of political and economic resources, high-quality institutions, and faster growth.     

经济增长与依德治国：一个分析框架

本从经济学的角度,构建了一个制度经济的分析框架,对经济增长,道德内生的经济模型,经济增长中的道德均衡,道德生命周期和道德滞后进行了探讨,从而揭示出依德治国不仅仅只是一种政治口号,更具有深刻的经济根源。     

THE POLITICS OF FDI EXPROPRIATION

I examine the role of political instability and fractionalization as potential explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e., the Lucas Paradox). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document that (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) countries subject to high investment risk (IR) receive low FDI inflows, and (iii) IR is higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies. These findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and FDI through the IR channel. I inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political economy model of redistribution, wherein policymakers can expropriate resources from foreign investors. The proceeds are used to finance group‐specific transfers to domestic workers but hinder economic growth by discouraging FDI. I show that the political equilibrium exhibits overexpropriation and underinvestment.     

Effective information,political structure and economic growth

Digital transformation of information led us to reconsider Hayek’s (American Economic Review, 35, 519–530) insight on a fuller use of information and re-classify political structures based on their information protection policies. This allows us to link the accumulation of information with the political structure to frame their joint impact on economic growth. We develop a model of ‘effective information’ beginning with information production and absorption and then allowing for its political propagation based on the degree of information protection. Using data from 40 countries, we find: (i) effective information and its spillovers contribute to an increase in productivity; and (ii) reductions in information protection bring larger increases in effective information as economies near an ‘information-technology frontier’ contributing to economic growth divergence.     

Why are Latin America's savings rates so low? An international comparative analysis

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical assessment of the determinants of savings rates, with special emphasis on Latin American savings rates. The study is based on international comparisons, using data from 36 countries for 1970–1992. A distinction is made between private and public savings. The later are endogenously determined by economic and political variables. Per capita income growth is the most important determinant of private and public savings; public savings are lower in countries with higher political instability; public savings crowd out private savings, but less than proportionately. Low Latin American savings are due to the magnitudes of their determinants, rather than structural differences.     

Political instability and economic growth

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 1982. We define political instability as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which such a measure of political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. We also discuss the effects of different types of government changes on growth.     

Theoretical foundations of sustainable economic welfare indicators — ISEW and political economy of the disembedded system

The conceptual foundations of the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) are surveyed and critiqued. It is argued that the three underlying theories of community, psychic income, and social welfare economics supply certain theoretical foundations for the ISEW. The focal point of the theories is to evaluate the positives and negatives of economic growth, with the hope of achieving a practical measure of sustainable economic welfare. However, they are not as well developed as they should be: the three theories have partial, underdeveloped explanations of the benefits (services) and costs (disservices) generated in the system. The theoretical particulars of ISEW abstract from the workings of the capitalist system, because the ISEW advocates have not specified a society in the socioeconomic system which we currently have. Specifically, there is no underlying linked systems view of the disembedded economy — where the exchange economy tends to dominate other aspects of culture. Without a systematic understanding of the political economy of capitalism, the ISEW is potentially flawed in design. Therefore, there is a need to search for a critical approach to sustainable economic welfare. As a point of departure, it is better to have a political economy theory. The political economy of the disembedded system provides an alternative theoretical approach to ISEW.     

以产业结构为中介的创新影响中国经济增长的机理*

本文基于熊彼特创新思想，借鉴Aghion创新模型分析方法，揭示创新通过产业结构调整影响经济增长的内在机理，并运用中国1998—2015年间的省际面板数据，采用3SLS法和联立方程模型对创新、产业结构调整与中国经济增长的关系进行经验检验。研究结果表明：（1）创新通过产业结构调整“中介作用”影响经济增长的机制是存在的；（2）中部、西部地区经济增长对创新的影响强度较大，东部地区所处的创新阶段更加领先，进一步突破前沿技术，容易遭遇瓶颈；（3）理论和实证的政策性意义在于中国长期经济增长需要进一步突出创新的主体地位，加大对产业内部技术创新的投入，促进技术创新对产业结构高级化作用的有效发挥。     

Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results

Summary We analyze the role of political competition on the type of economic policies that are selected in a one sector model of economic growth. We identify conditions under which neoclassical optimal growth plans occur, and conditions in which political business cycles occur. We find that the ability commit to multiperiod economic policy leads to less political stability of economic plans.Support for this research was provided in part by NSF grant #SES-9022932 to the California Institute of Technology. We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that our results could be extended to supra majority rules, as in Proposition 1.     

Education,Rent seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources

Empirical evidence suggests that natural resources breed corruption and reduce educational attainments, dampening economic growth. The theoretical literature has treated these two channels separately, with natural resources affecting growth either through human capital or corruption. In this article, we argue that education and corruption are jointly determined and depend on the endowment of natural resources. Natural resources affect the incentives to invest in education and rent seeking that in turn affect growth. Whether natural resources stimulate growth or induce a poverty‐trap crucially depends on inequality in access to education and political participation, as well as on the cost of political participation. For lower inequality and higher cost of political participation, a high‐growth and a poverty‐trap equilibrium coexist even with abundant natural resources.     

Women’s rights and development

Why has the expansion of women’s economic and political rights coincided with economic development? This paper investigates this question by focusing on a key economic right for women: property rights. The basic hypothesis is that the process of development (i.e., capital accumulation and declining fertility) exacerbated the tension in men’s conflicting interests as husbands versus fathers, ultimately resolving them in favor of the latter. As husbands, men stood to gain from their privileged position in a patriarchal world whereas, as fathers, they were hurt by a system that afforded few rights to their daughters. The model predicts that declining fertility would hasten reform of women’s property rights whereas legal systems that were initially more favorable to women would delay them. The theoretical relationship between capital and the relative attractiveness of reform is non-monotonic but growth inevitably leads to reform. I explore the empirical validity of the theoretical predictions by using cross-state variation in the US in the timing of married women obtaining property and earning rights between 1850 and 1920.     

Contributors

After a quarter century of environmental regulation in this country, significant environmental threats remain. Why has the regulatory system failed to fully address our environmental problems?

The goal of this paper is to suggest that the roots of environmental problems, and the failure of environmental regulation, are deeply embedded in the processes that generate economic growth. The logic of the argument to be presented will take the following form: long-run economic growth relies on the creation of new industries and new forms of economic activity; these new forms of economic activity create new kinds of environmental problems; these new forms of economic activity constitute vested political interests that oppose environmental regulation. Each of the three main sections of the paper will provide theoretical and empirical justification for each component part of the basic argument.